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Introduction
James A. Hampton and Yoad Winter
Abstract By highlighting relations between experimental and theoretical work,
this volume explores new ways of addressing the problem of concept composition,
which is one of the central challenges in the study of language and cognition. An
introductory chapter lays out the background to the problem. The subsequent
chapters by leading scholars and younger researchers in psychology, linguistics and
philosophy, aim to explain how meanings of different complex expressions are
derived from simple lexical concepts, and to analyze how these meanings connect
to concept representations. This work demonstrates an important advance in the
interdisciplinary study of concept composition, where points of convergence
between cognitive psychology, linguistics and philosophy emerge and lead to new
ﬁndings and theoretical insights.
In every day of our conscious life, we are constantly busy manipulating abstract
representations of the world around us. This human dexterity with mental repre-
sentations, or concepts, has fascinated scholars since antiquity. Modern cognitive
scientists formulate this fascination as two fundamental questions about the rela-
tions between language and thought. One question concerns the representation and
organization in the mind and brain of concepts for words like cat, big, sleep, and
nearby. How do these words refer to the external world? How do our minds
represent their meaning? Another question is about how concepts interact and
combine when humans use complex expressions like “the big cat that is sleeping
nearby”. How do the meanings of individual words combine to create a sentence
meaning, or a proposition? These two questions underlie studies of simple concepts
and concept composition. This distinction between two problems is convenient, but
it also reflects substantial gaps between current analyses of language understanding.
J.A. Hampton (✉)
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Since the 1970s, cognitive psychologists and theoretical linguists have taken rather
different routes in their study of concepts and how they compose. In Cognitive
Psychology, much research on concepts has been framed by the work of Eleanor
Rosch (1975), which focused on simple words and the everyday concepts they
denote. By contrast, in Theoretical Linguistics, and especially in formal and gen-
erative paradigms influenced by Montague (1973), the focus has been different. In
this framework, research on natural language semantics has predominantly
addressed the compositionality of meanings in relation to syntactic theory, with
special emphasis on a few logical concepts like every, some or most.
This analytical gap between Psychology and Linguistics is undesirable, as was
acknowledged early on in the history of natural language semantics (Katz and
Fodor 1963): psychological theories cannot ignore concept composition, and nat-
ural language semantics cannot ignore the complex mental aspects of meaning.
Later on, works in Cognitive Psychology following Osherson and Smith (1981),
Cohen and Murphy (1984) and Hampton (1987) have started to explore hard
problems of concept composition, especially in relation to short nominal expres-
sions. The importance of this line of work for formal semantics has been stressed in
Kamp and Partee (1995). More recently, and especially since the 2000s, more
points of contact between formal semantics and various aspects of concepts have
been developed in the study of lexical representations and vagueness in natural
language (Pustejovsky 1995; McNally and Kennedy 2008; Asher 2011; Nouwen
et al. 2011). Yet, despite similar motivations and related insights, much of the work
on concepts and meaning composition has been carried out independently in Lin-
guistics and Psychology.
This volume aims to help in bridging this gap. The articles here represent a
substantial sample of the recent work done on concept composition in experimental
semantics and psychology. The authors include leading authorities in their disci-
plines as well as younger researchers. Together, these works show the centrality and
complexity of the concept composition problem, and the many ways in which it
affects current research in Psychology, Linguistics and Philosophy.
The chapters by Barsalou and by Pelletier are broad overviews of concept
composition from a psychological perspective and a linguistic-philosophical per-
spective, respectively. Barsalou starts from the observation that we use concepts in
everyday life to understand our environment, solve problems and achieve goals. In
this respect, it could be claimed that we have a common heritage with other
intelligent forms of life, with a difference in degree of complexity but not in kind.
From this perspective, language, a late-comer in the evolution of humans, is
positioned on top of a highly developed and integrated system of intelligent con-
ceptual thinking. All human languages have the same basic structure. There are
atomic units (words or lexemes) which are combined according to syntactic rules
(grammar) into phrases and sentences. Barsalou stresses that in addition to such
“formal” considerations, situations, pragmatics, and imagery have all been found to
play a role in how language utterances acquire meaning. Consequently, language
meaning could not be effectively studied without also studying its users. Barsalou
proposes that a concept can act as a tool for simulating experience. “John stroked
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the cat” leads to an imaginative construction of a scene in which previous visual
and tactile experiences are recruited to ﬁll out the meaning of the sentence. This
process explains how the verb can change depending on the context—stroking
one’s beard, or stroking a putt in golf capture something of the same meaning (a
gentle movement in contact with an object) but at the same time the situation
simulated leads to many differences. Barsalou’s point is that to represent the
meaning of “stroke” as a single lexical symbol STROKE (Agent, Patient) fails to
account for the different inferences that are to be drawn from the simulation. Hence
the meaning of the word “stroke”, for example its propensity to allow us to think
true and false thoughts involving acts of stroking, can only be determined relative to
its context of use, which triggers complex interactions with the simulated situations.
Pelletier argues the case for the more formal approach to semantics and
meaning. He provides a “natural history” of different positions held by philosophers
of language, linguists of different schools, and cognitive psychologists. He draws
attention to a critical question that one should ask about any utterance, namely
“what was really said?” The difﬁculty that Pelletier points to is one that has long
been a contentious issue between philosophers and psychologists. Can the mental
representation of a concept be treated as being the “real meaning” of a term? Aren’t
there external aspects of meaning that are not inside the head?
If there are, as Pelletier argues (see also Rey 1983), how is this externalist view
of semantics connected to the efforts of cognitive scientists to provide a “micro”
account of how individual meanings arise with particular speakers and hearers and
particular contextual situations? How is it possible to integrate the important and
valuable insights into how different syntactic forms construct meanings for sen-
tences with the empirical evidence of how speakers themselves construct meanings
in context-dependent ways?
In the chapter by Hampton, these issues are given a further airing. Hampton
attempts to answer the conundrum of how concepts can combine to meet the
constraints of compositionality in the case where those concepts are in fact vague or
fuzzy prototypes. He outlines the Composite Prototype Model for combining
prototype concepts. Concepts are seen as being constituted by frame representations
containing features expressed as dimensions and values (e.g. COLOUR = [RED,
ORANGE]). When people have to form a conjunction or disjunction of prototype
concepts, the model provides an account of the processes by which the two frames
are amalgamated into a single composite frame. Along the way some properties of
the concepts are lost, while new emergent properties may also be added to the
composite, either from knowledge of the world or from the need to resolve
incompatibilities between the two concepts. A key result supporting the model is
the ﬁnding that, because of the merging of the two sets of prototypical features,
noun phrases that appear to express a conjunction (e.g. “sports which are also
games”) do not in fact receive a strict conjunctive interpretation when people
categorize different exemplars. In a second major section, Hampton explains how
this result relates to the distinction between two important theoretical notions linked
to prototype theory, namely Typicality and Graded Truth. These two notions are
then further differentiated from lack of knowledge or ignorance. Hampton
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concludes his chapter by defending the Internalist/Descriptivist theory of concep-
tual contents. Many concepts, he argues, (and particularly those that are not “natural
kinds” like snakes or lemons), are constituted by a structured set of intensional
properties. Because we understand concepts this way we are free to generate fan-
ciful and creative new ideas, unconstrained by their need to provide reference or
determine truth in the real world.
The three chapters by Lee, Poortman and Winter all address questions about
truth-value judgements. Lee reports results of two new experiments. One experi-
ment shows a natural tendency to prefer certain colors and materials to others with
different concepts. This preference is related to truth-value judgements with com-
plex nominals. For instance, 71% of the participants in this experiment accepted the
description wooden bike for a picture showing a bike that is only partially made of
wood. By contrast, only 42% of the participants accepted the description wooden
frame for a frame that contains the same amount of wood. This shows an important
effect of typicality on truth-value judgements, in agreement with previous results
about the correlations between typicality and membership, also described in
Hampton’s chapter.
Poortman shows more new results about the relations between typicality and
truth-value judgements. As Poortman’s experiments demonstrate, participants’
truth-value judgements on plural sentences like “the men are walking and writing”
show sensitivity to the (attested) fact that walking and writing do not typically occur
at the same time. Poortman shows that this atypicality increases tolerance to “split
situations”, with two men walking and two men writing. Such split situations are
less acceptable for sentences like “the men are walking and singing”, where there is
no incompatibility between concepts.
Winter uses the results of Lee and Poortman’s experiments in a proposal for a
general procedure of concept composition in formal semantics. As Winter stresses,
truth-value judgements are not simply a matter of how odd or commonplace dif-
ferent situations are. Situations where two men are walking, and two other men are
singing, are not odd at all, yet in Poortman’s experiment they are often rejected for
sentences like “the men are walking and singing”. In Winter’s account, the ten-
dency to accept sentences is boosted by potential atypicality of alternative situa-
tions. This has much in common with other new results about reciprocal sentences
like “the girls are pinching each other”. Winter proposes an account that uniﬁes the
analysis of these results with the analysis of Lee’s and Poortman’s data.
The three chapters by Lai et al., Gagné et al. and McNally and Boleda all
address the processes that add to the understanding of complex concepts, beyond
what is directly said. Lai et al. analyze verb phrase concepts in sentences like
“John began the book”. In such sentences, concept composition may require
understanding John’s relevant activity in relation to the book (reading, writing etc.).
Lai et al. compare such sentences with sentences containing psychological
verbs “John enjoyed/disliked the book” which also allow understanding of a rele-
vant activity, but through presumably different linguistic mechanisms. Based on a
self-paced reading and an fMRI study, Lai et al. argue against previous analyses,
where relevant entities for events like reading and writing are added in the process
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of semantic composition. Instead, they test the proposal that verbs like begin (but
not enjoy) involve concepts that require structured individuals. When describing
such individuals, Lai et al. rely on the understood internal structure of books and
similar objects. As they suggest, such internal structures can be established along
spatial (pages in a book), informational (e.g. the informational content of a book) or
other dimensions. They conclude that concept composition involves construing this
structure out of the complement triggered by the meaning requirements of the verb.
Gagné et al.’s chapter is in two parts. In the ﬁrst they discuss their research into
a recently discovered phenomenon known as the Modiﬁcation (or Modiﬁer) Effect
and originally reported by Connolly et al. (2007). When a generic statement such as
“candles are made of wax” is changed by adding an adjectival modiﬁer to the
subject noun (e.g. “purple candles are made of wax”) then people consider it less
likely to be true, even though they have no reason to connect the modiﬁer to the
property. Spalding and Gagné (2015) have also shown an inverse effect—if people
consider a generic statement to be false, then the modiﬁed version becomes more
likely in people’s estimation. Gagné et al. discuss how this phenomenon is a part of
a theoretically influential and important research area concerning the combination
of concepts to construct noun phrases, either with adjectival modiﬁcation (red shirt)
or through noun + noun compounding (e.g. football shirt). The topic has been
extensively researched since it was ﬁrst thrown out as a challenge to prototype
theory in the seminal article by Osherson and Smith (1981). In the second part of
their chapter, Gagné et al. outline a different conception of concepts based on
Aristotelian-Thomistic (AT) philosophy. This framework for understanding con-
cepts forms an intriguing bridge between the externalist semantics defended in large
part by Pelletier and the embodied cognition approach propounded by Barsalou.
Like the chapters by Lai et al. and Gagné et al., the chapter by McNally and
Boleda focuses on the processes that add to our understanding of complex con-
cepts. From a theoretical and computational perspective, McNally and Boleda
propose two processes that affect concept composition. One process, which they
call conceptual affordance, allows humans to use information within the composed
concepts themselves. For instance, one understanding of the complex expression
red box uses the information contained within the simple concepts red and box.
This process leads to the interpretation “box which is colored red”. By contrast, in
another process, called referential affordance, information about the referent
described by the phrase is used to guide the way in which the concepts in question
are composed. This process also allows other interpretations, like “box which
contains red objects” for the phrase red box. McNally and Boleda argue for a mixed
semantic model for composition using the two kinds of affordance, and propose an
integrated account that combines a formal semantic framework with distributional
semantics, a computational approach that models conceptual aspects of word
meaning.
Westerlund and Pylkkänen present an account of a particular cortical region, the
Left Anterior Temporal Lobe (LATL) which appears to have a direct role in many
of the conceptual modiﬁcation and combination processes already discussed in
other chapters in the volume. Using Magnetoencephalography (MEG) they show
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how this part of the cortex responds to conceptual combination. The greater the
degree to which the modiﬁer leads to specialization of the head noun, the more
powerful is the response in the LATL. Westerlund and Pylkkänen discuss different
accounts of conceptual combination—in particular schema based models that lead
to modiﬁcation of the head noun schema (e.g. Smith et al. 1988), and relation based
models that propose that meaning of a compound is generated by seeking an
appropriate semantic relation to link the two nouns (e.g. a dog house is a house built
for a dog). This work is connected with the chapters by Hampton, and by Gagné
et al., and the neurological data adds valuable criteria for how different accounts
may be evaluated.
Sassoon addresses a systematic difference between the way concepts are
expressed by adjectives and nouns, which surfaces in the acceptability of their
composition with comparative expressions. Many adjectives show their gradability
with comparative forms like richer, more expensive or more American. By contrast,
nouns do not easily allow constructions like more a millionaire, more an American,
or more a duck. In agreement with the prototype theory of concepts, Sassoon
proposes that both noun concepts and adjective concepts involve gradability.
However, according to her proposal, only adjectives have their gradable aspects
open for modiﬁcation by comparative operations (e.g. more or -er). Sassoon
describes some empirical and preliminary experimental results supporting her views
on the question of gradability and concept composition.
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Introduction 7
Cognitively Plausible Theories of Concept
Composition
Lawrence W. Barsalou
Abstract If a theory of concept composition aspires to psychological plausibility,
it may ﬁrst need to address several preliminary issues associated with naturally
occurring human concepts: content variability, multiple representational forms, and
pragmatic constraints. Not only do these issues constitute a signiﬁcant challenge for
explaining individual concepts, they pose an even more formidable challenge for
explaining concept compositions. How do concepts combine as their content
changes, as different representational forms become active, and as pragmatic con-
straints shape processing? Arguably, concepts are most ubiquitous and important in
compositions, relative to when they occur in isolation. Furthermore, entering into
compositions may play central roles in producing the changes in content, form, and
pragmatic relevance observed for individual concepts. Developing a theory of
concept composition that embraces and illuminates these issues would not only
constitute a signiﬁcant contribution to the study of concepts, it would provide
insight into the nature of human cognition.
The human ability to construct and combine concepts is proliﬁc. On the one hand,
people acquire tens of thousands of concepts for diverse categories of settings,
agents, objects, actions, mental states, bodily states, properties, relations, and so
forth. On the other, people combine these concepts to construct inﬁnite numbers of
more complex concepts, as the open-ended phrases, sentences, and texts that
humans produce effortlessly and ubiquitously illustrate. Major changes in the brain,
the emergence of language, and new capacities for social cognition all probably
played central roles in the evolution of these impressive conceptual abilities (e.g.,
Deacon 1997; Donald 1993; Tomasello 2009).
In psychology alone, much research addresses human concepts (e.g., Barsalou
2012;Murphy 2002; Smith andMedin 1981) and concept composition (often referred
to as conceptual combination; e.g., Costello and Keane 2000; Gagné and Spalding
2014; Hampton 1997; Hampton and Jönsson 2012;Medin and Shoben 1988;Murphy
L.W. Barsalou (✉)
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1988;Wisniewski 1997;Wu andBarsalou 2009).More generally across the cognitive
sciences, much additional research addresses concepts and the broader construct of
compositionality (for a recent collection, see Werning et al. 2012).
1 Background Framework
A grounded approach to concepts. Here I assume that a concept is a dynamical
distributed network in the brain coupled with a category in the environment or
experience, with this network guiding situated interactions with the category’s
instances (for further detail, see Barsalou 2003b, 2009, 2012, 2016a, 2016b).
The concept of bicycle, for example, represents and guides interactions with the
category of bicycles in the world. Across interactions with a category’s instances, a
concept develops in memory by aggregating information from perception, action,
and internal states. Thus, the concept of bicycle develops from aggregating multi-
modal information related to bicycles across the situations in which they are
experienced. As a consequence of using selective attention to extract information
relevant to the concept of bicycle from the current situation (e.g., a perceived
bicycle), and then using integration mechanisms to integrate it with other bicycle
information already in memory, aggregate information for the category develops
continually (Barsalou 1999). As described later, however, background situational
knowledge is also captured that plays important roles in conceptual processing
(Barsalou 2016b, 2003b; Yeh and Barsalou 2006). Although learning plays central
roles in establishing concepts, genetic and epigenetic processes constrain the
features that can be represented for a concept, and also their integration in the
brain’s association areas (e.g., Simmons and Barsalou 2003). For example,
biologically-based neural circuits may anticipate the conceptual structure of evo-
lutionarily important concepts, such as agents, minds, animals, foods, and tools.
Once the conceptual system is in place, it supports virtually all other forms of
cognitive activity, both online in the current situation and offline when representing
the world in language, memory, and thought (e.g., Barsalou 2012, 2016a, 2016b).
From the perspective developed here, when conceptual knowledge is needed for a
task, concepts produce situation-speciﬁc simulations of the relevant category
dynamically, where a simulation attempts to reenact the kind of neural and bodily
states associated with processing the category. On needing conceptual knowledge
about bicycles, for example, a small subset of the distributed bicycle network in the
brain becomes active to simulate what it would be like to interact with an actual
bicycle. This multimodal simulation provides anticipatory inferences about what is
likely to be perceived further for the bicycle in the current situation, how to interact
with it effectively, and what sorts of internal states might result (Barsalou 2009).
The speciﬁc bicycle simulation that becomes active is one of inﬁnitely many
simulations that could be constructed dynamically from the bicycle network—the
entire network never becomes fully active. Typically, simulations remain uncon-
scious, at least to a large extent, while causally influencing cognition, affect, and
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action. To the extent that part of a simulation becomes conscious, mental imagery is
experienced. Such simulations need not provide complete or accurate representa-
tions, but are likely to be incomplete and distorted, representing abstractions, car-
icatures, and ideals, as well as speciﬁc learning episodes.
Situating concepts. As Pelletier (2017) notes, theories of concepts often focus
either on concepts in the world from the formalist perspective (e.g., truth condi-
tions) or on concepts in the brain from the cognitivist perspective (what Pelletier
refers to as objectivist vs. subjectivist approaches). Although the grounded approach
to concepts makes many assumptions about concepts from the cognitivist per-
spective, it additionally assumes that physical situations play central roles in
establishing and using concepts (e.g., Barsalou 2003b, 2016b; Barsalou et al. 1993,
2007). From the grounded perspective, concepts are typically situated, that is, they
become active to process some aspect of the current physical situation (or a physical
situation in the past or future). Although concepts may sometimes become active
independently of a situation, they typically become active to support effective
action in a speciﬁc situation. As a result, concepts become coupled with their
physical referents. Although grounded theories of concepts have a long way to go
in developing satisfactory accounts of this coupling, they naturally anticipate it, and
provide many mechanisms for understanding and explaining it. Thus, grounded
theories offer an approach for unifying formalist and cognitivist accounts of con-
cepts, and further assume that neither approach alone is sufﬁcient.
Overview. The grounded account of concepts just described is not all that
unusual given the diverse theories of conceptual processing that exist within the
prototype, exemplar, connectionist, Bayesian, psycholinguistic, and grounded tra-
ditions of cognitive science (e.g., Asher 2011; Barsalou 1990; Bosch 1983; Casa-
santo and Lupyan 2015; Connell and Lynott 2014; Evans 2009; Jones and Love
2011; Lebois, Wilson-Mendenhall and Barsalou 2015; McClelland and Rumelhart
1985; Minda and Smith 2011; Pothos and Wills 2011). Many cognitively plausible
theories assume increasingly that concepts are represented dynamically and are
adapted to speciﬁc situations.
In contrast, theories of concept composition often assume relatively idealized
accounts of concepts, where much of the dynamically varying content of concepts
is omitted, given its complexity and messiness, focusing instead on a few key
features and relations (e.g., some of the chapters in Werning et al. 2012). Even in
the cognitivist accounts of concept composition mentioned earlier, concepts are
often relatively idealized. Idealizing concepts has made establishing principles of
concept composition tractable, and doing so has clearly been an effective strategy.
Nevertheless, avoiding the complexities of conceptual processing may obscure
important principles of how concepts combine. As theories of concept composition
mature increasingly, theorists and researchers appear willing to take on the chal-
lenge of dealing with these complexities (as illustrated by many of the chapters in
this volume and also in Werning et al. 2012). In this spirit, I focus on three
principles of human conceptual processing that strike me as central to its character:
content variability, multiple representational forms, and pragmatic constraint. On
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the one hand, these principles offer signiﬁcant challenges to theories of concept
composition. On the other, seriously addressing and incorporating these challenges
may yield new theories that provide increasingly powerful and insightful accounts.
1.1 Content Variability
Lack of conceptual cores. Researchers often assume that a concept has a core,
namely, important information about the respective category that is consistently
activated rapidly and automatically, independently of context. Although cores are
sometimes assumed to contain rules or deﬁnitions (e.g., “unmarried adult male
human” for bachelors), they can also contain typical features that are neither
necessary nor sufﬁcient for category membership (e.g., “small flying feathered
singing animal” for birds). Not only have traditional accounts of concepts proposed
that concepts have cores (e.g., Barsalou 1982, 1989; Conrad 1978; Greenspan
1986; Whitney et al. 1985), so have current accounts (e.g., Dove 2009; Machery
2007; Mahon and Caramazza 2008).
An interesting wrinkle to core theories is whether cores become active early
versus late (Lebois et al. 2015). According to most core theories, including those
just cited, a conceptual core is the ﬁrst information active for a concept, given its
importance in representing the respective category (i.e., “core early” theories).
Interestingly, however, major accounts of concepts over the years have assumed the
opposite, namely, conceptual cores are only activated late, if and when needed (i.e.,
“core late” theories). Rather than being automatic and context-dependent, cores
tend to be slow and optional.
In some core late theories, deﬁnitional information is considered relatively
specialized and only necessary when careful judgments about a category must be
made (e.g., Keil and Batterman 1984; Malt 1994; Smith et al. 1974). According to
these theories, typical non-core information is sufﬁcient most of the time for pro-
cessing a category. When processing water, for example, it is usually sufﬁcient to
represent it as a colorless, clear, liquid used for daily needs, and widely available
from faucets. Only on rare occasions does it become necessary to access and use
core deﬁnitional information that water is H2O (Malt 1994).
In other core late theories, core information tends to be active late because
typical information is easier to activate, thus becoming active initially (e.g.,
Blanchette and Dunbar 2000; Forbus Gentner and Law 1995; Gentner et al. 1993;
Ross 1984, 1987). From this perspective, cues ﬁrst retrieve typical information from
concepts related to superﬁcial properties of the situation. Even though deeper
knowledge might be available and relevant, it tends to be displaced by relatively
superﬁcial information that becomes active more easily. Only when strategic efforts
to activate deeper, more important information are made does this latter information
become available. Importantly for our purposes, however, core information in core
late theories is not activated quickly and automatically across contexts.
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Even more problematically for core early views, many theories argue that
concepts don’t have cores at all (e.g., Casasanto and Lupyan 2015; Connell and
Lynott 2014; Evans 2009; McCloskey and Glucksberg 1979). According to these
theories, all information in a concept is context-dependent, at least to some extent.
Although some information for a concept may be highly entrenched (e.g., feathers
for birds), it is still modulated by context. Indeed much recent research suggests
that central information in concepts isn’t activated automatically across contexts
(for reviews, see Gawronski and Cesario 2013; Kiefer et al. 2012; Lebois et al.
2015; but see Augustinova and Ferrand 2014). For example, in the Stroop task that
has long been believed to demonstrate the automatic activation of color features, it
turns out that the accessibility of these features varies across contexts. In the Simon
task that has long been believed to demonstrate the automatic activation of spatial
features, it turns out that the availability of these features varies across contexts as
well. In general, context modulates the activation of many kinds of central features
across diverse forms of conceptual knowledge. Given the ubiquitous effects of
contexts on the central features of concepts, it appears increasingly likely that the
activation of all conceptual knowledge is at least somewhat context-dependent.
For our purposes here, such ﬁndings suggest that the concepts combined during
concept composition typically vary widely in content (also see Asher 2011; Bosch
1983). When a given concept is combined with other concepts, its content is likely
to vary considerably across concept compositions. Even when the same two con-
cepts are combined on different occasions, their individual content is likely to vary,
especially when combined in different background situations.
Situation-speciﬁc conceptual content. A related phenomenon is that the
varying content of a concept often appears to contain information relevant in the
current situation. In some of these cases, the information appears to be stored in
the concept, with the current situation selecting it as relevant (e.g., Barsalou 1982;
Conrad 1978; Greenspan 1986; Whitney et al. 1985). When processing the concept
of water in the context of a Norwegian pond during winter, the property of freezes
becomes active, although it would not become active normally (e.g., in the context
of drinking water in a Norwegian restaurant). In other cases, varying content
appears to originate in background situations (e.g., Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings,
2005; Papies 2013; Wu and Barsalou 2009). When conceptualizing chair, for
example, people might include chairs as occurring in ofﬁces. Similarly, when
conceptualizing truth, people might represent truth as it occurs in courts of law. In
general, considerable amounts of information in conceptual representations appear
to originate in the background situation in which a concept is currently represented,
including the setting, related objects, other agents, actions, and variety of internal
states (e.g., goals, evaluations, affect, motivation, reward, mentalizing).
Furthermore, the background situations active for a given category are likely to
vary widely, both between and within individuals. The concept of chair, for
example, is likely to be associated in memory with background situations for
kitchens, living rooms, classrooms, theaters, jets, and ski lifts. Not only do different
kinds of chairs (and chair properties) become active when representing chairs in
these different background situations, so does differing knowledge about the
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external environment, action, and internal states. Sitting in a jet chair, for example,
is associated with a different setting, actions, and internal states than sitting in a
living room chair. Yeh and Barsalou (2006) review research in episodic and se-
mantic memory showing that a given concept is often associated with a variety of
background situations in memory. As a consequence, when a concept is processed
in a particular situation, the situation activates related background information that
enters into task performance.
Bayesian sampling. As we have just seen, the properties active for a concept
vary with context. As we also saw earlier, concepts may not be associated with
stable cores that are activated automatically. How, then, should we think about the
varying content of a concept?
One possibility is that conceptual content is sampled in a Bayesian manner; in
other words, sampling reflects both frequency of use and contextual relevance
(Barsalou 2011). In a given situation, information that has been processed fre-
quently across situations for the concept has a higher probability of becoming active
than information processed infrequently (e.g., round vs. floats for basketball).
Importantly, however, high probability information need not be core information,
becoming active on all occasions when the concept is processed. Rather than being
active obligatorily across situations, this information simply has a higher proba-
bility of being active than less frequent information. Depending on the context, high
probability information may or may not be active (Lebois et al. 2015).
Additionally, information that is relevant for the concept in the current situation
is more likely to become active than information less relevant in the situation. Thus,
floats has a higher probability of becoming active for basketball in the context of
needing a life preserver than in the context of playing pickup basketball. Putting
these two factors together, the information that becomes sampled for a concept on a
given occasion is a Bayesian function of its overall accessibility in memory and its
situational relevance. Future research is needed to assess this conjecture, but given
the general relevance of Bayesian processes in intelligent systems, Bayesian pro-
cesses are likely to play central roles in conceptual processing as well.
General concepts. If the conceptual content represented for a concept varies
dynamically across situations, how can a concept be represented in a general
manner (cf. Pelletier, 2017)? The grounded approach to concepts offers several
potential solutions to this issue.
First, the distributed network in the brain that aggregates multimodal information
for a concept across its exemplars offers a general representation of the respective
category. Because the network aggregates a tremendous amount of information
across experiences with the category, it doesn’t simply represent a single exemplar,
but represents all exemplars together (see the distinction between simulations and
simulators in Barsalou 1999, 2009, also 2016b). Although only one speciﬁc rep-
resentation of the concept is constructed at a time dynamically from the network,
the general concept is represented implicitly across the entire network. To the extent
that people are aware of possessing much more knowledge about a concept than
they can access in a given moment, they may believe that they possess a general
representation at a meta-cognitive level. Furthermore, the entire network may enter
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implicitly and unconsciously into cognitive functions, thereby producing general
effects of the concept.
Second, the most accessible simulation that can be easily constructed from the
network offers a default representation of the concept (cf. McNally and Boleda,
2017). Although the most accessible simulation is a speciﬁc simulation (or perhaps
a family of closely-related simulations), it nevertheless offers a prototypical rep-
resentation of all the simulations that the network is capable of producing. As a
result, it potentially functions as a general representation of all possible simulations,
in the spirit of global attractors (cf. McClelland and Rumelhart 1985) and prototype
theory (cf. Hampton 2006).
Third, people may learn to explicitly construct speciﬁc simulations of a concept
that offer a generic representation of it (e.g., one that omits situational detail). To the
extent that people understand meta-cognitively that a concept can be general, they
may be able to construct a simulation that captures this generic character. Notably,
such simulations are simply some of the inﬁnitely many simulations that the dis-
tributed multimodal network for a concept can construct. As a consequence, generic
simulations reside together with situation-speciﬁc simulations that support situated
action across diverse contexts. In a sense, generic simulations, too, are
situation-speciﬁc simulations, with the relevant situations being those where generic
representations are useful.
Sharing concepts. If the conceptual content represented for a concept varies
dynamically, how can individuals ever come to effectively share a common con-
ceptual representation in a speciﬁc situation (cf. Pelletier, 2017)? One likely
solution to this problem follows from the facts that different individuals have
similar bodies, brains, and cognitive systems; they live in similar physical envi-
ronments; they operate in highly-coordinated social contexts. As a result, different
individuals acquire similar distributed networks for a given concept over the course
of development. Within a particular social group or culture, different individuals’
networks are likely to be highly similar, given similar coordinated experiences with
many shared exemplars. Even across different cultures, these networks are likely to
be highly similar, given that all humans have similar bodies, brains, and cognitive
systems, operating in similar physical and social environments.
As we have seen, however, the network for a concept is capable of producing an
inﬁnite number of dynamically-varying simulations across situations. How, then, do
different individuals coordinate a shared simulation in a given situation, even when
they share highly similar networks? One potential solution is that coordination
results from establishing common ground (e.g., Clark 1996). Through the use of
linguistic reference, shared experience, cultural convention, and pragmatic strate-
gies, people coordinate their use of a concept in the current situation, attempting to
construct similar simulations of it from their similar networks. As a result, different
individuals may typically be able to establish a shared simulation relevant in the
current situation, such that effective understanding and communication follows.
Although the simulations that different conversants construct are never identical,
they may typically be similar enough for communicative success (with ineffective
communication occurring when the coordination of shared simulations fails).
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Although much remains to be learned about how individuals coordinate dynami-
cally constructed simulations, doing so seems feasible, given that establishing
common ground and utilizing effective pragmatic strategies may effectively con-
strain the construction of simulations from shared conceptual networks.
Implications for concept composition. This section has reviewed three prop-
erties of concepts that present potential challenges for theories of concept com-
position. First, concepts typically do not appear to have stable cores. Second, the
content active for a concept varies across situations. Third, the information active
on a given situation for a concept may result from Bayesian sampling.
Together these three properties suggest that when a given concept is combined
with others across situations, it is likely to exhibit no core stability and considerable
situation-speciﬁc variability. Although representations of the concept across situa-
tions probably exhibit statistical regularities associated with Bayesian priors and
situational relevance, they nevertheless take diverse forms, similar to how a given
phoneme constantly adapts to its phonemic and articulatory contexts (e.g., Repp
1982). To the extent that these three properties are present in concepts, they are
likely to play signiﬁcant roles in concept composition, thereby placing challenging
constraints on accounts of this process.
2 Multiple Representational Forms
Exemplars versus abstractions. Almost always, even psychological theories of
concept composition assume that abstractions represent the concepts being com-
bined, with these abstractions typically taking the form of rules, prototypes, and
frames/schemata (e.g., Barsalou 1992, 2012; Barsalou and Hale 1993; Hampton
2006; Murphy 2002; Pothos and Wills 2011). Nevertheless, considerable evidence
has accumulated that a given concept includes detailed information about speciﬁc
category exemplars (e.g., Allen and Brooks 1991; Medin and Schaffer 1978;
Nosofsky 2011; also see Minda and Smith 2011). Rather than abstracting over the
idiosyncratic features of category exemplars, conceptual knowledge includes these
features and correlations between them. Furthermore, when people later use this
knowledge, they often appear to draw on exemplar-level information. Such ﬁndings
have suggested to many researchers that memories of a category’s exemplars
represent a concept, not an abstraction.
It is worth noting, however, that abstractions (not just exemplars) are capable of
representing detailed information about category exemplars (Barsalou 1990, 2003a;
McClelland and Rumelhart 1985). Nevertheless, the important possibility remains
that people often activate memories of speciﬁc exemplars when representing a
concept. If so, then how does concept composition with the concept proceed? Even
if an abstraction were to represent the concept, what are the implications for concept
composition of exemplar-speciﬁc details that that the concept probably contains?
Amodal symbols. Typically, accounts of concept composition assume that it
operates on representations that are amodal, symbolic, and propositional (e.g.,
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Barsalou 1999, 2008a, 2010). From this perspective, a symbolic representational
structure, such as a relation, predicate, frame, or schema, has arguments, variables, or
slots, whose values vary across instances and situations (e.g., Barsalou 1992). Given
these kinds of representational structures, concept composition becomes readily fea-
sible (e.g., Gagné and Spalding 2014; Wisniewski 1997). To implement the combi-
nation of an object with a property, for example, a variable in the frame for the object is
set to a speciﬁc value. When representing the concept composition of green flamingo,
for example, the color variable in the flamingo frame is set to the value green.Similarly,
to implement the combination of two nouns, a frame assigns the two nouns as argu-
ments of different variables within a relation, predicate, frame, or schema. When rep-
resenting the concept composition offlamingo fare, a frame for eat could take flamingo
and fare as values of the variables for agent and theme, respectively.
Other accounts of concept composition assume that feature sets for individual
concepts are combined in varying ways to produce the meanings of complex
phrases (e.g., Hampton 1997; Hampton and Jönsson 2012). Again, the respective
features are typically assumed to be amodal symbolic representations. When rep-
resenting sports that are games, for example, people combine the feature sets for
sports and games to produce the combined concept.
Amodal representations such as frames and features may play central roles in the
representation of concepts, and in turn, during the process of combining them.
Nevertheless, other important representational processes appear to play important
roles in concept composition as well, in particular, multimodal simulations and
linguistic forms. If so, then theories of concept composition may beneﬁt from
taking them into account.
Multimodal simulations. Earlier, in the introduction, the construct of multi-
modal simulation was introduced when deﬁning concept. To reiterate briefly, a
distributed multimodal network for a category in the brain attempts to simulate the
kind of neural and bodily states that occur while interacting with a category’s
members. When simulating a bicycle, for example, the brain and body reenact the
kinds of states that occur while experiencing bicycles, including how they look,
where they are used, how to ride one, and associated internal states. Considerable
evidence has accumulated supporting the proposal that simulation is a basic com-
putational process in the brain, not only in conceptual processing, but in all cog-
nitive processes, ranging from perception to social cognition (e.g., Barsalou 2008a,
2016b). Certainly, multimodal simulation is not the only representational process in
the brain, but it appears to be a central one used widely and frequently. If so, then it
may contribute signiﬁcantly to the process of combining concepts.
To date, little research has addressed the role of simulation in concept compo-
sition directly. One set of experiments, however, provides some initial evidence
(Wu and Barsalou 2009). Across three experiments, a preliminary prediction was
that when participants produced the features of an object, they would simulate a
typical experience of the object, reporting features salient in the simulation. As a
consequence, features occluded in the simulation, and therefore not salient,
wouldn’t be produced frequently. When participants produce features of a typical
lawn, for example, they should simulate a green lawn. Because green and grass
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blades are salient in the simulation, they should be produced frequently. Because
dirt and roots are occluded, they should be produced rarely. Across experiments,
salient features were produced much more often than occluded features, as the
simulation account predicts.
The primary prediction across experiments was that when the same objects were
combined with modiﬁers that revealed normally occluded features, these occluded
features would become salient and therefore be reported more frequently. When
participants received the concept composition of rolled-up lawn, for example, they
should simulate a rolled-up lawn. Because dirt and roots become unoccluded in the
simulation and therefore salient, they should be reported more often than for lawn
alone. Across experiments, this ﬁnding occurred robustly. Not only did it occur for
familiar phrases such as half-watermelon, it occurred for unfamiliar phrases such as
glass car.
Most importantly, however, unoccluded features did not become more salient for
noun phrases such as rolled-up snake. This ﬁnding suggests two conclusions. First,
modiﬁers such as rolled-up do not have symbolic rules associated with them
specifying that the occluded features of any noun they modify become salient. If
such rules existed, then normally occluded features should always become more
salient whenever the modiﬁer combines with any noun. Again, however, occluded
features did not become more salient for phrases such as rolled-up snake. Second,
modiﬁers such as rolled-up only change the salience of normally occluded features
when the process of rolling up an object unoccludes these features, as when
someone rolls up a lawn, but not when a snake rolls up itself. Because it’s unlikely
that representations of rolled-up with every possible noun are already stored in
memory, it’s likely that most interpretations of these noun phrases are computed
online via concept composition, as the phrase is heard. Although it is in principle
possible to develop an amodal procedure that correctly increases (or doesn’t
increase) the salience of occluded features across all rolled up noun phrases, a
simpler approach exists: Simply simulate rolling up the noun object, and report the
features salient in the process, especially in the end state. Rather than relying on a
complex amodal rule to determine the concept composition, a simulation of the
noun phrase naturally speciﬁes whether occluded features become salient or not.
More generally, simulation may play central roles across many kinds of concept
composition. Consider Medin and Shoben’s (1988) example of gray hair versus
gray cloud, where gray takes on different values in the two noun phrases. Although
amodal symbols could capture such values, a simpler and more intuitive account is
that simulating gray hair and gray cloud lead to different shades of gray being
simulated. Because people store memories of gray hair and gray cloud, they can
easily retrieve and simulate these memories to produce meanings of the respective
phrases. Similarly, consider the noun-noun combinations of mountain trail and
desert trail. By retrieving and simulating memories of each, the resulting inter-
pretations implicitly represent the features that mountain trails tend to change
elevation and direction more often than do desert trails.
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Finally, multimodal simulations capture affordances that may often occur during
concept composition. The phrase handleless cup, for example, has the affordance of
being grasped with a power grip rather than with a precision grip. On hearing this
phrase in a sentence like, “Would you enjoy drinking from a handleless cup,” much
work suggests that people would immediately produce a motor simulation of
picking the cup up with a power grip to answer the question (e.g., Chaigneau et al.
2004; Heard et al. 2015). Because multimodal simulations carry affordances of
objects and situations, activating these simulations during the concept composition
that underlies language use prepares comprehenders for effective situated action in
the world.
As these examples illustrate, multimodal simulation offers a natural means of
establishing the integration of conceptual information that occurs in concept
composition. Not only does multimodal simulation offer a means of combining
concepts never combined before as just described (e.g., handleless cup), it also
offers a means of explaining the extensional feedback that underlies the learned
representations of many familiar phrases (e.g., tea cup), as described later. Multi-
modal simulation is also compatible with the graphical diagrams used widely across
cognitive linguistics to represent the concept composition that underlies spatial
relations, part-whole relations, and event structure (e.g., Langacker 1986, 1987,
2008; Talmy 1983, 1988, 2000).
Distributed linguistic representations. Still another potentially important rep-
resentational mechanism for implementing concept composition is the distribution
of linguistic forms associated with a concept (with linguistic forms including words,
phrases, and sentences). Depending on the approach, a distributed linguistic rep-
resentation can simply include the word associates of a concept, or it can be the
surrounding words and syntax that typically occur in sentences that include the
concept. Following Paivio’s (1971, 1986) Dual Coding Theory, many cognitive
psychologists have proposed that linguistic forms work together with an
image-based conceptual system to produce intelligent computation across a wide
variety of cognitive tasks (for several recent perspectives, see Barsalou, Santos et al.
2008; Glaser 1992; Louwerse 2008, 2011; Louwerse and Connell 2011).
Other researchers from the tradition of distributional semantics have similarly
suggested that distributed linguistic representations play a wide variety of important
roles in conceptual processing (Baroni and Lenci 2010; Erk 2012; Erk and Padó
2008; Landauer and Dumais 1997; Landauer et al. 2013; Padó and Lapata 2007).
Characterizing the word for a concept in terms of its distributed linguistic repre-
sentation reflects the word’s semantics, such that its similarity to the semantics of
other words can be established. To the extent that two concepts tend to cooccur with
the same linguistic forms, the more similar they are semantically. As much research
shows, the distributed linguistic representation associated with a concept affects its
processing across a wide variety of tasks and phenomena (e.g., Barsalou et al. 2008;
Erk 2012; Landauer et al. 2013; Louwerse 2011). Thus, it wouldn’t be surprising if
distributed linguistic representations enter into concept composition as well. As
McNally and Boleda (2017) suggest, distributed linguistic representations could
play central roles both in establishing both default interpretations of combined
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concepts and situationally-relevant interpretations (consistent with the Bayesian
account of conceptual variability presented earlier).
Consider two further possibilities. First, the distributed linguistic representations
of two words being combined may suggest relations for combining the underlying
concepts. When establishing the meaning of bicycle corridor, for example, the
distributed linguistic representations for bicycle and corridor may be established
initially. Because walk is a salient word associate of corridor, it becomes active
quickly. Once walk becomes active for corridor, it then matches the word for walk
that is stored with bicycle but is currently inactive (because ride is more highly
associated with bicycle than is walk). As a result of this match, walk becomes active
for bicycle, leading to the interpretation of bicycle corridor as a place where one
walks a bicycle. Clearly, other relational interpretations are possible, but this
interpretation illustrates how combining distributed linguistic representations could
help converge one of the many possible concept compositions available.
A second possibility is that the distributed linguistic representations of two
combined words project into long-term memory together, activating memories that
contain words from both. Imagine reading a newspaper article in the past about a
bicycle race around the underground snow corridors of a Canadian university, with
the phrase bicycle corridor not being mentioned. When hearing the phrase bicycle
corridor on a later occasion, the distributed linguistic representations generated
from the two words could map onto words from the earlier text, activate the
associated memory, and influence how bicycle corridor is currently understood.
Rather than being interpreted as a corridor where bicycles are walked, bicycle
corridor is now interpreted instead as a corridor where bicycles are raced.
Finally, researchers working from the distributed semantics perspective
increasingly explore distributed representations of non-linguistic information, such
as the images associated with a concept (e.g., Anderson et al. in press; Thill et al.
2014). To the extent that the distributions of images associated with two concepts
are similar, their conceptual content is likely to be similar as well. Interestingly, the
distribution of images associated with a concept may belong to the distributed
multimodal networks that represent concepts in grounded approaches (cf. Barsalou
1999, 2009, 2016a, 2016b).
Implications for concept composition. As this section has described, a concept
can be associated with a wide variety of representational forms. A concept can be
represented with abstractions, exemplars, or both. Orthogonally, these abstractions
and exemplars could be represented with amodal symbols, multimodal simulations,
distributed linguistic representations, or some combination. At this point, we don’t
really know which of these forms enter into concept composition. It wouldn’t be
surprising, though, if they all did, depending on the kinds of concepts being
combined, together with the goals and constraints associated with a given pro-
cessing context.
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3 Pragmatic Constraint
Extensional feedback. Researchers argue increasingly that cognition cannot be
studied independently of sensory-motor systems, the body, and the environment
(e.g., Aydede and Robbins 2009; Barsalou 2016a, 2016b, 2008a, 2010; Barsalou
et al. 2007; Clark 1998, 2008). From this perspective, it may be impossible to
understand concept composition adequately without taking into account how it is
grounded in these important ways.
Hampton’s (1988) construct of extensional feedback illustrates how the envi-
ronment can contribute to concept composition (see McNally and Boleda, 2017, for
the related construct of referentially-afforded modiﬁcation) . Knowing that a pet
bird is usually caged probably doesn’t result from conceptual knowledge stored
with pet or with bird, given that neither is usually caged. Instead, this knowledge
originates in seeing that the pet birds in one’s experience typically live in cages.
Thus, the meaning of pet bird is established by activating memories of caged birds
in the world—its meaning doesn’t solely result from conceptually combining pet
and bird.
The visual world paradigm developed by Tanenhaus et al. (1995) offers another
example of extensional feedback (for a recent review, see Huettig et al. 2011). In
this paradigm, participants perceive a visual world and are requested to act on it.
For example, a participant might see objects laid out on a table and be asked to
move one object on top of another. As participants hear various phrases, such as
“apple on a towel,” they have to ﬁgure out what these phrases mean. Much work
demonstrates that the meanings of these phrases don’t only result from concept
composition; they also result from extensional feedback via the visual world. The
visual world paradigm offers much potential for studying both concept composition
and the role of extensional feedback.
Effects of extensional feedback are likely to vary across cultures, further
demonstrating situational effects on concept composition. Imagine the classic
example of a pet ﬁsh. For many westerners who have had goldﬁsh and guppies as
pet ﬁsh, the extensional feedback from these experiences probably contributes to
how pet ﬁsh is interpreted. Imagine, though, a culture that doesn’t have pet ﬁsh.
What interpretations of pet ﬁsh would they produce? Without extensional feedback,
they would have to rely on concept composition to construct interpretations, such
that pet ﬁsh might well reflect a combination of what’s typical for the two con-
stituent concepts, pet and ﬁsh (e.g., Hampton 1988; Hampton and Jönsson 2012).
Alternatively, imagine cultures that keep different kinds of pet ﬁsh than do west-
erners, for example, relatively wild ﬁsh kept in backyard ponds, or in walled-off
areas of streams and rivers. For these cultures, extensional feedback from the
respective experiences would produce still different interpretations of pet ﬁsh, again
not based on concept composition but understood as a conventional phrase.
Multimodal simulation, discussed earlier, offers a natural mechanism for
explaining how extensional feedback becomes established in memory. When
experiencing a pet ﬁsh, for example, a multimodal sensory-motor representation of
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the ﬁsh is established, including its background situation. If someone uses the
phrase “pet ﬁsh” to describe the ﬁsh in this situation, the phrase becomes stored
with the multimodal memory. On hearing the phrase, “pet ﬁsh,” on a later occasion,
the associated memory becomes active as a simulation, which then represents the
meaning of the phrase. In this way, the simple process of capturing and running
multimodal simulations may contribute to the comprehension of concept
compositions.
Finally, concept composition interacts with extensional feedback in perhaps
unanticipated ways. Imagine never having heard the phrase, “pet ﬁsh” before and
never having encountered a pet ﬁsh. On hearing someone say, “Meet my pet ﬁsh,”
as they point to a goldﬁsh in a glass tank, it is necessary to make sense of pet ﬁsh in
this context. Even though an excellent example of a pet ﬁsh is readily perceptible in
the situation, understanding the uttered phrase, pet ﬁsh, and mapping it onto its
referent requires concept composition. Clearly, a variety of situational cues make
this possible, but it is still probably necessary to combine pet and ﬁsh conceptually
so that understanding what pet ﬁsh means can occur. This suggests that concept
composition plays important roles in understanding immediate situations, and
doesn’t only occur during language comprehension about non-present situations.
Counter-intuitively, perhaps, understanding a phrase or sentence about a
non-present situation may often draw heavily on extensional feedback, whereas
understanding what a phrase or sentence means in the current situation may
sometimes rely more on concept composition.
Situational constraint. As described earlier, people’s knowledge of a category
includes knowledge of background situations in which its instances occur. Imagine
hearing the sentence, “In my kitchen, I sat on an uncomfortable chair for three hours
straight.” To comprehend the concept composition, uncomfortable chair, someone
might represent the chair as a simple solid wooden chair of the type typically found
in kitchens, and might represent uncomfortable as a sore bottom from sitting too
long on hard wood. In contrast, imagine hearing, “On the jet, I sat in an uncom-
fortable chair for three hours straight.” Here someone might represent chair as a
cramped jet chair, and uncomfortable as stiffness from not being able to move.
As these examples illustrate, the background situation constrains the meaning of
a concept composition, such as uncomfortable chair, with it taking on different
meanings in different situations (for a review, see Yeh and Barsalou 2006). With
respect to the principle of variable content described earlier, situational constraint
offers one central mechanism that causes conceptual content to change across sit-
uations. As people comprehend words, phrases, and sentences, they heavily utilize
information in the background situation to construct meaning, a point
well-established in the comprehension literature (e.g., Bransford and Johnson 1972,
1973). Although the principle of situational constraint is related to the earlier
principle of situation-speciﬁc conceptual content, the two principles differ in
emphasis. Whereas situation-speciﬁc conceptual content focuses on situational
information as a source of varying conceptual content, situational constraint focuses
on the pragmatic influence that the current situation has on establishing varying
content.
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Implications for concept composition. As this section has described, interac-
tions with past and present situations appear to play central roles in how people
combine concepts. Often, memories of experienced entities and events from past
situations provide the meanings of current phrases and sentences via extensional
feedback. Similarly, the relevant background situation constrains how concept
composition proceeds, biasing the conceptual content activated and combined
toward situationally relevant information. It is likely that many other forms of
pragmatic constraint not anticipated here contribute to concept composition as well.
4 Conclusion
From the perspective of human cognition, principles of conceptual processing have
potential implications for theories of concept composition. First, the content active
for a concept on a given occasion appears to vary considerably. Rather than having
a stable core, a concept exhibits dynamically varying content across situations,
perhaps resulting from Bayesian sampling. Second, multiple representational forms
may constitute the dynamically constructed representation of a concept on a given
occasion. Although these representations could include abstractions, they may also
include exemplars, and are at least likely to include exemplar-level information.
Additionally, multimodal simulations and distributed linguistic representations may
become active and play central roles in concept composition, along with amodal
symbols. On a given occasion, the speciﬁc mix of representational forms may vary
widely. Third, the dynamic representation of a concept on a given occasion is likely
to reflect a variety of pragmatic constraints. On the one hand, these representations
could contain conceptual content established through extensional feedback on
earlier occasions. On the other, they could contain information associated with the
current background situation.
The principles of conceptual processing just described may be incorrect. Much
controversy remains concerning the nature of the human conceptual system, such
that some researchers, at least, would take issue with the principles of conceptual
processing presented here. Nevertheless, based on the current empirical literatures
in cognitive science, it is likely that at least some of these principles are approxi-
mately correct, and that the human conceptual system does not take the idealized
forms assumed in some accounts of concept composition.
A possible framework for understanding concept composition. Let’s assume
for the moment that the account of conceptual processing presented here is roughly
correct. For the sake of argument, how might we explain concept composition if
these principles are true? What kinds of theories might be successful under con-
ditions of varying conceptual content, multiple representational forms, and prag-
matic constraint?
Under these conditions, it seems difﬁcult to imagine how a formal symbolic
theory could be successful. Perhaps I’m being uncharitable, but a successful theory
of this type would require that considerable information about exemplars,
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situations, and multimodal content be formalized, as would be procedures for
combining it (consider what would be required to handle the representations of
rolled-up lawn vs. rolled-up snake described earlier).
Perhaps a more tractable approach is to assume that when people perform concept
composition, they typically attempt to construct a multimodal simulation of a rele-
vant situation (Barsalou 1999, 2008b; Wu and Barsalou 2009). In the process,
people draw heavily on previous situational experience, as they attempt to construct
a simulation that includes all the concepts being combined in a sensible manner.
Certainly, various types of grammatical and linguistic patterns may contribute to this
process. Nevertheless, attempting to construct a coherent simulation may be central.
Notably, simulation accounts of concept composition differ considerably from
symbolic accounts. Whereas simulation accounts represent conceptual content
implicitly in multimodal representations captured from situational experience,
symbolic approaches abstract this information from situational experience and
encoded it explicitly into amodal symbolic structures. As a consequence, the pro-
cesses that underlie concept composition differ considerably at the level of cognitive
and neural mechanisms (cf. Marr 1982). In simulation accounts, as we saw earlier for
Wu and Barsalou (2009), complex simulations of experience are constructed and
transformed, whereas in symbolic accounts, explicit symbolic structures are com-
bined according to the rules of logic and language. Although, at an abstract level, the
information being represented in the two approaches may be comparable, the rep-
resentation and processing of this information differs considerably, leading to dif-
ferent explanations and predictions at the cognitive and neural levels.
Although it remains to be seen whether a simulation approach to concept
composition will work, this approach has several qualities that might yield useful
outcomes. First, the simulation approach relies heavily on situational experience,
both past and current, consistent with the work reviewed earlier on the importance
of situations for conceptual processing. Not only does the multimodal simulation
constructed to represent a concept composition draw heavily on situational mem-
ories, it also draws pragmatically on the current physical situation.
Second, this approach seems well suited for handling variable conceptual con-
tent and multiple representational forms. From this perspective, it is not a problem
that a concept’s content varies constantly—it only matters whether its current
content can be integrated with the evolving multimodal simulation of the relevant
situation. Because the process of integrating simulations seems potentially
“sloppy,” varying content might not constitute a severe problem. Similarly, it
doesn’t really matter whether an exemplar or an abstraction becomes active,
because either could be integrated into an evolving simulation. Additionally, dis-
tributed linguistic representations could become active throughout the simulation
process, activating and structuring relevant simulation content.
Third, this approach doesn’t require a tight formalism to be effective. Rather than
linguistic forms being associated with semantic formulae that combine in a com-
positional manner, linguistic forms and grammatical structures constitute instruc-
tions for constructing, transforming, and evaluating multimodal simulations
(Barsalou 1999; cf. Langacker 1986, 1987, 2008). Because linguistic forms and
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grammar become cues for building simulations, their formal properties are less
important than the effects that they have on the simulation process.
Clearly, however, many approaches for explaining concept composition exist,
and many new ones are likely to develop. Perhaps what is most signiﬁcant and
encouraging currently is that diverse groups of researchers increasingly attempt to
understand concept composition from different perspectives (e.g., the contributors
to the current volume and to Werning et al. 2012). Because concept composition
may constitute an unusually challenging aspect of human cognition to explain, it
seems likely that adopting different theoretical perspectives will be essential, as will
be incorporating many kinds of empirical evidence.
Pelletier (2017) offers a long list of challenges for cognitivist approaches to
concepts, noting that cognitivist approaches have yet to provide accounts of sin-
gular terms, quantiﬁcation, grammatical categories, syntax, integrated thoughts,
negation, and so forth. Clearly, these are important issues, and cognitive approaches
have done relatively little to address them. To a large extent this is because cog-
nitive approaches have focused on other issues, often attempting to establish the
most basic mechanisms in the brain that underlie conceptual processing, holding off
on more challenging issues until basic issues are better understood. Additionally,
cognitive researchers often lack the technical expertise required to perform
informed empirical study of more complex issues.
Rather than challenging the cognitivists to explain these issues on their own,
perhaps formalists could work together with cognitivists to develop accounts that
integrate both perspectives. Ultimately, optimal accounts of conceptual processing
are likely to reflect sophistication about both its formal and cognitive aspects.
Furthermore, to the extent that the formal aspects of conceptual processing
reflect structure in the world (e.g., truth conditions), grounded cognition offers a
natural theoretical framework for integrating the formal and cognitive perspectives.
Because grounded cognition focuses on coupling cognition with the environment, it
sees the structure of concepts in the world as indispensible to conceptual processing
(although it might take a more statistical view of the physical world as opposed to a
logical one). From the grounded perspective, a successful account of conceptual
processing is only possible once both perspectives are included and uniﬁed. A pure
cognitive account on its own is far from sufﬁcient, as is a pure formal account of
structure in the world. Because cognition is coupled with the world, taking each
seriously in explaining the other is essential.
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Compositionality and Concepts—A
Perspective from Formal Semantics
and Philosophy of Language
Francis Jeﬀry Pelletier
Abstract It’s no secret that diﬀerent of the subﬁelds in cognitive science dispute
what the correct solution is to various problems that they each investigate in their
separate ways. Sometimes this is due to diﬀering antecedent ideas about what is
the appropriate way to investigate the phenomenon, other times it is due to diﬀer-
ing antecedent ideas about what principles an adequate solution should embody, and
still other times it is due to diﬀering antecedent ideas concerning what the dispute is
about. . . as for example when they use the same terminology for diﬀerent phenom-
ena. This paper is an investigation into these diﬀering antecedent ideas in the realm
of meaning and compositionality as they play out in linguistics, cognitive psychol-
ogy, and philosophy of language. The focus is on the notions of subjective meaning
and objective meaning, and a main conclusion is that there needs be a “two-factor
semantic theory” to accommodate the overall goals of both sides. Some steps are
made towards that end, but various previous attempts are argued to have missed the
point. In the end it will be shown that, clearly, more work needs to be done along a
number of speciﬁed dimensions, especially on the subjective side of the dispute.
1 (Some) Deep Background
I am going to be making some remarks about “what philosophers of language
believe” and “what cognitive psychologists believe”—as well as some equally
general-sounding claims about “what linguists/formal semanticists/cognitive scien-
tists/etc. believe”. Like all such general statements made about a group, mine should
not be taken as universally quantiﬁed.
1
(It would be almost beyond belief were all
1
In fact, most researchers into the ﬁeld of generics think that such “generic statements” can
be true—depending on the particulars of the case—even if only a relatively small percentage
of the relevant population manifest the property in question, especially when this subgroup is
“salient” in some way. See the discussion in Krifka et al. (1995).
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cognitive psychologists to believe the same theoretical things; it would be an even
further stretch to think that all philosophers of language believed the same theory;
and so on).
I furthermore will be making claims about the notion(s) of compositionality, and
will use my explanation of this/these notion(s) as a (rather meagre) web upon which
to link what philosophers of language, cognitive psychologists, formal semanticists,
cognitive linguists, etc., believe. In fact though, I think that the major reasons for
the diﬀerence in approaches to these topics come from two other sources, and not
compositionality considered simply in itself—which I see as just a consequence of
choices within these other sources. The ﬁrst source is an ontological commitment to
one of (what I will call) Atomism and Wholism, and the second source is a semantic
commitment to one of (what I will call) Subjectivism and Objectivism. I will try to
emphasize these options as the paper develops. At the end, I hope you’ll agree that
there are numerous “disconnects”, and that on the other hand there are some rather
surprising places where agreement is reached.
I start with compositionality.
2 (Some) Features of Compositionality
There are two conceptions of compositionally that make their appearance in the liter-
ature. One version, which I’ll call Ontological Compositionality2 describes the way
a complex item is put together. The underlying idea is that the complex is “nothing
more than” the collection of its parts (and the parts of these parts, etc.), put together
in some perhaps new conﬁguration. Underlying this sort of compositionality is the
slogan:
Deﬁnition 1 (Ontological Compositionality) A whole is a compositional system
built up only from materials in the parts, with due consideration about how these
parts are arranged.
Consider these two theories (don’t worry about their correctness as theories—we’re
only focussing on whether they express ontological compositionality or not).
Suppose assemblage-1 of neurons is active during task-1 and assemblage-2 is active dur-
ing task-2. Now consider a “supertask” which intuitively involves doing task-1 and task-2
together. Then: is the assemblage of neurons involved in this supertask made up out of, and
only of, those neurons involved in either task-1 or task-2? Or does the new supertask bring
an entirely new assemblage of neurons to bear on the new task? Many theorists think that,
at least after the new supertask becomes a learned, repetitive action, there is a new group of
neurons responsible. And thus, motor neural accounts are not ontologically compositional.
2
Or perhaps a better name would be Building-Block Compositionality.
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One view of prototypes
3
says that a prototype is a structure that has a number of attribute-
value pairs. A question of interest in this area is: Given that prototype-1 has a structure [A:
value-a; B: value-b; . . . ] and that prototype-2 has the structure [C: value-c; D: value-d . . . ], is
the prototype of the “combined prototypes” (that is, the conceptual combination of the two
prototypes) made up only from the material in the two component prototypes, that is, from
the attribute-value pairs that are in one or the other of the prototypes? Many theorists answer
‘yes’ to this question, thereby claiming that this manifests the (ontologically) compositional
view of prototypes. As an example, the prototype of PET FISH would be (ontologically) made
up compositionally from the prototypes of PET and FISH because all the “relevant material”
(the attributes) could be found in the these smaller, embedded prototypes, and merely needs
to be “re-arranged”.
A name for the underlying theory that holders of Ontological Compositionality
believe is Atomism—the view (in whatever area is under discussion) that there are
smallest items (atoms—that is, whatever the area claims to be its minimal elements)
and that all other ontological items (in the area) are larger and larger wholes that
are ultimately made up of these atoms put together in some speciﬁc way. (Diﬀerent
ways will generate diﬀerent objects out of the same parts.) The denier of Ontological
Compositionality believes in Wholism—the view (in the area under discussion) that
there are some items whose makeup at least partially consists in things that are not
in its parts.
4
Since Wholism takes it that some complex object (of whatever type) can contain
things that are not in any of the parts, Atomists naturally ﬁnd this quite puzzling.
One reaction is:
Those who say that a whole is greater than the sum of its parts either don’t know what a
whole is, or don’t know what a part is, or don’t know what being a sum is, or don’t know
what being greater than consists in.
To take our example of assemblages of neurons, the Atomists would claim that the
alleged complex object does not have the initial assemblages of neurons as parts.
It was a completely diﬀerent object that was created by learning or practice. It was
not the initial assemblages, rearranged, plus something new added on—to make it
into a whole. It was just a diﬀerent object. So it neither obeys nor violates Ontolog-
ical Compositionality: we just have two independent objects. Or at least, this is the
reaction that holders of Ontological Compositionality would claim.
But it is never totally clear when Wholism applies. According to the Boodin quote
in footnote 4, any whole that is generated in accordance with gestaltism violates
Atomism. Is a heap of sand, made from putting a bunch of grains into close prox-
imity to one another, a new whole over and apart from the grains? Or is it just the
grains, rearranged by being placed into the relevant proximity? Is a sentence. . . for
instance one which is made up of a noun phrase plus a verb phrase. . . such a whole?
Did something new come into existence, a sentence? Or is the alleged whole actually
nothing more than the noun phrase and the verb phrase put together in the appropri-
ate way? How can we tell in every case whether there is an entirely new, diﬀerent
3
E.g., in Hampton (1979, 1982), Smith et al. (1988); the idea can be seen already in Rosch (1975).
4
The OED cites Boodin (1939) as the originator of the word ‘wholism’: “Two concep-
tions. . . namely, creative synthesis (or emergence), and wholism (or gestaltism). . . ”.
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object coming into being, or just the parts that are arranged appropriately? Are the
(computational) connectionists right in saying that every property of a connectionist
system is an emergent property?
5
We leave these questions aside at this point.
But compositionally of the Ontological variety is not the only notion in the neigh-
bourhood. When discussing linguistic matters, it is far more common, at least in phi-
losophy of language and formal semantics, to see a discussion that presumes there
to be an already-given, well-deﬁned system of the sort that Ontological Composi-
tionality has characterized—namely the syntactic structures of language, treated as
a complex object made from atoms (and not as a newly-created whole). The atoms
are lexical items and the wholes that are made from them are syntactically-deﬁned
larger and larger linguistic units. But if we become interested in some property of
this system—for instance, in the meanings of the items—the issue then becomes
whether there is a way to deﬁne this property—the meaning—of all complex items
solely in terms of the meanings of the syntactically-given parts of the complex item
and their syntactic method of combination. A ‘yes’ answer to this for every com-
plex member signals that the semantic theory assigns meanings compositionally.
One might note that in this kind of compositional theory, there are two structures:
the ﬁrst, antecedently-given one (in the language case, the syntactic structure), and a
second structure (in the language case, it would be the structure that “the meanings”
manifest) which is a kind of mirror of the ﬁrst structure. So another way of asking
whether a semantic theory is compositional in this sense is to ask whether there is a
homomorphic mapping from the syntactic structure to the semantic structure.
In the language case, this mapping is called “the meaning function”, which most
authors writing about semantic compositionality symbolize by 𝜇. So, X = 𝜇(A)
means that (i) A is some element of the ﬁrst structure [i.e., A is some syntactic
item], and (ii) that X is the item in the meaning structure that is paired up with
A (i.e., X is the meaning of A). Then this second conception of compositionality
asserts that there is a function f such that whenever A is composed (in the sense of
Ontological Compositionality) of B, C, D . . . by means of syntactic method R, then
𝜇(A) is f applied to < 𝜇(B), 𝜇(C), 𝜇(D),…𝜇(R) >. That is: the system is composi-
tional if and only if, there is a function f such that for every (syntactically) com-
plex item A in the syntactic system, its meaning 𝜇(A) is a function of, and only of,
the meanings of A’s syntactic parts, together with the way they are combined. If
NP1 and VP1 make up the entirety of S1 and they are combined by rule-R to do so,
then 𝜇(S1) = f (𝜇(NP1), 𝜇(VP1), 𝜇(R)). Underlying this type of compositionality is
the slogan:
Deﬁnition 2 (Functional Compositionality) The 𝜇 of a whole is a function of the
𝜇’s of its parts and the ways those parts are combined.
5
I am speaking generically here about connectionists and generically about their views of most
properties.
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If we restrict our attention to cases where 𝜇 yields meanings, then this abstract notion
of Functional Compositionality becomes “semantic compositionality”.
A diﬀerence between the two notions of compositionality concerns whether some
“whole” can contain things not in the parts. According to the ontological building-
block view, no; but according to the functional version, yes. For, the ﬁrst notion
allows the whole to contain only what is in the parts, possibly re-arranged in some
manner. But the second allows the thing associated with a whole (in the linguistic
case: the meaning of a complex whole) to be a function of the things associated with
the parts (in the linguistic case: a function of the meanings of the syntactic parts and
syntactic mode of combination). And then there is nothing to stop such a function
from introducing new material into the thing associated with the whole—that is, the
function can make the meaning of a whole contain many new and radically diﬀerent
things from what are contained in the meanings of the parts. According to functional
compositionally, all that is required is that this be a function—which merely means
that it must introduce this same material and generate the same (type of) result every
time it is faced with the same (type of) parts and manner of combination.
A simpliﬁed example to illustrate the diﬀerence between Ontological and Func-
tional compositionality is this. Many theories have thought that adjective-noun com-
binations were to be analyzed semantically as a conjunction.
6
Thus, pink ribbon
is assigned a meaning like PINK(X) & RIBBON(X). Note, however, that we have
introduced something into the meaning that is not in the initial phrase nor in the
meanings of PINK or RIBBON: the meaning contains &, a conjunctive operator,
which is not to be found in the syntactic representation of pink ribbon. So, the let-
ter of the deﬁnition of Ontological Compositionality would not allow this to hap-
pen. On the other side, there is no problem for Functional Compositionality to gen-
erate such a representation by saying that the meaning of the syntactic operation
ADJPHRASE⇒ADJECTIVE NOUN is to insert a & (plus add the variables).
However, ﬁnding some arbitrary function to do this job is easy—too easy, accord-
ing tomany theorists. For, it seems possible, without any further constraints, to gerry-
mander the function so as to arbitrarily (but in accord with the function’s deﬁnition)
admit or omit anything at all as the value of any object in the function’s domain,
because a function need not be “regular” or “systematic” or “uniform” or “orderly”
in any intuitive sense. For example, Johnson (2014) remarks that while the follow-
ing three French sentences in (1) have various parts in common, it is still possible to
compositionally assign them the respective meanings in (2).
(1) a. Le chien aboie.
The dog barks.
b. Le chat aboie.
The cat barks.
c. Le chat pue.
The cat stinks.
6
Although current semantic theory does not hold to this account. I’m using it here merely as an
example to illustrate a diﬀerence in the two conceptions of compositonality.
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(2) a. The dog barks.
b. The cat dances.
c. The skunk eats.
Johnson says that we can see that sharing a verb does not say anything about simi-
larity of meanings, sharing a subject NP says nothing about a similarity of assigned
meanings. “Nevertheless,” he remarks, “there exists a function that takes the syntax,
and the meanings of the morphemes...and maps it to these meanings....In fact, any
random, unsystematic assignment of meanings to sentences is compatible with the
functional conception of compositionality....This is ‘dependence’ only in the weak-
est sense of that word.” In response to this general sort of worry, (Szabó 2012, p.
71) argues for the inclusion of a requirement that the function be one that makes the
meanings of the parts determine the meaning of the syntactic whole. (Pelletier 2012,
pp.160–1) says that the function has to correspond to the way that the meaning of
the complexes really depend on the meanings of their parts. . .where ‘really depend’
is taken in some sort of ontologically-explanatory way. Pagin (2009, 2012) suggests
that the function has to be a computable function, or perhaps an “elementarily com-
putable” function—or even a “humanly-computable-by-anyone” function.
The position that opposes Functional Compositionality is—at least when the
realm of meaning is being discussed—(semantic) holism.7 A semantic holist takes
it that the meanings of some complex expressions cannot be accounted for by any
function that “really depends” on the meanings of their parts. We discuss this notion
later, in Sect. 6.4.
Let me emphasize that Ontological and Functional Compositionality—as well as
their respective contraries, Wholism and Holism—can be applied to many diﬀerent
realms of inquiry. I focussed on the language-meaning case with respect to Func-
tional Compositionality, but that was just for convenience, and because there is a
large literature about this application. We return to the topic of compositionality and
its various manifestations after introducing a bevy of dramatis personae.
3 (Some) Philosophers of Language
It would be very diﬃcult to ﬁnd any modern philosophers of language who hold that
meaning is “in the mind”, or even just the weaker claim that the meaning of a lexical
item is a mental concept.
8
Locke (1690) had said
7
Note: without the ‘w’. It’s a strange word: it ought to mean a belief in the ontological reality of
holes, or perhaps a belief in the virtues of holiness. But it doesn’t. The OED attributes the ﬁrst
occurrence to Smuts (1926).
8
I did say that I’m speaking in generic sentences! There are works such as Hinzen and Sheehan
(2013) in which an individual’s concepts are viewed as having been generated pre-linguistically
and then having some linguistic label attached to them. But then this label becomes subject to
categories/conditions/features of language—both of “universal grammar” and the grammar of the
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Besides [the ability to make] articulate sounds, therefore, it was further necessary that
[Mankind] should be able to use these sounds as signs of internal conceptions; and to make
them stand as marks for the ideas within his own mind, whereby they might be made known
to others, and the thoughts of men’s minds be conveyed from one to another. Essay Con-
cerning Human Understanding iii.1.2
. . . a word is made arbitrarily the mark of such an idea. The use, then, of words, is to be sensi-
ble marks of ideas; and the ideas they stand for are their proper and immediate signiﬁcation.
Essay iii.2.1
This is nowadays cited in introductory philosophy of language textbooks as “themost
naïve view of meaning”, and the remainder of the text is taken up with a brief rebuttal
and then an exploration of alternative theories. Even the few avowedly mentalistic
theories (particularly that of Grice 1989) eschew the notion of a mental concept in
their theory, and employ instead the notion of intention, as in “intention to commu-
nicate something”, where this “something” is normally something “in or about the
world”—such as the proposition that it is raining outside.
Philosophers of language and formal semanticists more generally hold the view
that the meaning of a lexical item
9
is some extra-mental item, which they (unfortu-
nately?) call a concept. Mind you, diﬀerent ones of these philosophers and seman-
ticists hold diﬀerent views concerning what such an extra-mental concept is—some
hold they are “atomic” and cannot be analyzed. Others think that lexical decomposi-
tion is an observable phenomenon, so the corresponding concept must be decompos-
(Footnote 8 continued)
particular system becoming internalized. Likewise there are the various works of Fodor (1975,
1983, 1998, 2000, 2001; among many others) which have advocated a “language of thought” whose
atomic members are somehow associated with natural-language lexical items. But the atomicity of
the LOT items entails that the linguistic items also must be atomic and not subject to any deﬁnition
or decomposition. Many theorists have found this implausible. Probably they will ﬁnd the more
recent Fodor and Pylyshyn (2015) even more implausible, where there is no intensionality at all
in a concept, only extensionality considerations. (That is to say, only membership conditions for
instantiating the concept.).
9
Actually, wemean an individual sense of a lexical item. Sowe really wish to discuss separately, and
not as if one word, such cases as: Pitch: the degree of acuteness or gravity of a tone or sound at the
same time we discuss Pitch: the central part of a cricket ﬁeld or Pitch: the act or manner of pitching
a baseball to a batsman or Pitch: a dark-coloured viscous substance or Pitch: a stroke with a lofted
golf club and so on and on. Or if that seems obviously to be a group of separate words—and hence
obviously separate concepts—to you, consider the case of the noun Lamb whose senses include
a young sheep and the ﬂesh of a young sheep used as food. If those still seem as obviously being
separate meanings, each to be a separated sense, consider Collection: the activity of gathering things
together versus Collection: A group of things gathered together. The former is a sense indicating
an activity; the latter is a sense indicating the result of the activity. Are these separate senses, even
though closely related, or not? Some say yes, others say no. If they are separate, then they need to be
treated as separate “lexical items”. But all this depends on how ﬁnely we would like to individuate
senses. That having been said, we will not delve into that topic in this paper. For interesting thoughts
on the matter, see Chapt. 8 of Atkins and Rundell (2008). (Both Atkins and Rundell are dictionary
editors with many years of experience in issues concerning the individuation of senses.) We also
wish only to countenance the “base form” of such a lexical item—a lexeme, as they are sometimes
called.
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able. Still, the main view in philosophy of language is that the meaning of a lexical
item is a concept, in this extra-mental understanding of ‘concept’.
For (Frege 1891, 1892a, b), a concept is a particular type of function: one which,
when given a proper name (or as we would say now, a singular term) as an argu-
ment, yields a truth-value as a result. In more modern predicate logic terminology,
it is a monadic predicate (or rather, that entity in “reality” which corresponds to
the predicate—a property, perhaps). Note that this is explicitly not a psychological
item—Frege is quite resolute in his opposition to “psychologism”.
10
Philosophers of language have antecedently believed that language “talks about
the world” in that what one says is to be evaluated for truth or falsity
11
against what
is happening in the world, not in anyone’s mind. When a person says X, s/he is not
judged in accordance to how much that person believes that his/her concepts jus-
tify the assertion of X, but rather we just say the person has spoken falsely, if what
they say does not actually match the world. Even if one has a stereotype of SNAKE
that includes SLIMY, they cannot truthfully assert Snakes are slimy simply on that
account. Even if everybody had a mistaken belief about some such feature of objects
(maybe everyone’s mental idea of SNAKE includes SLIMY), it would not make the
claim true. Present tense assertions describe “the way the world is”; future tense
assertions describe “the way the world will be”. There is nothing here about the way
the speaker believes it to be, believes it will become, or “conceives” it to be. For, if it
were, then we’d say s/he was speaking truly even when saying something false—so
long as s/he just believes it. (And while there are doubtless philosophical theories
that promulgate such a viewpoint, they don’t include anyone in the philosophy of
language.
12
)
This sort of consideration is motivated in part by some famous—and still
accepted—doctrines brought out in works by Hillary Putnam (1975) on natural kind
terms, by Saul Kripke (1980) on proper names, and by Tyler Burge (1979) on various
terms that seem to rely on societal features rather than on an individual’s mental con-
cepts. The moral of these works, and the lesson that has been adopted in philosophy
of language, is nicely encapsulated by a phrase made famous by Putnam: “Meaning
Ain’t in the Head”. Philosophers of language ﬁnd it diﬃcult to believe that there are
respected (and reﬂective) theorists who seem to think otherwise.
13
We can trace the diﬀerence between the “objectively oriented” philosophers and
the “subjectively oriented” psychologists (and cognitive linguists) that are to be dis-
cussed in the next section by means of the What did s/he say? test.
Test 1 (What did s/he say?) When a person utters a sentence, X, ask “What did
s/he really say by uttering X?”
10
For a summary of Frege’s (and Husserl’s) arguments against “psychologism”, see for example
Pelletier et al. (2008). These were directed against various attempts to think of mathematics and
logic as “psychologistic”, but one might also see them as bolstering his position on thinking that
meanings and concepts can’t be mental entitles.
11
Or along other dimensions corresponding to speech acts other than assertion.
12
Still talking generically!.
13
I continue to speak generically!.
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If, for example, the speaker utters “All snakes lay eggs”, then when the philosopher
that we’ve been discussing applies the test, it would be claimed that the speaker
really said that every (species of) snake procreates by laying eggs. This is to be
evaluated by appeal to worldly facts, and if there are (species of) snakes that give
birth to live young, then what the speaker said was false. If you take this view of
what is said, you will always claim that these cases—where the speaker is sincere,
but mistaken—show that meaning is in the world and that meaning is not a matter
of what the speaker believed nor of what his/her concepts might be contained or was
organized in accord with. But since that is what we say about cases when the speaker
utters a falsehood, it seems equally to follow that when the speaker talks correctly,
so too is his/her meaning a matter of what is in the world.
There are those on the other side, those who think that what the speaker really said
was a fact about his/her concept of a snake, then the utterance “All snakes lay eggs”
might not be false, depending on what features his/her concept SNAKE happened to
have. It seems relevant here to note that in ordinary social interactions we distinguish
between speaking falsely and lying. The former seems to track what the Objectivist
has in mind by the what did s/he say? test, and therefore is about “reality”. The latter
seems to involve the speaker’s mental state, and depend on whether the speaker is
truly reporting what his/her concepts contain (with the intent to deceive). A more
stark way of putting this point is that Objectivists take the what did s/he say? test to
require an answer about the world whereas Subjectivists must take it to require an
answer about the speaker’s beliefs. Furthermore, and although intuitions here can
be a bit murky, it seems that if someone intentionally mis-reports his/her conceptual
beliefs (say, s/he believes that snakes all lay eggs, but is trying to tell a falsehood)
in saying “Some snakes give live birth”, then this is nonetheless a lie even though
it is a truth.
14
This intuition would be in accord with what the Subjectivist seems to
hold about the what did s/he say? test, although I think one should instead identify
it with what did s/he intend?.
4 (Some) Cognitive Psychologists
There have been a number of nice reviews of the recent history of the notion of a
concept within cognitive psychology, telling mostly the same story (Komatsu 1992;
Laurence and Margolis 1999; Murphy 2002; Machery 2009; Barsalou 2010; from
a more recent viewpoint see Hampton and Jönsson 2012; and from a recent philo-
sophical perspective see Leben 2015). The narrative generally goes like this:
14
About 70% of snake species are oviparous (they lay eggs). Of the other 30%, about two-thirds
are ovoviviparous (eggs are hatched while within the body then expelled). The remainder are
viviparous—they give live birth by nourishing the developing young through a placenta and yolk
sac, a very unusual feature for a reptile. While ovoviviparous snakes, like the rattlesnake, are often
said to give live birth, this is not true in the same sense that the viviparous snakes do it—which is
akin to how mammals give live birth.
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In the Classical Version of concepts, a concept was some mental item that classi-
ﬁed items into those that fell under the concept versus those that didn’t. The general
idea was that a concept was a deﬁnition, although it was not always clear whether
the theorists held that the classifying properties had to indicate necessary properties
of the item in “the world” (and a suﬃcient number of them) or whether they might
be able to “get along” with accidental properties so long as the classiﬁcation ability
worked in all the cases in which it was called upon. Would it matter whether our
concept of orangutan or of baking soda listed exactly the biological classiﬁcation
properties
15
or chemical features (NaHCO2)—or instead listed a suﬃcient number
of properties that any object that was encountered could be correctly classiﬁed as an
orangutan or not, or as baking soda or not? [Well, yes it does matter, philosophers
say. But that didn’t seem to aﬀect any of the psychological theories of the time.]
But data involving typicality judgments and category membership judgments
were seen as overthrowing the Classical theory. Even those theorists who wanted to
maintain that a concept had a “core” part and a “periphery” (sometimes called a “dic-
tionary versus encyclopedic” distinction) found that there was no special place for
such a distinction: it took subjects longer to judge that a chicken was a bird than that
a robin was a bird. Presumably this diﬀerence is due to “non-core” aspects, such as
size and ﬂying ability, since they both are 100% birds, and everyone knows this. Thus
there came to be a thought of replacing this with some sort of Prototype representa-
tion, one that attempted to accommodate the typicality and membership judgments
in terms of “distance from the mental prototype”. Here a prototype is something like
a “most typical instance” or an “average” of all the instances encountered. But this in
turn was reﬁned into (or replaced by) a “family-resemblance” version of the theory.
(The reference here to Wittgenstein was intentional, even if these theories were not,
on the whole, all that well-grounded in Wittgenstein 1953.)
Another way to accommodate the evidence from typicality judgments was to think
of a prototype as an exemplar: some particular example of the concept that one hap-
pens to fasten on. In addition, there will be a number of learned “rules” about how the
exemplar could be modiﬁed and still represent a member of the relevant category.
When this seemed not to adequately match the full range of typicality judgment
data, a more careful version of Prototype theory was elaborated as having feature
lists each one with associated probabilities. The concept DOG could have a feature
COLOUR with many possible instances listed, each associated with a probability or
likelihood. (Note now that there is no special distinction here between “core” and
“periphery” of these features.) But computational complexity issues concerning the
probabilities of combinations of features made these theories be untenable for some,
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The suggestion in the text of necessary or essential features deﬁning scientiﬁc categories is per-
haps most appropriate for non-biological concepts, or biological concepts as used by laypeople.
But it is not the current viewpoint of professional biologists. Instead the current view is that taxa—
species, genera, phyla—should be conceived genealogically, in terms of common ancestry with
selected paradigms. Thus, for a professional biologist, “being an X” is a relational property of an
individual organism, independent of both the superﬁcial properties used for initial identiﬁcation
(amphisbaenias are not snakes despite being legless reptiles) and of explanatory properties (tuna
are ray-ﬁnned ﬁsh despite beingwarm-blooded). Thanks to Allen Hazen for discussion on this topic.
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and gaveway to certain variants. If you think that every combination of values among
the diﬀerent feature lists and their probabilities could result in diﬀerent outcomes for
some further feature and its probability, and that this also depends on the probability
of an interaction eﬀect between groups of the features, it is pretty easy to see that
this is not a tractable problem to characterize and nor to compute a result, if one tries
to compute these in a straightforward manner. One way to extend this model could
be to add further structure to the concepts, such as having many exemplars and a
statement of the particular values each has on each feature dimension. One might
then propose that a novel item is evaluated by sampling the stored exemplars and
determining how close the newly encountered item is to the value generated from
the sampling. But this seems to be no longer a pure prototype theory.
It seemed to many theorists that all these prototype theories have the shortcom-
ing that there was no structure to the feature lists. Schemata theories were therefore
devised that divide the various properties envisaged by prototype theories into sepa-
rate “dimensions” that list the sorts of values they can embody, and can be related to
other dimensions or values in those other dimensions. And still more recently “the-
ory based” versions of this same idea have come to the fore with the underlying idea
that concepts are not just learned with an already-existing background of other con-
cepts, and therefore have to “ﬁt in” with them, but their internal structure will have
to embody previous knowledge about what sort of features are likely to be important
in a new concept.
And yet even more recently we’ve seen “neo-empiricist” theories of concepts
rejecting the assumption that there has to be any relationship among the features of a
conceptual structure. Instead we get temporary ad hoc groupings from sensation and
motor perception that ﬁt whatever situation one is in. You are in a situation/context
where it is important to recall the colour pattern of poisonous snakes, then your ad
hoc concept of SNAKE will contain that sort of colour information. But if instead it
is a situation where it is important to recall the type of constrictor snakes and their
size, then your ad hoc concept of SNAKE will contain that information. The idea is
that there is no continuous concept, no such thing as a concept of SNAKE in general.
(See Barsalou 2008, 2010, 2017, and in a related framework, Prinz 2002.)
The general idea is that the meaning of some general term (or singular term, for
that matter) is the mental concept it occasions. As we have just seen, some of the
recent theories hold to the view that such concepts aren’t merely “retrieved” but are
actively constructed on the spot as the linguistic and environmental input is received.
The construction depending on features of the environment, broadly conceived. We
will look at this “construction of meaning” in Sects. 5.2, 6.2 and 6.3 below. In the
literature that discusses this—both in the psychological literature and in the cogni-
tive linguistics literature (which is discussed in Sect. 5.2 below)—it is remarkable
that focus is given to very simple lexical items, and sometimes to the “conceptual
combination” apparent in two-word phrases. But language is “special” (in ways out-
lined below in Sect. 6.4). In particular it can create arbitrarily long noun phrases
that, according to the present theory, should also designate concepts. But one won-
ders whether the mechanism of conceptual-combination-in-context is up to the job.
Here is what Carlson (2010) says about two examples:
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[N]ot only do we talk about ﬂying geese and meowing cats and leaf-bearing trees, but we
also talk about
∙ Unpainted kitchen appliances that are just beginning to rust need to be replaced within a
period of two to three months by a qualiﬁed kitchen professional in order to prevent any
possibility of bacterial contamination.
∙ Friendly but slightly confused medical professionals without appropriate training who
nonetheless have medical degrees from top-ranked teaching hospitals have much to con-
tribute to society beyond their incomplete medical expertise.
The principled point is that linguistic expressions can be unbounded in complexity. . .with
the consequence that if these are mapped directly onto certain types of mental states that we
are calling concepts, then we stand in need of a device . . . that can produce the arbitrarily
large number of corresponding brain states in order to provide these phrases with appropriate
denotations.
Depending on how this “device” is deﬁned—and if such a device is really possible to
deﬁne—it might describe Ontological Compositionality or it might obey Functional
Compositionality. Or it might obey neither. But until such a “device” is described, it
is not possible to evaluate claims concerning whether the mental combination being
presumed by these modern theories of concepts is or isn’t compositional.
5 (Some) Linguistic Theories
Scholz et al. (2016) list three “grand traditions” in modern (and not-so-modern) lin-
guistics, which they label Essentialism, Emergentism, and Externalism. These grand
traditions are characterized by their diﬀerent attitudes towards seven diﬀerent aspects
of what a linguistic theory should be about or achieve. The seven aspects are:
∙ What are the primary data for theory construction in linguistics?
∙ What is the primary subject of a linguistic theory?
∙ What is the aim of a successful linguistic theory?
∙ What is linguistic structure?
∙ Besides accuracy, what is to be valued in a linguistic theory?
∙ What is the relation between child language and adult language?
∙ What is learned when a ﬁrst language gets acquired?
According to (Scholz et al. 2016)’s categorization, these grand trends reﬂect a ten-
dency within diﬀerent groups of researchers to answer these seven questions in one
of three ways. And so the members of a trend can be characterized by commitments
to a number of central tendencies or foci. But as Scholz et al. are also at pains to
remark, a wide variety of diﬀering research programs could be carried out within
each of the three trends. . . although as a sociological fact, members of each of the
three trends seem all to focus on more or less the same directions as one another.
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The three trends can be brieﬂy explained by saying that (a) Externalists are most
interested in “language as it occurs”, and the most visible research eﬀort of this
trend here is corpus analysis, (b) Emergentists are most interested in how language
is used by people and how this is an outgrowth of other cognitive aspects of peo-
ple, and probably the most visible research eﬀort of this trend is Cognitive Linguis-
tics/Semantics (but see footnote 17 below), and (c) Essentialists are most concerned
to presume an internalized language faculty that can be characterized by an abstract,
computationally-oriented model. The two most visible subgroups of this grand trend
are the theories put forth by Chomsky over the decades and the formal semanticists.
The three groups’ answers to the seven aspects of what a linguistic theory should be
like are given in (Scholz et al. 2016)’s Table 1.
5.1 (Some) Externalists
As Scholz et al. (2016) characterize these three trends or tendencies of research goals,
the Externalists are most typically exempliﬁed by some computational corpus lin-
guists, whose goals are to ﬁnd underlying patterns that are discernible in actual usage
when the sample is large enough to show it. The patterns might then be character-
izable by some rules that could be used to give an overall theory of the language.
Another version of Externalism holds to certain philosophical accounts of meaning
in terms of use: for example the “inferentialism” of Brandom (1994, 2000) or the
“language game” and “form of life” of Wittgenstein (1953). Many forms of linguis-
tic behaviourism could also be characterized in this way, for example Skinner (1957)
and in a diﬀerent wayOsgood et al. (1957). The computational approaches to linguis-
tic theorizing in the Externalist vein tend to eschew the postulation of mental items,
such as concepts, intentions, purposes, and the like, and instead take meaning to be
the likelihood of co-occurrence with nearby words. As can be seen from the ‘AIM’
row of Table 1, it is not a central concern of Externalism to worry about generating
semantic representations that obey semantic compositionality, nor with psychologi-
cal data concerning speaker/hearer mental life during conversation. And hence they
stand outside the sort of discussion this paper is concerned with, namely the inter-
action between linguistic features and mental items. So, I will ignore the work in the
Externalist direction in the remainder of this essay, except for mentioning how some
inferentialists view semantics.
16
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Important references for current versions of Externalism are (Manning and Schütze 1999; Juraf-
sky and Martin 2008) and (Schubert 2015, esp. Sect. 9: “Statistical Natural Language Processing”).
In this section, Schubert discusses how this is a new direction in computational linguistics that “is
signiﬁcant from a philosophical perspective, and not just a practical one.” Schubert discusses a wide
range of areas where this ‘philosophical shift’ has been applied.
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Table 1 Three approaches to the study of natural language. Printed with the kind permission of
the Editor of The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the authors of Scholz et al. (2016)
Externalists Emergentists Essentialists
Primary phenomena: Actual utterances as
produced by language
users
Facts of social
cognition, interaction,
and communication
Intuitions of
grammaticality and
literal meaning
Primary subject
matter:
Language use;
structural properties of
expressions and
languages
Linguistic
communication,
cognition, variation,
and change
Abstract universal
principles that explain
the properties of
speciﬁc languages
Aim: To describe attested
expression structure
and interrelations, and
predicting properties
of unattested
expressions
To explain structural
properties of
languages in terms of
general cognitive
mechanisms and
communicative
functions
To articulate universal
principles and provide
explanations for deep
and
cross-linguistically
constant linguistic
properties
Linguistic structure is: A system of patterns,
inferrable from
generally accessible,
objective features of
the use of language
A system of
constructions that
range from ﬁxed
idiomatic phrases to
highly abstract
productive types
A system of abstract
conditions that may
not be evident from
the experience of
typical language users
Value especially: Accurate modeling of
linguistic form that
accords with empirical
data and permits
prediction concerning
unconsidered cases
Cognitive, cultural,
historical, and
evolutionary
explanations of
phenomena found in
linguistic
communication
systems
Highly abstract,
covering-law
explanations for
properties of language
as inferred from
linguistic intuitions
Young children’s
language is:
A nascent form of
language, very
diﬀerent from adult
linguistic competence
A series of stages in an
ontogenetic process of
developing adult
communicative
competence
Very similar to adult
linguistic competence
though obscured by
cognitive, articulatory,
and lexical limits
What is acquired: A grasp of the distrib-
utional properties of
the constituents of
expressions of a
language
A mainly conventional
and culturally
transmitted system for
linguistic
communication
An internalized
generative device that
characterizes an
inﬁnite set of
expressions
5.2 (Some) Emergentists
It is the linguists from the Emergentist group—so-called because they see language
as developing out of and emerging from antecedently existing cognitive, social, or
biological forerunners—who are the most self-conscious employers in linguistics of
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“mental terminology” such as (mental) concept. One group—the self-named cogni-
tive linguists—is explicit, indeed insistent, about their orientation, that psychological
evidence is part and parcel of their own enterprise
17
:
. . . [W]hat is the precise meaning of cognitive in Cognitive Linguistics, and how does this
meaning diﬀer from the way in which other forms of linguistics conceive of themselves as
being a cognitive discipline? . . .Cognitive Linguistics is the study of language in its cognitive
function, where cognitive refers to the crucial role of intermediate informational structures
in our encounters with the world. Cognitive Linguistics is cognitive in the same way that
cognitive psychology is: by assuming that our interaction with the world is mediated through
informational structures in the mind. It is more speciﬁc than cognitive psychology, however,
by focusing on natural language as a means for organizing, processing, and conveying that
information. (Gaeraerts and Cuyckens 2007, pp. 4–5)
Sometimes, though, the use of diﬀerent names by various authors within the
framework for the mental entities that they assume to be the mental reality that lan-
guage is describing or reﬂecting, can make a casual reader think that they may not be
talking of the same thing that cognitive psychologists are. For instance, their use of
schema, constructions, spaces, categories, frames, prototypes, ﬁgure/ground, among
others, in explaining the inner workings of their theory may hide this. But about
them, under whatever name, the thought is that the meaning or semantic value of
lexical items (especially) are these mental items. Some programmatic but represen-
tative remarks about the standpoint of Cognitive Linguistics, as made by some of its
practitioners, are:
The experience that users have with language shapes cognitive representations, which are
built up through the application of general principles of human cognition to linguistic input.
The structure that appears to underlie language use reﬂects the operation of these principles
as they shape how individual speakers and hearers represent form and meaning and adapt
these forms and meanings as they speak. (Bybee and McClelland 2005, p. 382)
Representation is perhaps the most important, and most contested, foundational concept in
modern cognitive science. Cognitive Linguistics takes the view that linguistic structure is
motivated by conceptual representation and communicative function, thereby placing the
representational function of language at the center of its concerns. (Sinha 2007, p. 1280)
[The psychologist’s notion of] the basic level of categorization. . . is linguistically basic
because basic-level terms tend to be morphologically simpler, to be acquired earlier by chil-
dren, to be used as the unmarked choice for introducing referents into discourse, and to
provide the raw material for extensions of the lexicon by means of metaphor, metonymy,
and word formation. (Schmid 2007, p. 124)
Several general cognitive abilities can be brought under the broad title of “construal opera-
tions”. At issue is the fact that linguistic expressions do not, and cannot, designate a state of
17
There are other schools or orientations within the broadly Emergentist category, such as Func-
tionalism (Bybee 1998; Dirven and Fried 1987), Construction Grammar (Croft 2001; Goldberg
1995; Fried and Östman 2004; Östman and Fried 2004; Kay 1995), various sorts of Sociolinguis-
tics (Halliday 1978; Hurford 2000; Labov 1966, 1975; von Savigny 1988; Tomasello 1998; Van
Valin 2003), and Language Evolution (Burling 2005; Cheney and Seyfarth 2005; Greenhill et al.
2010; Li 2002; MacWhinney 2005; O’Grady 2008; Power 1998; Wildgen 2008; Worden 1998).
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aﬀairs as it “objectively” is; rather, the scene must be processed and conceptualized by the
human mind. Construal operations include attentional processes, force-dynamic construals,
metaphor, image schemas, and conceptual blending. (Taylor 2007, p. 574)
The semantic views held by Emergentists can perhaps be gleaned from the fore-
going quotations, but in short, and at least when restricted to a lexical item, the view
about meaning is:
Deﬁnition 3 (Linguistic Emergentism) The meaning of a lexical item is a (mental)
concept.
Of course, Emergentists will have interesting and complex things to say about the
nature of these mental concepts, and their mutability in context—where by ‘context’
is meant not only the longer sentence or discourse in which the lexical item occurs
but also the situation when and where it was uttered, and also by the sum of back-
ground experiences the speaker has plus his/her beliefs concerning the background
experiences of his/her audience. It is one of the fundamental views of Emergentism,
or at least the Cognitive Linguistics subtype of Emergentism, that linguistic expres-
sions are widely variable in their meanings, depending on the sorts of factors just
mentioned. But then since they are also committed to the view that meanings are
mental items, it follows that these concepts must also be able to vary along the same
dimensions.
Evans (2009) states a general feature (‘literalism’) he perceives in “traditional
linguistic theories”,
18
and which he is concerned to overthrow. It can be seen that
Evans’ view of compositionality, which he sees as inherent in these traditional the-
ories, amounts to what I called Ontological Compositionality with its “monotonic”,
“additive” view of composition, and not the Functional Compositionality that I had
attributed to these other types of linguistic trends. In this I think Evans is wrong,
and I think that the notion embraced by formal semanticists (who I shall introduce
shortly) is Functional Compositionality. I also see this as one of the “disconnects”
between cognitive linguistics/psychology and philosophy of language/formal seman-
tics. A further feature of Cognitive Linguistics, emphasized here by Evans, is that
there is no such thing as “the meaning of a word” (or other linguistic item): they are
always infected with contextual aspects when they are used, and furthermore when
they were ﬁrst learned. A meaning, on this view, is something ﬂeeting—it comes
and then goes as the context (linguistic or situational) changes.
19
[T]he view of word meaning adopted under literalism is that word meanings are assumed
to be relatively ﬁxed and stable. Put another way, the semantic primitives which make up
a given word meaning can be identiﬁed independently of context. Once identiﬁed, word
meanings are integrated, by applying the rules of the grammar, in order to provide sentence
meaning. Literalism, then, assumes that the contribution of language to meaning construc-
tion is essentially additive in nature, positing grammatical principles which ensure that the
18
By which he probably intends what I’ve called Essentialism.
19
Actually, Evans tries to separate “senses stored in semantic memory” from those “meanings con-
structed ‘online’ ”. But the idea is that the former serve only to guide the construction of the latter,
which is the meaning of the word-in-context.
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semantic units which result are unable to change or delete the meanings of the units which
are conjoined to form a larger semantic unit or expression. This restriction serves to make
a larger expression, for instance a sentence, monotonic with respect to its component parts,
where the term “monotonic” has to do with the view that the component parts retain their
original meanings in the larger expression. Thus, the individual word meanings do not alter
their meaning in the larger semantic units of which they form part. (Evans 2009, p. 6)
Later in the book, Evans returns to this thought:
[W]ords, I suggest, do not mean independently of context. Thus, the fundamental problem
with literalism is that it attempts to artiﬁcially divorce (word) meaning from (situated mean-
ing in) context of use. More precisely, literalism lives in something of a fool’s paradise. It
holds that language users retain an idealized, timeless meaning for open which they neatly
keep apart from the situated meanings of open which arise from its use in examples . . .The
mistake that literalism makes, then, is in being reductionist and simplistic about meaning.
[W]ords are never meaningful independent of the utterance in which they are embedded, and
the encyclopaedic knowledge and extra-linguistic context which guide how words embedded
in an utterance should be interpreted. Indeed, evidence from the perspectives of social psy-
chology, cognitive psychology, interactional sociolinguistics, cognitive linguistics, corpus
linguistics, and computational linguistics reveals that the view that words constitute ﬁxed,
context-independent structures, and that meaning construction is appropriately modelled
in terms of the straightforward approach to compositionality sketched above is untenable.
(Evans 2009, pp. 21–22)
This viewpoint is not idiosyncratic to Evans. Rather, as he says, part of this gen-
eral viewpoint of Cognitive Linguistics is that mental concepts, and hence the lin-
guistic items that receive their meaning from these concepts, are determined not by
some “core” dictionary meaning but rather are related to much more about the world
of one’s acquaintance. Using other terminology, a concept is said to embody ency-
clopedic knowledge and to be augmented or restricted by situational features of the
utterance. Many of the early Cognitive Linguists have also promulgated this view,
but Langacker (1987; 2008) is perhaps the most theoretically-oriented of the early
practitioners, and he was probably the most inﬂuential developer of “encyclopedic
semantics”. The idea is that lexical items (and longer linguistic phrases) directly
access concepts, and since these concepts are developed through interaction with
the world in non-uniform ways, these linguistic items can’t be understood indepen-
dently of the encyclopedic information held in these concepts. Semantic structure,
then, is just identical to conceptual structure.
Evans is concerned throughout his works to view meaning not only as mental
concepts, à la Langacker, but to show that these concepts are continually changing,
as the following quotation from a later work illustrates:
Language works extremely well because it is part of a larger meaning-making complex. It’s
dependent upon a suite of other capacities – in particular, a repository of thoughts and ideas,
that we carry with us, in our minds – upon which language draws each time we open our
mouths to speak. Language, together with this mental apparatus, co-conspires to produce
meaning, enabling eﬀective communication. (Evans 2015, p. 6)
(One notes that, even were all this true about how the co-conspiracy works, it is quite
unclear how that will help with communication!)
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This group of the Emergentists—the Cognitive Linguists—is one of the two
groups of linguists that I wish to keep in focus during the remainder of this paper.
We will return to a discussion of this group, with an eye to seeing whether and how it
is similar to (some) work on concepts in cognitive psychology of the sort I described
above. But ﬁrst we continue our account of linguistic theoretical frameworks.
5.3 (Some) Essentialists
A large number of contemporary Essentialists who follow Chomsky’s teaching on
this matter claim that semantics and pragmatics are not a part of the study of lan-
guage.
[T]he study of meaning and reference and of the use of language should be excluded from the
ﬁeld of linguistics . . . [G]iven a linguistic theory, the concepts of grammar are constructed
(so it seems) on the basis of primitive notions that are not semantic (where the grammar
contains the phonology and syntax), but that the linguistic theory itself must be chosen so as
to provide the best possible explanation of semantic phenomena, as well as others. (Chomsky
1977, p. 139)
It seems that other cognitive systems – in particular, our system of beliefs concerning things
in the world and their behavior – play an essential part in our judgments of meaning and
reference, in an extremely intricate manner, and it is not at all clear that much will remain
if we try to separate the purely linguistic components of what in informal usage or even in
technical discussion we call ‘the meaning of linguistic expression.’ (Chomsky 1977, p. 142)
In Chomsky’s view, “it is possible that natural language has only syntax and prag-
matics” (Chomsky 1995, p. 26); that is, only “internalist computations and perfor-
mance systems that access them”; semantic theories are merely “part of an interface
level” or “a form of syntax” (Chomsky 1992, p. 223). In his view, then, there is no
distinction between semantics and pragmatics, and neither forms a part of linguistic
theory.
So, in the Chomskean take on the matter, semantic topics such as the meaning
of lexical items are a matter for theories other than linguistics to determine. It is a
matter of the cognitive systems that describe our beliefs about things in the world
which would determine what meaning (and reference) is. Without using the term
concept in any technical sense, it would seem that Chomsky endorses the claim made
in Deﬁnition (3) above, about Emergentism, and denies only that this should have
anything to do with linguistics. (Of course, when an Emergentist hears this they will
be astonished to hear the ‘only’ in such a sentence, since they believe that this is the
fundamental starting point for linguistic theory!) Nonetheless, we can see that this
form of Evans’ “traditional linguistic theories” does not embody his “fool’s paradise
of literalism”. Meanings and such are not at all a part of linguistic theory.
However, not every Essentialist agrees with Chomsky on this point. Many believe
that every theory should incorporate a linguistic component—semantics—that yields
meanings, in much the same way that most philosophers of language believe there to
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be such a separate component of a theory of language. Often, although not always,
this component amounts to a truth-theoretic account of the values of syntactically-
characterized sentences. This typically involves a translation of the natural language
sentence into some representation that is “intermediate” between natural language
and a truth-theory—perhaps an augmented version of ﬁrst-order logic, or perhaps a
higher-order intensional language. And other times it involves a further level of syn-
tax, LF (sometimes this is inaccurately called “logical form”), which itself is then
interpreted by some truth- or information-theoretic method. The Essentialists who
study semantics in such ways usually agree with Chomsky in seeing little role for
pragmatics within linguistic theory. But their separation of semantics from prag-
matics allows them to accord semantics a legitimacy within linguistics itself, and
not “just” in psychology or sociology. This group are known by the general name
of Formal Semanticists. And perhaps this is Evans’ group of “traditional linguists”
who adopt “literalism”?
So for these Formal Semanticists, such features as the individual diﬀerences
between speakers on their beliefs about “the world” will become a part of pragmatics,
and not a part of semantics. And hence, not a part of linguistics. (But rather, of some
social psychological theory, or perhaps a theory about an individual’s cognitive life.)
This is a view they share with the philosophers of language who were surveyed ear-
lier. Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet (2000) and Heim and Kratzer (1998) are lead-
ing textbooks in this general framework, and both adopt a “logic-oriented” approach
to semantics that employs a possible world semantics and other formal tools. Their
diﬀerences reside in their length (Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet is much longer
than Heim and Kratzer) and to some extent in their diﬀering underlying syntactic
frameworks. (Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 2000) put their case in the preface
and beginning of the book as follows:
[W]e focus on what has come to be known as logical, truth-conditional, or model-theoretic
semantics. This general approach to meaning was developed originally within the tradition
of logic and the philosophy of language and over the last twenty years or so has been applied
systematically to the study of meaning in natural languages, due especially to the work of
Richard Montague. (Preface)
Whatever linguistic meaning is like, there must be some sort of compositional account of
the interpretation of complex expressions as composed or constructed from the interpreta-
tions of their parts and thus ultimately from the interpretations of the (ﬁnitely many) simple
expressions contained in them and of the syntactic structures in which they occur. . . . . An
important test of a semantic theory is set by compositionality. Can the theory generate the
required interpretations for complex expressions from a speciﬁcation of interpretations for
the basic items? As we will see, explicit speciﬁcation of how word meanings are combined
to produce sentential meanings is not a trivial task. (pp. 6–7)
Somewhat later in the book, this general train of thought is revisited, arguing further
that formal semantics is committed to Objectivism and is opposed to Subjectivism:
Meaning manifests itself in the systematic link between linguistic forms and things that we
speak of or talk about. . . .Were languages not to provide for signiﬁcance in this sense, the
question of meaning would hardly arise.
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Language enables us to talk about the world, to convey information to one another about
ourselves and our surroundings in a reliable fashion. What properties of language and its
uses underlie this remarkable fact? What allows language to serve as a guide to the world
and to enable us to learn from what others have perceived (seen, heard, felt, smelled) without
having to duplicate their perceptual experience ourselves? Informational signiﬁcance does
not require that language links to the world in ways that are predetermined by the physical
structure of our environment. Nor does it require that environmental information is simply
registered or received without active input from perceiving and thinking human minds. Yet
it does probably require a regular and systematic correspondence between language and the
shared environment, what is publicly accessible to many diﬀerent human minds. If you are
skeptical about informational signiﬁcance, consider the use of language in giving directions,
warnings, recipes, planning joint activities, describing events. Things occasionally misﬁre,
but by and large such uses of language are remarkably eﬀective. Language could not work
at all in such ways were it not imbued with some kind of informational signiﬁcance, being
about matters in a public world. (pp. 11–12)
It is also appropriate here to mention the area of “Truth-Functional Pragmat-
ics” (Recanati 2012). This is also an approach that I would like to bring under the
wing of Formal Semantics, even though the practitioners think of themselves as
allowing “pragmatic” eﬀects to “intrude” on the semantic understanding of utter-
ances. François Recanati is possibly the most inﬂuential member of this group,
and although this approach seems to endorse non-compositionality (in the Func-
tional sense), Recanati himself has given some ways to have it be “almost composi-
tional” (in Recanati 2012; see also Pelletier 2013 for further ways). On the dimension
of Cognitive-Linguistics-to-Formal-Semantics, truth-functional pragmatics is quite
close to Formal Semantics, and I will include them into the Formal Semantics group,
even though it also shares a number of features with Cognitive Linguistics (e.g., the
importance of context in determining the content of what is said, and a penchant for
claiming that this entails that the “true meaning” of what is said is full of “pragmatic
enrichment” and “modulation”). For, the fact is that in these theories the ﬁnal eval-
uation of an utterance depends on truth: that is, upon whether the meaning of what
is said is to be evaluated against what is happening “in the world”. And this puts it
pretty squarely in the camp of the Formal Semanticists.
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This Formal Semantics part of the Essentialist camp is the second group of lin-
guists that I wish to engage about the notion of compositionality, comparing their
view(s) with those from philosophers of language, cognitive linguists (Emergen-
tists), and cognitive psychologists.
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Of course, there are diﬀerences within the group and thus between (some of) them and (some
of) the earlier groups we distinguished. For the purposes of this paper, though, I will focus on
their mutual endorsement of Atomism and through that commitment, their advocacy of semantic
compositionality and its relatives.
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6 (Some) Objectivists Versus (Some) Subjectivists
There is a similarity, as I have noted, between the philosophers of language and the
formal semanticists. They both think of “meaning” as being outside of speakers, as
public, as being in common. Despite whatever other diﬀerences theremay be between
and amongst them, I therefore will call this merged group The Objectivists.21
There is a diﬀerent similarity that I noted between the cognitive psychologists
and the cognitive linguists. They both think of “meaning” as something that is inside
speakers, private, as being personal. Despite whatever other diﬀerences there may be
between and amongst them, I therefore will call this merged group The Subjectivists.
Carlson (2010) ends his discussion of the diﬀerence in usage of the term ‘concept’
in the formal semantics literature and the experimental psychology literature with
Concepts, as least as studied by psychologists, have not found a natural place in the study of
natural language semantics in the formal semantics tradition as practiced in the past thirty or
so years. This does not point to any shortcomings in semantic theory, I emphasize, for there
are excellent intellectual as well as practical reasons as to why this should be. However, it
does leave us with something of a disconnect between what is going on in the mind – and I
take concepts to be major features of it – and the way we talk about things. (p. 33)
I remarked earlier that philosophers of language—who also employ the word
‘concept’—think of it as being “in the world” and not “in the mind”. Another way
of putting all this is to say that Objectivists think of a concept as something that can
literally be apprehended or grasped by more than one person (and not as some sort
of “abstraction from, or averaging of, the private possessions of many diﬀerent peo-
ple”). On the other hand, Subjectivists are committed to a view of concepts that are
“private”, in the sense that it is literally true that a concept is in the mind of exactly
one person. (Correspondingly, the sense in which diﬀerent speakers have the same
concept is one of “determining similarities between and among the diﬀerent private
concepts, either by abstraction or averaging”.)
This diﬀerence is one of the root causes for the disputes that dot the literature. It
gives rise to one of the standard arguments used by Objectivists (mostly the philoso-
phers of language) against the Subjectivists (Sect. 6.1). It also gives rise to one of the
standard arguments used by Subjectivists (mostly the cognitive linguistics) against
the Objectivists (Sect. 6.2). In Sect. 6.3 I point to another place where (some) Sub-
jectivists and Objectivists battle: general terms. I argue in favour of the Objectivists,
although I also point to a possible two-tier theory imagined in Sect. 7.3. In Sect. 6.4
I discuss the so-called “Master Argument(s)” in favour of semantic compositional-
ity, bring out a feature that seems to have gone unnoticed by its proponents—that,
as an argument from the Objectivist side, it undermines itself by its own presuppo-
sitions. I also point out that these Master Arguments do not really support semantic
compositionality, but rather they are arguments for some sort of semantic Atomism.
But semantic Atomism is compatible with some Subjectivist frameworks.
21
Yes, there are various other groups that are also called ‘Objectivists’, but I’ll not be talking about
any of them in this essay.
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We start with a standard argument used by Objectivists against Subjectivists, to
the eﬀect that the Subjectivist notion of a concept implies an untenable position
concerning “privacy”. If this argument is right it puts the Subjectivists in a very
dire position indeed—they would be committed to the incoherence of all of what is
believed about human interaction. Let’s see how that goes:
6.1 Concepts and Privacy
Concepts, on the Subjectivist account, are private—there is no literal sharing, no
joint ownership, etc. There is thus no direct way to determine whether a speaker and
his/her audience share anything whatsoever when it comes to a concept—even in
the case where the concepts are occasioned by the same verbal signal (word). And
even though one might think of behavioural correlates such as classifying the same
objects and seeing how many they disagree with, this doesn’t give any reasonable
guarantee of sameness of concept, as opposed to agreement in behaviour.
But perhaps the Subjectivist would say that agreement in (certain types of) behav-
iour is suﬃcient for our purposes here; that we don’t really need shared concepts,
only shared behaviour of the relevant sort. To this an Objectivist counters by asking
whether we really would like to claim literal identity of diﬀerent people’s sensation
of pain, whenever they agree to rate the same number out of 10 on a Numeric Rating
Scale. The Objectivist thinks that no one, not even the most committed Subjectivist
would agree to that. Indeed, once the Classical theory of concepts is thrown out, it
is a part of the Subjectivist story that the concepts are developed by accommodating
to the experiences that an individual has. Surely this guarantees that the concept that
one person has will be both numerically and qualitatively diﬀerent from the next
person’s. And if we are supposing, as the current theorists do, that the meaning of a
lexical item is the concept it occasions, then of course no two people will have the
same meaning for any word. Subjectivists have not talked much about whether there
are also diﬀerent ways for concepts to combine in diﬀerent people on account of
their diﬀering experiences, seemingly treating any combination as if it were a con-
junction. But even if they were able to give us an account of how simple concepts
can combine in whatever ways they do, and how the resulting complex concepts can
themselves combine further, and yet further, until a “complete thought” (correspond-
ing to a full declarative sentence) is formed—as I say, even if that is all granted—then
since these combining rules or abilities will themselves be due to experience that is
learned-by-an-individual, they will thus almost certainly diﬀer from one person to
another. In short: this aspect of the Subjectivist theory guarantees that there will
be no understanding between any two people, at least if understanding amounts to
having (qualitatively) the same concept.
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It is tempting to say, and many Subjectivists have,
22
that communication does not
require “absolute identity” of the corresponding mental items but only that they be
“similar enough”. But this can’t really be made out in a non-circular way, it seems
to me. The hypothesis that two diﬀerent minds are “similar enough” with respect
to their understanding of some term—-say, ‘democracy’—has no empirical content
other than simply some antecedent belief that the two people are understanding what
each other says when they talk, despite their diﬀerences in acquisition of the relevant
concepts. But that was precisely the (alleged) fact that the “similarity” was hypoth-
esized to explain. The very nature of the Subjectivist notion of concept makes it
impossible to give an independent criterion of “similar enough”. Contrast this with
the Objectivist claim that there literally is something—something in reality—that
the participants both grasp. It may be correct to object that this is asserted without
any independent evidence, but at least it is not a restatement of the issue, as I claimed
(in the previous footnote) that the Subjectivist is committed to.
6.2 Concepts and Meaning
AlthoughObjectivists seem to believe they have knock-down reasons for holding that
“meaning just ain’t in the head”, as we outlined in Sect. 3, it seems equally obvious
to Subjectivists that without taking into account the mental life of speakers (and
possibly hearers, too) it is impossible to give an account of what meaning is. After
all, isn’t it obvious that a speaker has some belief that s/he wishes to get across, or
warning that s/he is trying to convey, or emotion that s/he is expressing, or ... . And
are these not all mental states? How could there be any meaning in an instance of
language use that did not give any role whatsoever to these mental items? Isn’t it
obvious that when a speaker says that The object in the corner is a chair that they
22
Here are two, chosen from some 200 years apart:
Men do not understand one another . . . by mutually occasioning one another to produce
exactly and completely the same concept; they do it by touching in one another the same
link in the chain of their sensory ideas and internal conceptualizations, by striking the same
note on their mental instrument, whereupon matching but not identical concepts are engen-
dered in each. (von Humboldt 2000, p. 152)
Since the cumulative experience that makes up the conceptual system will diﬀer between
individuals, often considerably; so, the ability of two individuals to communicate eﬀectively
depends on there being a minimum degree of overlap between their ongoing representa-
tions and, therefore, the concepts from which these representations derive. The question
then becomes: How much overlap is enough. Critically, understanding one another in com-
munication does not require identical representations between speaker and listener. . . , just
representations that overlap enough to achieve the current communicative goal. (Connell
and Lynott 2014, p. 400)
I think that anyone can see that neither account gives anything more than a restatement of the actual
issue, not a solution.
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are identifying some mental representation (a percept?) of some object taken to be in
the corner, and are classifying it as falling under the concept CHAIR? Given all this,
it certainly seems obvious that there is some relationship or other between concepts
andmeaning. Objectivism denies this, and is deﬁcient for this reason, the Subjectivist
says.
The intuitive and natural manner to characterize meaning in a Subjectivist frame-
work is to say that the basic way for mental concepts to operate is by representing
the world—at least the world as seen from the point of view of the holder or owner
of those concepts. A linguistic item then will designate or mean or be brought forth
by (or will bring forth) the relevant mental concept of the language user, and will
thereby represent the relevant aspect of the world. This is a type of “two-level” or
“dual aspect” or “two-tier” semantics, and we will canvass that sort of response in
the section below (Sect. 7). For now we just remark that the sort of two-tier theory
being alluded to also has analogies with theories mentioned in McNally and Boleda
(2017) and Winter (2017), and perhaps shows a remarkable convergence of opinion
among theorists with widely diﬀerent starting points.
One formal approach to subjectivist theories of meaning is exempliﬁed by so-
called proof-theoretic semantics. Such theories have started by thinking of the mean-
ings of the logical connectives as being given by the ways they can be introduced into
a discourse and what sorts of “language moves” they can justify. For some techni-
cal reasons this led to adopting intuitionistic logic as the underlying framework for a
theory of the use of such connectives (see especially Dummett 1991). Fuller versions
of this idea try to generalize the range of such introduction and exploitation moves
that can be given a formal exposition. Most of these theories have their formal roots
in the intuitionistic type-theory of Martin-Löf (1980) and Prawitz (2006); see for
example its development in natural language structures by Francez and Dyckhoﬀ
(2010); Francez et al. (2010); Francez and Ben-Avi (2015); Francez (2014, 2015).
In this approach, meaning is taken to be a certain type of proof, namely a set of
canonical derivability conditions—stated in natural deduction format from which
the derivability conditions are based. The idea is that the proof system reﬂects the
“use” of the sentences in the linguistic fragment under consideration and thus allows
recovery of their entailment and assertability conditions. This formal conception of
semantics is opposed to the more usual formal version in linguistics and philoso-
phy of language of describing the meanings as truth-conditions in arbitrary models,
which are taken to be ways the world actually is, or might be (the latter for intensional
language). In proof theoretic theories there is no notion of “truth” or of “modelling
the world”. There are only rules for the appropriate use of language. In more infor-
mal versions of proof theoretic semantics (Brandom 1994, 2000) this general strat-
egy is called inferentialism and is seen as a “use-based theory of meaning”, which
employs notions such as “language entry and exit rules”, and “language evaluation
rules”.
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(A nice description of both the formal and informal aspects of the topic is in
23
“Use theories of meaning” trace their ancestry to ordinary language philosophy, especially the
sort that is usually attributed to the later Wittgenstein (but now moved to a higher level of formal-
ity). In the Wittgensteinian version—and generally carried into the modern versions—the issue of
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Schroeder-Heister (2016). We shall not here evaluate the various arguments from the
proof-theoretic andmodel-theoretic sides that allege to ﬁnd shortcomings in the other
approach. A lot of this back-and-forth mirrors the Objectivist–Subjectivist argumen-
tation we have been canvassing, except done on a highly formal and mathematical
level. Instead I will simply appeal to proof-theoretic semantics below as a possible
formal account of the ways in which people can use the representations aﬀorded by
concepts to produce an “internal meaning” in our discussion of two-tier semantic
theories of Sect. 7.3.)
6.3 Specificity and Meaning in Particular Instances
of Language Use
Another feature of the dynamic between Objectivists and Subjectivists that holds
back some sort of rapprochement is their diﬀering underlying notions concerning
just what meaning should be in particular cases. We’ve already seen the large-scale
diﬀerences in the form of context-dependent versus independent, encyclopedic ver-
sus dictionary, and the like. But even in a speciﬁc case ofmeaning-in-a-very-deﬁnite-
context there are important diﬀerences between the two camps. Here I outline the
Objectivist side against the Subjectivist. The diﬀerences come in two forms.
6.3.1 Generality
Objectivists and Subjectivists diﬀer on the “level of speciﬁcity” that should be a
meaning in the various cases. It is not so clear to me why this should follow from
their overall positions, but their writings leave little room for doubt that it is so.
Objectivists have a notion that some meanings include others as special cases or as
particular ways that the meaning can be manifested. For example, they might say that
‘The cover of this book is red’ can be made true in many diﬀerent ways: it could be
crimson, it could be cardinal red, it could be scarlet, it could be cerise, etc., etc. And,
they hold, a person could truly say and mean that the book cover was red even all
the while knowing (or believing) that it has some speciﬁc shade, say raspberry. Their
Objectivist view is that what was said allows for instantiation in many diﬀerent ways;
the speaker’s particular knowledge of the shade is irrelevant to what was said (as is
any potential hearer’s knowledge of the situation which might dictate the particular
shade). Similarly, should some speaker claim ‘There is a red fruit in my refrigerator’,
it wouldn’t matter to what was said that it was, or was known by the speaker to be,
an apple with a red-delicious coloured exterior, a watermelon with a ruby-coloured
interior, or a burgundy-coloured grape, etc., etc. The idea, again, is that language
(Footnote 23 continued)
Objective versus Subjective was said to rest on a common mistake, that of not according primacy
to how (ordinary) people (ordinarily) use language.
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contains generality, allowing us to talk without having to always and completely
describe each and every detail of what is being asserted.
Presumably this attitude follows from the Objectivist’s viewpoint that what is said
(think of the what is said? Test (1) of Sect. 3) determines a certain group of possible
states of the world—those possible states that would render the statement true (for
assertions; mutatis mutandis for other speech acts). So long as the actual world is one
of those possible states, the statement is true. Thus, for the Objectivists, the meaning
is the set of possible ways that the sentence could be true. And with ‘The cover of this
book is red’, any of hundreds of speciﬁc shades would be adequate.
24
This picture is
nicely captured by Sainsbury (2001):
‘Italian F’ is satisﬁed by a satisﬁer of F which is of or pertaining to Italy. This is an unspeciﬁc
but deﬁnite, unambiguous and complete meaning. An Italian book is one of or pertaining to
Italy, and a book may pertain to Italy by being on my pile of books to take there, or by being
about Italy, or by being manufactured in Italy, or by being written in the dominant language
of Italy. . . . ‘Feline care’ is satisﬁed, in the same sense though not in the same way, by a vet
tending a cat and by a cat tending the puppy to which she is acting as foster mother. Both
vet and cat supply care of, or pertaining to, felines . . .
Sainsbury’s main point in this is the contention that theorists should distinguish
between diﬀerent ‘readings’ or meanings of a sentence from diﬀerent ways in which
it could be made true. Just because (for example) This is an Italian book can be made
true by this book’s being about Italy, or written in Italian, or the book bought while
visiting Italy, and so forth, it does not at all follow that this shows that there are
somehow diﬀerent ‘meanings’ involved with the sentence. And if these are all the
same ‘meaning’, then a compositional semantics needs only to generate a meaning
for Italian book that is a function of the meanings of Italian and book. It is not the
job of semantic theory to generate all the diﬀerent ‘readings’ of a sentence.
Some Subjectivists (especially in Cognitive Linguistics or where they follow the
general (Wittgensteinian) doctrine that all experience is “of the particular” and that
a desire for generality is “the root cause of all philosophical conundrums”) seem to
refuse to acknowledge that there is any reasonable notion of generality in meaning—
whether it be in language or in concepts. The fact that someone maybe has in mind
that they are attracted to the colour red in their footwear makes it be that when the
person says “I’m going to go buy a pair of shoes this afternoon” s/he means that
they are going to buy a pair of red shoes. The fact that some particular physical
phenomenon can be described in diﬀering ways is claimed to give rise to diﬀerent
“construals” (this is a technical term).
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Such diﬀerent construals are seen by these
24
A caveat should be registered here, concerning homography and homophony, where diﬀerent
words are spelled or pronounced the same. Diﬀerent words can give rise to diﬀerent meanings
and hence divergent ways they could be made true. But the same word-sense just gives rise to one
meaning with diﬀering ways to be made true. See also footnote 9.
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This technical usage seems to stem fromLangacker (1990), who discusses (p. 61) a person looking
at the night sky, describing what s/he sees as a constellation, a cluster of stars, as specks of light in
the sky, etc. He says “such expressions are semantically distinct; they reﬂect the speaker’s alternate
construals of the scene,. . . ”.
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Cognitive Linguists as being diﬀerent meanings for one and the same piece of lan-
guage; the apparent reason for this being a belief that the semantic interpretation of
some linguistic item is directly a particular mental structure without any intervening
level of representation that might itself describe or be true of many diﬀering val-
ues, and that these mental representations are speciﬁc. (Perhaps not totally speciﬁc,
one presumes, but certainly more speciﬁc than Objectivists think their non-mental
concepts are.) Objectivists naturally ﬁnd this viewpoint mysterious and hard to take
seriously, thinking that this is just a case of one and the same piece of language hav-
ing diﬀerent ways that it could be made true—that is, as being a case of generality.
But here are a few quotations to give the ﬂavour of the view, according at least to the
types of Subjectivists we are canvassing.
Expressions do not mean; they are prompts for us to construct meanings by working with
processes we already know. In no sense is the meaning of [an] . . . utterance ‘right there in the
words.’ When we understand an utterance, we in no sense are understanding ‘just what the
words say’; the words themselves say nothing independent of the richly detailed knowledge
and powerful cognitive processes we bring to bear. (Turner 1991, p. 206)
Thus, there is no “general meaning” for a word, only the speciﬁc meaning as it is
used on some particular occasion.
In [some] cases, varying content appears to originate in background situations. When repre-
senting sofa, for example, people might include information about sofas occurring in living
rooms. Similarly, when representing truth, people might include information about truth
being relevant in courts of law. In general, considerable amounts of information in concep-
tual representations appear to describe the background situations in which concepts occur,
including settings, related objects, other agents’, actions, and variety of internal states (e.g.,
goals, evaluations, aﬀect, motivation, reward, mentalizing). . . .The concept of chair, for
example, is likely to be associated in memory with background situations for kitchens, liv-
ing rooms, classrooms, theaters, jets, and ski lifts. . . . Sitting in a jet chair, for example, is
associated with a diﬀerent setting, actions, and internal states than sitting in a living room
chair. . . .As a consequence, when a concept is processed in a particular situation, the situ-
ation activates related background information that enters into task performance. In other
words, the extrinsic properties active for a concept also vary across situations, not just its
intrinsic properties. (Barsalou 2017)
And so each particular situation uses the word in the sense appropriate exactly to
such a situation, and not in its general sense.
Objectivists complain that the Subjectivists are so enthralled with the particu-
larity of an experience that they have blinded themselves to the fact that language
is full of generality in the description and reporting of that experience and refuse
to acknowledge that this is precisely what happens on particular occasions. Indeed,
they say, that’s the whole point of general terms. You use X to say something, then
it is what X is true of that counts. . . not some hidden (or even public) idiosyncratic
interpretation of X that you might have. If I say that I met someone on the train yes-
terday, an Objectivist would claim that it is just silly to think that I “really” meant
that I met a woman, just because I know that it is true that the person is a woman!
Objectivists think the Subjectivist theory is completely bewitched by the view that
what is being communicated is just exactly what one is aware of and what one’s par-
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ticular background knowledge picks out in some speciﬁc case. That’s just plain false,
they say: it depends exactly on what was said.
The what did s/he say? test shows that it can’t depend on what the speaker hap-
pens to believe, even when what the speaker believes is true: suppose a speaker says
Connie saw a cat yesterday, but Delia didn’t. And let us suppose that the speaker
knows it was a black cat that Connie saw, and that she saw it in regular daylight,
with her normal eyes, while paying attention. So the speaker knows that Connie is
aware that she was seeing a black cat.
Notice now that what I just said in those circumstances—that Connie saw a cat
yesterday but Delia didn’t see one—certainly wouldn’t be true if Connie saw a black
cat and Delia saw a tabby! But such a circumstance would make that claim be true if
the sentence were to mean what Subjectivists claim: that Delia didn’t see the same
black cat that Connie saw (or same colour of cat that Connie saw), as seems to follow
from the Subjectivist position under discussion. For, Delia can surely see a tabby
while she is not seeing any black cat! This shows, using the what did s/he say?
test that the speaker did not mean that Connie saw a black cat—despite the fact that
the speaker knows it was a black cat and despite the possible fact that the speaker’s
mental image of the incident included a black cat, and that s/he would assent to the
claim that Connie’s seen cat was black, and so on. That simply is not what was said
and hence not what was meant on that occasion.
The way to get the correct intended meaning is to make the a cat not be any
more speciﬁc than “being a cat”. Add any more and the sentence could be made
true if Delia didn’t see this extra material, even though she saw a cat. The view that
every meaning is as speciﬁc as the speaker happened to have in mind would make
lying or disseminating is impossible. Diplomacy would be impossible. Romantic
relations would be impossible. To Objectivists, it’s as if Subjectivists about language
have a morbid fear of things—even mental things, even linguistic things—that are
not tied down to speciﬁcs.
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One wonders what they might think about the concept
SPECKLED HEN and the number of speckles it might have (Tye 2009).
On a more conciliatory note, one might wonder whether the following is the root
cause of this dispute on generality. The truth-conditions of the language are general,
even when the relevant concepts are particular in their nature. But which should be
called the meaning? Objectivists point to the world, using arguments of the sort just
canvassed. Subjectivists point to the mind. Given the radical diﬀerences in what is
being “pointed to” by the two theories, they can’t both be right about the same thing.
So—is one right and the other wrong? or are they just talking about diﬀerent things,
calling them both ‘meaning’? Or—as we explore in Sect. 7.3—is it that meaning has
two diﬀerent aspects, while still being one item?
26
I’m speaking generically, of course.
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6.3.2 Grounding Concepts
We continue now with the general issue of subjectivity, and the Subjectivist’s appar-
ent commitment to meaning—and to thought more generally—as being “private”
and within the mind of a single person. This is obviously a position that none of
our Subjectivists
27
wants to hold in such a blatant form, for the reasons that I have
given above. The standard response by our Subjectivists is to invoke some notion of
“groundedness”.
28
There are many such notions in their literature,
29
sometimes going by other
names, such as ‘situated’, ‘embodied’, and ‘enactive’—with subtle diﬀerences in
application. (‘Grounded’ is used both as a general cover term and also more specif-
ically to cover a notion of “gained by experience”; ‘situated’ is often used to talk
about how a concept is activated in a particular situation; ‘embodied’ seems to be
used to avert to the fact that we are physical beings and thus live in the physical
world; ‘enactive’ is used for a more neuropsychological causal pathway. I’ll con-
tinue with ‘grounded’ as a general term for all these.
30
) The idea behind them all
is to give the otherwise private meanings (and other mental items) a way to “touch
reality”. (Perhaps a way to avoid the “Brain in a Vat” scenario to the eﬀect that since
we never have any interaction with “reality”, we can’t know or talk about it (Put-
nam 1981).) Employing one of these notions is pretty popular in all the forms of
Subjectivism about meaning we have been looking at, but while at least some vari-
eties might seem to Objectivists to be plausible, the high degree of “fuzziness” in the
articulation of how it in detail works—as well as the imaginative terminology that
has been invented to describe it—has not met with much in the line of conversion of
Objectivists. To many such un-convinced Objectivists, it seems no more informative
to be told that such meaning concepts are grounded, situated, embodied, or enacti-
vated, than it is to be told that inter-subjective validity is guaranteed by “our shared
form of life”.
The general reception by Objectivists of the notion of grounding in this form
seems to be: Subjectivists can talk and talk about how one’s mental concepts and
other meaning-related mental structures are ‘grounded’ in experience, ‘situated’ in
context, ‘embodied’ in one’s perceptual/motor systems, or ‘enactivated’. But so long
as this process—whatever it is—allows for diﬀering results on the mental items for
diﬀerent people or the same person at diﬀerent times, there has been no explanation
of how communication of mental structures to one another can succeed.
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Recall that I am speaking generically!.
28
A general overview of the area can be gleaned from (Shapiro 2014) and (Pecher and Zwaan 2005),
or at a higher level of generality in (Wilson and Foglia 2016).
29
A negative view of the many diﬀerent notions called “groundedness” is oﬀered in (Wilson 2002).
A positive view that nonetheless details many diﬀerent meanings of the notion is in (Rohrer 2007,
pp. 28–31).
30
See (Barsalou 2010, p. 619): “‘Grounded cognition’ reﬂects the assumption that cognition is
typically grounded inmultiple ways, including simulations, situated action, and, on occasion, bodily
states.”.
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6.4 Compositionality Cuts both Ways
Although the privacy topic is, I believe, the root cause for the diﬀerences between
Objectivists and Subjectivists, the literature from either side does not seem to dwell
on this topic. Instead, we ﬁnd other disputes that are tangentially related to this, but
this root cause is not often mentioned. For example, Objectivists have long pointed
to a set of “arguments” that are supposed to establish compositionality
31
:
Argument from understanding We can understand an inﬁnite number of novel
sentences, so long as they employ words we already understand. We understand
sentences and other combinations that we have never encountered. So, language
must be ‘compositional’: it must start with a ﬁnite stock of words/morphemes
with their meanings, and put these together in a ﬁnite number of diﬀerent ways,
but using an unlimited recursive method to arrive at the inﬁnite number of under-
stood sentences.
Argument from productivity/creativity We can create new sentences that we
have never heard or used before, and we know that they are appropriate to the
situation in which we use them. This can only happen if language is ‘composi-
tionally’ organized, so that we learn some ﬁnite base of words and rules, but know
how to combine them recursively so as to produce totally new descriptions with
the intended meanings.
Argument from learnability We are ﬁnite creatures who are exposed to a ﬁnite
amount of information concerning our language. Nonetheless we can learn a sys-
tem that is capable of inﬁnite expression of meanings. The only way this can
happen is if what we learn has a ﬁnite basis of terms and rules, but the rules
themselves allow for arbitrarily complex ‘composition’.
As I see it, there are three threads interwoven in the arguments:
1. that language is something special (inﬁnite, or novel, or creative, or whatever)
in its ability to express meanings,
2. that peoplemanage to use/learn/understand language despite their being “ﬁnite”,
3. that one (the only known?) way to do this is if language exhibits a semantically
compositional framework.
It is important to keep these arguments in mind when reviewing the Objectivist
position. Note in particular something we will return to in Sect. 7: Thread (2) of this
general position cites certain abilities or outcomes of mental operations in language
speakers. So whatever else is in the Objectivist position about meaning being “in the
world”, at least in their only direct arguments for compositionality, there is a pre-
sumed subjective aspect.
32
And although many Subjectivists try to establish that the
31
Well, it is admitted by all that these are “arguments to the best explanation” and do not logically
entail the conclusion of semantic compositionality.
32
In the linguistics literature there is also, to be sure, some argumentation concerning the proper
form of a linguistic theory; and in that milieu, semantic compositionality is praised for its clarity and
transparency. But these “methodological” (aesthetic?) considerations don’t really count as direct
arguments in favor of the position, in my mind.
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information present in the world impinging on language learners/speakers will allow
for the Thread (2) to occur without compositionality (even though Thread (1) is cor-
rect), it seems to me that they would be on more secure ground in arguments against
Objectivism were they to focus more attentively on the Objectivist’s “missing link”
(that these arguments can’t succeed in securing (3) if the underlying presupposition
of Objectivism is correct).
I have just argued that the Objectivists have painted themselves into a corner by
employing as their only justiﬁcation for (Functional) semantic compositionality an
argument that presupposes the falsity of Objectivism. But what is the alternative, if
one wanted to somehow include the Subjectivist presupposition? Two thoughts come
to mind, and both can be found in the Subjectivist writings (mostly in the Cognitive
Linguistics works). However, they are often stated in such a way that it is not clear
which of the two thoughts is being promoted. And to my mind, this is because the
two can be seen as shading into one another along a particular dimension, which
I will try to elucidate. As I see it, one of the two understandings is an impossible
position for anyone to hold, but the other one is not at all impossible. But given that
the two ends of this dimension shade into one another, a lot of the argumentation
has been against the impossible end and it has been allowed by some to impugn the
other end by a sort of guilty association. Even granted that it is diﬃcult to stop the
“slippery slope” from the one end to the other, I will try to emphasize an underlying
diﬀerence so as to take a step in rehabilitating the reputation of the group of possible
theories that inhabit the one end.
One end of the dimension along which these theories vary is given by such the-
orists as Schank (e.g., 1972) and Anna Wierzbicka & Cliﬀ Goddard (e.g., Goddard
and Wierzbicka 1994; Wierzbicka 1996; Goddard 2002). In these theories there is a
ﬁnite set of mental primitives in terms of which all other concepts can be deﬁned. As
I explained in Sect. 2, theories that can deﬁne all larger wholes in terms of their parts
are Atomistic in nature, and so this version of Subjectivism is Atomistic. As I also
explained in that section, theories that are Atomistic can often be compositional: at
this end of the dimension under discussion here, we see that it is maybe possible to
see the meaning of any deﬁned concept to be a function of the meanings of the parts
of that concept, and so on, down to the basic primitive universals. But onemight relax
the idea of a small set of primitives and allow more and more primitive concepts (or
primitive word-concepts). In fact, one might allow every word to be such a primitive,
thereby allowing every word-concept to be used in deﬁning the others. Depending
on how this is carried out, it may be either Wholistic or Atomistic, and the resulting
semantic theory might therefore be either holistic or atomistic. In the former case it
cannot be compositional, as I pointed out in Sect. 2, since holistic theories embody
a type of Wholism, and by deﬁnition a wholistic theory is not compositional. But in
the latter case, it might be. . . depending on the details of the theory.
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One version of this more inclusive picture is oﬀered by Langacker (1987), and I
interpret it as Atomistic even though it makes all word-concepts available as possible
members of the meaning of any other word-concept. (Langacker is being cited here
with approval by Evans 2009, p. 61):
What Langacker appears to have in mind is that the semantic material – informally the mean-
ing – associated with a lexical form, i.e., a word, relates directly to the contents of conceptual
structure. In principle, this conceptual structure relates to a diverse and sophisticated body of
non-linguistic knowledge . . . . The meaning of uncle, on this view, is potentially a function of
the vast body of encyclopaedic knowledge we have of what it means to be someone’s uncle.
In addition to the speciﬁc relationship holding between the child of uncle’s sibling, this also
includes detailed knowledge relating to marital relations, familial relations, the social status
of uncles, the types of behaviours associated with uncles, as well as individual knowledge
any given individual may have with respect to uncles they have known. Yet while this knowl-
edge is encyclopaedic, it is for Langacker part of semantic structure, i.e., directly encoded by
a lexical form. Langacker’s argument is that there is no principled way of separating putative
linguistic from non-linguistic semantic representation.
This sort of theory of the meaning of word-concepts is in the “middle” of my dimen-
sion, and despite that, I would wish to view it as being Atomistic even though it
allows for meanings to form “circular” deﬁnitional chains due to the large amount of
material allowed in the meanings of a word. At the far end of the dimension, max-
imally diﬀerent from the Shank or Wierzbicka/Goddard theories, and forming the
Wholistic version of these types of theories, are so-called conceptual role theories.
Conceptual Role theories can be found in very many versions of Cognitive Lin-
guistics. Like the Langacker version I just outlined, these theories also do not have
a small number of primitive concepts, but rather all word-concepts are allowed to
appear in the deﬁnition or explanation of any other concept. What sets conceptual
role theories apart from the Atomistic Langackerian theories, and makes them be
Wholistic, is their employment of semantic liaisons. A semantic liaison is an implica-
tive connection that one concept might have to another concept—typical liaisons
are ones of semantic inclusion (e.g., that being a tiger implies being a feline), con-
trary semantic entailment (e.g., that being a mammal is incompatible with being
cold-blooded), compatibility relations (e.g., that one object can be both a brother
to someone and a cousin of someone). More generally, in conceptual role theories
all such implicative connections that a concept A has are inherited by any concept
that includes concept A as part of its deﬁnition. Thus, if concept A has concept B
as a part of its deﬁnition, then concept A also has all the implicative relations that
B embodies. It is usually thought that this means that every concept has all other
concepts and their implicative relations as part of its meaning. So, the meaning of a
lexical item will be the concept it occasions plus all the “liaisons” it has with other
concepts. Here a liaison is seen as either some meaning-entailment or (less strictly)
some other association that the concept has with other concepts (that is, all the ency-
clopedic associations that a person might have with respect to the concept plus their
liaisons). The meaning then is seen as the collection of all these liaisons. And of
course, that is true for all concepts, including for the ones that form the liaisons with
the ﬁrst concept. In other words, meaning now becomes a feature of the entire set or
body of concepts, and insofar as one can attribute meaning to any one concept, it is
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most accurately said that this concept’s meaning is its place in the entire network of
liaisons among the concepts. Or, in the terminology mentioned above in Sect. 2, this
is Semantic Holism—the competitor to Functional Semantic Compositionality. But
it is not just a competitor to Semantic Compositionality, it is a competitor to any the-
ory in the Atomistic camp. . . even the Langacker-style theories surveyed just above.
In my mind it is important to keep these Atomistic vs. Wholistic versions of this style
of theory clearly separated, when we wish to evaluate candidates for a Subjectivist
theory of meaning.
Many theorists—and not just the Objectivists—ﬁnd meaning holism wanting,
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since according to this view, it would be very likely that diﬀerent people will have
had diﬀerent language-learning experiences, and therefore according to semantic
holism will have diﬀerent liaisons among their lexical items. In turn, this means they
do not speak with the same meanings associated with their words as one another.
So, it follows that they do not mean the same thing as one another even when they
utter the same word, phrase, or sentence. But then, when they (think they) agree
with one another, or disagree with one another, they are in fact not doing so. Any
evidence one has that you disagree with your conversational partner is, according to
the theory, equally good evidence that you are talking about diﬀerent things, and not
disagreeing at all. And should you (appear to) agree with someone whom you don’t
like, that is better evidence that you are talking about diﬀerent things, since you are
independently motivated to disagree with him or her.
It is also often pointed out that, not only is communication with others an impos-
sibility according to the theory’s own features, but also one cannot communicate
with oneself from one year to the next, one day to the next, one hour to the next,
. . . . For, in the intervening time period the person would have new experiences and
(except in very special cases where the person is comatose) these will impact the
class of liaisons that impinge on the meanings of his lexicon. Although one thinks
one remembers that the bark of eucalyptus trees peels oﬀ yearly, there is no jus-
tiﬁcation for this, according to the theory. Over the year when you last had that
thought, many of your liaisons have been altered—or at least, it is most likely to
have happened—and thus your last-year-thoughts do not necessarily have any con-
nection with this-year-thoughts.
Indeed, a Subjectivist-holist can’t change his mind about anything! For, the very
act of getting new information makes it be a diﬀerent thing, and hence it is not a case
of changing one’s mind about concept X. The old concept X is no longer there to
have a new opinion about. Not only is it impossible to disagree with another person,
as I remarked above, but it is impossible to disagree with the past. We think that
we have learned that Anaxagoras was wrong when he said that the unevenness of
the moon’s surface is due to the mixture of earthy matter with cold. But Subjectivist
holism is committed to claiming that we are in fact not at all disagreeing with him.
We can’t disagree. We can’t agree either. We’ve just changed the subject.
33
(Fodor and Lepore 1991) is perhaps the best-known opponent. It seems that one author is a
Subjectivist and the other is an Objectivist about meaning.
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At this point it is tempting for our Subjectivist-holist to retreat a bit from the view.
But it seems that the relevant retreat would be to a position akin to the Langacker-
style Atomistic Subjectivism of very complex, but separate, concepts—which is not
holistic. And so it might be a candidate for the Subjectivist portion of a two-tier
theory imagined in Sect. 7.3.
7 (Some) Desiderata for a Two-Tiered Semantic Theory
A two-tiered semantic theory is one that alleges an accommodation of both the
Objectivist and the Subjectivist theories, or at least of their main aspects or main
contentions concerning meaning. Some versions of such theories might keep the
two tiers separate, in the sense that neither one has any particular eﬀect on the other,
so that the features of the subjective (mental) never aﬀects anything about the fea-
tures of the objective, and correspondingly, the objective features never aﬀect the
subjective ones. We might, for example, follow a once-standard usage and call the
subjective features that we have been discussing the narrow meaning or the narrow
content of beliefs and meaning; and call the objective features the wide meaning or
wide content of language. We could then form a theory of narrow content of mental
concepts and its eﬀects on, as it may be, beliefs, desires, and actions. And a diﬀer-
ent theory of wide content for linguistic items that gave an account of the truth and
falsity of utterances.
But even if such a disjunctive two-part theory could be successful, each part in
its own realm, it wouldn’t be very satisfying to either the Objectivists or the Subjec-
tivists, who each think that their theory accounts for some very important aspects of
the uniﬁed activity or concept of meaning. What is desired is an “interactive” theory
that shows how the two are related. And to do this requires some point of contact: a
nexus of interaction. This nexus needn’t be anything especially exotic; it need only
be some item that both theories can agree upon, but which leads each theory in its
own way. I describe one possible nexus in Sect. 7.3.
There is a worry here, though, when one tries to integrate these two theories.
(Lewis 1970, p. 19) puts the worry thus:
I distinguish two topics: ﬁrst, the description of possible languages or grammars as abstract
semantic systems whereby symbols are associated with aspects of the world; and, second,
the description of the psychological and sociological facts whereby a particular one of these
abstract semantic systems is the one used by a person or population. Only confusion comes
of mixing these two topics.
Partee (1979) has also discussed some worries. She describes a group of phenom-
ena that she thinks cannot be handled by (what I call) Subjectivist theories. And in
considering what a Subjective-theorist might say in reacting to this challenge, she
considers three general attitudes they might take, but thinks that they all are inca-
pable of handling these (propositional-attitude-related) phenomena in a satisfactory
manner. In the end she despairs of ﬁnding any satisfactory solution. She calls the
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three approaches (i) the idealized approach, (ii) a realistic-egocentric approach, and
(iii) a realistic-nonegocentric approach; and it is useful to appreciate these options
and the shortcomings that they give rise to. The option (i) seems to require a system-
atic understanding of what the “non-ideal” mechanisms are, and how an idealized
theory can nonetheless account for them by means of some type of “contextual or
performance factors”, in the same way that friction and the like are contextual fac-
tors aﬀecting ideal laws of motion. She thinks this approach would not realistically
be possible in the realm of meaning. Approach (ii), she thinks, requires ﬁguring out
one person’s (one’s own?) psychological performance factors, allowing one thereby
to have a semantics for one’s own mental economy. But the remaining part of such
a theory then requires attributing those factors to other speakers, and this seems like
an implausible direction to go, given the diﬀerence in relevant experiences we all
have. The third approach is, in her estimation, just “giving up” on the problem. It
amounts to saying that, unlike option (ii) where we discover our own subjective the-
ory and attribute it to others, we instead just say that there are some such factors and
every person employs their own, whatever they may be. We merely “add variables
over psychological mechanisms incorporating performance factors and add variables
over psychological interpretations of individual lexical items”, and then existentially
quantify over these variables. She thinks that this is just a retreat from trying to
account for both Subjectivism and Objectivism in a single theory. It amounts to say-
ing that since we don’t know what the relevant features and factors are, we just put
existential quantiﬁers over them.
34
(Partee 1979) closes with this remark
What I have tried to suggest is that the [cognitive] linguist’s concern for psychological rep-
resentation may be relevant to every semanticist’s concern for an account of propositional
attitudes. So far I don’t see how to achieve either goal; my only positive suggestion is that a
good theory might be expected to achieve both at once.
I do agree with Partee’s “positive suggestion”. But I also don’t wish to engender
Lewis’s “confusion by mixing the two topics” of Objectivism and Subjectivism; and
rather, I would want to show that they each can play a role in a joint semantic theory.
One aspect of Lewis’s admonition not to mix the two types of theories is the
conviction that attempts to provide the two tiers both from within one side of the
Objectivist/Subjectivist divide is not the right way to go—this is where the confusion
comes from. I will try to demonstrate why I think this in Sects. 7.1 and 7.2. A part
of the story will be that, coming from within just one side of the dispute, there is no
common nexus point upon which the two can agree. It seems to me that the way to
avoid Lewis’s worry is to show how there can in fact be a common nexus, and from
this common point of agreement each of the theories goes its own way and does not
necessarily aﬀect the inner workings of the other. Below, in Sect. 7.3, I mention some
considerations that may alleviate the worry that with only a nexus for connection,
the two theories could diﬀer in all sorts of unimaginable ways.
34
Partee also thinks of Lewis’s positive approach in (Lewis 1970) as being like this.
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7.1 Objectivist Two-Tiered Theories
Some apparently two-tiered theories are actually theories within an Objectivist
framework. Kaplan (1989), for instance, distinguishes ‘context of utterance’ and ‘cir-
cumstance of utterance’, as well as character and content. A way of putting his dis-
tinctions is that the character of an utterance is “the meaning without taking into
account the context of utterance” or perhaps “the meaning in the language”. In any
particular context of utterance, the values of the various pronouns, demonstratives,
times, etc., that occur in the utterance are ﬁxed, and then the evaluation of the char-
acter at that context will yield a content. Now using this content, we can evaluate
it at a particular “circumstance” (maybe a particular possible world, such as the
actual one) and the result will be a truth value. Kaplan’s motivation for the distinc-
tion between character and content involves the interpretation of pronouns and other
indexicals (perhaps extended to predicates and the like), and not, generally speaking,
the Subjectivist-oriented concerns about the structure of concepts and how they lead
to beliefs, desires, and other features that guide behaviour.
So this picture plainly has both tiers working on the Objectivist side of mean-
ing: once the values of the contextual variables are determined, the resulting seman-
tic content is pretty much what one would expect from an Objectivist—a function
on a possible world or “circumstance” to a truth condition. The semantic value of
the character of a sentence is a function whose value at any context is the proposi-
tional content at that context. That is, a function that takes contexts as arguments and
returns content, content being a truth conditional statement, namely a function from
contexts and circumstances to some truth value. (See Westerståhl (2012) for how to
make Kaplan’s theory be compositional.)
Another theory that comes from the Objectivist side is Frege’s, although per-
haps the undeveloped Subjectivist side perhaps could be developed in some non-
Objectivist way. Frege’s semantic theory of meaning (Bedeutung) and sense (Sinn)
contains a subtheory which has certain explanatory powers relevant to a two-tiered
account, even though it has its roots in an Objectivist framework.
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In the objec-
tive, physical realm are the usual members of the physical universe of ordinary (and
scientiﬁcally discoverable) objects. In the objective, abstract realm are not only such
items as numbers, but also concepts and functions—taken to be the referents of pred-
icates, relations, and operations on objects. Singular terms of language mean (that is,
bedeuten or denote) the ordinary objects and the number-like items. Monadic pred-
icates mean the concepts, relational expressions mean the relations, and function
terms mean the functions—all members of the abstract realm.
A person can grasp—a technical term—these items in the abstract realm and
thereby consider and possibly understand them (in the ordinary senses of these
terms). But this is always done under some mode of presentation of the thing thus
grasped. Frege insists on this way of putting how objects are grasped under a mode of
presentation because of his realization that one needs somehow to distinguish cog-
35
Well, taking Frege’s view of the “abstract”, non-physical, non-mental, “third-realm” repository
of concepts and thoughts as being a version of Objectivism.
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nitive states of a person when the person has two names for the same object. The
sentences in (3) obviously have diﬀerent cognitive statuses, and yet the two names
mean (denote, bedeuten) the same object:
(3) a. Allen Stewart Konigsberg is Woody Allen
b. Allen Stewart Konigsberg is Allen Stewart Konigsberg
The mode of presentation ALLEN STEWART KONIGSBERG designates a person and
so does the mode WOODY ALLEN. But being told that the person designated via
ALLEN STEWART KONIGSBERG is that person who is designated via ALLEN STEWART
KONIGSBERG is cognitively trivial, whereas being told that it is the same person as
the one designated via WOODY ALLEN is (or can be) informative.
Frege does not give any account of how the subjective world ought to process
this “grasping”, nor what would happen in the subjective world that causes us to
recognize when modes of presentation are identical, or how certain conceptual fea-
tures would lead to assent or belief or action. Nonetheless, this picture has guided
those Frege-friendly Objectivists who want some (at least minimal) psychological
account of (at least) the informativity of identity statements. Frege’s type of formal
move seems relevant to having a two-tiered semantic theory: the Objective theory
would see no diﬀerence in the semantic values of (3-a) and (3-b), but the Subjective
theory would make it important.
7.2 Subjectivist Two-Tiered Theories
Subjectivist theories that attempt to also account for the “objective reality” aspect
of language all have the feature that they replace the Objectivist slogan of language
representing reality with the slogan that (some aspect of) people’s mental life—for
instance, their mental concepts—represents reality. It would seem to take some fancy
footwork to justify the replacement of an unexplained notion of representation with
another unexplained notion also to be called a representation.
One way that some Subjectivists have responded to the challenge that they need
to have two distinct tiers was to take the viewpoint that they can use the distinction
between people’s judgments of membership in a category and their judgments of the
typicality of membership in that category. The membership judgment could perhaps
ﬁll the role of the objective-tier membership in that category. But from the Objec-
tivist point of view using the judgements of membership as a substitute for “really
being a member of the category” is the sort of idea that will give rise to Lewis’s
“confusion”. At the best it can be evidence for membership in the category, but is is
clearly “contaminated” (the Objectivist claims) by all sorts of other biases. We can
see that this can’t really be the Objectivist’s “fact about reality” by considering some
of the actual experimentation that tests this. For example, the fact that subjects will
judge a middle-height person as “both tall and not tall” in strong preference both
to “tall” and to “not tall” (Alxatib and Pelletier 2011) does not in the least tend to
support any theory about the reality of people manifesting contradictory properties.
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Attempts to separate the two types of judgments (membership and typicality) and
use one as a proxy for “reference” just miss the point of Objectivism. Although we
can see this idea as endorsing a two-tier theory, we can also see that the use of “mem-
bership judgment” as if it were real membership is not something that Objectivists
would agree to. And this is because judgments of whatever type just aren’t the sort
of “neutral” nexus point that true two-tier theory requires.
Classic examples of this sort of “only apparently two-tier” theory from the Sub-
jectivist side, provided by the group of theories that separate the notions of typicality
from membership in a category, are (Smith et al. 1974; Osherson and Smith 1981;
Smith and Medin 1981; Smith and Osherson 1984; Armstrong et al. 1983; Bourne
1982), among many others that are more recent (e.g., Winter 2017). In this arena, the
main emphasis seems to be an argument as to whether there really are two diﬀerent
processes that people engage in. For example, Armstrong et al. (1983) demonstrated
that typicality judgments are given to concepts whose membership was categorial
by anyone’s standards, for example, odd versus even numbers. Such a result is then
taken by this group as evidence for a two-tier theory.
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But notice, as I said just
above, the presumption that this can be what Objectivists mean by “membership in
a category” is just wrong. An Objectivist will insist that it instead is a person’s belief
or judgment that it is or isn’t a member. So, this is not the type of theory that I wish
to call a true two-tier theory. A part of the objection is that such theories do not pro-
vide any nexus of contact between the two realms that is agreed-upon by both. Here
we see the Subjectivists take the concept of category-membership as the nexus; but
in the Objectivist’s eyes, this just raises the issue of how such a mental conception
be attached to the external world. In a way, this is the reverse of the Subjectivist’s
critique of the Frege “mode of presentation” nexus as a way to solve the issue of
co-referring proper names. A Subjectivist would not (or: not necessarily) agree that
this is where the two realms should meet.
Earlier in this subsection I remarked on the “fancy footwork” that might be
required to make replacement of one unexplained notion of representation by another
seem like an advance. Chomsky’s “Minimalist Program” has sometimes been thought
to exemplify this sort of footwork. I will display this by a few quotes from McGilvray
(1998), who is here explicating the notion of meaning in the Minimalist Program.
We will not pause to evaluate its accuracy as an account of Minimalism, but instead
will use it as a further example of a two-tier theory of meaning that has both aspects
on the Subjectivist side. The ﬁrst point in McGilvray’s exposition is to argue that the
“external world” cannot be relevant to meaning, on the grounds that it is not “near”
where the linguistic computation is taking place.
[B]ecause [linguistic] computations must also be local – they must proceed over ‘neighbour-
ing’ elements, or be local – practical necessity restricts it to items in the head. Extending
the domain of a theory of a cognitive competence outside the head makes it responsible for
far too much; a theory would have to cover so much that it would lose any serious chance of
being constructible. This poses a problem for an intentionalist view of a cognitive capacity,
one that insists on determining internal states by their relations to things outside the head.
36
The negative side of the argument has seemed to many to be settled by Hampton (1988b). See
also Hampton (2017).
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Intentional properties arise when an inner state or process is treated as a representation of
something in the world, or as having referential or alethic properties.
37
(McGilvray 1998, p.
231)
Further to the thought that the external world can’t participate inmeaning,McGilvray
later says
Although [linguistic structure] does not deal with the kinds of semantic issues that [Objec-
tivists] have in mind (reference and truth), it does deal with meanings. Generally, I suggest
that the domain of syntax includes all locally determined, intrinsic features of linguistic
mental events. If so, syntactic sciences include any disciplines that describe and explain the
elements of this domain. As we have seen, the locality condition excludes reference and
truth. (McGilvray 1998, p. 243)
And ﬁnally, McGilvray tries to show how this “perspective” allows for an internal-
ist viewpoint on linguistic meaning which nonetheless has certain “ties” with the
external world by means of when language is employed “in the world.”
Chomsky’s view of [the semantic value of a linguistic item] as “a perspective” was an adap-
tation for a general audience of the technical syntactically deﬁned concept of [such a value]
as “an interface”. He points to a way in which [these values] are both rich and anthropocen-
tric, and suggests a way to conceive of how they work cognitively in ‘interpreting’ the world:
[these values] focus attention on selected aspects of the world as it is taken to be by other
cognitive systems [my emphasis], and provide intricate and highly specialized perspectives
from which to view them, crucially involving human interests and concerns even in the sim-
plest cases. I have in mind by richness the idea that [these values] provide very ﬁne-grained
media for all sorts of enterprises, not only describing and explaining the world (although
not as a science that uses vocabulary apart from natural language would), but writing and
reading literature, chatting with friends, and so on. (McGilvray 1998, p. 256)
We note that the connection to objective meaning no longer counts as semantics,
in McGilvray’s presentation of Chomskean Minimalism. It instead becomes part of
the way the (rather mysterious) entities that are the “intrinsic features of linguis-
tic mental events” are processed by the non-linguistic mental realm. Appropriately,
this would relegate both the Objectivist’s semantic values and the Cognitive Lin-
guist/Psychologist’s meaning concepts to a non-semantic realm of (say) pragmatics.
This viewpoint then seems to have denied any nexus for Objectivists and Sub-
jectivists to agree upon for the interpretation of language and meaning. What starts
as the apparent promise of a method of accommodating both Objectivists and Sub-
jectivists in the realm of meaning has become a theory that neither side will agree
to.
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Note McGilvray’s use of ‘intensionalist’ here: it means that the mental item is about something
else—something in the objective realm, for instance. But it could instead be about some other type
of mental entity. This sort of intensionalism would be friendly to those Objectivists who want their
representations to “be about items of reality”. Thus McGilvray is here arguing against Objectivism,
and so is presumably attributing a form of Subjectivism to Chomsky’s Minimalism.
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7.3 Two-Tiered Theories with a Nexus
It is perhaps most clear from Frege’s example of “grasping” that we would want the
Objective Tier of our two-tiered theory to give an account of truth and possible truth
(etc.) by means of features of the world (or of features of possible worlds that are
objectively available in the actual world). And we would want the Subjective Tier
of the theory to give an account of the way that the world has “presented itself” to
an individual to account for aspects of that person’s belief states, desire states, and
intentional actions. (Some sort of a Belief plus Desire entails Action theory would
give an example of the sort of Two-Tier theory I have in mind.) This is the sort of
theory that Jerry Fodor seems to have had in mind during one of his earlier states
of theorizing (Fodor 1980), where wide versus narrow content was introduced. But
I would prefer a diﬀerent method of “tying together” the Objective and Subjective
than Fodor seems to have employed during this period of his thought on the topic.
From such a viewpoint, it also seems clear that the desired nexus—the placewhere
the two conceptions of meaning meet—is the word, or more accurately, the individ-
ual sense of a word, for the sort of reasons outlined in footnote 9 of Sect. 3. On the
Objectivist side of this theory, the meanings assigned to these senses (some sort of
reference or function on possible worlds) are the atomic units of meaning that form
the basis cases for compositional-like (atomistic) accounts of meaning. On the Sub-
jectivist side of this theory, it is the individual understanding of the mental meanings
of these senses that combine to form complexes which in turn can interact to form
beliefs, give rise to desires, and produce actions. My argumentation in Sect. 6.4 was
aimed at the conclusion that this subjective side also needed to be atomistic in its
treatment of meaning—although perhaps not compositional.
One recent foray into this realm is taken in (McNally and Boleda 2017), although
perhaps motivated by diﬀerent concerns than the one identiﬁed here. McNally and
Boleda are concerned with the fact that “in the absence of any speciﬁc context” some
sentences show a speciﬁc and particularly pronounced understanding, whereas when
enclosed in a wider linguistic context they can vary so much as to make the original
“default” interpretation be diﬃcult to see. They see two sources of information as
available for a language understander: the referential and the conceptual. And the two
sources may operate diﬀerently, the latter being especially sensitive to “aﬀordances”
provided by surrounding context. As they put it:
In the case of language, we take its connections to concepts and to the world to be distinct fea-
tures, each of which facilitates a distinct process of concept composition. When the concepts
contributed by two expressions in a grammatical phrase naturally suggest the ways in which
they should be composed, and interlocutors avail themselves of such a suggestion, we can
say the concept composition is conceptually aﬀorded. Alternative, if speciﬁc, independently
available information about the referent described by the phrase is used to guide the way in
which the concepts in question are composed, we can say that the concept composition is
referentially aﬀorded.
This general picture is rather attractive, and especially in that it locates the rele-
vant nexus to be linguistic items. (Although I would have preferred them to have
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identiﬁed speciﬁcally that they were senses of lexical items.)
38
Language is—as it
were—“neutral” in how it is to be understood, but diﬀerent cues give rise to a distinc-
tion in ways of understanding, between a referential interpretation and a conceptual
interpretation. Like the Frege theory, this seems to give us a way to picture how
a two-tier theory could be developed, this time from a Subjectivist point of view.
Below I will likewise gesture at a way of looking at a two-tier theory. I intend mine
to more strongly separate the (Objective) referential component from the (Subjec-
tive) conceptual-connection component. But like McNally and Boleda (2017), I will
just gesture at the theory and not give a lot of detail. In Sect. 8, I describe a number
of phenomena that need to be dealt with in the subjective tier before any such theory
can work.
In brief outline: I see the two-tier theory working somewhat as follows. A sense
of an individual content word
39
means
o
(mean in the objective tier) the sort of items
favoured by the formal semanticists—individuals for singular terms, sets of individ-
uals for simple nouns, properties
40
for adjectives, activities and processes for verbs,
and so on as required by a truth theory of meaning (or as modiﬁed for a theory of
truth at a possible world). They mean
s
(subjective meaning) some mental concept
(of the appropriate sort).
The objective tier is semantically compositional—or at least, is atomistic with
some sort of assignment of values for meaning
o
in a way that honours the general
argumentation for atomicity of meaning. It would be immensely pleasing if the sub-
jective tier could be similarly organized—that all the observed diﬀerences present
in meanings of complex linguistic expressions could be traced to the diﬀerences
between the meaning
o
and meaning
s
of individual lexical items. But it is a long-
established result that lexical items do not form the only place where the diﬀerence
in the meaning
s
of complex concepts is to be found. They are also found in the ways
that meanings
s
combine.
I view the referential portion to be in fairly good shape in these regards (it being
the focus of formal semanticists for many decades and all aimed at a similar “truth in
the objective world” goal), but that the concept-portion needs to answer many topics
that have not been dealt with in the Subjective literature (and hence can’t be directly
incorporated into a two-tiered theory, yet). See Sect. 8 for discussion of what other
further clariﬁcation of these matters is still called for.
The crucial point of a genuine two-tier theory is that there is some point of
contact—what I have called a nexus—where each side of the theory can agree upon
the features of that contact, but such that each side can decide on what aspect of these
features their particular theory should feature. As I see the nexus, it resides in a sense
38
And one might also object to this version of a two-tier theory on the grounds that McNally and
Boleda’s view of reference is questionable (they appeal to a distributional analysis of the closeness
of a word to other words in a corpus, using a multi-dimensional vector analysis). But we will not
dwell on that here.
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I do not here wish to discuss the rather diﬀerent workings of such non-content words as the
logical connectives, the copula-like words, the quantiﬁers, the multi-faceted prepositions, and so
on. Various comments about them are below, in Sect. 8.3.
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Functions from individuals to truth values (Or: functions from possible worlds to functions from
individuals to truth values.).
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of a lexical item. Such an item will have two parts: a meaning
o
and a meaning
s
, cor-
responding to some objective features of reality and some relevant subjective proper-
ties of mentation. Not only are these properties of a lexical sense diﬀerent, but what
can be done with each of them diﬀers, due to their diﬀering properties.
One crucial feature to be investigated concerning these diﬀerences is how far the
two theories of meaning can diverge from one another. Given that the meaning
o
is
dictated by the ﬁxed features of reality, the question then seems to become whether
the mental realm can veer willy-nilly away from the objective realm. As thus far
described, the answer is yes—no restrictions have been placed on the mental repre-
sentations. It is only by experimentation that we can ﬁnd out the ﬁne detail of the sub-
jective realm. However, on an a priori level we might say that, since the meanings is
supposed to give the agent’s reason for action by the way it can construct the agent’s
beliefs, it seems that these beliefs (in the main, anyway) can’t diverge too, too far
from the Objective realm. If the beliefs are all screwy, the agent won’t be able to get
along in the real world—for long, anyway. And it will be likely that many actions and
expressed beliefs will be at odds with others of theirs and of other people’s. That is,
when meaning
s
conﬂicts in action-oriented ways with meaning
o
, bad things can and
will happen. And so a basic thought about meaning
s
is that in an important sense they
can’t diverge much from meaning
o
. Serious divergence between (say) the objective
reality versus the subjective beliefs of the eating habits of grizzly bears might limit
the gene pool to be just those who do not have a divergence here.
In less serious cases, for instance where a person’s beliefs about snakes have
SLIMY as a component, diﬀerent outcomes might occur. If nothing intercedes, they
just go on believing that snakes are slimy and their actions (such as snake-avoidance)
is explained on the grounds that they have an aversion to sliminess. When it is
explained to them that snakes in reality are not slimy, they may alter their SNAKE
concept and change their actions; but they may also not accept such a claim and con-
tinue their previous actions; or ﬁnally, they may claim they accept the trutho, and
therefore answer that snakes are not slimy when asked, but not change their SNAKE
concept and not change their other actions that involve snakes. All three of these
reactions are possible. But the second and third reactions can’t happen too often,
since it would be evolutionarily a disaster were people not to change their internal
concepts in concert with what occurs in reality. it is this force that keeps the meaning
s
connected to meaning
o
.
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Asher (2011) develops the general form of theory that I wish to promote. Cen-
tral to his notion is that lexical items contain two parts: a contribution to objective
semantics and what he calls a TYPE. The objective portion is especially simple, but
the eﬀect of TYPE is intricate and detailed, withmany diﬀerent aspects, including pre-
supposition enablement, context sensitivity eﬀects, sense transfer, metonymy, predi-
cate transfers, discourse eﬀects, explanation of qua phrases, dedicative phrases, and
other very subtle meaning-topics.
41
James Hampton (p.c.) remarks that evolutionary pressure may not always work this way. Reli-
gious beliefs may serve to strengthen social groups to greater cohesion (and success) while being
relatively immune to falsiﬁcation by meaning
o
.
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Here are some of Asher’s introductory remarks on his vision:
The guiding idea. . . is that almost all words will have single and simple lexical entries. Words
like the nouns cat, lunch, book or the verbs kill, read, and master denote simple properties or
relations, and so accordingly the logical forms that specify their denotations are very simple.
For instance, cat has the lexical entry 𝜆xCat(x)42 . . . If words have simple entries and make
simple contributions to truth conditional content, they come with a rich amount of infor-
mation about the TYPE assigned . . .within them. These TYPEs will guide predication and
be responsible for ﬁne-grained diﬀerences in lexical meaning. When words are combined
together to form clauses, sentences, and discourses, the TYPE associated with various terms
will interact in complex ways. I will introduce operations of TYPE adjustment in response to
TYPE mismatches between predicate and argument that correspond to the accommodation
of a TYPE presupposition, or more generally speaking, the justiﬁcation of such a presuppo-
sition. . . .The eﬀects of these TYPE adjustments . . . is that the logical form for a clause will
contain elements that are not present in the lambda terms for the constituent words them-
selves. Predication involves not only applying a function to an argument but also operations
of adjustment corresponding to type presupposition justiﬁcation. (p. 22)
By his notion of “TYPE adjustment” and “coercion” he includes a very wide range
of examples that are familiar from the Cognitive Linguistics literature, such as
(4) a. good lunch versus good children
b. Mouse isn’t very tasty unless you’re a cat
c. John started a cigarette/started a car/began the sonata/started the novel
d. John liked the dress with the ﬂowers/liked the garden with the ﬂowers
And he mentions certain entailments as also falling under the sort of “coercion” he
is concerned to capture, such as
(5) John started the car defeasibly implies John started the engine of the car
In Asher’s account, another aspect of the TYPE portion of lexical entries concerns
how they interact with the TYPE-entries of other lexical items in a longer stretch of
discourse. This interaction is governed by the underlying logic of the mental side:
his adaption of classical type-theoretic logic to become a proof-theoretic semantics
for the TYPE side of his theory, as I suggested in Sect. 6.2.
I’ve argued that TYPEs are concepts, mind-dependent entities with ﬁne-grained content.
TYPEs have an internal semantics that is given at least in part in terms of the rules by which
they combine with other TYPEs; they are proof-theoretic objects. TYPEs can be associated
with other TYPEs – what we might think of as traits; each trait we associate with a TYPE is a
constraint on the introduction rule for the TYPE. . . . TYPEs as proof objects provide an inter-
nal semantics for natural language sentences and discourses that complements the external
semantics given by ordinary intensions. We can even distinguish between diﬀerent con-
ceptualizations of the same physical object or of the same property, so in some respects
the structure of types has the capacity to make ﬁner distinctions in meaning than inten-
sional semantics can. But the purpose of the internal semantics is not the same as that of
the external semantics. Intensions are the soul of a theory of meaning – they are needed to
determine truth, reference, and other external, semantic properties that link language to the
world we talk about. TYPEs and their adjustments are the heart of a theory of predication and
42
This lambda term is to be interpreted as “the feature of being an x such that x is a cat”, or more
simply, “the property of being a cat.”.
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responsible for other properties of meaning. . . .This is semantics but it is an internal matter,
something that speakers do “in their heads.” (pp. 44–45)
The one aspect I ﬁnd missing from this otherwise compelling story is that there is
no room here for individual variation of meanings. In particular, the mental realm—
as captured by the TYPE dimension of the dual-aspect lexical items and carried along
via the proof-theoretic semantics to full sentence-thoughts is the same for all people,
and it furthermore (appears to) contain exactly the objectively true features of the
encyclopedic facts in the word-TYPEs when these are manipulated so as to give the
meaning
s
for the sentence-thought. It thus cannot deal with issues of false beliefs
about items in the world; it will not give any account of why diﬀerent subjects give
individually diﬀerent results on the many tasks about meaning that have been admin-
istered over the decades in cognitive psychology.
Although Asher’s theory is not described this way, perhaps the alteration I would
advise is to make his theory be a theory for an individual agent, allowing this agent
to have his/her own set of encyclopedic “facts” for every lexical sense.
43
Presumably
there would also be individual diﬀerences in the underlying inference mechanisms
of the proof-theoretic semantics also, another topic not envisaged in Asher’s picture.
But this now would leave us without any way to accommodate “real communica-
tion”, where the two conversationalists are “really” talking about the same (mental)
things. While there can always be some check against “the objective facts” due to the
objective portion of meaning in Asher’s theory, this will not help conversation that
relies on having some mutual understanding of the TYPE-portion of meaning—the
meaning
s
.
I leave this problem hanging, as a very important topic still to be solved by any
two-tiered theory. And I turn instead to other aspects that need to be dealt with in
the subjective, TYPE portion of the theory.
8 (Some) Aspects of Current Theories of Mental
Concepts that Require Attention
Objectivist theories of meaning are just ﬁne—so far as they go, which is not very
far when it comes to mental life. (And one might reasonably think this is a very
major shortfall!) On the other hand, Subjectivist theories need some further work,
even within just the mental side of meaning with which they’ve been concerned. This
section is about a group of topics that need to be addressed more fully than they have
been, in order that one can take the Subjectivist theory of meaning seriously enough
to be included in the meaning
s
portion of a two-tier theory of meaning. I mention
three areas that seem to be “obvious problems” that need to be dealt with before it
is possible to develop any deep mental theories that invoke concepts., including the
43
I might mention that Asher’s picture does not take individual senses as the basic items, but rather
uses TYPE-coercion to generate the distinct senses as required in any particular sentence.
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desired concept-oriented portion of any two-tiered theory of meaning of the sorts
mentioned in Sect. 7.
The ﬁrst area concerns the type of concepts (and the details concerning them) that
such theories envisage, and it has several subparts. The second concerns a venera-
ble puzzle that should be considered by anyone when they embark on proposing any
account of meaning, whether Subjectivist or Objectivist. The third area requests Sub-
jectivists to construct even a basic version of what is already present in Objectivist
accounts. . . and then asks whether there is any reason to go to the trouble.
8.1 (Some) Messy Details for Conceptual Theories
I mention in this subsection a series of interrelated topics that seem to me to draw
attention to the inadequate attention that is paid to the vast majority of linguistic data
by theories of concepts and conceptual combination. These phenomena are seen as
central in Objectivist accounts, but which seem not to ﬁgure in most Subjectivist
accounts. This holds, I think, not only for the psychological theories that postulate
concepts to be tested against certain behavioural responses by language users (where
these theories don’t pretend to test a full range of linguistic phenomena), but also
for the cognitive linguists who are very aware of many of the deep and peculiar
intricacies of natural language but who nevertheless use the overly-simple results
from the psychological theories to account for them. (Sometimes just assuming that
“more of the same” will accommodate the intricacies.)
I write this from the point of view of an Objectivist, formal semanticist. All the
topics discussed below are thought to be adequately dealt with on the Objectivist
side of a two-tier theory (at least by Objectivists
44
). Presumably, Subjectivists would
have their own lists of topics that Objectivists need to deal with before any two-tier
account could be made to work. But someone else will have to provide that list.
8.1.1 Basic Problems with Singular Terms
Proper names and other singular terms do not seem to feature heavily in the Sub-
jectivist theories, although it seems pretty clear that these theories would somehow
wish to generate concepts in an individual’s mind corresponding to them. But proper
names and other singular terms have a number of well-studied peculiarities that seem
to tell against mental versions of concepts for proper nouns.
As we have seen, Subjectivist accounts claim that concepts embody “encyclope-
dic knowledge” of the items of which they are concepts. Thus, even though NATIVE
OF AFRICA is not part of the meaning of lion, it is a part of the concept LION, in
the Subjectivist’s view. The philosophers of language have advanced a number of
arguments that have seemed to Objectivists to show conclusively that this cannot
44
Speaking generically.
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be true for proper names. Although TEACHER OF ARISTOTLE might be part of the
stereotype or encyclopedic knowledge one has of Plato, we could discover that it was
all a mistake in the transcription of one ancient document, and that in fact Aristotle
was never in Plato’s Academy. Nonetheless, even after discovering this, when we
use the name Plato—as I just did in the last sentence—I was referring to the same
person as I always referred to. And, it is usually added, this could hold of any of the
encyclopedic properties of Plato—indeed, of all the encyclopedic properties (Kripke
1980).
45
A theory of concepts should in one way or another be able to accommodate this
ﬁnding. How can a singular term concept such as PLATO evolve so as to lose some,
and possibly all, of the properties given by our encyclopedic knowledge?
Similar remarks could be made about other singular terms. Unless one wants to
make the concept answering to The current President of the United States be the
same as that corresponding to The person I believe to be the current President of the
United States, one cannot include in the concept any stereotypical properties that are
not essential. But if you do decide that these were the same concept, you could never
discover that you were wrong! (Because they are the same concept, they said; so any
change just continues to make them (it?) the same concept.)
8.1.2 Basic Problems with Singulars versus Plurals, and Quantiﬁed
Noun Phrases
It is surprising that there is not more mention of the diﬀerence between concepts that
correspond to singular noun phrases in natural language and concepts of the corre-
sponding plurals. A survey of any of the literature will show that simple nouns like
dog get associated with a concept that is multiply-instantiated—that is, this concept
applies to (or represents) any dog. Intuitively it corresponds to a plural (or perhaps to
an unmarked-for-number) term. But in either case it remains somewhat of a mystery
how this can be employed to indicate a particular dog or to assert something true of
a single dog, and at the same time to assert something that is true of some but not all
the dogs. Clearly there needs to be some way to incorporate numerals and quantiﬁers
in the theory. Surely we want to conceptually diﬀerentiate the sentences A dog is in
the yard from Two dogs are in the yard from Dogs are in the yard. Yet it seems quite
diﬃcult to have this sort of modiﬁcation of simple nouns when using only the type
of conceptual combination that is usually described in Subjectivist writings.
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This claim—that an object identiﬁed by a proper name could lack all the properties traditionally
associated with the object and still be referred to by the proper name—follows from any version of
the “historical-causal theory” of reference (of proper names). One intuition supporting the claim is
that any of the initial identifying features in fact needn’t have been true—they need only seem to
be true to the initiator of the use of the proper name. And then those who adopt this name into their
idiolect just assume these to be factual claims about the initial referent. But as this consideration
shows, the truth needn’t be a part of this assumed set of features.
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Furthermore, natural language contains a myriad of diﬀerent types of quantiﬁed
noun phrases such as all people just as much as it does adjectival modiﬁcations of
nouns such as tall people. This suggests that since conceptual combination is used to
generate a concept TALL PEOPLE from the concepts TALL and PERSON,
46
something
akin to it should be used to generate the concept ALL PEOPLE. But this would require
a concept ALL, much along the lines of the concept TALL. And this has seemed to
most philosophers an unlikely suggestion: quantiﬁers are higher-order, that is, they
are properties of properties. Here ALL would need to be a property of PERSON, not
one of PERSON’s properties.
Without a theory that accommodates the quantiﬁers (and there are many more
than just some and all), the theory of concepts is essentially unable to accommodate
the vast majority of our language and our mental life.
8.1.3 Basic Problems with Noun-Oriented Concepts
It is striking, although perhaps explainable, that theories of concepts start by pre-
suming concepts corresponding to certain lexical nouns: the concepts PET, CAT,
MOUNTAIN, CABIN, . . . , and so on. As mentioned above, and as is ubiquitous in
the literature, the history is that very much of this research program’s time is now
spent on trying to determine just what the nature of these concepts should be: fea-
ture lists, prototypes, stereotypes, schemata, dynamic whatevers, and so on. A test
for correctness of the resulting theory is then developed, and it consists in how well
“conceptual combination” works according to these tests. But the examples thereby
considered for these tests, at least in the ﬁrst instances—PET CAT, MOUNTAIN CABIN,
CHERRY BLOSSOM, . . . —seem to be carefully-chosen noun-noun compounds, since
they don’t include things like PET ROCK, CABIN CAT, CABIN FEVER, . . . , for which
there are intuitively plausible interpretations but where the method for arriving at
these interpretations would seem to be in conﬂict with the methods established for
the initial examples. The diﬀerence of interpretation between IRON GATE and WATER
METER, obviously requires some distinction between “material substance of” and
“recipient of” to formally yield for us a gate made of iron versus a meter that con-
trols or measures water.
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Furthermore, as presented in the literature, the various mechanisms for concep-
tual combination in the literature are—at least in the main and for the most part,
as emphasized in (Hampton 2011b)—“symmetric”: for example, one considers the
feature lists from two prototypes and constructs some sort of new feature list corre-
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Note the insertion here of some sort of plurality operator to form the combined concept! As I
said, there needs to be some way for concept theory to generate the singular-plural distinction.
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There are, of course, the hints from those Subjectivists who propose types of “metaphorical inter-
pretations” and rely on magic for the formalism. And more plausibly, there are suggestions about
how there can be underlying principles governing diﬀering types of this sort of compounding. For
example, there are nice principles stated in (Wisniewski 1997; Gagné 2002; Gagné and Spalding
2006; Spalding andGagné 2008; Gagné et al. 2016), but I would prefer to see some sort of algorithm
instead.
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sponding to the combined phrase. From PET and FISH, one constructs a prototype for
PET FISH. But as a symmetric procedure, this very same result should be generated
from the phrase ﬁsh pet also, even though it is very diﬃcult to give an interpretation
for that noun-noun compound, as it occurs in natural language.
But matters are more complicated here, since some noun-noun compounds do
in fact have interpretations for either order of the lexical nouns, but the interpreta-
tions are diﬀerent: grease gun versus gun grease, talk show versus show talk, truck
delivery versus delivery truck, school teacher versus teacher school, ﬂea circus ver-
sus circus ﬂea, for example. All this is one topic that should be addressed at the
very beginning of any theory of concepts. Hampton (2011b) outlines various types
of “non-intersective” conceptual combination, referring to some seminal work in
(Wisniewski 1997). Word order (in English) gives rise to much of the “direction of
interpretation”: the head of a noun-noun phrase tends to be on the right. Although
this is correct (generally) for English orthography and verbal production, it is not
at all clear why it should dictate how the concepts themselves should combine. Is it
that the concepts GREASE and GUN can combine in both ways freely, but that one is
associated with the linguistic phrase grease gun while the other is associated with
the phrase gun grease? But now what is needed is some principle that determines
why one of the concepts is associated with the one linguistic phrase while the other
concept is associated with the other phrase. Is there anything at all intrinsic to the
concepts that dictates one over the other? (For some thoughts on this dark matter,
see Hampton 2011a.)
Of course, disjunctions of nouns occur in language, as well as conjunctions. So
we would like a satisfying account of the type of concept one gets for either a dog
or a cat and (more diﬃcult, perhaps) either an aggressive intruder or a ﬁgment of
the imagination.
Most theories of concepts also explicitly introduce concepts corresponding to
adjectives, so that we have concepts like HAPPY, TALL, RED, etc. Now we can
have conceptual combination to yield concepts corresponding to happy pet, green
cabin, red rock, . . . ; but in these cases we do not have symmetry of conceptual
combination—pet happy, cabin green, rock red, . . . are not normally grammatical
when the second item is an adjective, unlike (most) cases where they both are nouns.
(In those cases the phrases are grammatical but may be semantically incoherent. This
seems a natural thing to say, but one can wonder whether the Subjectivist account of
concepts will allow a distinction between ungrammaticality and semantic incoher-
ence.) This argues that concepts corresponding to adjectives have to be diﬀerentiated
from those corresponding to nouns. And as a consequence, conceptual combination
of concepts of adjectives would probably be diﬀerent from that for nouns: the adjec-
tive phrase rich, happy, and well-adjusted maybe corresponds to a conceptually very
diﬀerent sort of concept from the concept corresponding to the noun phrase men,
women, and children.
I do not suggest that no work has been done on these topics—disjunctions and
negations were discussed long ago in (Hampton 1988a, 1997). But as I will mention
in Sect. 8.3, a theory that explains the workings within the realm of concepts that is
of a scope as broad as the Objectivist account still remains to be articulated.
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8.1.4 Basic Problems with Verb-Oriented Concepts
One presumes that lexical verbs also correspond to mental concepts in this overall
picture, and that since verb phrases can conjoin (eats, drinks, and falls asleep as
well as marries, works, breeds, and dies); so presumably the corresponding verb-
oriented concepts can conjoin. But as I will try to demonstrate in this section, it
seems reasonable to suppose it will be a diﬀerent type of concept combination than
in the nominal side of things, because of the particular diﬀerences there are between
the noun-concepts and the verb-concepts, as well as the higher degree of complexity
that verb-concepts display.
Conceptual combination seems to have been designed to deal with what might
be called “conjunctive (or: intersective) concepts”, even though the resulting fea-
ture lists (or whatever used to keep track of properties) is not a simple conjunction
of the feature lists of the subparts. A part of the rationale for concentrating on this
could be that English allows easily for conjoined noun phrases (Bob and Sally, Men
and women, Both small dogs and short snakes, All baseball players but only some
Olympic high-jumpers, etc.) And also that the interpretation of adjective-noun com-
binations has historically been seen as conjunctive (although modern formal seman-
tics treats them otherwise). But it is not so clear to me how any similar technique
will work with what might be called “disjunctive concepts”. After all, English pretty
easily allows for disjunctive noun phrases: Juan or Alice, Men or women, Either
Americans or Canadians, etc.48
As remarked just above, verb phrases easily conjoin just as much as noun phrases
do, but I claimed that the conceptual items corresponding to verbal items will require
some diﬀerent sort of combining method from the ones in the noun realm. Verb
phrases can disjoin, like noun phrases can, for linguistic phrases such as is either
swimming or eating. Another place where noun concepts and verb concepts appear
to be diﬀerent is in the case of linguistic conjunction. But given that the conceptual
combining method for verb-concepts is diﬀerent from that of noun-concepts, due
to the inherently more complex nature of verbs, it seems likely that the method for
forming disjunctive verb-concepts would have to be diﬀerent from that of forming
disjunctive noun-concepts.
A special diﬃculty for theories of concepts attends to those concepts that cor-
respond to non-monadic verbs. That is, to relational verbs—ones that take direct
and indirect objects.) For example, the verb kick requires a direct object, and so any
corresponding concept will require something corresponding to this. As with any
verb-concept, there will need to be some notion of a subject of the kicking-concept.
But in the case of transitive verbs, the corresponding concept will also require the
notion of a recipient of the kicking. It seems that some as-yet unspeciﬁed notion
of conceptual combination is required for this. (And a further unspeciﬁed one for
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In the olden days there were various works on disjunctive concepts, both learning and using them
(Furth 1963; Conant and Trabasso 1964; Seggie 1969; Bar-Hillel and Eifermann 1970; Trabasso
et al. 1971; Newstead and Griggs 1983), but these have seemingly diminished in recent years, and
the few more recent writings have focussed on reasoning with disjunctions. However, there are
works by, especially, James Hampton on aspects of these topics: (1988a, 1997, 2007, 2012).
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indirect objects.) As I have mentioned above, noun phrases are not only these sim-
ple lexical nouns nor do they merely include only the conjunctive and disjunctive
nouns, but they also include proper names and quantiﬁed noun phrases. It is most
unclear how the imagined-but-as-yet-unspeciﬁed-conceptual-combination that cre-
ates verbal concepts with direct and indirect object concepts really works, even in
simple cases like loves dogs, but it seems quite a bit more diﬃcult to imagine any
such method of conceptual combination that would work with loves all dogs or with
loves some dogs or with loves many dogs, or with loves all dogs but only a few cats,
etc., and give the intuitively correct distinctions among them all. (And with indi-
rect objects we can have verb phrases like gave many children numerous gifts. It is
again most unclear how such complex concepts can be built up, especially since the
underlying concept for the verbs and noun phrases are unspeciﬁed as yet.) A further
related diﬃculty arises with those verbs that can also be used in an ergative manner
as in (6-b):
(6) a. Mary boiled the water
b The water boiled
(7) a. Kim tripped Sandy
b. Sandy tripped
Yet another diﬃculty that seems not often addressed is the diﬀerence that English
(and other languages) shows between “stative” and “eventive” verb phrases. (Knows
Japanese is a stative verb phrase whereas is speaking Japanese is eventive, report-
ing an activity. Other types of eventive verbs indicate achievements or accomplish-
ments. One linguistic test is that eventive verbs allow the progressive (in English),
whereas stative verbs don’t: *John is knowing Japanese is not correct, but John is
speaking Japanese is.) This distinction also brings up the diﬀerence between ability
versus activity senses. And that is another diﬃculty for concept theories. When FLY
is conceptually combined with TWEETY,
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is the result a representation of the nat-
ural language Tweety can ﬂy or Tweety is ﬂying? There is a very large literature in the
intersection of philosophy of language and formal semantics that deals with issues
involved with this distinction, and these ought to be reﬂected in theories of concepts
(e.g., Parsons 1990; Schein 1993; Casati and Varzi 2015).
8.1.5 Basic Problems About Other Noun- and Verb-Oriented Concepts
The fact that the various major categories of syntax allow for conjunctive and dis-
junctive combinations, and that the Subjectivist theory thereby requires some type
of concepts corresponding to them, leads one to wonder whether there can be neg-
ative noun-concepts, or conditional noun-concepts, according to theories of mental
constructions. Similarly, one wonders about negative or conditional verb-concepts.
Although negation in English can apply pretty easily to verbs/verb phrases, and to
adjectival/adverbial phrases with only a slight increase in diﬃculty, they apply with
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Assuming that the concept theorists have a way of representing proper names as concepts.
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rather more diﬃculty to noun phrases. Can there be a concept NON-CAT? Maybe it’s
more plausible to have a concept NON-STARTER? But then there are more complex
noun phrases, and if concept-theories are extended to handle arbitrary noun conjunc-
tion/disjunction, it ought to be extended with negation so as to handle the concept
associated with short adults but not tall children or neither oil nor coal, and the like.
One wonders, then, just how negative noun-concepts are going to be handled. My
own intuition is that it will require very diﬀerent applications to the diﬀerent sorts
of concepts (that is, it will apply diﬀerently to diﬀerent grammatical categories). It
would be good to see a careful account that will accommodate all this.
Since English easily allows for conjunctive and disjunctive noun phrases, adjecti-
val phrases, adverbial phrases, and verb phrases, and allows easily for negative verb
phrases, adjectival phrases, and adverbial phrases, it seems that the usual “logical
connectives” can apply to any of the usual linguistic categories other than nouns. But
then one wonders about non-standard connectives like conditionals: English allows
conditionals in all the linguistic categories (although it is rather more stilted in the
noun case): is happy if he is eating (conditional verb phrase), if not tall then at least
not short (conditional negations and adjectives); morally if not legally (conditional
adverbial phrase), crocodiles, if not all reptiles (conditional noun phrase, with nega-
tion). So it seems that there needs to be some sort of conditional-forming conceptual
combination. Needless to say, this doesn’t at all look like the usual conceptual com-
bination.
8.2 Concepts, Sentences, and Bradley’s Regress
We observe that there has not been any account of the interpretation of sentences
given by Subjectivists. That is, there is as yet no account of a (mental) judgment.
Even granting a singular concept SANDY and a verbal concept SWIMS, there is not
yet any judgment that Sandy is swimming.
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This is related to another question that concept-theorists seem not to have
addressed about an old philosophical puzzle and to a more modern apparent para-
dox. The puzzle is: how can mere words combine to form a sentence? That is, what
is the diﬀerence between a list of words and a complete sentence? How can it be that
a list of words becomes something diﬀerent—something that expresses an entire
proposition? All sentences, even very simple ones, give rise to this puzzle: Consider
My list of words:
[Word #1] Kim
[Word #2] runs
My Assertion:
Kim runs.
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Or that Sandy can swim, depending on the account given as an interpretation of the concept SWIM.
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As various writers in the past have claimed, the former is “inert” and “is a mere
congeries”, whereas the latter actually “does something” in making an assertion that
describes a feature of Kim.
Note that a structurally identical puzzle arises if ‘Word’ is replaced by ‘Concept’
and ‘My assertion’ is replaced by ‘My judgment’. Both Objectivists and Subjectivists
are subject to this puzzle, and they both should give some sort of answer. However,
Subjectivists seem not to have thought of a diﬀerence between the noun-phrase con-
ceptual combination {SANDY; SWIM} and the sentential conceptual combination
{SANDY IS SWIMMING}. Nor has it seemed to occur to them that in order to give
a concept-analysis of some noun phrase like a man who is tall, there needs to be
a sentential analysis of the embedded relative clause (as well as an analysis of the
contribution of ‘a’, as mentioned above in Sect. 8.1.2).
This puzzle is at least as old as Plato, and has provoked considerable discussion
over the centuries. One type of answer might be to postulate a copula-like intermedi-
ary, call it ‘exempliﬁcation’, with the idea that it is this intermediary that causes the
other items to merge into a full sentence. But as one can pretty easily see, this just
leads to some sort of inﬁnite regress: for, now there needs to be a further explanation
of how it is that ‘Kim’ (or the person corresponding to that name) can combine with
this newly postulated object to then be able to combine with ‘runs’ (or the object
corresponding to that predicate). This is known as Bradley’s Regress, or The Unity
of the Proposition/Sentence problem.
Objectivists have proposed various answers to the Unity problem, one of the most
popular being some variant on the metaphor of saturated/unsaturated from Frege
(1892a). The idea is that singular terms are such that they are designed to designate
“independent” or “saturated” objects, whereas predicate terms are designed to desig-
nate “unﬁlled” or “unsaturated” items, namely “concepts”. (Recall that for Frege and
the Objectivists, a concept is a non-mental, abstract entity.) When these two diﬀerent
kinds of entities “meet”, the saturated object “ﬁlls in” the unsaturated object, produc-
ing a new, saturated object—a complete sentence (which expresses a “thought”, in
Fregean terminology. . .where “thought” is also understood as a non-mental, abstract
item).
Well, whatever one thinks of such metaphorical accounts (and something akin to
this is adopted in Formal Semantics’ model-theoretic theories), it is at least some
sort of explanation, showing that there might be some wiggle room in Objectivist
theories that would provide an appropriate description of what is going on.
However, it seems that Subjectivist accounts are not in such a good place, at least
not if they hold that lexical concepts designate mental items like concepts. For it
seems that this would presume there to be a concept of INSTANTIATION—sort of a
mental version of the linguistic exempliﬁcation, and now it appears that the Bradley
regress can start. Subjectivists of the sort we have been considering will respond by
claiming that conceptual combination is how they handle this topic. But it should
be noted that conceptual combination in these works is deﬁned for noun-noun and
adjective-noun combinations (perhaps also for adverb-verb combinations?). But this
won’t work for sentence generation: perhaps the conceptual combination of DOG and
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TAIL will yield a concept that somehow contains dogs with tails, but it isn’t a concept
corresponding to Dogs have tails.
The Bradley Regress puzzle should encourage Subjectivists to engage in serious
theory construction for such a further mental operation. But it has to be an opera-
tion, and not a concept. For, a concept will only reinstate the Bradley Regress. So,
besides conceptual combination, and whatever other related operations are required
to accommodate the types of other combination I mentioned in the previous sub-
section, it is absolutely necessary that there be some further type of operation that
forms “complete mental thoughts” out of concepts. And what should these be called?
It seems to me that it would be much too confusing to simply reuse the term ‘con-
cept’, so I will start using ‘thought’. This maintains the parallel of usages with the
(Fregean) Objectivists: they use ‘concept’ to refer to an objectively existing, abstract
object; they use ‘thought’ to refer to an objectively existing, abstract object that can
be evaluated in a truth-valued manner (or other manner for diﬀerent speech acts than
assertion). Subjectivists in the proposed usage employ ‘concept’ to refer to subjec-
tive items of individual minds that correspond to items of the non-sentential syntactic
categories; they use ‘thought’ to refer to the mental complex that can be evaluated
as a complete judgment.
8.3 REAL Negation, Conjunction, Conditional,
and Disjunction
We’ve seen that English easily allows noun phrases, adjectival phrases, adverbial
phrases, and verb phrases all to be conjunctive and disjunctive. English also allows
for negative verb phrases, adjectival phrases, and adverbial phrases. And there is also
some opening for conditional phrases of these various linguistic sorts. But this is
not—at least, is not according to most philosophical and formal semantic theories—
the major use of conjunction, disjunction, and negation. For that use, say the Objec-
tivists, we negate, conjoin or disjoin sentences.
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But there is no provision within the
Subjectivist conception of a mental regime of concepts for this type of combination.
(For one thing, there has not been any explanation of how to generate thoughts from
simpler concepts.)
But suppose we grant the Subjectivists that they can generate thoughts—that is,
that they have some sort of concept combination that will generate judgments rather
than just merged noun-like concepts. And further suppose they have some operations
to generate concepts that are negations, conjunctions, and disjunctions of noun-,
verb-, adjective-, and adverb-concepts. They still haven’t done what most formal
semanticists see as the central point of these notions: the ability to form thoughts
which correspond to complex statements. The sort of work that is in the literature
seems aimed at somewhat diﬀerent targets, such as describing the various eﬀects
that diﬀerent of these constructions have in speciﬁc cases as opposed to large-scale
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Or propositions, if one is in the market for using abstract entities rather than mental concepts.
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rules that would apply universally. Those problems seem simply not to be the ones
that are addressed, and so it is not so surprising that the investigations don’t yield
such overarching theoretical proposals.
Instead there are “local” accounts. But note, for the present case under discussion,
that negation, conjunction, disjunction, and conditional cannot be concepts, under
the pain of running again into the Bradley regress. But also it is not so easy to deal
with these complex sentential operations as it is to deal with the corresponding ones
operating on concepts. One example is discussed in Pelletier (1998), where the idea
was that negation might be an operation that transforms “regular” concepts into some
other type of concept. For example, the conceptual operation of negationmight trans-
form a verb-concept like IS TALL into a disjunctive concept like IS EITHER SHORT
OR MIDDLE-HEIGHT. Or, it might transform the verb-concept IS RED into IS SOME
COLOUR THAT IS CONTRARY TO RED, which would presuppose that colour concepts
(and maybe all concepts generally) fall into “incompatibility classes”, where nothing
can manifest any two diﬀerent concepts in that incompatibility class. And there are
other possibilities.
This has the eﬀect of making all sentence negations into predicate negations, and
it is far from obvious that this sort of move can really bemaintained. It is also far from
obvious whether there is anything similar that can be done with the other “thought-
combining concepts”.
But even if there were some such way to endorse all the earlier additions to the
mental world of concepts, and even if there were some mental analogue to the Objec-
tivist notion of “saturation” as a way to solve the Unity of the Thought issue, it seems
that the Subjectivists would just be mirroring the Objectivist account, but with a very
complex and otherwise unmotivated set of operations. And then, such rumination
makes one want to ask: Why bother? Even if it could all be done, would there have
been any advance at all in explaining how natural language describes the world? Or
even what is possibly more to the point from the Subjectivist point of view: has there
been any advance at all in explaining how people use natural language to describe
the world? It is hard to see what it might be.
It seems to me that the only reasonable answer from the Subjectivist camp to such
rumination would have to emphasize the role of concepts in a Belief+Desire⇒Action
framework. It is in this realm that we can see people making use of concepts that do
not correctly mirror reality. (“She eats brown eggs rather than white eggs because
she thinks they have less cholesterol”. It seems that an appropriate account of this
subject’s concepts would somehow explain such an objectively strange behaviour by
using some such account of his/her beliefs and desires.) From the Objectivist camp,
presumably the only appropriate answer to such rumination would be to show how
“objective truth” can alter conceptual connections. And I think it is in this interaction
of the two realms that the correct account of meaning lies, including why both are
required.
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9 (Some) Concluding Remarks
I have tried in this paper to lay out the (sometimes) subtle interactions that are inher-
ent in a number of distinct commitments held by many theorists who study the
semantics of language. A major division among these theorists is between those who
think to study language by an investigation of how language describes or attaches
to “the world” versus those who think of it primarily in terms of how it describes
“mental structures” of users of the language. This is what I called the Objectivist ver-
sus Subjectivist distinction. This diﬀerence in viewpoint impinges on several topics
of interest. A simple but confusing topic concerns the diﬀerence in intent when the
two groups employ terms like ‘concept’ and ‘thought’, where Objectivists, following
Frege, think of these as “public”, objective entities that can be “grasped” by many
diﬀerent language users, while Subjectivists think of them as “private” and exist-
ing only in the mind of a single language user. (Hence, any talk of a shared concept
then becomes an issue of the similarity between the diﬀerent concepts and thoughts
possessed by the diﬀerent speakers.)
Although it might appear on the surface that this is the entire diﬀerence between
the philosophers-formal semanticists (the Objectivists) and the cognitive linguists-
psychologists (the Subjectivists), there are further ramiﬁcations that may not be so
obvious from just that simple diﬀerence. For, it is this that makes the Subjectivists
think that meanings are not compositional, because of data about such topics as con-
ceptual combination (for the cognitive psychologists) and the choice of meaning
speciﬁcity by a speaker and hearer (for the cognitive linguists). And on the other
hand, the separation of a speaker’smental life from “meaning in theworld”makes the
philosopher/semanticist group able to hold on to semantic compositionality even in
the face of the psychological data. They say that since mental concepts are not com-
positional, that is yet further evidence (besides what they believe they have shown)
that such concepts can’t be meanings—since semantic compositionality is true.
This diﬀerence furthermore opens the door to distinct accounts of how meanings
are to be speciﬁed. In the Objectivist version of this, meanings are organized in what I
called anAtomisticmanner. There are smallest units ofmeaning (words, or whatever)
and these smallest units combine in one or another way to form the meaning of larger
and larger units. The dispute over compositionality within the Objectivist camp then
becomes whether this combination follows a notion of Functional Compositionality,
or whether there can be exceptions. Note that this dispute is entirely about “meaning
in terms of the objective world” and has no direct reﬂex into the subjective contents
of a person’s mind.
But when it comes to the Subjectivist side of things, issues of compositionality
can take two diﬀerent forms. One is a kind of mental “mirror” of the Objectivist
viewpoint, where there are smallest units that bear meaning—lexical items, let’s say.
But these lexical items mean concepts and these concepts have a very rich structure,
replete with “encyclopedic facts”. Nonetheless, the notion of Functional Compo-
sitionality could still apply to this picture, if only the meanings of more complex
phrases could be described in terms of a function applied to the very complex mean-
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ings of the simpler parts. As I mentioned, most researchers think this is not possi-
ble, although in my mind the jury is still out on this until the Subjectivist theory of
complex concepts is ﬁlled out more fully. As it is currently given, the majority of
research concerns the concept-combination of two particularly simple noun-based
concepts. And for them it does indeed seem to be diﬃcult to give a compositional
treatment—although one should always keep in mind that functional compositional-
ity is a particularly powerful tool with many unexpected strengths to capture under
its aegis all sorts of phenomena in the objective realm. (Many of these are recounted
in Pelletier 2016.) Perhaps the same strengths can be employed in the mental realm,
especially when the “meaning” of concepts is explicated in an atomistic way, as out-
lined in Sect. 6.4. But it is diﬃcult to know in the absence of a more developed theory
of complex concepts.
The other way that a Subjectivist theory of meaning might go is to say that a part
of each concept’s meaning is all the liaisons that concept has with other concepts.
This is diﬀerent from the other form of complex concepts, because here each concept
has every other related concept as a part of its meaning. And since this holds of
these related concepts also, it follows that what is related to them becomes a part
of the original concept’s meaning. As one can see, this makes conceptual meaning
be a “network” or “web”, where every concept involves every other concept, and no
concept has any meaning of its own.
The former of the two Subjectivist theories is—like the Objectivist theories—
Atomistic in nature. While the latter theory is Wholistic, leading to a holistic theory
of meaning. To my mind, there are a number of devastating objections to any version
of this latter theory. And so I rejected this version of Subjectivism, but not the other
version, which is the general sort of account that I see being plausible for one half
of a two-tier semantic theory.
It is not surprising, though, that Subjectivists of both types claim that semantic
compositionality is false. Holistic semantic theories are, by deﬁnition, not Atomistic,
and hence stand no chance of being compositional. The other type of Subjectivism,
where concepts corresponding to lexical items contain a wealth of encyclopedic
information, could be compositional if these presumed complex meanings happened
to be organized appropriately. But at least so far as that idea has been developed by
this point in time, they do not appear to be compositional. For the most part, the the-
oretical apparatus used for determining the meaning of complex mental items is so
underspeciﬁed that it is in fact unable to create such complex items, much less create
them in a way that would obey the strictures of semantic compositionality. But on
the other hand, the Objectivists have not done two related things. They have not said
how the lexical items that are at the terminal nodes of a syntactic tree are assigned
their meanings other than to say that these meanings are “from the world”; and they
have not described what relationship there is between this “meaning in the world”
and a language-user’s mental life or concepts. (Neither for the lexical items nor for
larger linguistic units like sentences.)
Do the Objectivists need to give such descriptions? After all, they might say, the
enterprise of formal semantics is pretty much deﬁned as articulating how sentences
encode information about the world, and it has no particular place for human menta-
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tion, except perhaps in the case of ﬁnding semantic treatments for attitude reports.
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And the task of a formal semantics is to explain how complex meanings are con-
structed from simple meanings. For that purpose one needs to start with the simple
meanings as a given.
Although both of those claims are true, at least as the task is conceived by the
Objectivists, they seem also to have forgotten their rationales for ﬁnding semantic
compositionality attractive in the ﬁrst place: the arguments from understandability,
from productivity, from learnability, and from creativity. Certainly all of these argu-
ments make the claim that the justiﬁcation of semantic compositionality lies in the
way it facilitates mental processing. And thus, even if the picture that “language is
about the world” is correct, these arguments nevertheless presuppose or require that
language also embody features of one’s mental life.
A natural place for the Objectivists to ﬁnd this missing connection is to claim
that the terminal nodes of their meaning structures are given by mental items, such
as concepts. And then they can go ahead and—from this starting point—be entirely
compositional. In fact, I’m sure that most of the philosophers-semanticists who give
any thought to the issue probably believe something along those lines. But let’s look
at what this would entail.
If the psychological results are correct—and they have been replicated over and
over, at least in regards to simple binary combination—that mental concepts allow
both for diﬀerences in degree of typicality of the concept and also for diﬀerences in
degree of membership (Hampton and Jönsson 2012, pp. 386–87), then this would
have to be a feature of the meanings at the terminal nodes of the semantic structure.
The lexical item ‘furniture’, for instance, would have to admit in the world of diﬀerent
degrees of truth (and not merely diﬀerent degrees of typicality) for ‘This chair is
furniture’ and ‘This clock is furniture’. I think philosophers-semanticists would not
countenance this.
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In response to all these competing pressures, I surveyed the prospects for a two-
tiered semantic theory: one aspect being the Objectivist’s “connection to the world”
and the other aspect being the Subjectivist’s account of mental activity. As it turns
out, some of the works that claim to provide a two-tier theory actually are within just
one of the Subjectivist or Objectivist camp, in that both of their tiers have their foun-
dational starting point, or common nexus, entirely within one camp. I also mentioned
a few theories that appear to be genuinely two-tiered, but noted that they require fur-
ther input, especially from the Subjectivist side of the theory. To agree to anything
like the two-tiered theory I outlined, one needs to accept two claims: First, that lin-
guistic utterances are to be judged as to how well they “ﬁt” the (external) world. One
way to put this, and I did, is to say that what is meanto by an utterance concerns
the actual world, and not any conceptual representation. The two come apart when
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Such as John wants to marry a princess, the ambiguity of which (a speciﬁc princess versus any
princess) seems to invite an analysis that would involve John’s mental states. And also, since human
mentation is actually occurring in the physical world, it must ﬁnd a proper place even in Objective
semantics as something to be described.
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I’m still speaking generically!.
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the representation is incorrect in one way or another, and evaluation—whether the
utterance is true or is false (in the case of declaratives) or otherwise appropriately
felicitous (in the case of other speech acts)—is provided by the ﬁt with the world.
And secondly, that the appropriate explanation of human actions of all sorts of types
is due to the meaning
s
that an agent uses to conceptualize the world: how its beliefs
and desires lead to actions that are in accordance with those beliefs and desires, and
not to how the beliefs and desires match up with the way the world (really) is.
So the upshot of this casual survey of work from linguists, philosophers of lan-
guage, and cognitive psychologists seems to be twofold. First, that formal semanti-
cists and philosophers of language make theories that have “meaning” be a feature
of how language “ﬁts the world”—usually some sort of intensionalized, possible-
world-oriented truth-theory, or (in other hands) an information-theoretic dynamic
framework. In doing this they have no obvious place to attach this theory to “mean-
ing” as some feature about how a speaker-hearer dynamic can possibly work. This
seems to be a very undesirable state of aﬀairs for a theory of meaning.
On the second hand, the cognitive linguists and the cognitive psychologists seem
to have left out the way language is intended to “describe the world”, as they empha-
size instead the way that an individual’s mental concepts work in classifying other
aspects of their mental life. The attempt to make it be grounded, embodied, situ-
ated, or enactive appear to lack convincing detail. In particular, it is not so clear that
any expedient from this general point of view can succeed, at least according to the
Objectivists, since it continues to employ mental “information” (sensations, beliefs
about the speech situation, and impressions about ones intentions). It will therefore
always be “within the mental world” and not touch “reality”.
Only a two-tier theory can do both jobs.
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Compositionality and Concepts
James A. Hampton
Abstract In this chapter I aim to explain how psychology understands concepts,
and why there is a need for semantic theory to take on the challenge of psycho-
logical data. All of the contributors to this volume are (presumably) in the business
of trying to understand and explain how language has meaning, and the primary
source of evidence for this has to be our intuitions of what things mean. Further-
more, if my semantic intuitions (as a theorist) are out of kilter with those of the
common language user, then it is my theory which should be called into question
and not the lay intuition. This chapter describes a range of results from my research
program over the last 30 years, some old and some new, with the aim of giving a
general account of using Prototype Theory as a way to explain semantic intuitions.
1 Concepts and Prototypes
In The Compositionality Papers, Fodor and Lepore (2002) return frequently to a
“knock-down” argument against the suggestion that concepts might be prototypes.
Concepts, they argue, must be compositional. It must be possible, if one accepts the
representational theory of mind, to explain how the meaning of a complex phrase is
based solely on the meaning of the elements from which it is constructed, plus the
syntactic structure into which they are placed. To account for our ability to
understand the meaning of sentences such as (1) and (2) and countless other similar
sentences the semantic system needs a set of ﬁxed symbols to represent the con-
ceptual atoms in the sentences (John, Mary, Bill, loves, hates) which can then be
inserted into suitable syntactically structured sentence frames to yield the appro-
priate meaning for the sentence as a whole.
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(1) John loves Mary.
(2) John loves Mary, but Mary loves Bill and Mary hates John.
They claim that without this type of compositionality it is not possible to provide
an account of how thoughts (and indeed utterances) can express ideas.
Given the claim that concepts must be compositional, the argument continues
that prototypes are in fact anything but compositional. For example, the proto-
typical pet ﬁsh is not simply the prototype pet conjoined with the prototype ﬁsh.
Indeed something like a goldﬁsh or guppy, while being a good match for the pet
ﬁsh prototype, has little in common with the cats and dogs that are typical pets, or
the cod and trout that are typical ﬁsh (Osherson and Smith 1981).
More generally, the prototype of any particular complex noun phrase (should it
have one) will not be derivable from the prototypes of the content words of which it
is composed. Hence concepts (which must be compositional) cannot be prototypes
(which are often non-compositional).
The debate on compositionality has generated a large literature in semantics and
philosophy—see for example the substantial collection of papers edited by
Werning et al. (2012) For critical accounts on whether language is in fact com-
positional, particularly in respect of the systematicity of its grammar, see Johnson
(2004) and Pullum and Scholz (2007). As Pelletier (2017) remarks, the issue
probably represents one of the most substantial points of disagreement within
cognitive science between the more empirically minded psychologists and linguists
who study concepts and word meanings “in the mind”, language in use, and lay
people’s semantic intuitions, and the more theoretically minded semanticists and
philosophers whose interests cover broader issues of concepts as constituting lexical
meanings within a particular language, and issues of sentential truth and logic.
(Like Pelletier, I am speaking generically here).
As an empirical researcher into word meanings, I ﬁnd myself strongly drawn to
the conclusion that lexical meanings do not compose according to the rules of set
logic applied to extensions. That is to say that the meaning of a complex phrase will
not always be determined simply by the meanings of its components and their mode
of combination. I will argue that the construction of complex concepts proceeds
(most naturally) through the interactive combination of the intensional meanings of
the individual concepts. Wherever two concepts are combined whose intensional
contents overlap or interact semantically, then extensional compositionality of
meaning will tend to fail. Moreover, if we consider thought rather than language,
our capacities to combine concepts greatly exceed the simple combinatorial rules
provided by extensional logic, as will become apparent in the last part of this
chapter.
96 J.A. Hampton
1.1 Combining Prototypes
A key piece of evidence for proposing that the category membership of complex
concepts depends on more than their components and their mode of combination
comes from a series of experiments that I and others conducted in the 1980s and
1990s. To illustrate, in Hampton (1988b, Experiments 2 and 3) I looked at how
people interpret the phrases “Sports which are Games”, or “Games which are
Sports”. These phrases were chosen because (at least at ﬁrst sight) a standard
semantic analysis would see the meaning as being a conjunction—that is the ex-
tension of both phrases should correspond quite simply to the intersection of the set
of Games and the set of Sports. The two alternative phrasings come at the inter-
section in different ways (either ﬁnding the subset of sports that are also games, or
vice versa) but the result should be the same.
To test this standard proposal, I provided 36 respondents with a list of 43
recreational activities selected to fall in all four possible combinations of being
Sports or not, and being Games or not. Their ﬁrst task was to judge whether each
item was a Sport (together with a rating of degree of typicality or relatedness) and
then to judge whether each item was a Game. (Order of tasks was balanced over
subjects). Four weeks later the same individuals returned and decided which items
were in one or other of the conjunctions mentioned above.
Based purely on their true/false judgments of “whether the general category
name can be applied to a particular example”, the data were analysed to see whether
in fact people followed an intersective rule, only saying Yes to the conjunction for
those items (like Tennis or Football) where they had said Yes to both conjuncts.
The results were very clear. People did not follow this rule. In fact 25% of games
that were not sports, and 54% of sports that were not games, according to ﬁrst week
responses, were nevertheless categorized in the conjunction on week 4. This
overextension was not attributable to a contrast effect between the categories, nor to
randomness in people’s choices, since the equivalent inconsistent pattern of saying
No to an item that had been judged as in both sets was much less frequent (11%).
A further study showed that the effect was not driven by a response bias, since
adding in new items to the list for the second phase so that the expected rate of Yes
responses for the conjunction would be 50% (rather than 25%) had no influence on
the rate of overextension of the other items.
A ﬁnal experiment in this paper showed that the effect generalized to six other
pairs of categories, including pets which are birds and dwellings which are build-
ings. Regression analysis was applied to predicting the mean degree of membership
in the conjunction from means for each conjunct. Including an interaction term, on
average 93% of the variance in mean membership ratings for the conjunction was
explained. The analyses also showed that the relative clause form is
non-commutative (for example, weapons which are tools are not equivalent to tools
which are weapons) and that one of the two concepts often carries more weight in
the prediction than the other (a phenomenon termed dominance).
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Subsequent research has shown that this lack of respect for the conjunction rule
is easily replicated across a range of domains and linguistic ways of expressing a
conjunction (Storms et al. 1998; Hampton 1996; Jönsson 2015). It can be shown
with the same individual making all three judgments, or with different individuals
making each judgment. It also appears when the relative clause is negated. For
example, a horse is not often considered to be a vehicle, but it is frequently con-
sidered to be a vehicle that is not a machine. Hampton (1988a) showed that the
problem of non-extensional combination applies equally to disjunctions. A mush-
room is never classed as a fruit, and only 50% of respondents called it a vegetable.
However 90% decided that it was either a fruit or a vegetable.
The challenge of these results to extensional theories of semantics should be
clear. These results do not just depend on judgments of typicality or even judgments
of degrees of truth which might be subject to psychological biases (Osherson and
Smith 1981, 1982). They simply reflect the common semantic intuitions of
everyday language speakers about the applicability of complex phrases, and as such
they require an explanation.
1.2 Intensional Composition
The account of overextension that I offered in Hampton (1987) was a relatively
straightforward explanation based on the intensional properties of the concepts
involved.
Classically speaking, when a complex concept is constructed as a conjunction,
then the features that deﬁne it intensionally will be derived in a compositional
fashion as a disjunction of the features of the two conjuncts. For example, to form
the conjunction of people who are both singers and songwriters, one would look to
set up a categorization procedure that would require potential candidates to have the
union of the features of each set (person AND singer AND songwriter). To model
the combination of categories such as Sports and Games, one can simply propose
that Sports which are also Games should therefore be a composite prototype
resulting from aggregating all the features commonly associated with either of the
two conjuncts. As Sports they should be activities which involve exercise and
training and as Games they should also involve competition and fun.
Most importantly, this way of modelling the construction of a conjunctive
concept provides a neat explanation of why people are inconsistent in judging
extensions of conjunctions. Consider the case where there are two prototype con-
cepts A and B, each with 3 features. In line with Rosch’s idea of family resemblance
and prototypes, let us suppose that any item will belong in either concept if it has at
least 2 of the 3 features of that concept.
Table 1 shows the resulting composite, in which the conjunction A^B is created
with all six features in its prototype. Now if having 2 out of 3 features is sufﬁcient to
belong in either of the two concepts A or B, then it is natural to suggest that 4 out of
6 features should be sufﬁcient to belong in their conjunction. Accordingly, Item 1
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which has 2 of each of the concept’s features should belong in the conjunction.
However Item 2, which has 3 A features but only 1 B feature, passes the criterion
for belonging in the conjunction, but fails to have enough features to be an example
of Concept B. The result is that Item 2 would be overextended—it would belong in
the conjunction but not in one of the conjuncts. Effectively, pooling together the
features, even before any interaction between them has been considered (resulting
in inheritance failure or the addition of new emergent features, see below), leads to
the likelihood of inconsistent responding and overextension.
Hampton (1987) collected data on the attributes associated with each of the
conjuncts and their conjunction for the same pairs of categories as were used in
Hampton (1988b) described above, and traced the way in which attributes for the
composite prototype are derived from the constituent components. The procedure
involved two separate samples of participants. A ﬁrst sample was divided into four
groups. For a pair of concepts such as Sports and Games, group 1 listed attributes
for Sports, group 2 for Games, group 3 for “Sports that are also Games” and group
4 for “Games that are also Sports”. They were asked to imagine that they had to
deﬁne and describe the objects named to someone who was unfamiliar with them.
They were to do this by listing on 10 blank lines the attributes or properties that
were in any way involved in deciding if an object belongs in the named set. (Full
details can be found in Hampton 1987, p. 58). Lists of around 30 attributes for each
pair of concepts were then drawn up by including any attribute generated by at least
3 out of 10 participants in any of the four groups.
A second sample of participants was then used to judge the attributes for how
important they were for deﬁning each concept and each conjunction. The sample
was divided into four groups exactly as before, but now each participant saw the list
of attributes and made a rating judgment. “N” was to be chosen as a response if an
Table 1 A scheme for aggregating the attributes of two concepts A and B into a conjunctive
concept A^B. If a “two out of three” rule is used to determine category membership, then Item 1
will be a member of A, B and of the conjunction. However Item 2 will be a member of A and of
the conjunction, but will not be a member of category B, having only one of the b attributes. The
model predicts overextension of the conjunction through compensation (an excellent member of A
can be in the conjunction A^B although only weakly connected to B)
Concept A Conjunction A^B Item 1 Item 2
a1 a1 a1 a1
a2 a2 a2 a2
a3 a3 - a3
b1 b1 b1
Concept B b2 b2 -
b1 b3 - -
b2
b3
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attribute was necessary for a category, responses “A”, “B” and “C” were used to
indicate decreasing importance (A = very important, C = typically true but not
very deﬁning), “X” meant the attribute was not usually true, and “XX” meant the
attribute was necessarily false of all possible examples of the concept. The results
from this rating task were then used to assess how attributes of conjuncts are
inherited by their conjunctions.
There were many interesting aspects to the results which I will not try to
summarize here. As predicted, importance for a conjunct could be used to predict
importance for a conjunction (Multiple R averaged around 0.8, close to the relia-
bility of the scales at 0.85). The process is analogous to one of inherited traits, with
traits possessed by both parent concepts being carried through to the offspring
conjunction. Most notably there were some attributes which failed to be “inherited”
by the composite, and others that “emerged” in the composite which were not in the
constituents. Pets which are Birds, for example, lost some features of pets (cuddly)
and some features of birds (fly south in winter), but gained other new features not
seen in either concept alone such as (lives in cages) or (talks).
1.3 Prototypes as Intensions
I have argued that the way in which people interpret simple semantic rules such as
relative clause modiﬁcation can be accurately modelled by a deeper analysis of the
intensional meaning of the words. What is the evidence then that such intensions
have the prototype structure that leads to the patterns of overextension seen above?
If we consider most common content words in natural language—nouns, verbs,
adjectives and adverbs—then it is often the case that neither the extension nor the
intension are easy to pin down. The meaning of function words like prepositions is
even harder. Consider for example the following common uses of “on” in English:
(3) The cup is on the table.
(4) I got paint on my shirt.
(5) Harry is on holiday.
(6) The train is on platform 2.
Any attempt to deﬁne the extension of situations to which “on” applies is likely
to end up simply as a disjunctive list of different cases. The fact that prepositions do
not easily translate between languages supports this claim (Bowerman and Choi
2003a, b). When I told a French friend that I had travelled to Paris “sur le train”, the
puzzled response was to ask if it wasn’t very windy sitting on the roof. Similar
problems arise with adjectives such as “fresh” or “open” (Murphy and Andrew
1993), with multiple inter-related senses determined by context. For further dis-
cussion see Rice (1992).
Returning to the (perhaps) simpler case of nouns, consider a simple everyday
term such as “ﬁsh”. First there is a potential ambiguity arising from the domain of
discourse. Fish features in cookery and food and as such its extension may include
creatures such as squid, oysters and lobsters. Fish is also part of a commercial
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industry, exploiting marine resources, and in the past the category extension
included whales. Finally, ﬁsh may be taken to have a biological meaning. Unfor-
tunately, those who pin their hopes on science to identify the “correct” extensional
class, are due to be disappointed. Current scientiﬁc theory suggests there is no
common ancestor to the different classes that we call ﬁsh. The term describes a
disjunctive category with no role to play in biological theory. Thus, not only do we
have these three different ways to place the term in context, but within each context
the determination of what is in the extension becomes equally problematic. Should
shell-ﬁsh be included in the culinary term—what about seahorses, rays or squid?
The term is underspeciﬁed, as the psychological data clearly show (Hampton 1998;
Hampton et al. 2006; McCloskey and Glucksberg 1978).
Since intensions are closely tied to extensions, it is not surprising to ﬁnd that the
intensional deﬁnitions of terms are equally difﬁcult to pin down. Most ency-
clopaedia entries will state that all ﬁsh are cold-blooded. However, they then go on
to say that some ﬁsh (like tuna) are not. It has proved very difﬁcult to provide clear
deﬁnitions for most of our vocabulary terms. There always seem to be exceptions.
Exceptions to the rule that there are always exceptions may be found when a
concept has a particularly important role to play in the regulation of society. Then it
will often be found to have an explicit deﬁnition. The deﬁnition of a “US dollar” or
“British citizen” has a legal foundation which leads to a clear-cut differentiation into
members and non-members of the class.
A slightly less clear example is provided by certain kinship terms, like “father”
or “nephew” in English which are often found to be amenable to an analysis in
terms of semantic components. As Goodenough (1965) describes it
A system of kin relationships rests on the established institutions and customs relating to
membership in households, sexual rights, the deﬁnition of procreation, the legitimization of
progeny as members of a jural community and the like.
In relation to “grandmother” Landau (1982) showed how both a deﬁnitional
criterion (female having a grandchild) and a stereotypical age and appearance are
seen in responses for both children and adults when selecting appropriate pictures.
Even when kinship terms such as “uncle” are extended to non-blood relations we
are able to distinguish a “real” uncle from other kinds of uncle. On the other hand,
the development of non-traditional families has led to the undermining of many
kinship terms (see Lakoff’s 1987, discussion of “mother”), and terms such as
“brothers” and “sisters” can be used with extended meaning to refer to others who
share the speaker’s beliefs, goals or group membership.
Terms describing crimes (such as murder, theft, or fraud) are likewise provided
with deﬁnitions by the legislature of each jurisdiction, so that juries can focus on
establishing the facts of a case based on the evidence, rather than having to decide
how to interpret the meaning of the words. (The latter task is left to judges in higher
courts who aim to establish stable interpretations of the terms through reasoned
argument about test cases and guessing the plausible intention of the law-makers).
However, when a concept does not have this consequential weight resting upon it, it
will usually resist easy deﬁnition.
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The lack of a clear deﬁnition where one is needed can lead to expensive court
cases, as the following extract from an article by Caroline Davies in the UK
newspaper The Guardian of 27 April, 2015, shows:
Bridge, the genteel and physically unchallenging card game played by millions, may
exercise the brain muscle, but is it a sport? That is the question taxing legal minds as a high
court ruling on Monday paved the way for a courtroom battle to decide. The row centres on
a refusal by Sport England to recognise the trick-taking game as a legitimate sport and thus
eligible for lottery grants. The English Bridge Union claim it ought to be recognised as a
“mind sport” and want Sport England’s refusal to do so declared unlawful.
Arguments presented to the court included the amount of physical activity in-
volved (compared for example to rifle shooting), the health beneﬁts of taking part,
and the fact that other physical activities are not classiﬁed as sports. It was clear that
lawyers on each side were seeking to ﬁnd a plausible deﬁnition (intension) that
would enable them to either include or exclude bridge from the category containing
clear examples of sport such as tennis or football. (What is less clear is why the
judge was willing to entertain the argument that the brain is a muscle!)
The issues involved here can be related to two fundamental issues in semantics
—context sensitivity and vagueness. Perhaps the lack of clearly speciﬁed meanings
of terms, and the consequent inconsistency in semantic intuitions results from the
lack of a clear context. Alternatively, the difﬁculty of providing clear meanings may
in fact result from those meanings being inherently unclear or vague, in the same
way that scalar adjectives such as “tall” or “bald” have been shown to lack
precision.
1.4 Context Sensitivity
The meanings of terms can change depending on context. Classic examples are
scalar adjectives—a large ant is not as big as a small elephant. Alternatively, there
is the example of ﬁsh described above, and the different contexts in which the term
might be used.
But can context sensitivity fully explain the difﬁculty in deﬁning extensions and
intensions? In an attempt to ﬁnd evidence for this suggestion, Hampton et al. (2006)
ran a set of studies in which we manipulated the context in which people had to
classify items in vague categories. We used eight different categories from different
ontological domains, and created lists of 24 possible members in which we
deliberately included clear cases, clear non-members of the category and about 12
cases that would be difﬁcult to categorise. (The existence of borderline cases in
natural categories was originally demonstrated by McCloskey and Glucksberg
1978, when they showed that not only were there many items showing substantial
disagreement between people, but that people were also inconsistent in how they
categorized those same items when returning a month later to do the task again.)
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Our hypotheses for the study related to the idea that apparent vagueness in the
category boundaries can be attributed to a lack of a clear context for the classiﬁ-
cation. We therefore had three main conditions in which we provided different
contexts for the categorization. The ﬁrst was a Neutral control condition which
simply asked “Consider each of the following items and decide whether they
belong in the category of _____”. A second condition, the Pragmatic condition,
asked people to categorize items in categories “where people would expect to ﬁnd
them, so that they could be easily found”. Scenarios included an internet news
group, a mail-order catalogue and a library index. Here we hoped to reduce
vagueness because everyone would be attempting to mirror the behaviour of
everyone else in the group. The third condition, the Technical condition, provided a
set of contexts much like the case of Bridge and Sport described above. People were
asked to imagine that they were advising a government agency controlling tax
regimes (for Tools and Furniture), ecological reports (for Insects and Fish) or
funding agencies (for Science and Sport). They were told that the classiﬁcation
would have important consequences and so they should try to classify “correctly”.
Participants worked through each list classifying items as Yes or No, and
returned after 3–4 weeks to do the task again in the same condition as before.
Our prediction was that if lack of categorization context was contributing to
vagueness, then various measures of vagueness would be reduced in the Technical
and Pragmatic conditions. There should be better inter-subject agreement on clas-
siﬁcation, more stability in categorization decisions over time, a reduced correlation
of categorization probability with simple ratings of Typicality, and a shift in the size
of the categories, with Technical conditions yielding smaller categories. In the
event, none of these predictions was generally supported by the data. Effectively
categorization probability in all conditions was correlated at around 0.95 (the limit
of measurement reliability) with judgments of item typicality in the category.
A second study showed that requiring people to read the instructions aloud and
reflect on them before starting to categorize had no effect on the results. There was
no easily accessible “deeper” meaning for people to describe if asked to take the
task more seriously. Finally, we looked at whether people would be less likely to
give a “partial” or graded response in the Technical condition. In this last study,
people were given a graded categorization scale to use running from not at all
through barely, sort of and very much, to completely. If people felt that a category
has a clear deﬁnition (even if they are uncertain what it is), then we expected them
to be disinclined to use a partial rating such as “sort of” or “very much”, and to stick
to the two extreme responses—“not at all” or “completely”. In the event our
manipulation of context had no effect on this measure either.
In the light of these results, it would appear that instability and disagreement in
categorization is not exclusively driven by a lack of speciﬁcity in the context.
Whether simply classifying, trying to capture common categorization practices, or
yet advising a technical committee on the correct way to classify, people rely on the
same underlying conceptual representation and this is best described in terms of a
typicality gradient.
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Typicality is a measure that has had wide use in Psychology, but its relation to
semantics is often rather obscure, and subject to misunderstanding. In the next
section I therefore discuss in detail just what typicality is measuring, and how it
relates to issues of semantics.
1.5 Typicality and Gradedness
In Hampton (2007) I deﬁne a position on the relation of typicality to graded
categorization. In the Threshold Model I propose that a semantic category is rep-
resented by a set of intensional information in the form of a prototype (which may
include schematic structure about causal-explanatory links between features).
Potential exemplars can be ranked in terms of their similarity to this prototype, as
determined by an asymmetric measure of how well the exemplar matches the
prototype features. For example, similarity of a tomato to fruit will be greater on
this measure than the similarity of fruit to tomato. It is assumed that tomato matches
more features of fruit than fruit matches features of tomato because of the greater
abstraction of fruit.
The ranking based on similarity then provides the basis for judgments of typi-
cality (assuming other factors are held constant—see below), and also provides the
basis for categorization decisions through the application of a criterion or threshold.
With the additional assumption that the placement of the threshold is subject to
normally distributed error both within and across individuals, a standard psycho-
metric function is obtained relating the probability of a positive categorization to the
underlying similarity.
It is perhaps common in some parts of the Cognitive Science community (e.g.
Armstrong et al. 1983; Fodor 1998; Osherson and Smith 1981, 1982, 1997) to
dismiss typicality effects as purely psychological and hence peripheral to the
development of lexical semantic theory. After all, we know that the way in which
the mind stores words in the mental lexicon shows all kinds of psychological
influences that are orthogonal to issues of lexical meaning. Frequency of a word in
the language, for example, has large effects on reading, memory and a range of
other cognitive tasks. It has also been found that the degree to which words are
associated (like “Fish” and “Chips” in the UK) can be highly predictive of a range
of phenomena. Why should not typicality effects be of the same kind?
I will argue that when people judge typicality (for example of an item in a
category) they may be judging quite a number of different things. Nonetheless
paramount among those different dimensions is similarity to a prototype repre-
senting the common intensional properties of the class. Because this measure of
similarity also determines the degree to which an item can be said to belong in a
category, typicality ratings do an excellent job of predicting the likelihood that an
item will be placed in a category as evidenced in the Hampton et al. (2006)
experiments, and many other similar studies.
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1.6 Does Variation in Typicality Really Undermine
the Classical Model?
Any description of the impact of Rosch’s prototype theory on the psychology of
concepts tends to make much of typicality effects. The classical theory against
which Rosch was arguing proposed that a concept could be deﬁned intensionally as
a conjunction of individually necessary and jointly sufﬁcient features. A concept
such as “bachelor” could be deﬁned as “human, male, adult, and eligible to marry”.
It has been claimed by supporters of the prototype model that this classical theory
gives equal status to all items that meet the deﬁnition, so there should be no
differences between items in terms of how well they represent the class. Although
often repeated, I do not take this to be a fair criticism of the classical model.
Typicality can reflect many different underlying structural variables, many of which
do not relate to the question of whether a concept term applies to an exemplar. It is
important therefore to tease apart the different influences on typicality to get a clear
picture of the role that it plays in conceptual structure.
First, the notion of typicality or goodness-of-example is often confounded with
other non-semantic dimensions such as familiarity (Malt and Smith 1982). Indeed
Armstrong et al. (1983) demonstrated that well-deﬁned categories such as Odd and
Even Numbers have clear typicality structure, most probably based on simplicity
and familiarity (but see Larochelle et al. 2000, for counter-evidence). (Of course,
the demonstration that well-deﬁned categories show typicality effects does nothing
to undermine the theory that for other types of categories, lacking an explicit
deﬁnition, typicality may be a critical factor in determining membership.)
Second, it has been suggested that category membership is determined by a
deﬁning core of features, whereas additional “characteristic” features are associated
with typicality differences (Osherson and Smith 1981; Rey 1983; Smith et al.
1974). In support of this proposal, Rips (1989) presented a variety of attempts to
dissociate measures of similarity, typicality and category membership, in which it is
claimed that some item may be more typical of category A than of category B, even
though it is a better member of B than of A. His results have however not stood up
well under replication (Hampton et al. 2007; Smith and Sloman 1994).
Given that Typicality effects on their own do not provide strong evidence against
the classical model, what do we know about their basis?
1.7 Ingredients of Typicality 1: Ideals
It has been shown (e.g. Barsalou 1985) that when people are asked to say how
typical an item is as a member of a category, then they are influenced by several
different dimensions. First and foremost, Typicality ratings are assumed to be a pure
measure of the underlying similarity in meaning, or degree of match of semantic
features, between a member and its superordinate category. This dimension of
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similarity is clearly a major influence on Typicality ratings. However other factors
are also involved. Barsalou (1985) showed that in addition to what he termed
Central Tendency (closeness of a concept to the centre of its category), ratings of
Typicality were also correlated with frequency of instantiation (a measure of
familiarity) and matching of Ideals. An ideal is a feature of a concept that represents
extreme rather than average values of a dimension. Thus a winter coat may be
considered most typical if it is ideally warm and light, as opposed to being closest to
the average winter coat (which will be of average warmth and average weight).
So Typicality per se must be interpreted with this ambiguity in mind. The
ambiguity has been made a lot worse by Rosch’s (1975) original characterization of
typicality as “goodness-of-example”, a term also used in Barsalou (1985). Barsalou
notes that the word “typicality” was not used in his study because it could bias
participants into thinking of frequency of instantiation. As a consequence, he asked
for goodness-of-example, with a scale running from “poor example” to “excellent
example”. Similarly, Burnett et al. (2005) concluded that expert ﬁshermen judged
the typicality of types of ﬁsh based on ideals, while using “goodness of example” as
their measure of typicality. The difﬁculty here is that asking about “goodness” leads
to an evaluative judgment and hence allows ideals to have a greater influence on the
judgments.
There have been very few attempts to distinguish between the two senses of
typicality. One exception is Kittur et al. (2006) who dissociated the two dimensions
using a novel relational concept learned in the laboratory. They found that ratings of
goodness of example reflected just ideals, whereas typicality judgments reflected
both ideals and central tendencies.
One way to understand the relation of typicality and ideals would be to propose
that ideals should be understood as contributing to typicality itself which then
determines degrees of membership. In this way, typicality would mediate the
influence of ideals on category membership. This proposal needs empirical testing.
In an experimental manipulation of ideals, Kim and Murphy (2011) demonstrated
that in fact ideal exemplars that best served a category’s goals were not necessarily
perceived as most typical. For example, a great party might be considered ideal, but
was not judged as typical.
1.8 Ingredients of Typicality 2: Frequency and Familiarity
As well as Ideals, Barsalou (1985) also identiﬁed Frequency of Instantiation as a
component of Typicality. Participants were asked to judge subjectively how often a
category member occurred as an instantiation of the category. Allied to this measure
is a second measure: Category Dominance. Going back to the early days of asso-
ciationist psychology, the measure of Category Dominance is the relative frequency
with which an item is generated when people are asked to list all the category
members that come to mind within a limited time (Battig and Montague 1969).
A third measure related to frequency of instantiation is familiarity, in which
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participants rate items in terms of how familiar they seem. These different measures
tend to correlate together and to form a separate dimension from typicality owing to
family resemblance or similarity (Barsalou 1985; Hampton and Gardiner 1983).
Hampton (1997a) was able to show a double dissociation of the effects of
Typicality and Category Dominance on response times and errors when people
make speeded categorization decisions. In a ﬁrst experiment, regression methods
were used to differentiate the effects of typicality, familiarity and category domi-
nance on the average time to categorize items, and the likelihood of making a
positive response. Participants were given a category (e.g. Fruit) and then a list of
words one at a time. They had to make a speeded decision for each word whether it
belonged in the category or not. Mean reaction time was predicted in a multiple
regression equation using norms for semantic categories collected by Hampton and
Gardiner (1983). (Hampton and Gardiner 1983, used instructions for typicality that
explicitly differentiated it from frequency of instantiation.) Likelihood of a Yes
response was also predicted. The results showed that typicality and category
dominance each made independent and signiﬁcant contributions to predicting
decision time. Although the two measures were correlated with each other, the
speed in making a decision was driven both by the availability of the item in
memory (as measured by category dominance) and by the similarity of the item to
the category (as measured by typicality). When it came to response probability,
only typicality predicted the likelihood of a Yes or No response.
The second experiment introduced two manipulations. First, manipulating the
difﬁculty of the task by including closely related false items (e.g. a bat is a bird)
slowed down atypical items relative to typical items, but had no effect on items as a
function of their category dominance. A second manipulation in which half the
items were seen in a different context before having to be categorized showed that
the category dominance effect but not the typicality effect was eliminated by earlier
exposure of the items. Taken together the results all suggest that while high
dominance items are more readily available in memory, the actual decision of
whether something is in a category is just affected by its typicality and not by
associative strength. There is an interesting parallel here with the heuristics of
Availability and Representativeness proposed by Tversky and Kahneman to explain
people’s judgments of probability (Kahneman et al. 1982).
1.9 Typicality and Membership
Having described the multiple influences on typicality, including the ambiguity of
what it is to be a “good” example, and the confounding with familiarity and
category dominance, what is the evidence that there is nonetheless a purer notion of
typicality that should be taken seriously as a component of meaning? The results of
the study by Hampton et al. (2006) described above provide one such piece of
evidence. Here we had eight categories in which there was uncertainty or vagueness
in the classiﬁcation of borderline items. Moreover, the basis of the disagreement
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and inconsistency did not come down to mere ignorance. There is no fact of the
matter or correct answer to these borderline categorization cases. In that respect
they can be termed an example of Vagueness, with similar properties to the tra-
ditional cases of vagueness seen in adjectives like red, bald or tall. Being bald is a
matter of degree, so that it is meaningless to ask exactly how many hairs need to be
lost before someone is correctly termed bald. In the same way, many noun cate-
gories have membership which is a matter of degree (sociology may be considered
a better science than palm-reading) but there is no hard and fast way to determine
who is right and who is wrong in the event of a borderline dispute. We come back
again to the dispute about bridge being a sport. With due respect to the UK
Supreme Court, there is no higher authority to which one can turn to decide the
question in an objective fashion (as there might be in the case of a biological or
technical term). As in matters of taste, it appears that each may be entitled to his/her
own opinion about such cases (Wright 1995).
It is in the context of this vagueness in noun meanings that the notion of
Typicality can be helpful. Disputes about borderline cases often end up with party
A arguing “X is a sport because it has features D, E and F”, while party B argues “X
is not a sport because it lacks features P, Q and R”. But this is exactly what the
“pure” notion of Typicality captures—the fact that the more features of a concept an
item possesses the more justiﬁed one is in placing it in the category. There is a
continuity between one category member being more typical of a category because
it has more matching features (as in the case of a robin being a more typical bird
than an ostrich, even though both are clearly birds) and one item being more likely
to be classed as a member of a category than another for the same reason (as in
ten-pin bowling being considered more of a sport than billiards.)
This is a critical point for the debate between formal semantics and psychology.
If typicality is a purely psychological phenomenon that does not affect truth values
(as in the robin versus ostrich case) then it is safe for semantics to ignore it and
instead to focus on category membership (a position taken among others by Osh-
erson and Smith 1997). However when other conceptual categories are considered,
it turns out that variation in typicality (as determined by similarity to a prototype or
by the degree to which something possesses the prototypical features) does affect
truth values. In the Hampton et al. (2006) experiments we showed again and again
that rated typicality was the best predictor of people’s judgments of truth for sen-
tences such as “seaweed is a vegetable”, “a tomato is a fruit”, “a squid is a ﬁsh” or
“a piano is a kind of furniture”.
In Hampton (2007) I argued therefore for a single underlying dimension that in
the ﬁrst place determines how typical some item is of its class (in the family
resemblance sense of typical, rather than anything involving ideals or familiarity),
and in the second place determines how much of a member of the class it is. This
underlying dimension relates to the degree to which the conceptual representation
of the item brought to mind in the given task context matches that of the super-
ordinate category that it is being compared to.
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To develop this model, the notion of Typicality has to be extended or adapted a
little further. Linguistically speaking, to say that X is a typical (or atypical) Y
carries the presupposition that X is indeed a Y. One would probably not say that a
bat is an atypical bird. It may resemble a bird but that doesn’t make it an atypical
one. However in the original introduction of typicality ratings as “goodness-of-
example” Rosch (1975) also chose to ignore this reﬁnement and asked participants
to judge typicality across a full range of items running from typical exemplars
through borderline cases to clear non-examples. Adapting to the pragmatics of the
task, her participants duly obliged, and so Typicality also has an extended meaning
corresponding to something like “typicality if it is a member and closeness to the
category if it is not”.
In a number of papers, (Hampton 1979; Hampton and Gardiner 1983; Hampton
1988b) I developed a graded membership scale based on this more explicit notion
which was then used in the studies of concept conjunction negation and disjunction
described above. As discussed above, the key result of those studies was that
membership in a conjunctively deﬁned category showed a continuous gradation (in
terms of the probability of a positive response) that was highly predictable in a
regression from degree of membership in the two constituents. Furthermore, just as
typicality in a conjunction is known to sometimes surpass typicality in a conjunct
(the guppy as a pet ﬁsh is the example proposed by Osherson and Smith 1981), so
membership in a conjunction can surpass membership in a conjunct.
This phenomenon of overextension has been demonstrated most recently in a
study of activity verbs by Martin Jönsson. Jönsson (2015) showed people videos of
an actor simultaneously performing two actions, such as Smoking and Walking.
The action would be a typical example of the ﬁrst action (e.g. smoking) but a very
atypical example of the second (e.g. walking). The task asked for a Yes/No answer
to simple questions such as “Is this man smoking?”, “Is this man walking?” or “Is
this man smoking and walking?”. Jönsson found with this particular example that
100% answered yes to the ﬁrst question, and only 39% answered yes to the second.
However 70% answered yes to the conjunctive question. It appears that likelihood
of agreeing to classiﬁcation in a conjunction may involve an average of perceived
degrees of membership in each conjunct, rather than the likelihood of believing that
the item is in the ﬁrst category and also believing that the item is in the second.
A crucial test of the involvement of Typicality in categorization judgments is to
show that variation of typicality among cases which are clearly members of a
category can nonetheless affect categorization in a conjunction. Suppose that an
item is clearly a member of one category, but is on the borderline for another. For
example, suppose that everyone agrees that Jack is bald (about half his head is
hairless) but only 50% agree that he is tall. Then the composite prototype account
would predict that increasing Jack’s degree of baldness yet further would com-
pensate for his lack of tallness and make it more likely that people would accept
that he is both bald and tall.
This prediction of compensation between typicality in one category and mem-
bership in a conjunction was tested in Hampton (1996). People made a set of three
judgments about cartoon faces representing a range of age from child to adult and a
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range of emotion from happy to sad. Critical test items were clearly either children
or adults, but differed in typicality in those categories. At the same time these test
faces were borderline in terms of emotion. The study showed, for example, that
variability in the typicality of a given adult face influenced the likelihood of cat-
egorization in a conjunction such as “happy adult”. Thus typicality of a face as an
adult face could compensate for borderline membership as a happy face and affect
the categorization in the conjunction.
1.10 Differentiating Vagueness from Ignorance
A recent paper (Hampton et al. 2012) shows that the ontological uncertainty about
whether (say) bridge is a sport can be differentiated from other kinds of uncertainty
based on ignorance. In a set of studies we looked at the problem of higher order
vagueness. The basic set up was as follows. Two groups of people had to judge
whether a list of items belonged in a category, and as previously, the list was
designed to contain many borderline or disputable items. The procedure required
them to return after two weeks and to perform the task again (as in McCloskey and
Glucksberg 1978). We measured the likelihood that they would give the same
response on each occasion—a measure we labelled as Consistency. In the ﬁrst
group who responded simply Yes or No, people would typically maintain the same
response for about 80% of items. People in the second group, rather than saying
simply Yes or No, were given the chance to create a third, middle, response
category. They were instructed to ﬁrst decide if the item was 100% certain to be in
the category, or 100% certain to be NOT in the category, and respond accordingly.
Any item for which they were not 100% sure, they were told to put in a middle
response category of “Not 100% sure”. As for the ﬁrst group, we measured con-
sistency of responding.
Our original intuition was that this second condition would lead to greater
consistency. As people could “cherry pick” the easy items and leave the others
aside, and as they would be given credit for being consistent if they put an item in
the “Not 100% sure” category both times, we felt that they would change their
minds much less often. In fact, the results were quite clear in showing that the
likelihood of changing your mind about whether something is 100% certain to be in
a category is no more nor less than the likelihood of being inconsistent in judging if
it is in the category or not. Higher order vagueness (determining the boundaries of
the vague region where things are unsure) turned out to be just the same as lower
order vagueness (the indecision within the vague region).
This effect can be used to argue that vagueness about category membership is
not equivalent to uncertainty owing to ignorance. In different versions of the task,
we tried the same procedure with general knowledge statements. Instead of a
statement such as “rhubarb is a fruit” we had statements like “The Uruguayan flag
has red in it”. Now, the second group who were allowed to say when they were
unsure were signiﬁcantly more consistent in their responses. After several other
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studies, including both those in the paper and other unpublished studies done since,
we can conclude that when there is an objective truth to a statement (as in general
knowledge, or as in the correct meaning of a word, or as in memory for a video)
then people can reliably identify the statements that they “know they don’t know”.
On the other hand, when the truth of a statement has a more subjective basis, as in
categorization but also as in personal judgments about one’s aspirations, moral
beliefs or early childhood memories, then one cannot do so. In these cases, asking
people to only say “yes” when they are deﬁnitely sure simply moves the decision
criterion to a higher level but does nothing to reduce the inherent unreliability of the
decision.
A recent unpublished study, conducted with Shauna-Kaye Williams demon-
strates this effect with a single dimensional example of vagueness. We had two sets
of faces which varied according to their emotional expression. The ﬁrst were a set of
morphs between a neutral expression and a happy expression. The second were
morphed between a neutral expression and a surprised expression. In a ﬁrst session,
participants went through each set of faces twice, once deciding if the faces were
happy or not, or surprised or not (depending on the set), and once deciding if they
were clearly happy or not, or clearly surprised or not. They returned for a second
session a week later, and repeated the task. In this case, we were interested in
whether asking people only to respond positively if the faces were “clearly”
showing the emotion would lead to a sharper boundary and more consistent
responding over time. In fact, neither of these occurred. Figure 1 shows the results
where logistic regression functions were ﬁt to each individual’s data and then a plot
made based on the average slope and threshold. In both sets of faces, the
requirement to select faces that clearly showed the expression simply moved the
threshold to the right, while leaving the sharpness of the boundary unaffected. (In
fact, the surprised faces had a slightly lower slope—a vaguer boundary—for the
clearly judgments).
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Fig. 1 Logistic functions ﬁt to the likelihood of a positive categorization as a function of the
morphed scale of emotional intensity for happy or clearly happy faces (left) and surprised or
clearly surprised faces (right)
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1.11 Concept Intensions as Fundamental
I have hoped to show that there are a number of phenomena that argue for a
fundamental role for intensional representations of concepts as the raw components
of thoughts. My research into conjunctions of prototype concepts shows that people
are not particularly concerned to respect the logic that requires that to be in a
conjunction means to be in each of the conjuncts. Likewise there is good evidence
that neither disjunction nor negation fares any better in terms of maintaining logical
norms (Hampton 1988a, 1997b). To account for these deviations from logic, it is
most fruitful to look at how intensions might be combined in different ways to form
conjunctive, negated or disjunctive concepts (Hampton et al. 2012). The Composite
Prototype Model (CPM, Hampton 1987, 1988b) details how we might account for
the results through a process of integrating two prototype concepts into a single
composite to represent the complex concept. As Pelletier (2017) describes it, this is
compositionality as applied to prototypes. We know that prototypes for conjunc-
tions (e.g. pet birds) may look quite different from those of their conjuncts (pets and
birds considered separately). As described above, the model suggests an initial
process of attempting to combine the two concepts by taking the disjunction of their
features. This is followed by the identiﬁcation of points of incompatibility and
either the deletion of certain features (pet birds do not migrate in winter) and/or the
addition of new emergent features not seen in either concept (pet birds live in cages
though neither birds nor pets do normally).
In order to explore the process of conceptual combination in a “pure” state,
without the influence of prior familiarity, Hampton (1997c) described a study in
which people were required to describe conjunctions of categories which do not
currently exist, such as a computer that was also a kind of teacup, or a vehicle that
was also a kind of ﬁsh. Why set people such a task? I was primarily interested in
demonstrating that concept intensions are flexible and adaptable. Just as when
forming the concept of Pet Fish one must abandon some salient features of each
concept (we don’t eat pet ﬁsh with French fries, and nor do they cuddle on our
laps), so when truly incompatible conjunctions need to be imagined the process can
be taken to extremes. Figure 2 shows an example of one of the solutions offered by
Fig. 2 A bird that is a
kitchen utensil. Redrawn from
original drawing of an
anonymous participant
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the more creative participants, in response to the requirement to ﬁnd a bird that was
also a kitchen utensil. In this case a woodpecker has been trained to whisk eggs
using its powerful head movements.
Qualitative analysis of the results of this ﬁrst pilot study showed some very
interesting principles were involved in combining concepts. First, there was evi-
dence for instantiation of superordinate categories to basic level categories—birds
became woodpeckers, fruit bananas, and furniture couches. Second, people would
align properties and functions between the two concepts. The example given here
shows how the need to ﬁnd a function for a kitchen utensil is met by ﬁnding a
behavior of a particular bird that can serve the function of a particular utensil. Third,
there was evidence for simulation processes, in line with Barsalou’s suggestions
about the role of concepts in achieving goals (Barsalou 1991). Commentary pro-
vided by the creator of the woodpecker whisk pointed out that it would not need
electrical power (good for camping trips) but would on the other hand be unhy-
gienic. The use of simulation takes the speciﬁcation of the combined concept and
develops it in totally non-compositional directions, as the new concept is adapted to
real world knowledge. Finally, many solutions identiﬁed conflicting properties in
the newly combined concept, and offered new emergent features to resolve them.
For example, when a participant solved “A fruit that is also a kind of furniture” by
proposing a banana couch, they went on to specify that the banana had been
modiﬁed to grow very large and to ripen very slowly.
Extensional accounts of meaning focus on the sets of exemplars in the world. As
such they can have nothing to say about concepts which have no members. (The
problem of empty and ﬁctional names is well known, Braun 2005). Thus when we
think about counter-factual or hypothetical objects, the extension has to be taken to
refer not to the actual world but to a virtual or “possible” world. Computer teacups
do not currently exist, but it is possible to imagine an alternative world in which
they do, and we can speculate about their properties. In fact this process of con-
ceptual combination may be a key factor in innovation and creativity.
In a recent paper (Gibbert et al. 2012) my colleagues and I investigated cre-
ativity in the forming of concepts of hybrid products—artifacts that serve more than
one traditional function. In direct agreement with the processes postulated by the
Composite Prototype Model we showed how ﬁrst attempts to imagine (say) a
pillow that was also a telephone would simply aggregate the features of the two
concepts into a composite. However when the two concepts being combined were
sufﬁciently dissimilar, then a second attempt at combining the concepts would
generate integrative solutions in which features of one concept would be aligned
with those of the other to provide emergent functionality. The telephone could be
programmed to provide gentle sounds to help people get to sleep, or the pillow
could gently move to alert the user that a phone call was arriving. A less kind
proposal was that the pillow would allow one to nap while listening to one’s mother
on the phone. When people were able to generate integrative solutions, these were
consistently judged to be more likely to succeed as marketable products.
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1.12 Impossible Objects and Hierarchical Levels
To conclude this chapter I will describe a study in this project, conducted with
Diane Lewis and Zachary Estes in which we looked more speciﬁcally at the issue of
instantiation. We designed a study in which half the concepts were basic level
categories (Rosch et al. 1976) corresponding to the most common names for
objects, like CAR and LEMON and the other half were superordinate categories
like VEHICLE or FRUIT, where there is no single image than can be formed of the
category as a whole.1 We had two ideas in mind about how this variable would
affect the likely success of forming incompatible conjunctions. On the one hand,
superordinate categories place fewer constraints on the solution. For an object to be
a car requires some minimum description in terms of shape, size and material which
need not be true for something to be a vehicle. We therefore predicted that in
general our participants would ﬁnd it easier to combine disjoint sets at the super-
ordinate level, leading to Superordinate-Superordinate combinations being the
easiest to form, Basic-Basic combinations to be hardest, and mixed combinations in
between. As a rider to this hypothesis, we also considered it likely that successful
use of Superordinate concepts would be found greatest when they were actually
instantiated in the solution as familiar basic level concepts.
Set against this prediction was the possibility that because basic objects are very
familiar and easily imagined, there would be some processing advantage to having
the task set at this concrete level. Indeed there is evidence (Smits et al. 2002) that
people actually make decisions about superordinate categories by retrieving
prominent basic level exemplars. In particular, we felt that a case could be made for
arguing that the mixed conditions Superordinate-Basic and Basic-Superordinate
would be the easiest. In these conditions one of the concepts would be anchored to a
familiar and concrete basic level object, and the task would then be to modify or
transform this easily imagined object in order to meet the criteria of the other
superordinate category in some way.
The design was a 2 × 2 within subjects design manipulating whether the ﬁrst
and second nouns were basic or superordinate concepts. Thirty-two students and
other young adults (18 female) aged 17–32, completed booklets. Eight sets of items
were constructed. Each set was a quadruple of a pair of basic level concepts to be
combined, together with their superordinates. Table 2 lists the materials used.
A combination was created by taking one of the nouns from the left two columns
and combining it with one of the nouns from the same row in the right two columns.
There were thus four possible combinations for each quadruple, such as
Banana-Bus, Banana-Vehicle, Fruit-Bus and Fruit-Vehicle.
Each participant was given two pairs in each of the four conditions, and the
materials were rotated through the four conditions across four groups of participants
1Some of our superordinate concepts, like Bird and Fish were probably at the basic level in terms
of Rosch et al.’s (1976) criteria. However the manipulation of level was still valid with “Wood-
pecker” providing greater constraints on a combined concept than “Bird”.
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so that each quadruple contributed equally to all conditions. The ﬁrst nouns were
always the Head nouns, and the second the Modiﬁers in a phrase such as “A banana
that is also a bus”.
1.13 Results
Responses were rated by two independent judges on scales of success (1–10) and
symmetry (rescaled for analysis as 1 = bias towards head, 0 = no bias, −1 = bias
towards modiﬁer). Reliabilities were estimated by the Spearman Brown method as
0.70 for success ratings and 0.75 for symmetry. Raters disagreed by more than 4
scale points for the success rating on only 5% of occasions, and gave opposing
symmetry judgments also on only 5% of occasions.
Success. Figure 3 shows the mean rated success of solutions as a function of the
level of the head and modiﬁer concepts. Problems involving superordinate terms
were more successfully solved than those involving basic level terms, both for the
head noun (5.8 vs. 5.4) and for the modiﬁer noun (5.8 vs. 5.5). ANOVA conﬁrmed
independent signiﬁcant main effects of level for the head noun (F(1, 31) = 6.9,
Table 2 Materials used in
the experiment for forming
“impossible” combinations of
concepts
First noun Second noun
Basic Superordinate Basic Superordinate
Banana Fruit Bus Vehicle
Woodpecker Bird Jumper Clothing
Shark Fish Daffodil Flower
Table Furniture Mosquito Insect
Bomb Weapon Carrot Vegetable
Snake Reptile Bungalow Building
Horse Mammal Spanner Tool
Hamster Pet Guitar Musical
instrument
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p < 0.05, and for the modiﬁer noun (F(1, 31) = 4.55, p < 0.05), with no signiﬁcant
interaction (F < 1).
Symmetry. Analysis of the Symmetry judgements showed that solutions tended
to be more similar to the head noun than the modiﬁer (mean bias = 0.14, SD =
0.54, t(127) = 2.84, p < 0.005), but there were no effects of level. This result
suggests that the head noun may be taken as a starting point and modiﬁed in the
direction of the modiﬁer, rather than vice versa.
Instantiation. The signiﬁcant effects of level on success were in keeping with the
prediction that the greater flexibility allowed to the participant from the use of a
superordinate would allow better solutions to be found. To test this notion further
we examined the interaction between success and the amount of instantiation used
in a solution.
Solutions for the conditions involving superordinates (Basic-Superordinate,
Superordinate-Basic and Superordinate-Superordinate) were divided on the basis of
whether either the head or modiﬁer superordinate was clearly instantiated as a
particular basic level term. Some of the 16 superordinate categories were almost
always instantiated (notably furniture, fruit, mammal, pet, vehicle) whereas others
were almost never instantiated (flower, ﬁsh). The likelihood of a superordinate
concept being instantiated was greater (72%) when the other concept was also
superordinate, than when the other was a basic level term (59%), so it appears that
ﬁnding a solution is easier if at least one of the terms is at the basic level or has
been instantiated at the basic level.
Average success of solutions was compared for cases where the superordinate(s)
were instantiated and cases where they were not. For this purpose instantiation was
treated as a Post Hoc Factor. For the conditions with one Basic and one Superor-
dinate concept, instantiation of the superordinate had a relatively small effect (mean
success = 6.0 instantiated, 5.4 un-instantiated, t(126) = 1.97, p = 0.051).
However for the Superordinate-Superordinate condition, instantiation had a
sizeable effect on success. Where neither was instantiated (13 out of 64 cases),
mean success was only 4.3, whereas when either one or both were instantiated it
rose to 6.3. Because of small cell sizes, a one-way ANOVA was conducted com-
paring three levels of instantiation—both nouns instantiated, just one instantiated,
or neither noun instantiated. There was a strong effect of instantiation (F(2,
61) = 6.1, p < 0.005). Figure 4 illustrates some of the more successful solutions
offered.
What has been shown by these explorations of the creative potential in our
conceptual system? Clearly the primary function of words and sentences is to
enable us to communicate and coordinate our thoughts about the world. Lexical
items have a dictionary meaning that provides a ﬁrm basis for learning a language
and using it effectively across a range of social contexts. At the same time, the
concepts that constitute the basis of those meanings are capable of showing a
flexibility that is fundamental to the process of invention and conceptual change. To
understand how lexical composition occurs it helps to understand more about how
conceptual contents can be combined. That process would appear to require access
to the full repertoire of human cognitive capacities, well beyond the limits of a set
116 J.A. Hampton
of compositional rules applied to a ﬁnite set of ﬁxed concepts. In particular it may
require active simulation of concepts in an imagined world (Barsalou, 2017) and
access to knowledge of the world (Murphy and Medin 1985).
2 Conclusions
In this chapter I have tried to provide some hard evidence that lexical meanings are
often concepts that are constituted as prototypes in the mind of the language user.
The prototype consists of a set of correlated features that represent what people
know and expect about the most typical or representative example of the kind, and
the amount of variability that can be expected around that. Because these concepts
lack hard deﬁnitions, it is common to ﬁnd borderline disputes about meaning.
Furthermore when modelling the way in which people interpret apparently con-
junctive phrases such as “an A which is a B” it is necessary to take account of these
prototype intensions in order to explain the patterns of overextension and com-
pensation that occur, together with other effects such as non-commutativity and
category dominance.
Fig. 4 Examples of the successful solutions generated by the more creative participants.
Clockwise from top left a horse which is a tool, a bird which is clothing, a pet which is a musical
instrument, and a reptile which is a building. Instantiation, alignment and emergent features are
evident in these solutions. Original drawings of anonymous participants have been redrawn
Compositionality and Concepts 117
I hope also to have provided an explanation of why typicality should not be
taken as a unitary measure, since as a task it can invite a range of different prag-
matic interpretations, including ideals and familiarity as well as the intended one of
representativeness.
Let me conclude with some comments about the relation of this work to the
work of formal semantics as described in the chapter in this volume by Pelletier. It
is perfectly true that the work I have described offers no account of the difference
between individuals and kinds, no account of how the scope of quantiﬁers is
determined from syntax and no account of indeﬁnitely many other linguistic and
semantic phenomena. That was never its aim. The focus on intersective noun
combinations was primarily to demonstrate that you need intensions to explain
people’s intuitions of applicability in these cases. There is a large psychological
literature on other forms of conceptual combination involving noun-noun com-
pounds (Wisniewski 1997; Gagne and Shoben 1997; Estes and Glucksberg 2000)
showing that intersective interpretations are relatively rare compared to a number of
other commonly used thematic relations such as “MADE OF” (e.g. CHOCOLATE
EGG), “LOCATED IN” (e.g. CITY BUS) or “USED FOR” (e.g. CEMENT
TRUCK). The question is therefore whether the two distinct approaches to
semantics can ﬁnd a way to mesh, or whether there are fundamental incompati-
bilities between them. A problem of ﬁnding the right conceptual combination.
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Typicality Knowledge
and the Interpretation of Adjectives
Choonkyu Lee
Abstract In this paper, we discuss our experimental results involving color pref-
erence and yes/no categorization judgments that provide insight into the interpre-
tation of color adjectives. We selected a set of object categories that show a
consistent color typicality bias, and presented them with varying degrees of color
manipulation in our experiments. In Experiment 1, Dutch speakers performed a
forced-choice picture-phrase matching task. Between a photograph of an object in
its typical color (e.g., a light green tomato) and another photograph in a focal color
(a darker green tomato), participants showed a signiﬁcantly higher proportion of
preference for the typical, nonfocal color for categories with a color bias (e.g.,
tomato; 52%) than for categories without a bias (e.g., box; 36%). In Experiment 2,
we conducted a categorization task in which participants judged whether an image
was an example of the target adjective-noun combination or not, in yes-no format,
for 14 adjective-noun combinations including color and other adjectives, such as
pattern and material adjectives. When presented with nonfocal images, participants
were much more likely to give ‘Yes’ responses for categories with a typicality bias
(55%) than for those without a bias (27%), demonstrating an effect of world
knowledge in yes-no categorization judgments as well.
1 Introduction
The domain of colors was discussed frequently in the early literature on concept
composition (e.g., Smith et al. 1988; Medin and Shoben 1988), and also played a
key role in the development of prototype theory (Heider 1972; Berlin and Kay
1969). It continues to be central in the literature on top-down influences on cate-
gorization (e.g., Mitterer et al. 2009). In the semantics literature, however, color
adjectives have usually been considered intersective adjectives whose composition
with nouns simply involves set intersection and whose truth-conditions are inde-
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pendent of the context they appear in (e.g., Keenan and Faltz 1985; Chierchia and
McConnell-Ginet 1996; Drašković et al. 2013).
Previous discussion of adjective-noun combinations involving color adjectives
revealed some general issues in meaning composition. Smith et al. (1988) used
examples such as red apple and brown apple to illustrate how their model of
meaning composition, ‘selective modiﬁcation,’ worked. In this model, a noun
representation has multiple attributes, including its color (when it is relevant), and
adjectival modiﬁcation of the noun with a color term selectively influences the color
attribute. A mental representation of apple thus includes relevant attributes such as
its color, shape, texture, and freshness, each with default values set according to our
world knowledge. In their example, Smith et al. (1988) assigned the values 25 for
red, 5 for green, and 0 for brown in the color attribute of apple to model our
expectation about different possibilities of the color of an apple. In this model,
modifying the noun apple with a color adjective red or brown simply re-assigns the
color-attribute values so that the corresponding color gets all the values (30 red, 0
green, 0 brown for red apple; and 0 red, 0 green, and 30 brown for brown apple),
while also increasing the diagnosticity of the color attribute in similarity judgments.
When Smith et al. (1988) tested their model’s predictions against participants’
typicality ratings of various items for concepts such as red vegetable and red fruit,
they obtained correlations between 0.70 and 0.97, which were in a similar range to
other adjective-noun combinations such as round vegetable and round fruit.
Medin and Shoben (1988), however, pointed out the limitations of Smith et al.’s
(1988) selective modiﬁcation model with an emphasis on correlated attributes in the
world. In the brown apple example above, the brown color usually indicates that the
apple is not fresh, and neglecting such world knowledge would be an oversim-
pliﬁcation for a model of conceptual representation. Participants in Medin and
Shoben’s (1988) typicality rating study demonstrated their awareness of correlated
attributes, judging white clouds to be more harmless than gray clouds, and
black-and-white TVs to be more likely to be small than color TVs. Moreover, their
similarity judgments demonstrated that the internal structure of color space changes
according to the noun context, with the color pair white-gray judged to be more
similar than the pair gray-black in the context of hair, but the other way around in
the context of cloud or bear.
1.1 Overextension and World Knowledge
Aside from the impact of world knowledge, Hampton (1996) showed non-Boolean
processes in concept composition, using letters in different colors, but there is
evidence in Smith and Osherson’s (1984) early data that suggests world knowledge
also constrains these processes in concept composition. Hampton (1996) conducted
categorization experiments on ambiguous-colored letter shapes, whose values on
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the dimensions of color and shape similarity to the letters, A or H, varied along
11-point scales. In one experiment, participants gave a forced-choice response
between the colors, blue and green, to judge the color of a letter shape, and later
gave a yes-no categorization response for the same visual stimuli with regard to
adjective-noun descriptions such as Blue H. Hampton (1996) observed that in about
10–20% of the trials, participants accepted descriptions such as Blue H after
choosing the color Green over Blue for the same image, when the stimulus color
was slightly closer to green but the stimulus shape was a very good H. Another
experiment using the colors, orange and red, and yes-no questions such as Is this
Orange? instead of a forced choice between two colors, showed a similar rate of
overextension. The main issue in this study was not world knowledge, as there is
presumably no clear color preference between blue versus green As and Hs, or
between orange versus red As and Hs in our world knowledge. Hampton’s (1996)
results showed that categorization judgments that are negative for a single
dimension (simply color) can be positive when the dimension is combined with
another in which the stimulus has high ‘goodness-of-membership,’ revealing
non-Boolean composition.
Smith and Osherson’s (1984) typicality rating results (Experiment 2, p. 349)
showed a similar ‘relaxation’ of standards in the interpretation of adjectival mod-
iﬁers: In response to pictures that were intermediate between two adjective concepts
(e.g., an ambiguous red-brown apple drawing), participants’ typicality ratings of the
drawing as an example of the adjective-noun description (red apple and brown
apple) were signiﬁcantly higher than those with just the adjective category (red and
brown). Because Smith and Osherson used concepts for which we have stronger
knowledge-based biases than colored letter shapes in Hampton’s (1996) study, we
can observe the impact of world knowledge on judgments involving complex
concepts. When the color in the verbal description was an atypical color for the
depicted category in the drawing and thus negatively diagnostic (e.g., brown apple
and red canary), there was always reliable overextension in typicality ratings,
namely, signiﬁcantly higher ratings for the adjective-noun descriptions (brown
apple, red canary) compared to just the color adjective (brown, red), regardless of
the actual degree of match between the image and the description. In contrast, when
the color of a description was a typical one for the noun category and thus posi-
tively diagnostic (red apple and yellow canary), there was not consistent overex-
tension of a color judgment from simple descriptions (red, yellow) to complex ones
(red apple, yellow canary). In fact, when the drawing was a poor match (e.g., a
drawing of a brown apple) for the target descriptions (red and red apple), there was
even a decrease in typicality ratings from the simple description with the adjective
alone (red) to the complex one (red apple)—in other words, a brown apple was a
worse example of red apple than of red, according to Smith and Osherson’s (1984)
participants. The fact that overextension for adjective-noun combinations depends
on the diagnosticity of the particular adjective reflects our color typicality knowl-
edge about the noun categories (apples and canaries).
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1.2 Further Effects of World Knowledge Involving Color
Terms
Later developments employing different methodologies such as corpus/dictionary
analysis and color labeling experiments shed further light on the role of world
knowledge on color-term usage. Steinvall (2002) analyzed color-adjective uses in
the Bank of English corpus and color-adjective entries in the Oxford English
Dictionary (1993), and made an important distinction between the ‘classifying’ and
the ‘characterizing/descriptive’ functions of color adjectives. While the latter use
focuses on the color of a speciﬁc instance in the referential setting, the former use,
which Steinvall (2002) also called type modiﬁcation, picks out a subtype of the
noun category in question. For example, natural kinds (e.g., onions, undyed hair)
usually exist only in a few colors, rather than in the full range of a color spectrum,
and for these, Steinvall (2002) observed that basic color terms are predominantly
used to classify the subtypes based on colors without necessarily being descrip-
tively precise with regard to the actual referent object (e.g., red onion for a purple
hue, since there are no other types of onions closer to a prototypical bright red).
These results are consistent with Anishchanka, Speelman and Geeraerts’s (2014)
results from an analysis of color-term usage in online marketing, in which the
authors found hypernymous usage with a broad referential range of colors for basic
color terms, and a much narrower referential range for non-basic color terms. The
exact causal history of basic color terms—whether they arose due to the limited
color types in frequently mentioned natural categories, or they just happened to be
conveniently adequate for type classiﬁcation—is, however, admittedly unclear
(Steinvall 2002).
Aside from adjective-noun combinations, there are experimental studies
involving single-word color terms in color labeling and categorization tasks that
also demonstrate an effect of typicality biases due to the object category being
asked about. Using hand-drawn images of typically orange (e.g., a carrot) and
typically yellow objects (e.g., a banana), Mitterer and de Ruiter (2008) demon-
strated that participants were more likely to label, for example, a carrot as “orange”
and a banana as “yellow” even when these were presented in the same exact hue.
A color typicality effect was also evident at the level of perception for the hue
midway between orange and yellow: Participants who saw this ambiguous
orange-yellow hue on a carrot ﬁrst categorized the same color sock (i.e., an object
with little intrinsic color bias) in a later task as “orange,” and those who saw this
hue on a banana ﬁrst categorized the same color sock in a later task as “yellow”.
In order to locate the cause of the color typicality effect precisely by teasing
visual and declarative memory from life experience apart, Mitterer et al. (2009)
picked trafﬁc lights as their visual stimuli in a later experiment. Due to European
Union regulations, EU citizens presumably share a common perceptual experience
with regard to trafﬁc lights, but some language groups nevertheless differ in their
naming of the color of the middle light. Dutch speakers call the middle light oranje
(‘orange’), whereas German speakers call it gelb (‘yellow’). Mitterer et al. (2009)
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found that this difference in color-naming habits led to different color-labeling
behavior in the experiment when the same ambiguous orange-yellow hue was
presented on a trafﬁc light image: When presented with the same exact hue on a
middle trafﬁc light, Dutch speakers were more likely to call it “orange,” while
German speakers were more likely to call it “yellow,” reflecting their habit. These
two language groups were, however, indistinguishable when the ambiguous hue
was presented on other object categories, such as a carrot, a banana, and a sock, for
which there is presumably no systematic difference in color-naming habits between
the two groups. Mitterer et al. (2009) thus concluded that it is primarily declarative
memory (i.e., everyday color-term usage), rather than visual memory from life
experience, that gave rise to the world knowledge effect in color labeling and
categorization.
In sum, there is reason to believe that our general knowledge of typical prop-
erties of and relations between objects plays an important role in using color
adjectives for labeling different hues. In our study, we investigated whether our
knowledge of typical object properties and relations in the world influences our
discrete categorization judgments in the context of adjective-noun combinations as
well. Speciﬁcally, we were interested in the competing factors of set intersection in
concept composition and color typicality knowledge in complex concepts with a
bias toward a nonfocal color (cf., Heider 1972; Regier et al. 2005, for the notion of
a ‘focal’ color, which refers to the best representative of a color category, as widely
recognized across different linguistic communities), such as red hair (whose typical
red is not the focal, bright red) and green tomato (whose typical green is much
lighter than the focal green). In a series of pilot studies, we ﬁrst found a set of object
categories whose typical colors are not focal colors in our commonsense knowledge
(e.g., red hair and green tomato). Most previous studies involving color descrip-
tions and visual stimuli presented a single image at a time on a given trial, in which
the participant had to make a yes-no response with regard to a color description or a
forced choice between two color descriptions for the better match. In our Experi-
ment 1, we had participants make a forced choice between two images, one in a
focal color and the other in a nonfocal color, for the better match to an
adjective-noun description such as green tomato. We predicted that, compared to
categories without a color typicality bias (e.g., boxes), categories with a typical
nonfocal color bias in the real world such as tomatoes would lead to a higher
proportion of responses toward the nonfocal-colored image, against the predictions
of stricter accounts of concept composition which might accept only good examples
of green as good examples of green tomato. For example, if participants treat the
word meanings of green and tomato separately ﬁrst and simply combine them in set
intersection for the meaning of green tomato, they might prefer a focal-green
tomato even though it looks artiﬁcial. Forced-choice preference data in Experiment
1 by itself, however, would not establish that people’s discrete categorization
judgments with regard to an adjective-noun combination differ depending on the
intrinsic color properties of the relevant object category. A simple preference for a
focal-green box image over a nonfocal-green box image as an example of the
description green box tells us nothing about whether the participant would
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categorize the dispreferred nonfocal image (or even the focal image) as an example
of green box or not in yes-no format. In order to get at people’s truth-judgments
directly, in Experiment 2 we conducted another picture-phrase matching experi-
ment in which only one image was presented at a time, and participants judged
whether the image was an example of the target adjective-noun description in
yes-no format. A world knowledge effect in such discrete judgments would strongly
point to flexibility in our truth-evaluations even in non-ﬁgurative language, contrary
to some traditional assumptions in theoretical accounts of color adjective meanings
as intersective (e.g., Keenan and Faltz 1985; Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 1996;
Drašković et al. 2013).
2 Experiments
2.1 Pretest: Category Conﬁrmation and Color Shift
Judgments Along a Spectrum
We presented photographs of seven categories with an intrinsic color bias: banana,
bear, jeans, tomato, egg, grass, and horse. All of these categories had at least two
naturally existing typical colors, with one of the colors being more ‘canonical’ (e.g.,
yellow bananas and green bananas). In order to investigate the effect of a color
typicality bias on color judgments on a ﬁne-grained level, we found digital pho-
tographs of objects from these categories, and manipulated the color of each cat-
egory by starting with the original image and creating a duplicate layer with varying
levels of transparency, hue, and/or saturation with a color copied from another
object image of the same category in Photoshop.1 The images varied in color along
an 11-level spectrum (similar to Hampton 1996), but we needed to make sure that
the color manipulation did not affect the category status—e.g., a banana with an
ambiguous yellow-green color is judged to be atypical but nevertheless a banana—
as observed in categorization judgments and response times.
1There are two main ways of color matching we used in Photoshop. First, Photoshop has a built-in
function ‘Match Color’ under Image—Adjustments for copying the color of (a selected area in) a
source image to (a selected area in) a target image directly. Although this automatic function
sometimes affects the luminance patterns in the target image too much, it is possible to control the
luminance to preserve the patterns in a precise way. The second way is to create a duplicate layer
in the target image ﬁle and use an eyedropper to sample a color in a source image to copy onto the
target image or simply use the above method and adjust the transparency of the duplicate layer. It
is also possible to pre-process the source image by applying an ‘Average’ ﬁlter under Filter—Blur
when the internal pattern of the source image is too complex and difﬁcult to transfer naturally to
another image using the automatic method. Using the ‘Color’ mode instead of the default ‘Normal’
mode in the duplicate layer helps preserve the internal patterns based on contours, etc. Unfortu-
nately there is no single optimal way for all categories, so it is necessary to decide the optimal
combination on a case-by-case basis.
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In Pretest (a), we looked at three kinds of stimuli: (1) the seven color-biased
categories in three different shades (Levels 3, 6, and 9 on the 11-level spectrum,
with higher numbers indicating higher color typicality)—a total of 21 Main trials—
for detecting any extreme unnaturalness in any direction of the spectrum (3: less
typical, 6: midpoint, 9: typical); (2) six Control trials involving categories that
require positive extension of the normal noun meaning (stone lion, rubber duck,
wooden toy car, model train, Mickey Mouse, and Miffy (an animated rabbit
character)), which were included to ensure that our atypical colors in the Main
stimuli would not lead to as much surprise as in these noun extension cases; and
(3) 24 “No” Filler trials that required a clear “no” response, in order to prevent a set
response (see Fig. 1).
Thirteen native speakers of Dutch provided picture-word match decisions in
yes-no format under a 5-s time limit, and the response times were measured as well.
The judgments were generally consistent with our expectation: For our Main
stimuli, we observed around 95% “Yes” responses to all three shades (Levels 3, 6,
and 9) of our test categories (258 out of 273 trials, with 1 timed-out trial and 14
“No” responses), conﬁrming that our color manipulation in our stimulus images did
not affect their noun category membership—black bears are just as good as brown
and black-brown ambiguous ones for the category bear, and for Fillers, accuracy
was high at 86%. For the six Control categories, for which we expected much
greater surprise compared to the atypical colors in the Main trials at least in par-
ticipants’ reaction times and possibly also in their higher rejection rates, our par-
ticipants gave 94% “Yes” responses (73 out of 78), accepting the images most of
the time for a broader sense of each noun category. In response times, however,
these Control categories led to the slowest decisions, as we expected (mean =
1.28 s, see Table 1). Among our Main categories, in contrast, reaction-time dif-
ferences due to color levels in trials with “yes” responses (n = 258: Level 3
average = 1065 ms, Level 6 average = 1009 ms, Level 9 average = 974 ms) were
(1) Tomato? (2) Duck? (3) Orange (fruit)?
Fig. 1 Example trials from Pretest (a): (1) Main trial, (2) Control trial, and (3) “No” Filler trial
(translated from Dutch). [A color reproduction of this ﬁgure appears in the eBook at doi:10.1007/
978-3-319-45977-6_5]
Table 1 Response times in noun category conﬁrmation
Stimulus type N Mean (ms) Standard deviation (ms)
Main, Level 3 91 1077 (1065 in “yes” trials) 448
Main, Level 6 91 1073 (1009) 582
Main, Level 9 91 1002 (974) 421
Control 78 1283 589
Fillers 312 1169 518
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small and not statistically reliable (F(2, 255) = 0.82, n.s.), conﬁrming our expec-
tation that an atypical color would not make participants hesitate on the category
membership of the object shown.
In Pretest (b), we asked the same group of participants from Pretest (a) for their
color-shift judgment along a color spectrum, in order to conﬁrm that they did
indeed see a color change in our stimuli, and that the locus of this change was not
skewed too much toward one end of our color manipulation spectrum. In this task,
the participants saw the entire spectrum of 11 colors of each object category on a
single screen and indicated the manipulation level at which they thought there was a
color shift by typing in the corresponding number (see Fig. 2).
The direction of the spectrum on the screen (from Level 1 to Level 11, or from
Level 11 to Level 1) was randomized for each trial. With Level 6 being the mid-
point on the scale of 1–11, participants reported a perceived color shift around an
average level of 5–7 for all our Main categories, as we expected (see Table 2).
3 Experiment 1: Forced Choice Between a Focal Color
Versus a Nonfocal, Typical Color
In order to test which color people choose between a focal color and a nonfocal but
canonical color for the category (e.g., focal green vs. nonfocal, ‘tomato’ green) as
the better example of an adjective-noun description (e.g., green tomato), we con-
ducted a preference judgment task in which participants had to choose between an
image pair. As a control, we also tested categories with no strongly associated color
(e.g., box). We predicted that participants’ color typicality knowledge would
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Where does the color of the image change into another color? (translated from Dutch)
Fig. 2 An example trial from Pretest 2(b): tomato. [A color reproduction of this ﬁgure appears in
the eBook at doi:10.1007/978-3-319-45977-6_5]
Table 2 Average level of
perceived color shift on a
level 1–11 manipulation
spectrum
Category N Mean Standard deviation
Banana 13 4.92 1.19
Bear 13 6.08 1.38
Egg 13 5.69 1.65
Grass 13 5.54 1.56
Horse 13 5.54 1.85
Jeans 13 4.85 1.28
Tomato 13 5.08 1.38
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influence their color preferences in this task, such that participants will be much
more likely to prefer a nonfocal color over a focal one for color-biased categories
such as tomatoes than for color-neutral categories such as boxes.
4 Method
We gave 11 adult native Dutch speakers a forced-choice picture-phrase matching
task in which they saw two photographs of an object along with an adjective-noun
combination and picked the image they preferred as the better match for the phrase.
For example, the participant would see on the computer screen a photograph of a
green tomato in its typical color (‘nonfocal’ green), another photograph of the same
green tomato whose color was manipulated to be a focal green, and the expression
green tomato (see Fig. 3). ‘Nonfocal’ colors were simply sampled from the web in
a search of photographs of our stimulus categories, and for an operational deﬁnition
of ‘focal’ colors in our digital images, we used the RGB triplets in Table 3.
We picked a category from the pretests which had a nonfocal color as a typically
existing color and added more to the list for four color-biased categories (green
tomato, green apple, orange sky, red leaf) and, as a control, four color-neutral
categories (box, flag, table, T-shirt) whose colors were matched with a color-biased
category. There were 16 ﬁller trials with non-color adjective modiﬁers (such as
striped apple, bald man, female scientist, and wooden spoon) or with mismatching
noun categories. Four of these ﬁller trials had an image of the canonical color for
the category (e.g., red tomato) along with a focal-color image (focal-green tomato)
to check that participants actually paid attention to the description (green tomato)
(1) Green tomato (← / ↓ / →) (2) Green box (← / ↓ / →)
Fig. 3 Example trials from Experiment 1: (1) color-biased, and (2) color-neutral categories, in
which the ﬁgure on the right of each pair is a focal green, and the ﬁgure on the left is a non-focal
green typical of a green tomato. [A color reproduction of this ﬁgure appears in the eBook at
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-45977-6_5]
Table 3 RGB triplets for the
colors in Experiments 1 and 2
Color name (based on X11 names) RGB
Blue (0, 0, 255)
Dark orange (255, 140, 0)
Ofﬁce green (0, 128, 0)
Red (255, 0, 0)
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and pick the focal-color as the better match even when it is an unnatural image,
rather than simply choose a more familiar image (red tomato, which is a bad match
for the description green tomato) on most trials. Participants clicked arrow keys to
indicate ‘left image,’ ‘right image,’ or ‘no preference’ (the last option was expected
for the noun-mismatching trials).
4.1 Results
We predicted a color bias effect in a speciﬁc direction, namely, a lower proportion
of focal preferences for color-biased categories. We thus recoded the participants’
responses for a one-tailed logistic regression test: Preference for the focal-color
image was ‘1,’ and preference for the nonfocal-color image or no preference was
‘0.’ We analyzed the proportion of focal preferences as a function of color bias (see
Table 4). Logistic regression with a random slope and intercept for Participant
revealed that participants showed a signiﬁcantly higher proportion of focal pref-
erences for color-neutral categories (mean = 0.64, SD = 0.487, N = 44) than for
color-biased categories (mean = 0.48, SD = 0.505, N = 44) (z = −1.72,
p = 0.043, one-tailed).
5 Experiment 2: Yes-No Categorization Judgment
Although Experiment 1 demonstrated that, given a pair of images with a focal and a
nonfocal color, participants’ preferences for an image matching a target phrase
showed an effect of the typical color of the target category, it does not establish that
people’s truth-judgments or categorization judgments may differ for the same color
on two different objects, depending on whether the object categories have an
intrinsically typical color or not. In other words, we were interested in ﬁnding
instances of a nonfocal color that normally falls outside an acceptable range of a
certain color term (e.g., a gingery-orange color for the term red) to see if this color
will be rejected when it is applied to a category without an intrinsic bias in favor of
that color (e.g., a gingery-orange car as an example of red car), but accepted when
it is applied to a category with a color-biased category (e.g., gingery-orange hair as
an example of red hair). We thus conducted another picture-phrase matching
experiment in which only one image was presented at a time, and participants
Table 4 Mean proportion
(%) of focal preferences by
category in Experiment 1
Biased Neutral
Green apple 45 Green flag 55
Green tomato 45 Green box 73
Orange sky 73 Orange table 100
Red leaf 27 Red T-shirt 27
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judged whether the image was an example of the target adjective-noun combination
in yes-no format. In addition to color adjectives, we included some other kinds of
adjectives, such as pattern and material adjectives, in order to explore the gener-
alizability of a world knowledge effect.
5.1 Method
For our linguistic stimuli, we selected seven adjectives, each combined with two
noun categories to be tested for their ‘Biased’ versus ‘Neutral’ status in the relevant
adjective dimension (color, pattern, or material) in a pretest: red hair/car, green
tomato/chair, striped apple/T-shirt, straight leg/road, cork mug/board, wooden
bike/frame, and woolen shoe/floor-mat. We conducted a pretest with 17 native
speakers of Dutch to establish the Biased versus Neutral distinction in each of the
seven category pairs above using three tasks. For color and pattern adjectives (red,
green, striped, straight), we ﬁrst conducted a focal preference task similar to
Experiment 1 to conﬁrm a higher focal preference for the neutral noun categories
(see Table 5).
For material adjectives (cork, wooden, woolen), Biased versus Neutral status of
noun categories was conﬁrmed in free-response production and yes-no typicality
judgment tasks. In the free response task, participants were shown a category name
(e.g., bike) and asked to type in the typical material it is made of. Next, in the
typicality judgment task, participants were shown an adjective-noun combination
(e.g., wooden bike), and asked whether it was a typical combination. Our goal in the
free-response task was to ﬁnd no instances of spontaneous production of our target
materials (cork, wood, wool) in the Biased categories, but a few instances of the
target (or synonymous/hypernymous) materials in the Neutral categories, and our
three category pairs conﬁrmed our expected pattern (see Table 6). In the typicality
judgments, we also conﬁrmed the expected pattern of higher positive responses to
our Neutral adjective-noun combinations than to the Biased counterparts in our
category pairs (see Table 7).
For the 14 adjective-noun combinations, we prepared two photographs for each
adjective-noun combination, one focal (e.g., red hair with a bright focal red) and
one nonfocal (red hair with a more typical orange/copper hue). Within a
Biased-Neutral pair, the values on the relevant adjective dimensions were held
constant (RGB for color, pixel proportions for source material, and pattern/shape
Table 5 Mean proportion of focal preferences by category pair in Experiment 2 pretest
Biased Neutral
Hair (target ADJ: red) 24 Car (target ADJ: red) 94
Tomato (target ADJ: green) 41 Chair (target ADJ: green) 59
Apple (target ADJ: striped) 0 T-shirt (target ADJ: striped) 88
Leg (target ADJ: straight) 41 Road (target ADJ: straight) 71
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for pattern by copying and pasting, see Fig. 4). Twenty-four adult native speakers
of Dutch saw a photograph along with an adjective-noun combination, and judged
(yes/no) whether the picture matched the expression within a three-second time
limit. Each participant saw both photographs for each of the 14 adjective-noun
combinations for a total of 28 main trials, along with 28 ﬁller trials.
5.2 Results
In the Focal condition, acceptability judgments were high (>80%) for all
adjective-noun combinations except one (striped T-shirt, 33%), conﬁrming that
participants treated the task as a category- or truth-judgment and not just a
typicality/familiarity judgment. In the critical Nonfocal condition, in contrast,
Biased categories (hair, bike, etc.) led to signiﬁcantly higher ‘Yes’ responses (55%)
than Neutral categories (car, frame, etc., 27%; p < 0.001).
5.3 Discussion
Our ﬁnding demonstrates that when typical properties of (noun) categories in our
commonsense knowledge are biased against the ‘focal’ value of an adjective
dimension (e.g., focal red in hair, 100% wood throughout a bike, etc.), our standards
for categorization are relaxed such that a ‘nonfocal’ value (orange/copper rather
than red, or wood only in parts of a bike) is more acceptable for these categories
compared to those that have no such typicality bias against a focal value. Experi-
ment 2 suggests that similar effects of typicality knowledge play a role in different
Table 6 Common responses in Experiment 2 pretest (free response)
Biased Neutral
Mug 13 (out of 17) ‘porcelain/stone/clay’ Board 10 ‘cork’
no ‘cork’ 4 ‘cardboard/paper’
Bike 16 ‘metal/steel/iron/aluminum’ Frame 14 ‘wood’
no ‘wood’
Shoe 17 ‘leather’ Floor-mat 11 ‘fabric/cotton’
no ‘wool’ 1 ‘wool’
Table 7 Proportion of ‘yes’
responses (%) in Experiment
2 pretest (typicality judgment)
Biased Neutral
Cork mug 0 Cork board 94
Wooden bike 6 Wooden frame 100
Woolen shoe 6 Woolen floor-mat 59
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domains of adjectival meanings, such as colors, pattern, and material, although
future research is needed for a much wider range of stimuli. The typicality effect in
rapid discrete categorization beyond typicality ratings (e.g., Smith and Osherson
1984) lends support to theoretical accounts that propose a uniform underlying
representational space for both typicality and truth judgments, such as Hampton’s
(2007) threshold model.
Fig. 4 Stimuli and percentage of “Yes” categorization responses from Experiment 2: non-focal
and focal versions of color-biased categories (left half) and color-neutral categories (right half)
(translated from Dutch). [A color reproduction of this ﬁgure appears in the eBook at doi:10.1007/
978-3-319-45977-6_5]
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6 Conclusion
Our results point to noun context effects on the interpretation of color adjectives,
whose meanings show shifting boundaries for truth-judgments. Color adjectives
may seem context-independent and intersective for many categories when the
category-speciﬁc color spaces converge, but when we consider color judgments for
categories with an intrinsic color bias in the real world, we observe
context-dependent truth-judgments in uses of color terms. Similar effects of
extensional feedback (Hampton 1988) in truth and categorization judgments may
arise for many other adjective classes that have traditionally been analyzed as
intersective.2 Compositional processes that go beyond classical logic and set theory
(such as Boolean conjunction and set intersection) are so pervasive in natural
language that they cannot simply be set aside as a peripheral issue in semantic
theory and pose a serious challenge to accounts of meaning composition as set
intersection (e.g., Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 1996; Heim and Kratzer 1998).
It would also be important in future research to pursue further the compositional
processes at varying degrees of frequent and conventionalized adjective-noun
combinations. Dynamic, context-dependent ‘recalibrations’ of a predicate meaning
(Kamp and Partee 1995) or modiﬁcation of a comparison class to which a predicate
applies (Klein 1980) seem to point to general processes of meaning composition in
any domain where we have extensional feedback based on our world knowledge,
not limited just to a small class of vague predicates.
Experimental studies in categorization and reasoning have made strides in
mapping our conceptual space (Gärdenfors 2000) and ﬁne-tuning our ideas about
the combination of different conceptual dimensions. Fine-grained quantitative
comparisons in the degree or amount of overextension between our study and
earlier ones, especially Hampton (1996), would be difﬁcult due to the subtlety of
color space and color manipulation (or the lack of detailed descriptions of stimuli in
Smith and Osherson 1984). A combination of tasks, such as truth-value judgments,
color shift judgments in simultaneous presentation of multiple colors, forced-choice
preferences between given colors, and phrase-picture matching tasks, should take
us closer to better understanding of concept combination involving color adjectives.
There are important additional insights and challenges from the theoretical lit-
erature on color-term interpretation. One is the source or ontological status of the
colors—i.e., whether they represent two distinct kinds (e.g., brown vs. black horses)
or two stages of the same kind (green vs. red tomatoes that ripen over time).
Kennedy and McNally (2010) argue that color adjectives are ambiguous between a
gradable reading (denoting a degree scale for the color quality/quantity) and a
non-gradable one (denoting a binary presence/absence of an underlying property
2In spontaneous production data (Sedivy 2003), color adjectives do differ, however, from material
or scalar adjectives in that they appeared frequently even when they were over-informative and
unnecessary, perhaps for a reinforcing effect in referential communication based on the perceptual
salience of colors.
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correlated with the surface color—e.g., genetic makeup). It remains to be seen
whether such taxonomic knowledge is automatically and rapidly accessed, and
makes a qualitative difference in our semantic composition of color adjectives with
nouns. One may also apply the insights from an account of gradable adjectives such
as Toledo and Sassoon’s (2011) by analyzing the context-dependent determination
of truth-conditions in terms of comparison classes consisting of other members of
the same category (in type classiﬁcation of color-biased categories), or apply the
theoretical distinction between stage-level versus individual-level predicates
(Carlson 1977) to color adjectives by considering other possible instantiations of an
individual (for more gradable usage, e.g., in a maturational sense).
Contrary to a domain such as colors, there are domains that do not have a
reasonable context-independent focal point or ‘most typical value’ (such as size and
height—big, tall). We would expect similar world knowledge effects for these
predicates as well (e.g., a man who is 190-cm tall may be considered tall in normal
business attire but not tall in basketball gear, showing the typicality bias in height
for basketball players as opposed to height-neutral businessmen), but these predi-
cates need to be studied in future experimental research. Another interesting issue
for future research is whether the relative order of modiﬁer and head has any impact
on the composition of meanings in real time. It would be interesting to see if
preference for nonfocal color typicality is facilitated in languages with post-nominal
adjectives, such as French and Hebrew, in which one processes the relevant noun
category before a color adjective, in ways that are observable through nonfocal
preference speed and proportion measures, compared to Dutch or English, with
pre-nominal adjectives.
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Concept Typicality and the Interpretation
of Plural Predicate Conjunction
Eva B. Poortman
Abstract This chapter studies the interpretations of plural sentences with con-
joined predicates, e.g. The boys are sitting and cooking and The boys are waving
and smiling. Such sentences are sometimes interpreted intersectively, sometimes
non-intersectively (or ‘split’), and sometimes both interpretations appear to be
allowed. This is surprising, since the logical structure of these sentences is identical,
i.e. they differ only with respect to content words (e.g. sitting, cooking vs. waving,
smiling). I propose that the logical interpretation of these sentences is systematically
affected by lexical information tied to the complex predicate in the sentences,
speciﬁcally their so-called typicality effects. With a set of experiments, I show that
(a) the acceptability of a sentence in a non-intersective situation can be expressed in
terms of a continuum and (b) each acceptability proportion is predicted by the
typicality of the two conjoined predicates applying simultaneously. This way, I
specify at least one of the relevant pragmatic considerations that determine the
interpretation of a plural sentence with conjunctive predicates. More generally,
these results stress the importance of conceptual structure of predicates in semantic
theories of language.
1 Introduction
For a long time, it has been a common tradition in logical semantics to draw a clear
line between lexical knowledge and compositional operations (Cruse 1986;
Jacobson 2014). Logical semanticists generally focus on the latter, studying the way
meaning is composed and how syntax affects this process, mostly irrespective of
word meanings. Even though lexical semantics is acknowledged to some degree,
the connection between the two domains of study has always been relatively weak.
Such an approach proved sufﬁcient in the study of the meanings of logical
expressions such as all or at most three. Whether we speak of all girls, all giraffes
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or even all giraffes owned by girls, does not change the logical contribution of all to
the meaning of the phrase. One would expect a similar independence of word
meaning with logical operators such as each other and and, e.g. the logical con-
tribution of and does not change between I saw boys and girls and I saw giraffes
and elephants. Recently however, studies that looked into these operators revealed
that we can no longer make do with such a simple division of labor (e.g. Dalrymple
et al. 1998; Kerem et al. 2009; Poortman et al. 2017).1 These works have shown
that contextual information (containing lexical information) and compositional
semantics can interact, exposing the need for a more complex story than what is
generally assumed. The current chapter deals with one area in which we see
‘logical’ sentence meaning being affected by ‘non-logical’ word meaning, namely
plural predicate conjunction, proving that the connection between the two domains
is actually fruitful.
Plural sentences with conjunctive predicates as in (1) and (2) are considered to
be true if and only if every boy that is referred to is in the intersection of the two
sets that are denoted by the conjoined verbs. In other words, sentence (1) is true iff
each boy is sitting and each boy is reading, and sentence (2) is true iff each boy is
waving and each boy is smiling.
(1) The boys are sitting and reading
(2) The boys are waving and smiling
We arrive at such interpretations by applying the well-known boolean analysis
of conjunction, according to which it behaves as set-theoretic intersection (Keenan
and Faltz 1985; Partee and Rooth 1983), and combining it with a distributivity
operator that shifts a VP into one that holds of a plural individual such as the boys
iff that VP holds of each atomic part of that individual, i.e. each boy (Link 1983).
Importantly, such an analysis assumes that the way we logically reason about these
natural language sentences is independent of the lexical elements they contain (such
as sitting, standing, waving or smiling). As a result, the logical interpretations of
sentences like (3) and (4) are expected to be derived in a similar way as those of
(1) and (2), with the difference between the sentences only being a matter of word
meaning.
(3) The boys are sitting and standing
(4) The boys are sitting and cooking
In this chapter, I report experiments that show that sentences (3) and (4) in fact
receive weaker logical interpretations than sentences (1) and (2). Sentence (3) is
generally interpreted such that a subset of the boys is sitting and the rest of the boys
are standing—I will call this a ‘split’ interpretation2 (Heycock and Zamparelli 2005).
1In fact, even a seemingly simple term such as all has been shown to be context-dependent at times
Leslie et al. (2011).
2Throughout the chapter, when using the term ‘interpretation’ I simply refer to the situations that
support a truthful usage of a sentence.
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Sentence (4) also allows such a ‘split’ interpretation, but crucially to a lesser extent
than sentence (3). Understanding such acceptability patterns calls for a systematic
investigation of the lexical information that is tied to the verbs in the sentence, as this
appears to be inseparable from a proper analysis of conjunction. I show that there is
in fact a continuum of acceptability values (i.e. percentages of “true” judgments) for
sentences with conjunctive predicates in non-intersective or ‘split’ situations, and I
account for this continuum with a principle that predicts how language users apply
predicates to plural subjects based on the typicality structure of the complex
predicate.
2 Context and Logical Meaning
The insight that context in general, and lexical information in particular, system-
atically predicts the logical interpretation of a sentence is relatively new. A turning
point came with an influential paper on reciprocity by Dalrymple et al. (1998).
Dalrymple et al. were the ﬁrst to start to incorporate a notion of context within
logical meaning. They put forward a principle called the Strongest Meaning
Hypothesis (SMH), which aims to resolve ambiguity that is caused by contextual
information, speciﬁcally in the area of reciprocals. Structurally similar reciprocal
sentences as in (5) and (6) receive different logical interpretations, despite the fact
that they merely differ with respect to the lexical information in the context of the
reciprocal expression.
(5) The boys know each other
(6) The boys are following each other
For each occurrence of the reciprocal, the SMH selects as its interpretation the
strongest meaning (from an inventory of six possible meanings) that is consistent
with context. For example, if we assume three boys, then sentence (5) receives a
strong interpretation in which every boy knows every other boy, since there are no
contextual restrictions on the amount of possible ‘knowing-relations’. All weaker
meanings are consequently disallowed for (5). By contrast, sentence (6) most likely
means something weaker than every boy following every other boy. According to
the SMH, we weaken the meaning of the sentence as far as context pushes us to.
For this example, that meaning is most likely one where boy 1 follows boy 2, and
boy 2 follows boy 3. This is the strongest candidate meaning that does not con-
tradict our knowledge about following people (assuming the boys are not following
each other in a circle). Summarizing, we can say that the SMH, unlike what logical
semanticists would assume, takes non-logical information to be relevant in deter-
mining logical interpretation. It does so without delving too much into what exactly
constitutes this non-logical information, other than referring to it as ‘context’ in
general. However, without a speciﬁc notion of context, empirically supporting such
a principle is very difﬁcult.
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Nevertheless, Winter (2001) re-uses the main gist of the SMH as a solution to
the different interpretations of plural predicate conjunction. Many previous works
have described non-intersective interpretations of plural sentences such as example
(3) above, as well as sentences with noun phrase conjunction as in (7) given below
(e.g. Krifka 1990; Heycock and Zamparelli 2005).
(7) John and Mary wrote an article together
Sentence (7) does not entail that John wrote an article together and Mary wrote
an article together, similar to sentence (3) which does not entail that the boys are
sitting and those same boys are standing. Krifka (1990) proposes to extend the
generally accepted non-intersective conjunction of noun phrases as in (7) to con-
junction of predicates as in (3). He proposes that any conjunction P1 and P2 holds
of an entity x if x can be partitioned into two entities x1 and x2 such that P1 holds of
x1 and P2 holds of x2. For (3), this means that whenever the entity ‘the boys’ can be
partitioned into two entities, then the predicate sitting can hold of one of these
entities and the predicate standing can hold of the other. Winter (2001) acknowl-
edges that while this is a proper analysis for sentences like (3), it fails to capture the
fact that sentences like (1) only allow an intersective interpretation. He claims that
on top of Krifka’s descriptive proposal of non-intersective conjunction in addition
to intersective conjunction, we also need a principle that determines when which
analysis is allowed, thus when the different interpretations actually occur. Winter
(2001) proposes that a maximality principle like the SMH is a suitable candidate.
First, he assumes that the SMH is not construction-speciﬁc to plural sentences with
reciprocals. He rephrases it into a general principle of plural predication, such that
any complex plural predicate with a meaning that is derived from one or more
singular predicates using universal quantiﬁcation is interpreted using the logically
strongest truth conditions that are not contradicted by known properties of the
singular predicate(s) (Winter 2001). Note that unlike Dalrymple et al.’s SMH,
Winter’s extended SMH does not speak of ‘context’ in general, but focuses on a
more manageable part of context, namely the lexical information tied to predicates.
The contrast between minimal pairs like (1) and (3) is then captured in the fol-
lowing way. Again, the SMH selects the logically strongest possible candidate
meaning for each sentence. When a strong interpretation (intersective conjunction)
is consistent with properties of the predicates, then this is the attested meaning of
the sentence—an example is sentence (1). On the other hand, when such a strong
interpretation is inconsistent with these properties, the interpretation is weakened.
We see this in sentence (3): An intersective interpretation in which all boys are in
the intersection of the set of sitting individuals and the set of standing individuals
contradicts what we know about ‘sitting’ and ‘standing’. Thus, sentence (3) re-
ceives a ‘split’ interpretation, which is the strongest interpretation that does not
contradict this knowledge.
In the current chapter, I argue that the predictions made by the SMH can be too
strong, speciﬁcally because its notion of context is still not deﬁned speciﬁcally
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enough. Consider sentences (8) and (9), which are of a similar nature to sentence
(4) above.
(8) The men are lying down and drinking
(9) The men are waving and drawing
If Winter’s extended SMH is correct in assuming that non-intersective inter-
pretations are only available when intersective interpretations are strictly ruled out
by the predicates, then these sentences would only allow an intersective interpre-
tation. As I will show in the current chapter, non-intersective, ‘split’ interpretations
are readily available to many speakers for sentences like (4), (8) and (9), even
though the predicates do not strictly exclude an intersective one. For example, it
may be exceptional, but it is possible for a person to wave and draw simultaneously.
Several previous works have recognized a similar problem for the SMH con-
cerning reciprocal sentences that receive weaker interpretations than predicted (e.g.
Winter 2001; Philip, 2000; Kerem et al. 2009; Poortman et al. 2017). For example,
both Kerem et al. (2009) and Poortman et al. (2017) showed experimentally that a
sentence like The boys are pinching each other in the case of three boys is judged
as true in a situation where each boy pinches only one other boy, despite the fact
that a stronger interpretation is not excluded by properties of the predicate pinch.
3 Typicality: Deﬁning Context
These examples, both with reciprocals and conjunction, point to a fundamental
issue with the proposal at hand. Since context is not speciﬁed in much detail, the
SMH, both in its original and extended form, assumes that the interpretation of
these sentences is only sensitive to so called ‘deﬁnitional’ aspects of the meaning of
predicate concepts. In other words, it only takes into account whether particular
denotations of predicates are possible or impossible, i.e. whether they are an
instance of that predicate concept or not. In the case of predicate conjunction, that
means that the hypothesis only looks at whether intersective conjunction is possible
or not, given the predicates at hand. Such sharp distinctions appear to be insufﬁcient
in accounting for the interpretation patterns that we observe. Alternatively, one can
take into account so-called typicality effects in categorization. The notion of typi-
cality (at least as it is assumed in the current study) simply refers to the phe-
nomenon that human subjects are able to grade different instances of a concept with
respect to their representativeness of a given category. To illustrate, besides being
able to categorize a sparrow and an ostrich within the bird category and a bat and a
crocodile outside of it, people also distinguish between members of a category: e.g.
a sparrow is judged a more typical bird than an ostrich. Since the 1970’s, a range of
psychological studies has shown for such one-place predicates that subjects con-
sistently rank some instances of a concept as more typical than others, and that such
rankings correlate with other measures of typicality such as categorization speed
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and error rate (e.g. Rosch 1973; Smith et al. 1974; Rosch and Mervis 1975).
Moreover, I follow Hampton (2007) in assuming that an instance’s category
membership and its typicality as an instance of that category are two related
behavioral measurements, based on one and the same underlying variable. For
example, there is a correlation between binary membership measures for sparrow
(1), ostrich (1), bat (0) and crocodile (0) on the one hand, and their typicality rating
on the other hand (sparrow > ostrich > bat > crocodile). Hampton assumes a
so-called threshold model, according to which there is a threshold somewhere along
a typicality function that makes a binary distinction between members (sparrow,
ostrich) and non-members (bat, crocodile).
For the current purposes, taking into account typicality means extending the
aspects of meaning that the SMH is sensitive to from deﬁnitional to prototypical,
thus fleshing out what constitutes context.3 Incorporating such typicality effects
on reasoning was ﬁrst proposed as a solution for reciprocal sentences, in the
shape of the Maximal Typicality Hypothesis (Kerem et al. 2009; Poortman et al.
2017). Firstly, this hypothesis assumes that typicality effects also exist for verb
concepts like the binary predicate concept pinch, i.e. it assumes that subjects can
consistently rank some instances of pinching as more typical than others. The
difference with noun concepts like bird is thus merely a matter of the type of
things that are being categorized, namely events instead of objects. Secondly, it
predicts that these typicality effects for verb concepts systematically affect the
logical interpretation of the reciprocal expression that they combine with.
Speciﬁcally, the Maximal Typicality Hypothesis (MTH) predicts the core situation
for a reciprocal sentence to be the maximal one among those that are most typical
for the predicate concept in the sentence (for an elaborate discussion see Poort-
man et al. 2017).
In this chapter, I extend the same logic to plural sentences with predicate con-
junction. I view the MTH as a general principle of meaning composition that
systematically governs vagueness in plural sentences. The MTH as such a general
mechanism surfaces whenever a graded concept such as reciprocity (in reciprocal
sentences) or distributivity (in predicate conjunction sentences)4 combines with a
natural concept such as a verb or an adjective—which each have their own typi-
cality structure. Accordingly, I claim that typicality also affects interpretation in
3Note that Dalrymple et al.’s notion of context is not very clear, and seems to include the predicate
in the scope of the reciprocal as well as things like world knowledge and speaker intentions. All I
mean here is that I study one particular aspect of what they refer to as ‘context’, namely the
predicate concepts, and I use typicality as a probe into it.
4I assume that reciprocity and distributivity are graded similar to how simple plural sentences are
(Winter 2017). Take for example the sentence The men are sitting. Such a sentence is more often
judged true the more men are actually sitting. Similarly for reciprocal sentences like The men know
each other (which is more often judged true the more knowing pairs there are) and predicate
conjunction sentences like The men are sitting and cooking (which is more often judged true the
more men are both sitting and cooking).
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plural sentences where two predicate concepts are conjoined. Note that my aim here
is not to provide a theory of concepts nor to explain how typicality judgments come
about (for an explanation of relevant notions of typicality see Hampton (2017)), but
merely to investigate the relationship between interpretation and typicality. The
proposal works as follows.
We know that predicate conjunctions such as (1) through (4) are classically
analyzed intersectively, such that both conjoined predicates apply to each individual
in the plural subject simultaneously. The MTH predicts that the degree to which a
weaker interpretation is available depends on typicality. Take for example the
predicate concept sitting, for which we assume typicality effects much like for the
concept bird: within the instances that are categorized as ‘sitting’ instances (or
members of the sitting category), I predict that some are consistently judged more
typical than others. For example, an event in which a person is sitting straight up in
a chair is probably judged as a more typical instance of sitting than an event in
which a person is leaning so far back that they are almost lying down on the floor.
I expect that the different interpretation patterns of sentences (1)–(4) arise due to
similar typicality effects with verb concepts. To illustrate, I predict that an event in
which a person is sitting while also reading can easily be categorized as a typical
instance of the concept sitting, and similarly an event in which a person is reading
while also sitting can be categorized as a typical instance of the concept reading.
The fact that both predicates apply simultaneously (i.e. a person is reading while
sitting, or sitting while reading) does not affect the typicality of the event for each
predicate concept in isolation. For predicate combinations for which this is the case,
I predict that plural sentences with combined predicates (e.g. the boys are sitting
and reading in example (1)) simply behave according to an intersective analysis,
i.e. we multiply the number of times the two predicates apply simultaneously based
on the number of individuals that the plural refers to, since this does not affect the
typicality of the entire situation. By contrast, I predict that events in which a person
is sitting while also standing are physically impossible, and therefore not catego-
rized as instances of sitting.5 Similarly, they are not instances of standing either.
Assuming a threshold model (Hampton 2007), we could say that they fall below the
threshold for category membership of sitting or standing (when the typicality of an
event increases for the concept sitting, it decreases for the concept standing, and
vice versa). If we now consider a plural sentence with these predicates combined
(e.g. the boys are sitting and standing in example (3)), an intersective interpretation
is physically impossible (or of close-to-zero typicality for each concept), causing us
to weaken the interpretation such that each individual that the plural subject refers
to either sits or stands. Crucially, the MTH does not merely make predictions about
these two extreme cases, but in fact considers them to be end points on a scale. An
example like the boys are sitting and cooking (example (4)) clariﬁes this. Consider
5Or, if you could imagine some strange situation of sitting and standing simultaneously, then it
would at least be a highly atypical instance of sitting. This does not affect the nature of the
argument.
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an event in which a person is sitting while also cooking. Such an event, however
odd, can probably be categorized as an instance of the concept sitting (i.e. it is
above the category membership threshold). And, similarly, an event in which a
person is cooking while also sitting can be categorized as an instance of the concept
cooking. Interestingly however, the fact that both predicates apply at the same time,
causes the typicality of the event as an instance of each concept in isolation to
decline. An event in which one is sitting while cooking is probably not the most
typical instance of sitting, and an event in which one is cooking while sitting is
deﬁnitely not a typical instance of cooking.
Crucially, this degree of atypicality that I predict is caused by the simultaneous
application of two predicates within one event. Therefore, I will henceforth speak
about ‘compatibility’ as a measurement of this atypicality, allowing me to directly
compare compatibility between different pairs of predicates. Ideally, if one were to
be interested in the full typicality structure of verb concepts like sitting, one could
construct a standard task (similar to the tasks used for noun concepts like bird),
namely rating all possible sitting events with respect to how typical they are for the
concept. In the current chapter however, I restricted my measurements since they
are led by a direct research question, based on an observation: I was speciﬁcally
interested in the different interpretation patterns of sentences like (1)-(4), thus
looking for a measurement that allowed me to directly compare “sitting and
cooking” versus “sitting and reading” versus “sitting and standing”. One should
keep in mind, however, that when I speak of ‘compatibility’ of predicate concepts
P1 and P2, I aim to indirectly measure the typicality of an instance of P1 in an event
that has been categorized as an instance of P2, and the typicality of an instance of P2
in an event that has been categorized as an instance of P1. The reason I did not test
this directly, i.e. presenting subjects with an event in which both predicates apply
and measure its typicality as an instance of concept P1 and of concept P2 (similar to
measuring the typicality of an ostrich as an instance of the concept bird), was
because I was also interested in strictly incompatible pairs of predicates (e.g. sitting
and standing)—which cannot be depicted within one event. Moreover, I did not use
a direct textual test either, i.e. “rate how typical it is for a person to do P1 in a
situation in which she is known to be doing P2” because this seemed to me a harder
and more confusing task than a simple compatibility task. Thus instead, I conducted
a more indirect, simple textual compatibility test, in which I assess the typicality of
an event for concept P1 and concept P2 by measuring the predicates’ compatibility.
The measured compatibility is predicted to affect the way sentences are inter-
preted in which those predicates combine with a plural. Speciﬁcally, the less typical
the intersective situation is for the two combined predicate concepts in isolation, the
more we diverge from an intersective interpretation when those combine with a
plural. In more general terms, one could say that when we interpret sentences like
(1) through (4) there are two factors at work: (1) maximize the number of predi-
cations and (2) retain typicality. These factors are sometimes in conflict, which is
when the MTH surfaces. Summarizing, I phrase the proposal as follows:
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MTH for plural predicate conjunction
For any sentence The X P1 and P2, in which X is a plural and P1 and P2 are singular
predicates; and an event E in which P1 and P2 apply simultaneously to one individual
member of X:
The less typical event E is for concept P1 and for concept P2, the more we diverge from an
intersective interpretation of the sentence The X P1 and P2.
Crucially, this formulation of the MTH assumes that both the notions of typi-
cality and of acceptability can be expressed in terms of a continuum—allowing for
more subtle distinctions than the SMH. The experiments that are discussed below
measure typicality (via compatibility) and interpretation separately. I predict to ﬁnd
a) that there is a continuum of typicality values for event E as an instance of
predicate P1 and of predicate P2, b) that there is a continuum of acceptability values
for a plural sentence with those predicates (The X P1 and P2) in a given situation
and c) that the values on both continuums correlate—indicating that typicality of an
event for particular concepts in isolation systematically affects interpretation of
sentences containing those concepts. I conducted two behavioral experiments and a
correlation analysis to test these predictions.
4 Experimental Investigation
This section reports on pretests, two experiments and a correlation analysis.
Experiment 1 checked the acceptability of plural predicate conjunction sentences of
the form The X are P1 and P2 (where X is a plural noun and P1 and P2 are
predicates) in a non-intersective, ‘split’ situation. Experiment 2 measured com-
patibility of predicate concepts P1 and P2 as an indirect typicality test, as argued in
the previous section. Materials for the experiments were constructed based on
pretests that were conducted in order to include a wide range of compatibility
values in the actual experiments.
4.1 Pretests: Constructing Materials
The aim of the ﬁrst pretest was to gather as many Dutch verb combinations as
possible, especially atypical ones. I provided 8 participants with 16 sets of two pairs
of predicates, P1 and P2 and P1 and P3: one very natural pair, and one pair that is
physically impossible to apply simultaneously, e.g. sitting and reading (P1 and P2)
and sitting and standing (P1 and P3). I then asked them to provide as many verbs
that they could come up with that combine with P1 (i.e. sitting in this case) that led
to a possible but atypical, uncommon or strange pair. The pairs that participants
constructed, combined with more natural pairs that I came up with, led to a list of
91 verb combinations in total.
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In the second pretest, 29 different participants rated all of these 91 pairs for
compatibility, in a paper-and-pencil task. For each pair, participants were asked to
rate how odd6 they would consider it if both verbs applied to one person at the same
time. Oddness was rated on a 6-point scale, where 1 meant ‘not odd at all’ and 6
meant ‘physically impossible’. I mentioned explicitly that 5 thus meant ‘very odd,
but physically possible’, in order to distinguish large atypicality from impossibility,
or in other words: to distinguish members from non-members by indicating that the
category membership threshold for P1 or P2 is between 5 and 6. Results of this
pretest showed great variability in ratings between verb pairs, with a high level of
agreement between the participants (Cronbach’s alpha was 0.88 for the 91 items).
The selection of verb pairs that were to be used in Experiments 1 and 2 proceeded
as follows. I deﬁned sets of verb pairs on the basis of the different P1 verbs, e.g. a
set consisted of sitting and reading, sitting and standing, sitting and knitting, sitting
and cooking, etc. Then I selected the 12 sets that showed the greatest range of
ratings. Finally, three verb pairs from within each of these 12 sets were selected: the
verb pair that was rated lowest on the oddness scale (compatible pairs like sitting
and reading), the verb pair that was rated highest (incompatible ones like sitting
and standing), and a verb pair that was rated in between, at a mean of 4 points7
(atypical pairs like sitting and cooking). The 36 verb pairs that constituted the ﬁnal
material, translated from Dutch, are given in Table 1 (the original Dutch material
can be found in the Appendix). Creating the three groups (with labels ‘compatible’,
‘incompatible’ and ‘atypical’) was done purely to ensure variability while con-
structing the materials. I will refer to these three groups when discussing set-up and
results of Experiments 1 and 2. Note however that the distinction between the
groups is not meaningful in the ﬁnal correlation analysis of all data points.
4.2 Experiment 1: Interpretation of Plural Predicate
Conjunction Sentences
This experiment checked the acceptability of 36 plural sentences with two con-
joined verbs in a ‘split’ situation. Each sentence was of the form The X are P1 and
6Phrasing the question negatively by asking ‘how odd’ subjects would rate a situation was done
because (a) directly asking for ‘how compatible’ they would judge two predictes seemed like a too
technical and too direct task, and (b) asking for ‘how typical’ they would judge a situation turned
out to be ambiguous in Dutch. Some subjects interpreted the word typical to mean ‘atypical’,
whereas asking for oddness is unambiguous.
7Additional inclusion criteria included that (a) each verb should be expressed by one word only,
(b) ratings for verb pairs should have small variation (whenever there was more than one candidate
for selection, the one with the lowest standard deviation for the ratings was selected). Finally, if
after considering these criteria there were still two candidate pairs for the atypical group, I decided
that (c) atypical verb pairs should have no 6 point ratings (since that meant that at least one
participant judged it to be physically impossible for the two verbs to apply simultaneously). This
was only a very small criterion, applying to one case.
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P2 (where X is a plural noun and P1 and P2 are verbal predicates). The reason for
using a ‘split’ situation was that sentences with incompatible pairs cannot be
depicted any other way, and I wished to keep all factors in the comparison between
pairs equal.
Participants A total of 33 students from Utrecht University (28 female, age
M = 21) participated for monetary compensation. All participants were native
speakers of Dutch without dyslexia. Prior to the experiment all participants signed
an informed consent form.
Materials The material consisted of two versions of a truth-value judgment task,
each containing 18 unique test items plus 18 ﬁller items that were the same across
versions. Each test item contained a plural predicate conjunction sentence in Dutch
(The X are P1 and P2)
8 and a drawing depicting four individuals in a
non-intersective, ‘split’ interpretation of that sentence: predicate P1 applied only to
persons 1 and 2, predicate P2 applied only to persons 3 and 4. Half of the pictures
depicted male individuals, and the other half depicted female individuals. An
example of a test item drawing is given in Fig. 1.
In each version of the experiment, one third of the test items contained sentences
with verb pairs that were considered compatible P1 and P2 in the second pretest
(e.g. The men are sitting and reading), one third contained sentences with verb
pairs that were considered incompatible P1 and P2 (e.g. The men are sitting and
standing) and one third contained sentences with pairs that were considered atypical
P1 and P2 (e.g. The men are sitting and cooking). The same drawings were used for
sentences with compatible and incompatible pairs with identical P1 (e.g. The men
Table 1 Overview of predicate pairs, translated from Dutch
Compatible Incompatible Atypical
Sitting and reading Sitting and standing Sitting and cooking
Waving and smiling Waving and clapping Waving and drawing
Walking and singing Walking and swimming Walking and writing
Crawling and screaming Crawling and jumping Crawling and reading
Standing and reading Standing and squatting Standing and falling asleep
Reading and smiling Reading and sleeping Reading and drawing
Lying down and stretching Lying down and running Lying down and drinking
Drawing and yawning Drawing and typing Drawing and walking
Swimming and smiling Swimming and crawling Swimming and reading
Texting and frowning Texting and knitting Texting and waving
Knitting and singing Knitting and clapping Knitting and walking
Sleeping and drooling Sleeping and telephoning Sleeping and standing
8All the sentences in the experiment were in the simple present tense, which can be used to
describe ongoing events as well as states in Dutch. Whereas in English one would use the
progressive tense for all sentences in Experiment 1, the distribution of the progressive tense in
Dutch is different, such that it could not be used for all sentences in the experiment alike.
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are sitting and standing and The men are sitting and reading). To ensure that
subjects never saw the same drawing twice (such as the one in Fig. 1), one of these
sentences occurred in version 1 and the other occurred in version 2. The atypical
items were divided over the two versions, resulting in two experiments with 6
sentences with compatible pairs, 6 sentences with incompatible pairs and 6 sen-
tences with atypical pairs each, accompanied by 18 unique drawings.
Filler items contained similar drawings with four people, but a different type of
accompanying sentence. The accompanying sentences in the ﬁller items were either
sentences with quantiﬁers (Some boys are P) or sentences mentioning speciﬁc
individuals in the picture (Boys A, B and C are P). Half of the ﬁller items were
expected to be judged true, and half of them were expected to be judged false. Both
versions of the experiment contained the same ﬁller items.
The order of items was pseudo-randomized using Mix software (Van Casteren
and Davis 2006), with the following restrictions: items containing the same verb
were at least six items apart; there were at most two test items immediately fol-
lowing each other, and at most two ﬁller items immediately following each other;
similar test items (in terms of compatible/incompatible/atypical) or similar ﬁller
items (in terms of quantiﬁer/speciﬁc individuals) never immediately followed each
other. Finally, I constructed two orders of each version, with the second one having
reversed order of items.
Procedure Each participant completed one version of the experiment. The task
was presented in a sound-proof booth on a PC using Open Sesame software
(Mathôt et al. 2012). Prior to entering the sound-proof booth, each participant
received verbal instructions explaining the experimental set-up. Further, more
detailed instructions were given on the PC monitor.
After being instructed, each participant completed three practice trials. Subse-
quently, they were given the opportunity to ask for clariﬁcations, if necessary.
Fig. 1 Example of a test item drawing of Experiment 1. All rights for further use of the
illustration arranged with the artist
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No verb used in the practice session appeared in the actual experiment. The
experiment itself consisted of the 36 items described above. Drawing and sentence
were presented in the center of a white screen. Participants were instructed to
indicate as soon as possible whether they judged the sentence to be true or false
given the situation in the drawing by pressing the left or right button with their
dominant hand.
Coding and analysis Responses were coded ‘1’ when participants judged a
sentence to be true for a given drawing, and ‘0’ when they judged a sentence to be
false. I computed the proportion of true-responses for each of the three types of
sentences for each participant. I then performed a repeated measures ANOVA
across participants with Compatibility as the within-subjects factor (with 3 levels:
compatible, atypical, and incompatible).9 Post hoc Bonferroni corrected multiple
comparisons were performed in order to analyze differences between different
Compatibility levels in detail. An ANOVA across items, with Compatibility as the
between-item variable (also with 3 levels), gave similar results to the participant
analysis. Therefore only the ﬁrst analysis is reported.
Results Table 2 provides an overview of the data. It shows the acceptability of
sentences, i.e. the percentage of “true” judgments, for the three levels of Com-
patibility that were tested for all versions taken together. More detailed results on
acceptability per item are in the Appendix. Overall, the truth percentages of the
different sentences in the experiment ranged from 24% to 100%. I predicted lowest
acceptability for the sentences with compatible pairs and highest acceptability for
the sentences with incompatible pairs.
A repeated measures ANOVA revealed that there was a main effect of Com-
patibility (F (1.36, 43.49) = 37.41, p < 0.001). This means that the mean pro-
portions of acceptability for the three Compatibility levels are not equal. Pairwise
comparisons show that all three levels differ signiﬁcantly from each other in
acceptability: the acceptability of sentences with compatible predicates differs from
the acceptability of sentences with incompatible predicates (p < 0.001); the
acceptability of sentences with compatible predicates differs from the acceptability
of sentences with atypical predicates (p < 0.001); and the acceptability of sentences
with incompatible predicates differs from the acceptability of sentences with
atypical predicates (p < 0.05). Note again, however, that the main conclusion from
Table 2 Mean acceptability Compatibility type % “true” judgments (st. dev.)
Compatible 54 (31)
Atypical 78 (31)
Incompatible 84 (32)
9A repeated measures ANOVA with Version as between-subjects factor was also performed, but
showed no effect of Version (F (3, 29) = 0.47, p = 0.71) nor an interaction effect of Ver-
sion * Compatibility (F (6, 58) = 0.82, p = 0.58). I thus collapsed the versions for the analysis.
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this experiment is not that there are signiﬁcant differences between groups, but the
fact that there is variation in the data.
4.3 Experiment 2: Compatibility of Predicate Pairs
This experiment checked compatibility for the 36 predicate concept pairs that were
used in sentences of Experiment 1. I aimed to measure the typicality of one par-
ticular event as an instance of the concepts P1 and P2, namely one in which both
predicates P1 and P2 apply simultaneously (event E). As already discussed at length
earlier on in this paper, I conducted an indirect textual test in which I assess the
typicality of event E for P1 and P2 by measuring the predicates’ compatibility. This
test was identical to the pretest, but carried out by different subjects and now
containing fewer items, in a fully controlled experiment.
Participants The same 33 students from Utrecht University from Experiment 1
participated in this experiment. Each subject completed the interpretation experi-
ment ﬁrst, before proceeding with the typicality experiment. Also, in between
experiments they took part in a third, unrelated experiment.
Materials The materials consisted of a questionnaire containing 36 statements about
one person involved in two actions simultaneously. Half of the statements were
about males and half of them were about females (matching the gender of persons in
the pictures of Experiment 1). Each statement contained a singular object (a male or
a female) and two conjoined predicates (e.g. The man is sitting and reading). The 36
pairs of verbs were the same as the ones used in sentences of Experiment 1, thus one
third of the pairs were considered compatible in the second pretest (e.g. sitting and
reading), one third were considered incompatible (e.g. sitting and standing), and one
third were considered atypical (e.g. sitting and cooking).
The order of items was pseudo-randomized using Mix software (Van Casteren
and Davis 2006), with the restriction that at most two items of the same type (in
terms of compatible/incompatible/atypical) immediately followed each other.
Finally, four different orders of the questionnaire were constructed: two versions
that started with the statements about males (with the second one having reversed
order within males and females statements), and two versions that started with the
statements about females (with the second one having reversed order within males
and females statements).
Procedure Each participant received one of the questionnaires on paper, in a
sound-proof booth. They were instructed to rate how odd10 they would consider it if
both verbs applied to the given person at the same time. Oddness was rated on a
10As mentioned in footnote 6, phrasing the question negatively by asking ‘how odd’ subjects
would rate a situation was done because directly asking for ‘how compatible’ or ‘how typical’ they
would judge a situation turned out to be unsuitable.
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6-point scale, where 1 meant ‘not odd at all’ and 6 meant ‘physically impossible’, or
in other words: to distinguish members from non-members by indicating that the
category membership threshold for P1 or P2 is between 5 and 6. It was mentioned
explicitly that 5 thus meant ‘very odd, but physically possible’, in order to dis-
tinguish large atypicality from impossiblity.
Coding and analysis Responses were coded ‘1’ through ‘6’ corresponding to the
participant’s oddness judgment. This way the incompatibility rating for each verb
pair was computed. I performed a repeated measures ANOVA with Compatibility
as the within-subjects factor (with 3 levels: compatible, atypical, and incompatible).
Post hoc Bonferroni corrected multiple comparisons were performed in order to
analyze differences between different Compatibility levels in detail.
Results Table 3 provides an overview of the data. It shows the mean incompati-
bility rating for the three levels of Compatibility that were tested, for all versions
taken together. More detailed results on incompatibility rating per item are in the
Appendix. Overall, mean ratings per verb pair ranged from 1.03 to 5.94, and there
was a very high correlation between these ratings and the ratings for these items in
the pretest (r = 0.98, p < 0.001).
A repeated measures ANOVA revealed that there was again a main effect of
Compatibility (F (1.95, 62.45) = 1187.02, p < 0.001). This means that the mean
incompatibility ratings for the three Compatibility levels are not equal. Pairwise
comparisons show that all three levels differ signiﬁcantly from each other: the
incompatibility of supposed compatible pairs differs from the incompatibility of
supposed incompatible pairs (p < 0.001); similarly for the incompatibility of
compatible vs. atypical pairs (p < 0.001); and the incompatibility of incompatible
vs. atypical pairs (p < 0.001). This means that the three groups that were selected
based on the pretest were conﬁrmed in Experiment 2 (with different subjects and a
subset of the stimuli).
4.4 Correlation Between Interpretation and Compatibility
The crucial test for the proposal is the relationship between interpretation and
compatibility. In order to account for the degree to which non-intersective inter-
pretations of sentences The X are P1 and P2 are available given two particular
conjoined predicates P1 and P2, we need to check whether this correlates with the
degree to which P1 and P2 are incompatible (as an indirect measurement of the
atypicality of P1 and P2 applying simultaneously (event E) for each concept in
Table 3 Mean
incompatibility ratings
Compatibility type Mean incompatiblity (st. dv.)
Compatible 1.35 (0.29)
Atypical 3.82 (0.58)
Incompatible 5.66 (0.38)
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isolation). In order to check this, I performed a correlation analysis between all the
results of Experiment 1 and those of Experiment 2 (Fig. 2). The result was a
positive correlation between mean proportion acceptability of a sentence in a
non-intersective interpretation and mean incompatiblity rating of a predicate pair
(r = 0.66, n = 36, p < 0.001).
5 Discussion
This paper reports on an experimental investigation into the interpretation of plural
sentences with predicate conjunction, and its connection to typicality. I proposed
that the extent to which non-intersective interpretations are available directly cor-
relates with the atypicality of an event in which the two predicates apply simul-
taneously. Experiment 1 revealed a continuum of acceptability values of 36
sentences in a non-intersective, ‘split’ situation, ranging from 24% to 100%
acceptable. Such a continuum is unexpected under the extended SMH by Winter
(2001), which assumes that any given sentence is either true or false in a particular
situation, depending on what the context allows. Next, Experiment 2 showed that
differences in compatibility exist between different predicate pairs. The compati-
bility ratings for 36 pairs ranged over the entire 6-point scale. I assumed that the
compatiblity measurement is an indirect measurement of typicality, namely of the
typicality of event E (in which two predicates apply simultaneously) for each
predicate concept in isolation, and hence that this effect is similar to the effects that
were found repeatedly for one-place predicates (e.g. Rosch 1973). I proposed to
extend the Maximal Typicality Hypothesis (Kerem et al. 2009; Poortman et al.
2017) by formulating it for predicate conjunction in such a way that typicality
relates to acceptability so that the less compatible the two predicates in Experiment
2 are judged to be (i.e. the less typical event E is), the more a non-intersective
interpretation is available. Based on a correlation analysis, I conclude that this
prediction was borne out. Note that this correlation does not hinge on my
assumption that compatibility is an indirect way of measuring typicality. I merely
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take these results to be an indication of conceptual structure of predicates playing a
crucial role in sentence interpretation, in line with similar results on reciprocal
sentences (Poortman et al. 2017).
5.1 Reference Shift of the Plural Subject?
The particular interpretation that was in the focus of the current study was the
so-called ‘split’ interpretation in which P1 always applies to two of the individuals
in the picture and P2 always applies to the two remaining individuals. I have
claimed that this interpretation is sometimes available for predicate conjunction
sentences, namely to the degree that a situation in which the conjoined predicates
apply simultaneously is atypical. One might argue instead that the acceptability of
these sentences given a split interpretation has nothing to do with typicality. As an
alternative, one might reason that we accept a sentence like (3) (repeated below as
(10)) because its deep structure is the sentential conjunction in (11), which contains
two deﬁnite plurals that hence allow the possibility of referring to two different
groups of boys. In other words, the reasoning would be that we accept (10) in a split
situation because we are able to very quickly shift the reference of the plural noun
the boys from one set of boys to another set of boys. My experiments would then in
fact deal with reference resolution instead of with matters of typicality.
(10) The boys are sitting and standing
(11) The boysi are sitting and the boysj are standing
If we indeed actually interpret the predicate conjunction in (10) as sentential
conjunction (as is made explicit in (11)), then I would expect to see no differences
between different test sentences. If reference shift would explain why sentence
(10) is accepted in a split situation, then we should be able to use this strategy
across the board for all types of predicate conjunction that were tested—whether
they are typical, atypical or incompatible. This is clearly not the case, and the
question remains what explains the range of acceptability values.
In fact, a pilot study11 has revealed that when sentential conjunction is explicit in
the surface form of the sentence (i.e. when subjects are given sentences like (11)),
we see that indeed it is possible to shift the referent for different types of predicate
11The study was conducted with 9 participants who were students at Utrecht University (6 female,
age M = 23), and checked the acceptability of 12 plural sentences with sentential conjunction in a
‘split’ situation. Each sentence was of the form The x are P1 and the x are P2 (where x is a plural
noun (used twice) and P1 and P2 are verbal predicates). Half of the P1 and P2 pairs were
compatible predicates while the other half were incompatible predicates (based on pretests from
the study reported in this paper). One participant accepted none of the sentences, the remaining
eight participants accepted all or all but one.
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conjunction. Subjects accepted sentence (11) (with incompatible predicates) given a
split situation, but they also accepted sentences like (12) and (13) given a split
situation—even though we have seen that sentences containing such compatible
predicates behave differently when presented as mere predicate conjunctions (i.e.
they are generally judged false 50% of the time). A single subject did not accept
sentence (11) in a split situation, but they also refused to accept sentences like
(12) and (13) in a split situation.
(12) The boys are sitting and the boys are reading
(13) The boys are waving and the boys are smiling
What this suggests is that reference shift is independent from the obtained results
in the current study. Sentences with sentential conjunction do not show the same
correlation with typicality as sentences with predicate conjunction do. I believe
reference shift of the plural subject in sentences like (11)–(13) is purely motivated
by trying to make a sentence true. This explains why most participants always
accepted such sentences in a split situation (i.e. used reference shift to make the
sentence true). The one subject that did not use reference shift, was consistent in not
using it across different types of predicate conjunction (compatible and
incompatible).
Another argument against the reference shift explanation is the ﬁnding (based on
a small pilot12) that sentences with proper name conjunctions instead of deﬁnite
plurals are accepted in a split situation signiﬁcantly more often when the conjoined
predicates are incompatible (as in (14)) compared to when they are compatible (as
in (15)).
(14) John, Bill, Sue and Jane are sitting and standing
(15) John, Bill, Sue and Jane are sitting and reading
For such sentences, reference shift of the subject John, Bill, Sue and Jane is
obviously not possible, and still a sensitivity to the predicate concepts in the sen-
tence is observed, which is along the same lines as the results presented in the
current chapter.
Summarizing, I conclude that it is unlikely that the presented results are due to
reference shift of the plural subject. Shifting the reference of the subjects from one
referent to another does not explain the systematic variability in acceptability, nor
that a similar pattern arises for sentences with proper name conjunction as in
(14) and (15).
12This study was conducted with 22 participants who were students at Utrecht University (18
female, age M = 19). It checked the acceptability of 8 plural sentences with predicate conjunction
in a ‘split’ situation. Each sentence was of the form A, B, C and D are P1 and P2 (where A, B, C
and D are names and P1 and P2 are verbal predicates). Half of the P1 and P2 pairs were compatible
predicates while the other half were incompatible predicates (based on introspection). Sentences
with compatible pairs were accepted in a split situation 10% of the time, sentences with incom-
patible predicates were accepted in a split situation 40% of the time.
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5.2 Other Measures of Typicality
Despite the fact that we can safely rule out reference shift as an alternative
explanation of the results, obviously there are many other factors that are worth
further exploration. The correlation that was found in this study was high (r = 0.66,
n = 36, p < 0.001), though obviously not perfect. This means that there must be
more factors that affect interpretation besides the one tested here. An important next
step is to delve deeper into typicality effects for complex predicates. In the current
chapter, I report an experiment that indirectly measured one particular typicality
measurement with one particular dependent measure, namely the typicality of two
simultaneous actions, rated on a scale. One can imagine that in fact the typicality of
the opposite event, i.e. two predicates applying to two separate individuals, or
perhaps sequentially to one individual, might also affect the interpretation of a
plural sentence with those predicates. Moreover, as pointed out by a reviewer,
perhaps not only the verb concepts but also the head noun of the sentences play a
role. It might be that the compatibility of two predicates is quite different in the
context of humans than it is for example in the context of dogs: people can run and
scratch their heads simultaneously, but dogs cannot. In order to fully understand the
factors that influence sentence interpretation, an intricate combination of typicality
measures is necessary.
Also, it will be good to correlate rating measures with different kinds of
dependent measures such as categorizaton speed or error rate to have a more robust
result—similar to the investigations into typicality effects for nouns. However, the
fact that even one measure can distinguish different types of verb pairs so clearly, is
a promising starting point for this enterprise.
Another related issue is the deeper question of how typicality effects come about:
What exactly makes a particular instance of a concept typical? A potential candidate
factor is that typicality is formed by prior experiences or likelihood of a situation.
An anonymous reviewer, however, pointed out example (16).
(16) The boys are unicycling and juggling
The reviewer claims that despite the fact that we probably rarely see a person
simultaneously unicycling and juggling, we still probably interpret the conjunction
in sentence (16) intersectively (though of course a full sample of participants would
need to be consulted to be sure). Such an example points out that typicality is not
simply a matter of frequency, but a far more complex notion that needs to be studied
further. The question of what makes something typical does not affect the results
described in this chapter per se, but knowing what affects typicality would give
them more explanatory power, as pointed out by this reviewer.
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5.3 Further Areas
Another logical step would be to investigate other cases in language where typi-
cality affects reasoning. So far we have seen that understanding both reciprocal
sentences and the sentences with conjunction that were investigated in the current
chapter, is inseparable from the study of concepts. Another area where we see
typicality affecting interpretation, is the area of adjective-noun constructions such as
red hair (Lee 2017). For such a construction, the typicality structure of hair appears
to interact with the way we interpret the adjective red. Even though the concept red
in isolation might have as its most typical instance a focal red, orange-like hues are
generally more typical for the concept hair. When the two combine, these typicality
preferences interact (for more on these effects see the work by Lee (2017) and
Winter (2017)). This interaction is intuitively of a similar nature to the one between
a verb concept like pinch and the reciprocal expression each other, as well as the
one between verb concepts like sitting and cooking and the logical expression and.
It is highly likely that these are not the only areas in which this is the case, thus it is
worthwhile for further research to investigate whether a principle like the MTH can
function as a general principle of language use.
6 Conclusion
This chapter started from the observation that plural sentences with conjunctive
predicates do not always receive the same logical interpretations. Previous work on
reciprocal sentences has already taught us that lexical information can influence
sentence meaning in systematic ways (e.g. Dalrymple et al. 1998; Kerem et al.
2009; Poortman et al. 2017). Here I reported on experimental investigation of plural
sentences with predicate conjunction, that provided insight into speciﬁcally the role
of typicality information of predicate concepts. With this result, I add to the line of
work that investigates the interface between lexical and compositional semantics,
and lead the way towards directions for further research in this area.
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Appendix
This appendix contains the original Dutch stimulus verb pairs P1 and P2 that were
used in Experiments 1 and 2, and their English translation. In Experiment 1, each
verb pair was contained in a sentence of the form The X are P1 and P2 (where X is a
plural noun). The two rightmost columns in the appendix give the mean results of
each experiment for each stimulus verb pair.
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Group Verb pair P1
and P2
English translation Interpretation
(% true)
incompatibility
(rating 1–6)
incomp Zitten en staan Sitting and
standing
0.94 5.91
incomp Zwaaien en
klappen
Waving and
clapping
0.82 5.27
incomp Lopen en
zwemmen
Walking and
swimming
0.88 5.94
incomp Kruipen en
springen
Crawling and
jumping
0.71 5.82
incomp Staan en hurken Standing and
squatting
0.94 5.85
incomp Lezen en slapen Reading and
sleeping
0.76 5.88
incomp Liggen en
rennen
Lying down and
running
0.88 5.91
incomp Tekenen en
typen
Drawing and
typing
0.82 5.09
incomp Zwemmen en
kruipen
Swimming and
crawling
1 5.91
incomp Smsen en breien Texting and
knitting
0.71 5.03
incomp Breien en
klappen
Knitting and
clapping
0.88 5.7
incomp Slapen en bellen Sleeping and
telephoning
0.76 5.61
MEAN 0.84 5.66
atyp Zitten en koken Sitting and
cooking
0.88 3.12
(continued)
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(continued)
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Group Verb pair P1
and P2
English translation Interpretation
(% true)
incompatibility
(rating 1–6)
atyp Zwaaien en
tekenen
Waving and
drawing
0.75 3.79
atyp Lopen en
schrijven
Walking and
writing
0.81 3.39
atyp Kruipen en
lezen
Crawling and
reading
0.71 4.55
atyp Staan en dutten Standing and
falling asleep
0.47 3.7
atyp Lezen en
tekenen
Reading and
drawing
0.94 4.18
atyp Liggen en
drinken
Lying down and
drinking
0.81 3.42
atyp Tekenen en
lopen
Drawing and
walking
0.76 3.76
atyp Zwemmen en
lezen
Swimming and
reading
0.76 4.97
atyp Smsen en
zwaaien
Texting and
waving
0.81 2.39
atyp Breien en lopen Knitting and
walking
0.88 3.7
atyp Slapen en staan Sleeping and
standing
0.76 4.91
MEAN 0.78 3.82
comp Zitten en lezen Sitting and reading 0.65 1.03
comp Zwaaien en
lachen
Waving and
smiling
0.31 1.06
comp Lopen en zingen Walking and
singing
0.24 1.18
comp Kruipen en
schreeuwen
Crawling and
screaming
0.81 2.55
comp Staan en lezen Standing and
reading
0.65 1.91
comp Lezen en
glimlachen
Reading and
smiling
0.31 1.03
comp Liggen en
rekken
Lying down and
stretching
0.65 1.15
comp Tekenen en
gapen
Drawing and
yawning
0.75 1.18
comp Zwemmen en
lachen
Swimming and
smiling
0.24 1.42
comp Smsen en
fronsen
Texting and
frowning
0.56 1.06
(continued)
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(continued)
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Group Verb pair P1
and P2
English translation Interpretation
(% true)
incompatibility
(rating 1–6)
comp Breien en
zingen
Knitting and
singing
0.71 1.24
comp Slapen en
kwijlen
Sleeping and
drooling
0.63 1.42
MEAN 0.54 1.35
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Critical Typicality: Truth Judgements
and Compositionality with Plurals
and Other Gradable Concepts
Yoad Winter
Abstract Compositional semantic frameworks often compute the extension of a
complex expression directly from the extensions of its parts. However, much work
in cognitive psychology has shown important challenges for compositional meth-
ods. For instance, Hampton (J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cognit 14(1):12–32, 1988b)
showed that speakers may let the complex nominal sports that are games include
chess as one of its instances, without admitting chess in the extension of sports.
Similarly, Lee (2017) experimentally supports the common intuition that instances
of red hair are not necessarily categorized as red. This paper reviews further results
about plural quantiﬁers, showing similar challenges for compositionality. It is pro-
posed that typicality eﬀects play a systematic role in compositional interpretation
and the determination of truth-values. For instance, the “overextension” eﬀect in the
red hair example is predicted by the fact that focal red is an atypical hair color. Sim-
ilarly, in the plural sentence the men are walking and writing, the availability of the
split reading (“some men are walking and some men are writing”) increases due
to the atypicality of doing both activities at the same time (Poortman, 2017). Fur-
ther, in reciprocal sentences like the three men are pinching each other, the number
of pinching acts may be three. This is related to the atypicality of situations where
every man pinches two other men at the same time, as required by a strong interpre-
tation of each other. The paper gives a uniform account of truth-value judgements on
these diﬀerent constructions, based on the identiﬁcation of conﬂicts between typical
preferences.
1 Introduction
One of the biggest challenges for semantic theory is the tension between contextu-
ality and compositionality. To take a simple example, suppose that someone tells us
that A and B cost the same. We may reasonably conclude that if A is expensive, then
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B is expensive as well. However, as a general inference rule, this conclusion is too
hasty. We realize that when we consider the possibility that A is a laptop and B is
a car. At some level, our initial conclusion was justiﬁed: without doubt, price is the
most salient parameter in our interpretation of the concept EXPENSIVE. However, as
soon as we become aware of further information about the objects A and B, we may
easily discharge conclusions that were drawn on the basis of price alone. A theory
of reasoning that ignores such contextual information, e.g. by relegating it to some
underspeciﬁed pragmatic variables, runs the risk of becoming empirically empty.
It is important to note that the same risk threatens formal semantic theories of
meaning composition. When analyzing the compositional interpretation of phrases
like my expensive laptop and my expensive car, we again have to address prob-
lems about contextuality. Here, the interpretation of the adjective expensive is most
directly aﬀected by its immediate linguistic context: the head noun—laptop or car.
The eﬀect that these nouns have on the meaning of expensive is similar to the contex-
tual eﬀect that the identity of A and B have in the example above. Therefore, a theory
of semantic composition must pay close attention to contextual eﬀects, and not only
consider the formal description of language structures. In view of this point, some
researchers in cognitive psychology doubt that formal semantic theories, with their
arcane symbolic methods, have a prominent role to play in the analysis of concept
composition (Barsalou, 2017).
However, there is another side to the compositionally problem, which indicates
that formal theories cannot so easily be dismissed. Consider the distinction between
the phrase expensive laptops and cars and the phrase laptops and expensive cars.
The former expression is ambiguous (it may or may not be about expensive cars)
whereas the latter is unambiguous (it must be about expensive cars). The ambiguity
in the former phrase is not simply a matter of the larger prosodic distance between
the words expensive and cars. This can be seen by considering the phrase expensive
laptops in cars, which unambiguously refers to expensive laptops, not to expensive
cars. Clearly, the syntactic nature of the construction—a coordinate structure or a
subordinated prepositional phrase—has an important impact on potential ambigui-
ties when concepts evoked by language are put together. To understand such eﬀects
we need to rely on syntactic theory. This is where notions of compositionality from
formal semantics become important. As we move on to more complex quantiﬁca-
tional structures, temporal and spatial expressions, anaphoric items etc., we increas-
ingly need to rely on structural analyses and symbolic principles to explain the close
interactions between form and meaning (Pelletier, 2017).
One of the motivations for the present work is the conviction that both contextual
considerations and formal considerations are important for analyzing meaning com-
position. More speciﬁcally, this paper proposes that compositional theories should
rely on typicality eﬀects. These eﬀects are critical for understanding concepts in gen-
eral, and they have been playing an important role in the study of concept compo-
sition since the early works of Osherson and Smith in the 1980s. Notwithstanding,
there is an on-going debate on whether typicality eﬀects are relevant for the study
of natural language semantics (Sassoon 2013). Following previous work, especially
Kamp and Partee (1995), this paper aims to examine the role that typicality eﬀects
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play in formal semantics. I propose that using observations about typicality eﬀects,
we can systematically account for gradability phenomena in truth-value judgements.
I claim that the distribution of judgements about “truth” and “falsity” of complex
sentences is at least partially predictable from judgements about typical instances
for the concepts that sentences evoke. Thus, although typicality eﬀects are logically
separate from truth-value judgements, they aﬀect such judgements in a non-trivial
way.
One might suppose that the more typical an object is for a category, the likelier
it is to be categorized in that category. However, part of the interest in typicality
phenomena is that their interactions with truth-value judgements are much subtler
than that. For instance, as Lee (2017) shows, ginger-like hues are much more often
accepted for red hair than they are for red car. As we will see, similar eﬀects appear
in other areas of semantic theory, speciﬁcally reciprocal expressions (‘each other’),
and conjunctive plural predicates (‘are big and red’, Poortman, 2017). In all three
cases, a gradable concept combines with another concept, with possibly conﬂict-
ing typicality preferences. Capitalizing on this parallelism, the paper employs one
uniﬁed principle for explaining recent experimental results in the three domains.
Section 2 reviews familiar notions about vagueness of gradable concepts. Section 3
uses these notions for also modeling some vagueness eﬀects with plurals. Section 4
addresses familiar motivations to distinguish vagueness. Section 5 explains the pro-
posed approach in relation to the familiar problem of typicality eﬀects with grad-
able adjectives (‘expensive car’, ‘red car’). Section 6 applies the same approach to
plurals, speciﬁcally reciprocal expressions (‘each other’) and conjunctive predicates
(‘big and red’). Finally, Sect. 7 puts the pieces together, by analyzing the eﬀects of
typicality on truth-value judgements. Section 8 concludes.
2 Vagueness and Acceptability Functions
“Truth” and “falsity” are often seen as the pinnacles of natural language semantics.
However, truth-conditional semanticsmust address the fact that speakers’ truth-value
judgements about sentences are often inherently non-uniform, in a way that cannot be
explained by ambiguity or by multiple processing strategies. Consider for example a
simple sentence like this hue is red. For monochromatic light at 610 nm, between typ-
ical red and typical orange, speakersmay disagree onwhether the sentence is ‘true’ or
‘false’, or ﬁnd it hard to decide between the two possibilities (Bonini et al. 1999). The
phenomenon is commonly referred to as vagueness. 1 We say that vague sentences
such as this hue is red may have a varying degree of acceptability depending on the
situation. Upon being shown a black hue, virtually all speakers (who are not color-
1
For a reader on vagueness in philosophy, see Keefe and Smith (1996). For linguistic work on
vagueness, see Kennedy (2011) for a semantic overview, and Nouwen et al. (2011) for further work
in linguistics and philosophy. See Alxatib and Pelletier (2011), Egré et al. (2013), Hampton (1998,
2007) Serchuk et al. (2011) for experimental work.
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blind) would judge the sentence as ‘false’. Upon being shown a hue in the focal red
area (around 650 nm), virtually all speakers would judge the sentence as ‘true’. For
the oranges, pinks, magentas etc., we take the acceptability to be a number between
0 and 1, according to the proportion of speakers who consider the sentence true.
Proportion-based analyses of acceptability go back to Black (1937) “consistency
proﬁles”. Black lumps between-speaker consistency together with within-speaker
consistency. However, there are empirical distinctions between the two (McCloskey
and Glucksberg 1978). I consider here acceptability as a between-speaker measure,
because it is in line with the way truth-value judgements and typicality judgements
are analyzed in the experiments cited throughout this paper.
2
However, since this
paper concerns the connections between acceptability and typicality, it is only crucial
that they are consistently measured. Other measures of acceptability and typicality
may be used, and are expected to show similar behaviors to those studied here.
Since concepts like RED, EXPENSIVE, TALL etc. impose graded acceptability on
situations, we refer to them as gradable concepts (GCs). Diﬀerent theories of vague-
ness have diﬀerent interpretations of what acceptability scores for GCs mean and
how they should be treated. Here we only use them for reﬂecting experimental mea-
sures of truth-value judgements, without a commitment to any speciﬁc theory of
vagueness. For convenience, we also ignore all sorts of questions about the non-
linguistic context. Thus, for a sentence like this hue is red we may assume that the
‘situation’ is a simple color grid presented without any speciﬁc context, ignoring
complex problems that may appear when the contextual information is more intri-
cate (e.g. as in Egré et al. 2013). These assumptions are useful for addressing our
main problem here, and they do not aﬀect too much the proposed analysis.
Summarizing, we deﬁne acceptability functions as follows.
3
(1) Given a gradable concept GC, the acceptability function ACC
GC
is a function
from situations to the real numbers in [0, 1].
In many cases, the order that GCs induce on situations is upward-monotone in the
relevant dimension. To see what this means, consider for instance the following sen-
tence.
(2) This jacket is expensive.
The concept EXPENSIVE satisﬁes the following condition:
For any two situations S1 and S2 with the same jacket x, if the price of x in S1 is
less or equal to its price in S2, then ACCEXPENSIVE(S1) ≤ ACCEXPENSIVE(S2).
2
Measuring speakers’ judgements embodies an “internalist” approach to meaning (Pelletier, 2017).
James Hampton (p.c.) remarks that speakers’ acceptability judgements on expressions like risk may
diverge quite substantially from “externalist” deﬁnitions of their meanings (e.g. based on probability
theory). This divergence may reﬂect two diﬀerent senses of the word risk—an “ordinary” sense and
a “scientiﬁc” sense. This distinction hardly aﬀects the concepts studied in this paper.
3
In semantics, the numeric values that acceptability functions return are often called “degrees”
(Kennedy 2007). In works on concepts, degrees are often described in terms of “graded member-
ship” in a category (Hampton 1998, 2007; Kamp and Partee 1995) among others).
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Monotonicity implies that the acceptability function for the concept EXPENSIVE
induces a partial order on situations on the basis of the price. For instance, in sentence
(2), suppose that we consider two situations: S1, where the jacket costs $50, and S2,
where it costs $120. We expect sentence (2) to be at least as acceptable in situation S2
as it is in S1. Thus, when speakers are asked out-of-the-blue if sentence (2) is “true”,
we expect the proportion of positive responses for situation S2 to be greater or equal
than for situation S1. Similarly, for the concept RED, the nearer the hue of an object
x is to the deﬁnitely red area (say, around 650 nm), the higher the acceptability of
the sentence x is red. Note that not all gradable concepts are upward-monotone in
this way. For instance, the concept MIDDLE-AGED is not upward-monotone in age:
its acceptability may increase up to certain ages (say around 55), but at later ages it
may start to decrease (say around 65). Thus, this acceptability is upward-monotone
in some age groups, and downward-monotone in others.
3 Distributivity and Reciprocity as Gradable Concepts
Noun phrases like the children and the townspeople were not traditionally studied
as part of the puzzles surrounding vagueness in natural language. However, in some
works on plurals it has been observed that such noun phrases also exhibit consider-
able vagueness.
4
For instance, consider the following example by Lasersohn (1999).
(3) The townspeople are asleep.
How many of the townspeople need to be asleep in order for sentence (3) to be con-
sidered “true”? When trying to answer such questions, we see that sentence (3) has
a characteristic behavior of vague sentences.
5
To capture such vagueness eﬀects, we
associate an acceptability function ACC with the predicate “are asleep” in (3). To
be precise, we associate this acceptability function with a concept DIST, for a distri-
bution quantiﬁer. This means that we roughly interpret sentence (3) as claiming that
many, or enough, of the townspeople are asleep. As with these explicitly vague con-
cepts, the acceptability of sentence (3) gets higher as more townspeople are asleep.
This monotonicity is determined by the acceptability function for the DIST concept.
Explicitly:
4
See Brisson (1998), Burnett (2012), Dowty (1987), Lasersohn (1999) for theoretical work, and
Križ and Chemla (2015), Schwarz (2013) for recent experimental work.
5
E.g. consider the vagueness criteria surveyed by Kennedy (2011). Sentence (3) has borderline
cases, e.g. when 75% of the townspeople are asleep. The same sentence also demonstrates the
“Sorites Paradox”: if you consider (3) true for a situation with 10,000 sleeping townspeople, you’ll
ﬁnd it hard to change your mind if one of them suddenly wakes up. Sentences like (3) have also been
demonstrated to be context sensitive. E.g. consider Lasersohn’s (1999) example “the subjects are
asleep”, in the context of an experiment where the purpose is that all the subjects fall asleep. In such
cases the preference that all subjects are asleep becomes stronger. See Burnett (2012) for further
discussion. Some authors refer to vagueness eﬀects as in (3) as ‘non-maximality’ or ‘homogeneity
violation’ (Križ and Chemla 2015).
168 Y. Winter
∙ If each townsperson in S is asleep: ACC
DIST
(S) = 1
∙ If no townsperson in S is asleep: ACC
DIST
(S) = 0
∙ ACC
DIST
is upward-monotone with respect to containment between sets: if the
set of townspeople is the same in situations S1 and S2, and the set of sleeping
townspeople in S1 is contained in the set of sleeping townspeople in S2, then
ACC
DIST
(S1) ≤ ACCDIST(S2).
Similar vagueness appears with another plurality phenomenon, which is related
to distributivity: reciprocity (Dalrymple et al. 1998; Langendoen 1978). Consider
the following sentence.
(4) The three girls admire each other.
Intuitively, sentence (4) is perfectly true if each girl admires the other two. The less
admiration relations there are, the less acceptable the sentence is. In experiments
by Kerem et al. (2009) and Poortman et al. (2017), sentences similar to (4) were
evaluated by participants in diﬀerent situations, which are described schematically
in Fig. 1.
Participants in Poortman et al.’s experiment were presented with schemes as in
Fig. 1 and were asked to judge if a given scheme is a “possible depiction of the
sentence”. Of the participants, 96%, 48% and 4%, respectively, judged schemes I6,
I3 and I2 as possible descriptions for a Dutch translation of sentences like “A, B
and C admire each other”. We describe these facts using an acceptability function
ACC
RECIP
for the reciprocity concept RECIP:
∙ In situation I6: ACC
RECIP
(I6) = 0.96
∙ In situation I3: ACC
RECIP
(I3) = 0.48
∙ In situation I2: ACC
RECIP
(I2) = 0.04
∙ The acceptability function ACC
RECIP
is upward-monotone with respect to contain-
ment between binary relations. Thus, if the set of three girls is the same in two
situations S1 and S2, and the set of admiration pairs in S1 is contained in the set of
admiration pairs in S2, then ACCRECIP(S1) ≤ ACCRECIP(S2).
The measured acceptability values for situations I2, I3 and I6 are consistent with
the monotonicity assumption about ACC
RECIP
, since the set of arrows in I6 contains
the set of arrows in I3, and the set of arrows in Figure I3 contains the set of arrows
in I2.
We have considered three diﬀerent kinds of gradable concepts (GCs) with adjec-
tives (EXPENSIVE, RED), quantiﬁcational distributivity (DIST), and reciprocal quanti-
Fig. 1 Three situations for
the interpretation of sentence
(4)
I2 I3 I6
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ﬁers (RECIP). As we have seen, all three kinds of GCs are vague and display upward-
monotonicity. With this background on GCs, we can address some problems sur-
rounding their interpretation and typicality eﬀects.
4 Acceptability Versus Typicality
Speakers often judge an object to be an atypical member of a concept, but without
denying its membership in the concept’s extension, or category (Rosch 1973). As
Kamp and Partee (1995, p. 133) mention, if Robbie is a pelican then his acceptabil-
ity as an instance of the concept BIRD ought to be close to 1. Notwithstanding, Robbie
is clearly an atypical instance of this concept. Since Rosch and her associates’ sem-
inal works in the 1970s, this dissociation between acceptability and typicality has
been illustrated by a variety of typicality eﬀects. For instance, in McCloskey and
Glucksberg’s (1978) experiments, the following category-exemplar pairs received
typicality ratings lower than 7 (on a 1–10 scale), but membership was considered
positive by more than 90% of the participants:
ANIMAL: cobra, lizard, woman BIRD: penguin CARPENTER’S TOOL: crowbar DISEASE: alco-
holism, schizophrenia INSECT: louse, silkworm NATURAL EARTH FORMATION: sinkhole SCIENCE:
agriculture WEATHER PHENOMENON: dew VEGETABLE: rhubarb, soy bean.
This kind of empirical dissociation between measures of acceptability (=graded
membership) and measures of typicality has been repeatedly demonstrated, and is
hardly controversial. A bigger controversy surrounds the question whether typical-
ity eﬀects relate to the same mental faculties that aﬀect vagueness. Hampton (2007)
describes one position in the debate by stating that “Osherson & Smith and Kamp
& Partee contend [that] typicality T has quite diﬀerent properties as a variable from
degree of membership M”. By contrast, Hampton himself (a.o.) proposes “that both
degree of membership M and typicality T are based on a single underlying metric
of similarity [to the prototype]”. For more on this debate, see Hampton (1998), Rips
(1989).
The present paper shows more evidence that typicality aﬀects category mem-
bership.
6
Speciﬁcally, typicality for lexical concepts may inﬂuence graded member-
ship in categories for complex expressions made of these lexical concepts. For a
start, this section considers some examples where typicality is distinguished from
acceptability, and which are speciﬁcally relevant for the rest of this paper. These
examples concern the behavior of noun concepts, reciprocity and distributivity, as
tested in recentexperiments by Kerem et al. (2009), Lee (2017), Poortman (2017) and
6
Note however, that I remain agnostic regarding Hampton’s claim that typicality and acceptability
are determined by the same underlying metrics of similarity (to a prototype). Especially, the pro-
posal below is neutral with respect to Hampton’s assumption that typicality measures with complex
expressions reﬂect the same metrics that aﬀects truth-value judgements.
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(b)(a)
Fig. 2 Two illustrations of the transitive meaning of the Hebrew verb for “shake”. All rights for
further use of the illustration arranged with the artist
Poortman et al. (2017). These examples help us observe common principles in the
complex interplay between acceptability and typicality.
Example 1 HAIR
In one of Lee’s experiments (Lee, 2017: Fig. 5.4), participants were shown a picture
of hair that was atypically dyed focal red. 87% of the participants accepted this pic-
ture as an instance of the concept RED HAIR. Therefore, we may reasonably conclude
that the stimulus was quite acceptable as an instance of HAIR.
7
However, in a color
preference task for the concept HAIR, only 24% of the participants preferred focal red
to a more natural hue for hair (RGB value: 201,113,13). In accordance with naive
intuition, we may conclude that hair that is dyed focal red is an acceptable instance
of HAIR, but is atypical for the category.
Example 2 SHAKE
In one of Kerem et al.’s experiments, participants were shown two pictures of a man
shaking infant beds (Fig. 2a, b), as well as an incomplete transitive sentence “the
man is shaking (something)”.
8
Although both pictures clearly show the man doing
the activity reported in the sentence, 87% of the participants preferred Fig. 2a as a
“better illustration for the sentence”. We conclude that a situation with two patients
is an atypical instance of the concept SHAKE, despite its high acceptability.
Example 3 WALK and WRITE
In one of the experiments by Poortman (2017), participants were instructed to
rate the oddness of a situation where a person walks and writes at the same time.
7
Lee did not directly check the degree of acceptability for HAIR. Overextension eﬀects (Hampton
1996) may mean that the actual acceptability for HAIR in the focal red stimulus was slightly below
87%. But this eﬀect cannot be too big, since the pictures that Lee used were quite natural hair.
8
The Hebrew example in Kerem et al.’s questionnaires was ha-isˆ mena’ane’a (“the-man shake”).
The Hebrew verb only has the transitive meaning of the English verb shake (“cause to move”), not
the intransitive meaning (“tremble”).
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The average oddness rate for this pair of verbs was 3.39 on a scale between 1 and 6,
where 1 meant “not odd at all” and 6 meant “physically impossible”. We conclude
that such a situation is atypical for the concepts WALK and WRITE. Nevertheless, the
situation is highly acceptable as a legitimate instance for each of those concepts:
when Lucy happens to be walking and writing at the same time, we do not expect
many speakers to reject the description “Lucy is walking” just because the event is
atypical for the concept WALK. Similarly we do not expect the sentence “Lucy is
writing” to be rejected if she happens to be walking at the same time.
To describe the dissociation between judgements about vagueness and typical-
ity, it is common to associate concepts with typicality functions. Similarly to our
treatment of acceptability functions, we will use typicality functions that map sit-
uations to a value between 0 and 1.9 The typicality value assigned to a situation
may be diﬀerent than the value assigned by the acceptability function. Summarizing
the judgements in Examples 1–3 above, we make the following assumptions on the
typicality and acceptability functions.
For the concept HAIR in Example 1, let S1 be a situation with a focally red hair.
Based on the observations above, we denote:
ACC
HAIR
(S1) ≈ 1 and TYPHAIR(S1) ≪ 1.
For the concept SHAKE in Example 2, let S2 be the situation in Fig. 2b. We denote:
ACC
SHAKE
(S2) ≈ 1 and TYPSHAKE(S2) ≪ 1.
For the concepts WALK and WRITE in Example 3, let S3 be a situation where Lucy
is walking and writing simultaneously. We denote:
ACC
WALK
(S3) ≈ 1 and TYPWALK(S3) ≪ 1, and similarly for WRITE.
With this background on concepts, their vagueness and typicality eﬀects, we can
move on to the question of concept composition.
5 Guppy eﬀects with gradable adjectives
In formal semantics it is commonly assumed that meanings of complex phrases are
determined by a general principle, known as compositionality (Barker and Jacobson
2007; Janssen 1997; Werning et al. 2012). According to this principle, the mean-
ing of a complex expression is determined by the meanings of its parts, and the
way they combine with each other. For phrases like a vegetarian student, the sim-
plest way to follow the compositionality principle is to use logical conjunction:
a vegetarian student is someone who is independently categorized as both a student
and a vegetarian. While in this example the conjunctive process works quite well,
9
I here ignore the question of whether there is indeed a bounding value for typicality (Hampton
1998, 2007; Osherson and Smith 1981; Smith and Medin 1981; Smith and Osherson 1984). I also
do not rule out the possibility that typicality and acceptability (at least at the lexical level) are deter-
mined by the same variable, as Hampton suggests. The data discussed in this paper are consistent
with this possibility. The important point is the uncontroversial assumption that typicality rating
may be diﬀerent than acceptability.
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other modiﬁcation constructions require a more complicated semantic or pragmatic
treatment. Osherson and Smith (1981) study the implications of applying the simple
conjunctive treatment to compounds like pet ﬁsh, as in the following analysis.
(5) An entity is categorized as a PET FISH if it is independently categorized as a PET
and as a FISH.
According to O&S’s intuitions, a guppy should be considered more typical for the
category PET FISH than it is for any of the categories PET and FISH in isolation. This
means that the typicality of an object for the category PET FISH cannot be easily deter-
mined using the object’s typicality values for each of the two constituent categories
independently. This kind of problem for understanding typicality was demonstrated
in many experiments, starting in Smith and Osherson (1984). We collectively refer
to such challenges about typicality as “guppy eﬀects”.
10
Applying O&S’s claims to
adjective-noun compounds, Smith and Osherson (1984) showed that objects may be
more typical for such constructions than they are for the adjective and the noun in
isolation. For instance, in S&O’s experiment, brown instances of apples received
higher typicality ratings for the expression brown apple than for each of the words
brown and apple in isolation.
Despite the relevance of O&S’s puzzle for the study of complex concepts, it
should be noted that O&S themselves did not consider guppy eﬀects to be a imme-
diate problem for a compositional rule as in (5). O&S’s approach is based on a sharp
distinction between typicality and vagueness (Osherson and Smith 1997). Thus,
according to O&S’s view, category membership can be determined using a com-
positional rule like (5), while typicality judgements are governed by other, possi-
bly non-compositional, mechanisms. However, O&S’s sharp dissociation of typical-
ity from vagueness is not easy to maintain. As many works have shown, there are
important relations between typicality and category membership. McCloskey and
Glucksberg (1978) showed that speakers often disagree about category membership
when exemplars have intermediate typicality values, but they are less likely to dis-
agree aboutmembership if typicality is very high or very low. Furthermore, Hampton
(1988b) showed guppy eﬀects for typicality rating tasks, as well as for membership
rating tasks. For instance, Hampton studied membership rating for complex expres-
sions like sport which is also a game. The results showed that the item chess was
more often categorized as a sport which is also a game, than it was categorized as
both a sport and a game independently. This kind of overextension eﬀect challenges
the conjunctive rule in (5), and it was demonstrated with many items in relative
clauses. Chater et al. (1990) obtained similar results to Hampton’s using a Y/N cate-
gory membership task, without membership rating. Similar eﬀects were shown with
adjective modiﬁers, noun compounds, disjunction and negation (Hampton 1988a,
1997; Storms et al. 1996).
10
Somewhat ironically, Storms et al. (1998) report a failure to experimentally attest a guppy eﬀect
with the pet ﬁsh example of O&S. However, this failure only concerns O&S’s speciﬁc example, and
the so-called guppy eﬀect was attested in many experiments, including Storms et al.’s.
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The overextension eﬀects that were studied in the literature normally dealt with
conjunctive expressions where there is not necessarily a conﬂict between the con-
joined categories. For instance, golf is both a highly typical sport and a highly typi-
cal game, and in Hampton’s experiments it was commonly judged to belong in both
categories (Hampton 1988b). Thus, there is no necessary competition between the
typicality that exemplars have with respect to the concepts SPORT and GAME.
11
A
similar point holds for many of the items studied in the literature on overextension.
By contrast, O&S were interested in concept composition where one concept is in
a “negatively diagnostic” relation with another concept (Smith and Osherson 1984,
p. 340). For instance, consider the inherent typicality conﬂict in the expression red
hair. Hair instances that are typical of RED are atypical for the concept HAIR. Con-
versely, typical HAIR instances are of hues that are either not red at all or quite atypi-
cal for RED. Lee (2017) checked the eﬀects of such typicality conﬂicts on truth-value
judgements. His experiments contrast combinations like red hair, where there is an
intuitive conﬂict in typicality (S&O’s “negatively diagnostic” relation), and cases
like red car, where there is no typicality conﬂict (S&O’s “nondiagnostic” relation).
Accordingly, in Lee’s experiment 2, participants were asked to give their judgements
on two images:
Image 1: an image of a woman whose hair is the same hue of Example 1 above
(RGB value: 201,113,13—Lee, 2017: Fig. 5.4).
Image 2: an image of a car that is painted the same hue as in Image 1.
The majority (92%) of the participants in Lee’s experiment accepted the categoriza-
tion red hair for Image 1, but only 17% accepted the categorization red car for Image
2. This means that for at least 75% of the participants, a simple conjunctive analysis
as in (5) would not work without additional assumptions. We can standardly assume
that the likelihood that an object is categorized as red is aﬀected by the linguistic
and non-linguistic context.
12
11
In fact, many typical sports are also typical games. For this reason, Hampton’s (1997) study of
constructions like sports that are not games is exceptional in that it (indirectly) tests potential typ-
icality clashes, here between sports and non-games.
12
For linguistic work, see Cresswell (1976), Kamp (1975), Kamp and Partee (1995), Klein (1980),
Kennedy (2007). For experimental work, see Hansen et al. (2006), Kubat et al. (2009). Because of
contextual eﬀects, it is likely that some of the participants in Lee’s experiment would accept the
hair in Image 1 as red but reject the car in Image 2, even if the nouns would not be mentioned,
relativizing redness to the visual instances of the concepts HAIR and CAR. Lee’s work did not try
to factor out possible eﬀects of the visual stimuli, which are also central for concept composition
(see Barsalou, 2017). However, Lee’s eﬀects in distinguishing gradable-concept categorization in
complex expressions with “neutral” versus “biased” categorizes are much stronger than in previous
work on categorization with simple color terms. Therefore, we can maintain the assumption that
the interpretation of an adjective is aﬀected both by its visual context and its linguistic context.
Below I ignore eﬀects of the visual context because they are less directly relevant to the composi-
tionality problem in linguistics. Most importantly, eﬀects coming from the non-linguistic context
are not immediately testable when analyzing reciprocity and distributivity, because these concepts,
unlike adjective concepts, are not easily studied in isolation: unlike category names such as RED,
reciprocity and distributivity are bound to appear as sentence parts.
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Here we concentrate on the eﬀects of the noun concept on the interpretation of
contrastive pairs like red hair/car. Such contrasts show a simple enough illustration
of the problem for the conjunctive rule. Therefore, from a theoretical perspective,
they are useful for analyzing the relations between membership and typicality with
complex expressions. Like other gradable concepts, the concept RED imposes a nat-
ural ordering on entities. Here the ordering is naturally based on hue, and can be
expressed by the comparative statement x is redder than y. Let us now consider the
concept CAR in the phrase red car. The relation between the concepts RED and CAR
is what S&O classify as a “nondiagnostic” relation: the typicality of CAR instances
is likely to remain by and large unaﬀected by changes in hue. More formally, sup-
pose that we are given two situations S1 and S2 with a car, where the only diﬀerence
between S1 and S2 is in the car’s hue. We may reasonably assume that TYPCAR(S1) is
close to TYP
CAR
(S2). Speciﬁcally, suppose that S1 has a car painted focal red, and S2
has the same car painted some other hue, quite distant from focal red. Both instances
are expected to be equally typical for the concept CAR.
Unlike the concept CAR, the concept HAIR clearly hasmore typical and less typical
colors. For instance, various shades of black and brown are more typical for human
hair than, say, shocking pink. Among the hues between orange and focal red, some
hues, at the margins of the concept RED, may be categorized as quite typical for HAIR.
These are the hues that are most common for hair that is classiﬁed as RED HAIR. Let
us informally refer to these hues as ‘ginger’. When we consider the complex expres-
sion red hair, we see a typicality conﬂict (S&O’s “negatively diagnostic” relation),
which is due to the eﬀect of hue on the typicality for HAIR. Starting from those hues
that we called ‘ginger’, the redder the hue gets, the lower the typicality is for the
concept HAIR. We classify this eﬀect as downward-monotonicity of the typicality
function for the concept HAIR, and say the function TYP
HAIR
is downward-monotone
relative to the order imposed by the gradable concept RED. More formally:
For any two instances x1 and x2 of HAIR, where x1 and x2’s hues are between ginger
and focal red: if x1 is redder than x2, then TYPHAIR(x1) ≤ TYPHAIR(x2)
Note that this downward-monotonicity is only local: if we look at the hues that lie
between the ginger hues and, say, the green hues, the HAIR typicality function is
upward-monotone, since ginger hues are more typical as hair colors than green hues.
Therefore, the ginger hues give a local maximum of the typicality for the concept
HAIR among the hues that may reasonably be categorized as red.13
13
The choice of green hues as the point where typicality starts to increase towards ginger is
for presentation sake. Black, brown and blond may be globally more typical than ginger hues.
Therefore, other hues besides ginger attain local maxima for HAIR typicality. However, between
the black, brown and blond hues that are most typical for HAIR, we assume that typicality for HAIR
must decrease somewhere before it raises again towards the ginger hues. Hence, for the sake of
illustration, it is safe to assume that ginger attains a local maximum for hair typicality also in other
dimensions of color other than the one illustrated here. This simpliﬁed presentation would not work
for multi-dimensional concepts like PET or FISH, which introduce further complications when deal-
ing with constructions like pet ﬁsh (Hampton 2007, p. 374). I believe that the current proposal can be
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Above I have described the distinction between red car and red hair in terms of
the behavior of the typicality functions for the concepts CAR and HAIR under changes
of hue. Let us look at more concrete, hypothetical typicality functions that show this
behavior, based on Lee’s example. For purposes of illustration, we may suppose that
green hues have typicality 0 for the concept RED, ginger hues (around RGB value
201,113,13, as in Lee’s experiments) have typicality 0.6 for RED, and focal red has
typicality 1 (Fig. 3 on top). In all our analyses, we concentrate on typicality for the
head concept (HC): the concept that is being modiﬁed by the graded concept in the
construction, e.g. the concepts HAIR and CAR in the constructions red hair and red
car. For these two expressions, we look at situations that vary with respect to their
typicality for the gradable concept RED. We encode situations according to their
typicality for the concept RED. Speciﬁcally, we let the situations that we consider be
described by numbers between 0 and 1, according to their typicality for RED. For
instance, for RED HAIR we are interested in various situations where hair only diﬀers
in hue, and the hues range between green and focal red. Now, Fig. 3a approximares
the typicality for the head concept HAIR as a function of the hue typicality for the
gradable concept RED.
14
As illustrated in this ﬁgure, ginger attains local maximal
typicality for the concept HAIR. We look at this local maximum as an optimal “com-
promise” in typicality between the concepts RED and HAIR, referring to it as a critical
typicality (CT) point for the complex concept RED HAIR.
Using the same kind of analysis, let us now consider the concept CAR. We
assumed that typicality for CAR is constant in the hue. Thus, all hues obtain local
maxima for CAR, as illustrated in Fig. 3b. Among these hues, we deﬁne the CT point
for RED CAR as the reddest one, i.e. focal red. Thus, the CT point for RED CAR is
much redder than ginger, which is the CT point for RED HAIR.
15
Note that the dif-
ference between Fig. 3a and b is predicted from the diﬀerence between the typicality
functions for the concepts HAIR and CAR, and the way they behave under changes
in typicality for RED.
16
Thus, our ability to see diﬀerences between expressions like
red hair and red car is based on the information we have on their parts, in agreement
with compositionality. However, unlike standard conjunctive rules, the information
(Footnote 13 continued)
subsumed by current models of distributional semantics (Baroni and Zamparelli 2010, Mitchell and
Lapata 2010, McNally and Boleda, 2017). However, since pet ﬁsh examples concern problems with
noun modiﬁcation that are not immediately relevant for plurals, this task is left for further work.
14
The graphs in Fig. 3, as well as in Figs. 4 and 5, are only for illustrative purposes. Using exact
typicality values here is impossible, since the experiments by Lee, Poortman et al. and Poortman
did not measure typicality directly, but only compared various situations as for their typicality.
With respect to acceptability (as opposed to typicality), Figs. 7, 8 and 9 that follow later better
approximate the results in those experiments.
15
This idea is inspired by the following intuition in Krifka (1999): Context-sensitive interpretation
of RED can be given as: “When combined with a noun meaning N, it singles out those objects in N
that appear closest to the color of blood for the human eye.”.
16
The process can be extended for complex phrases like giant midget/midget giant (Kamp and Par-
tee 1995), where both concepts are gradable (and unidimensional). However, the focus here is on
those cases where one of the concepts is gradable and the other one is not, since in those cases the
generalization to plural concepts is most direct.
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(a) (b)
TYPRED(green) = 0 TYPRED(ginger) = 0.6 TYPRED(focal red) = 1
Fig. 3 Determining the CT point for RED HAIR and RED CAR: Typicality values of diﬀerent hues
for RED (see on top) are used to describe typicality for HAIR and CAR as a function of typicality
for RED (a and b). The reddest local maximum point(s) of these functions is the critical typicality
(CT) point (def. (7), example (6)). The CT point aﬀects the determination of acceptability for the
complex concept (Sect. 7)
we use is not just the extension of these parts, i.e. it is not the sets of items catego-
rized by them. Rather, as the “meaning” of the parts we use the typicality functions
derived from the lexical concepts.
With diﬀerent CT points for the expressions red hair and red car, we are half
way in the analysis of Lee’s results. As will be described more explicitly below,
instances at the CT points are expected to be frequently judged as instances of the
complex concept. Thus, since focal-red cars are at the CT point, they are likeliest
to be classiﬁed as a red car. However, ginger cars are substantially below the CT
point for CAR, hence they are unlikely to be classiﬁed as red car. By contrast, ginger
hair instances are at the CT point for HAIR, hence are likely to be classiﬁed as red
hair. A separate question, which will also be discussed below, is what happens with
focal-red instances of HAIR, which are substantially above the CT points for HAIR.
As we will see, diﬀerent concepts behave diﬀerently at such points.
Before moving on to plural concepts, let us explicitly summarize our analysis of
the red hair example.
(6) Let LM-HAIR be the set of local typicality maxima for the concept HAIR. In
formula:
LM-HAIR = argmaxxTYPHAIR(x).
The critical typicality point(s) for RED HAIR is deﬁned by:
argmaxx∈LM-HAIRTYPRED(x).
In words: the critical typicality points for RED HAIR are those points that attain max-
imal typicality for RED among the points that attain maximal typicality for HAIR.
Suppose that the local maxima in LM-HAIR are four points that represent the focal
hues for brown, black, blond and ginger. Of these focal hues, ginger attains maximal
typicality for RED, hence it is classiﬁed as the CT point for RED HAIR. A similar pro-
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cedure yields a focal red as the critical point for RED CAR: supposing, as we did, that
all hues are equally typical for CAR, we get the set of local maxima for CAR contain
the whole spectrum. Of these hues, focal red is most typical for RED, hence classiﬁed
as the CT point for RED CAR.
In more general terms, let us deﬁne the critical typicality point(s) for gradable
concepts (e.g. RED) when they operate with head concepts like CAR or HAIR.
(7) Critical Typicality (CT): Let GC be a gradable concept and HC be a head
concept. Let LM-HC be the set of local typicality maxima for HC, deﬁned by:
LM-HC = argmaxxTYPHC(x).
The set CT
GC-HC
of critical typicality (CT) points for the complex concept GC-
HC is deﬁned by:
argmaxx∈LM-HCTYPGC(x).
In words: the CT points for the complex concept GC-HC are those points that attain
maximal typicality for the gradable concept GC among the points that attainmaximal
typicality for the head concept HC. This is precisely the same deﬁnition as in (6),
but using more general notation.
17
This deﬁnition will now help us analyze various
guppy eﬀects where the gradable concept is a plurality operator: distributivity or
reciprocity.
6 Guppy Eﬀects with Plurals
While guppy eﬀects in concept composition have been widely studied in the litera-
ture on vagueness and adjectives, they have less often been addressed in relation to
the interpretation of plurals. The main proposal of this paper is that the contextual
mechanisms aﬀecting meaning composition with vague adjectives are also opera-
tional with vague plural quantiﬁers. To see the parallelism, consider the following
two sentences (Philip 2000; Winter 2001).
(8) a. Mary, Lucy and Candy are pinching each other.
b. Mary, Lucy and Candy know each other.
17
James Hampton (p.c.) points out that deﬁnition (7) is not fully general. For instance, for GREEN
HAIR, we would like the CT point to be around focal green, and not, say, ginger or focal black.
However, since ginger and focal black are local maxima for HAIR typicality, deﬁnition (7) might
classify them as CT points, despite their zero typicality for GREEN. To address this problem, we
would need deﬁnition (7) to only consider local maxima of HC-typicality which are close enough to
the maximal typicality points for GC. E.g., for GREEN HAIR, we would only consider hair instances
at a certain distance d from focal green. Reasonably, all these points would be equally (a)typical
for HAIR, hence classiﬁed as local maxima. Accordingly, focal green would be classiﬁed as the CT
point for GREEN HAIR. By contrast, if we look at hair instances at distance d from focal red, we
expect to see some increase in HAIR typicality at diﬀerent points closer to the browns, blonds or
gingers. This would only allow such points be the local maxima, in agreement with the analysis
above. For sake of presentation, we avoid this complication of (7), which is unnecessary for the
analysis of plural concepts.
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Aswemay naturally expect, the concept PINCH shows preference for situations where
an agent only pinches one patient at a time (this was experimentally veriﬁed by
Kerem et al. and Poortman et al.). However, the reciprocity concept for each other
prefers as many relations as possible (Dalrymple et al. 1998; Sabato and Winter
2012). In sentence (8a) this leads to a conﬂict between the preferences of the two
concepts. By contrast, in sentence (8b) there is no conﬂict in preferences between
the verb and the reciprocal expression: a person may know many people, without
clear typicality preferences between diﬀerent numbers of acquaintances. Intuitively,
this contrast points to a possible guppy eﬀect in sentence (8a) when compared to
(8b). Indeed, Kerem et al. and Poortman et al. experimentally showed that there is a
substantial diﬀerence in the interpretations of sentences like (8a) and (8b). Poortman
et al. tested truth-value judgements on Dutch versions of these sentences (and similar
ones) for I3 situations as in Fig. 1 above: three agents, each of them acting on another
agent. While 88% of the participants accepted (8a) as true in this I3 situation, only
36% accepted (8b) in the same situation. Kerem et al. and Poortman et al. explain
such diﬀerences as a guppy eﬀect, using a principle that they call the Maximal Typ-
icality Hypothesis (MTH). As an instance of the more general principle in (7), the
MTH is analyzed as responsible for the guppy eﬀect. For example, with the concept
PINCH in (8a), the I3 situation is the most typical situation for the reciprocity concept
that is consistent with the preference that one person does not pinch more than two
people at the same time. If we try to add more relations to I3 in order to satisfy better
the preferences of the reciprocal concept, we get atypical situations for the PINCH
concept, As a result, I3 is the critical typicality point for the verb phrase pinch each
other in sentence (8a). By contrast, in sentence (8b), with the concept KNOW, there is
no substantial typicality diﬀerence between I3 and conﬁgurations containing more
relations. Consequently, the preferences of the reciprocal concept are free to take
over, and I3 is not a CT point for the expression know each other in (8b). Rather,
in this case the CT point is the I6 situation, where every one of the three people
knows every other person. Figure 4a, b summarizes the typicality considerations for
sentences (8a) and (8b) with I3 and I6. For contrast, these ﬁgures also include the
I2 situation, with only two pinching relations between the three people. In Kerem
et al.’s and Poortman et al.’s experiments, I2 situations consistently showed very
low acceptability for reciprocal sentences with all tested verbs.
In (9) below we apply principle (7) to the case of the complex concept for pinch
each other, where PINCH is the head concept HC and RECIP is the gradable concept
GC.
(9) Let LM-P be the set of local typicality maxima for the concept PINCH. In for-
mula:
LM-P = argmaxxTYPPINCH(x).
The CT point(s) for pinch each other is deﬁned by:
argmaxx∈LM-PTYPRECIP(x).
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Fig. 4 Determining the CT point for pinch each other and know each other: Typicality values of
the I2, I3, and I6 situations are used to describe typicality for PINCH and KNOW as a function of
typicality for RECIP (a and b). The “most reciprocal” local maximum point(s) of these functions is
the critical typicality (CT) point (def. (7), example (9)). The CT point aﬀects the determination of
acceptability for the complex concept (Sect. 7)
In words: the critical typicality points for pinch each other are the situations that
attain maximal typicality for the gradable concept RECIP among the situations that
attain maximal typicality for PINCH. As we saw, this entails that I3 is a CT point for
pinch each other. This analysis is analogous to the analysis of the RED HAIR example.
A similar procedure gives us I6 as the CT point for know each other, in analogy to
the RED CAR example.
Poortman (2017) studies another guppy-like eﬀect with plurals. Consider the fol-
lowing sentences.
(10) a. Dan, Bill, John and George are walking and writing.
b. Dan, Bill, John and George are walking and singing.
In these constructions, we view ‘bi-concepts’ like WALK&WRITE and WALK&SING
as the head concepts. The gradable concept of “distributivity” DIST is not overtly
present in the sentence, but is standardly introduced in the analysis, as discussed
above. We analyze the distributivity concept DIST as a gradable vague concept sim-
ilar to many or enough. The complex concept for the plural expression are walking
and writing is denoted DIST WALK&WRITE (as opposed to the conjunctive concept
WALK&WRITE for the uninﬂected conjunction). Similarly, the complex concept for
the expression are walking and singing is denoted DIST WALK&SING.
Now let us consider three types of situations for sentences (10a–b), illustrated in
Fig. 5:
∙ A joint situation, where each of the four people is doing both activities, i.e. walking
and writing/singing.
∙ A full-split situation, where two people are performing one activity, and the other
two are performing the other activity.
∙ A partial-split situation, where one of the persons is performing one activity,
and another person is performing the other activity. The other two people are not
engaged in any of the activities.
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Fig. 5 Three situations for the interpretation of sentences (10a–b). The dots represent the agents
Dan, Bill, John and George, and the numbers 1 and 2 represent the activities done by each person
(walk, write/sing, or both)
Partial-split situations are quite unacceptable for both sentences (10a) and (10b).
Thus, when Dan walks, George writes and Bill and John are doing neither activity,
sentence (10a) is quite odd, and similarly for (10b). By contrast, in full-split situa-
tions, Poortman’s experiments show a diﬀerence between Dutch sentences similar
(10a) and (10b). While 81% of the participants accepted sentences like (10a) in a
full-split situation, only 24% accepted (10b) (in Poortman’s experiment the subjects
were deﬁnite descriptions, e.g. the boys). Once more, when accounting for this eﬀect
we rely on critical typicality points. In (11) below we apply principle (7) to the case
of the expression are walking and writing. In this example, we denote WALK&WRITE
for the head concept HC, where DIST, the distributivity concept, is the gradable con-
cept GC.
(11) Let LM-WW be the set of local typicality maxima for the concept WALK&
WRITE. In formula:
LM-WW = argmaxxTYPWALK&WRITE(x).
The CT point(s) for the complex concept DIST WALK&WRITE is deﬁned by:
argmaxx∈LM-WWTYPDIST(x).
In words: the CT points for the expression are walking and writing are the situations
that attain maximal typicality for the gradable concept DIST among the situations that
attain maximal typicality for WALK&WRITE. Among the three situations we con-
sider, the full-split and partial-split situations are more typical for WALK&WRITE
than the joint situation. Between these two situations, the full-split situation is sub-
stantially more typical for the concept DIST, as it contains more people who are
engaged in the relevant activities. This means that for sentence (10a), full-split is
the CT point among the three situations. By contrast, for sentence (10a), the three
situations are equally typical for the head concept WALK&SING. This is because the
concepts WALK and SING, unlike WALK and WRITE, are not in any conﬂict (this kind
of contrast is shown in another experiment by Poortman). In this case, for sentence
(10b), the critical typicality point is the “joint situation”, which is the most typical
for the distributivity concept alone. This analysis is summarized in Fig. 6.
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Fig. 6 Determining the CT point for walking and writing and walking and singing: Typicality
values of diﬀerent conﬁgurations (partial-split, full-split and joint) are used to describe typicality
for WALK&WRITE and WALK&SING as a function of typicality for DIST (a and b). The local “most
distributive” maximum point(s) of these functions is the critical typicality (CT) point (def. (7),
example (11)). The CT point aﬀects the determination of acceptability for the complex concept
(Sect. 7)
7 The Eﬀect of Critical Typicality on Acceptability
We have seen that for three diﬀerent cases, typicality considerations allow us to spec-
ify points of critical typicality. Such CT points hit the optimal equilibrium between
the (possibly conﬂicting) typicality preferences of concepts appearing together in a
complex construction. We would like to use CT points in order to explain facts like
the following:
(12) a. Ginger-hued hair is more acceptable for red hair than car instances of the
same hue are for red car (0.92 vs. 0.17 acceptability rates in Lee’s experi-
ments).
b. I3 situations are more acceptable for pinch each other than for know each
other (0.88 vs. 0.36 acceptability rates in Poortman et al.’s experiments).
c. Full-split situations are more acceptable for walking and writing than for
walking and singing (0.81 vs. 0.24 acceptability rates in Poortman’s exper-
iments).
The three experiments compared acceptability proportions when participants were
asked to categorize instances of two complex expressions. From the perspective
developed here, which follows Black (1937), a central goal of semantic theory is
to account for such results on acceptability. It is important to note that a priori,
it is not self-evident that acceptability proportions reﬂect typicality preferences for
the complex concept. Typicality eﬀects are only studied here insofar as they help
to predict acceptability, as measured in truth-value judgement tasks. The typicality
data that were tested in Lee’s, Poortman et al.’s and Poortman’s experiments con-
cern the head concept, and not any complex concepts. As Fodor (1981) claimed, it
becomesincreasingly harder to study typicality information when it comes to com-
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plex expressions.
18
An example for the diﬃculty was illustrated in one of Kerem
et al.’s 2009 experiments. In a forced choice experiment, only 26% of the partici-
pants preferred I3 to I6 as a better illustration for sentences of the form A, B and
C are pinching each other. Thus, if we want to explain why I3 situations are more
acceptable for pinch each other than for know each other, it is not clear how typ-
icality eﬀects might help us: when participants were asked about their preferences
(as opposed to their acceptability judgements), many of them preferred I6 to I3 sit-
uations for pinch each other, and ignored the atypical status of such scenarios for
the concept PINCH. This eﬀect nicely demonstrates Fodor’s point: as expressions get
longer and more complicated, typicality judgements do not seem very informative.
Because of this point, we concentrate on acceptability judgements for complex
expressions, rather than on typicality judgements. Typicality judgements are only
collected for lexical expressions, which are then used for predicting the CT point(s).
These CT points, in turn, are proposed to be an important factor that boosts accept-
ability judgements for complex expressions. The facts in (12) are all explained using
the following generalization.
(13) Let GC-HC1 and GC-HC2 be two complex concepts, with the same graded
concept GC, but with diﬀerent head concepts HC1 and HC2. Let two situations,
S1 and S2 be exemplars for HC1 and HC2, respectively, where S1 and S2 are of
equal typicality for the graded concept GC. Suppose that S1 is a CT point for
the complex concept GC-HC1, but below the CT point for the complex concept
GC-HC2. Then the acceptability of S1 for GC-HC1 is substantially higher than
the acceptability of S2 for GC-HC2.
For instance, since ginger hues are CT points for the concept HAIR, but not for the
concept CAR, their acceptability for red hair is substantially higher than for red car.
Similarly, since I3 situations are CT points for the concept PINCH, but not for the
concept KNOW, their acceptability for pinch each other is substantially higher than
for know each other. Further, since full-split situations are CT points for the concept
WALK&WRITE, but not for WALK&SING, their acceptability for are walking and writ-
ing is substantially higher than for are walking and singing.
Note that the CT point is proposed to be a factor that boosts acceptability, but
does not necessarily maximize it. Points above the CT point may have acceptability
lower than or equal to the acceptability at the CT point, but they may also have higher
acceptability. Here are two examples for this variability:
∙ In Lee’s experiments, focal red hair was slightly less acceptable for red hair than
ginger hair (0.87 vs. 0.92). By contrast, a bike made completely of wood was more
acceptable for wooden bike than a more typical bike with some wood parts (0.96
vs. 0.71).
18
Fodor used the complex phrase “American cities situated on the East Coast just a little south of
Tennessee” to argue against the plausibility of prototype theory. According to Fodor, it is unlikely
that such expressions have any prototype.
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∙ In Poortman et al.’s experiments, the I6 situation was as acceptable for pinch each
other as the I3 situation (0.88 in both cases). By contrast, the I6 situation was
substantially less acceptable for bite each other than I3 (0.44 vs. 0.84).
Thus, above the CT point (I3, ginger hues, partially wooden bike), acceptability may
increase, decrease, or remain the same. I propose that this happens because accept-
ability for a complex concept above the CT point is compositionally aﬀected by the
acceptability values for the parts. For instance, participants may fail to accept I6 situ-
ations as biting situations, simply because they reject the possibility that one person
can be biting two people simultaneously. By contrast, a bike made completely of
wood is still a bike, hence acceptability for wooden bike may continue to increase
beyond the CT point.
Based on this account, we use CT points for specifying acceptability functions for
complex concepts on the basis of the acceptability functions of their parts. Consider
again our running example, the concept RED HAIR. Let us assume that x0 is the least
red hue that is still categorized as RED by some speakers.
19
For instance, x0 may be a
slightly redder hue than focal green (where the latter has zero acceptability for RED).
Based on the minimal acceptability point x0 and the critical typicality point CT, we
can describe the acceptability function for RED HAIR as consisting of three parts:
(i) For every hue x between focal green and x0, the acceptability ACCRED HAIR(x) is
constantly zero (as x is deﬁnitely not red).
(ii) For every hue x between the CT point (ginger) and focal red: ACC
RED HAIR
(x)
is compositionally determined by ACC
RED
(x) and ACC
HAIR
(x), e.g. by multi-
plication.
20
Intuitively, hair hues that are redder than the CT point(s) inherit
their acceptability compositionally, from the acceptability for RED and for HAIR
independently.
(iii) For every hue x between x0 and the CT point (ginger): ACCRED HAIR(x) grows
monotonically—e.g. linearly.
21
This penalizes acceptability of hues below the
CT point, while allowing them to be non-zero.
This captures three facts about RED HAIR. Point (i) explains why instances of HAIR
that are close enough to focal green, i.e. less red than x0, are fully unacceptable for
RED HAIR, as they are for RED. Point (ii) explains how hair instances that are red-
der than ginger (the CT point) may have lower, equal, or even greater acceptability:
the only restriction that this assumption puts on the acceptability function for the
complex expression is that it is determined compositionally from the acceptability
of its parts. Part (iii) of the acceptability function describes how points between x0
19
It is not guaranteed that such a point exists: acceptability for RED may asymptotically reach zero.
The assumption of x0 is only a convenience here.
20
The exact way to compose acceptability functions must be studied empirically, and is likely to
be quite diﬀerent from multiplication, which is only assumed here for illustration. The important
assumption is that the acceptability of for the complex concepts grows monotonically in the accept-
ability of its parts.
21
As with the case ofmultiplication above, linearity is only assumed here for illustration. The impor-
tant assumption is that the function grows monotonically.
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Fig. 7 Eﬀects of CT point on acceptability of red hair and red car: The critical typicality (CT)
point (def. (7)) is used for determining acceptability for complex concepts in two noun-adjective
constructions (def. (14))
and ginger are only mildly acceptable for RED HAIR, while letting acceptability grow
monotonically as hues move towards ginger.
In more general terms, we adopt the following rule, which deﬁnes how CT points
interact with acceptability for complex concepts.
(14) CT-induced Acceptability: Let GC be a gradable concept and let HC be a head
concept. Suppose that in the interval [0, 1], the CT point(s) for the concept GC-
HC are precisely the segment/point [x1, x2]where x1 ≤ x2. Suppose further that
x0 is a maximal point s.t. ACCGC(x0) attains a ceratin minimum, denoted min.
Thus, for every x ≤ x0, ACCGC(x) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛, and for every x > x0: ACCGC(x) >
𝑚𝑖𝑛. We deﬁne the acceptability function for the concept GC-HC as follows:
ACC
GC-HC
(x) =
⎧
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎩
min x ≤ x0
𝐥𝐢𝐧𝐞𝐚𝐫 x0 ≤ x ≤ x1
𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐧𝐭 x1 ≤ x ≤ x2
x ⋅ ACC
HC
(x) x ≥ x2
The linear part is only assumed for concreteness, and may be replaced by any other
function that grows monotonically in the acceptability for GC. The same remark
holds for the last part, where multiplication may be replaced by any other two-place
function that is upward-monotonic on both its arguments. The acceptability function
ACC
RED HAIR
(x) of the concept RED HAIR is plotted in Fig. 7a, under the linearity
assumption between x0 and the CT point, and a slight decline in acceptability (in
Lee’s experiment—from 92 to 87%) in the points higher than the CT point. In Fig. 7b,
a similar graph describes the acceptability function ACC
RED CAR
(x) of the concept
RED CAR. Here the CT point is the point for focal red, hence the acceptability function
raises linearly from the point x0 of minimal acceptability to that CT point of maximal
acceptability. The diﬀerence between the graphs in Fig. 7a, b illustrates the eﬀect of
the CT point on the acceptability for complex concepts.
22
22
The linearity approximation in Fig. 7b grossly underplays the eﬀect of the CT point in Lee’s
experiment: in fact, only 17% of the participants accepted ginger hues for RED CAR.
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Fig. 8 Eﬀects of CT point on acceptability of PINCH EACH OTHER and KNOW EACH OTHER: The
critical typicality (CT) point (def. (7)) is used for determining acceptability for complex concepts
in two reciprocal constructions (def. (14))
Let us consider another example for the application of CT-induced acceptability:
the acceptability function for pinch each other in sentence (8a). We assume that
x0=I2 is a minimum point with zero acceptability for each other, and that the critical
typicality point CT is I3.
23
As a result, we get the following acceptability function,
with two parts in its deﬁnition (since I2 and I3 are discrete points).
ACC
PINCH EACH OTHER
(x) =
{
0 x is a situation with 2 or less PINCH relations
x ⋅ ACC
PINCH
(x) x is a situation with between 3 and 6 PINCH relations
Here the acceptability of any lower point than I3 (=CT point), with 2 or less relations,
is zero (or otherwise very low, to the extent reciprocity tolerates such situations, see
Beck and von Stechow 2007; Mari 2014). Higher points than the CT, between I3
and I6, inherit their acceptability from the acceptability of reciprocity (x) and the
acceptability for the concept PINCH (which decreases with number of relations). In
Poortman et al.’s experiments this leads to equal acceptability of I3 and I6 for pinch
each other. The acceptability function for pinch each other is described in Fig. 8a.
When applying principle (14) to know each other in sentence (8b), we again use
the assumption that x0=I2 is a minimum point. However, as we saw, the CT point for
know each other is I6, hence the acceptability function that (14) generates is diﬀerent
than for pinch each other. This function is given below.
ACC
KNOW EACH OTHER
(x) =
⎧
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎩
0 x is a situation with 2 or less KNOW relations
𝐥𝐢𝐧𝐞𝐚𝐫 x is a situation with between 3 and 6 KNOW relations
1 x = I6 (i.e. 6 KNOW relations)
Here I2 and “smaller” situations are of low acceptability as with pinch each other.
However, the CT point for know each other is I6. As a result, I6 is the only point
where sentence (8b) attains maximal acceptability. In the points between I2 and I6,
the acceptability function increases monotonically. This acceptability function for
know each other is described in Fig. 8b.
23
The ﬁrst assumption is only for the sake of illustration: actually 16% of the participants in Poort-
man et al.’s experiments accepted I2 for sentences like (8a). It is likely that situations like I1 and I0
(one and zero relations) would get even lower acceptability, hence the actual x0 point is probably
I1 or I0. The second assumption on typicality is based on the clear preference in Poortman et al.’s
experiments for situations in which each agent only pinches one patient, rather than more than one.
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Fig. 9 Eﬀects of CT point on acceptability of are walking and writing/singing: The critical typi-
cality (CT) point (def. (7)) is used for determining acceptability for complex concepts in two con-
junctive plural constructions (def. (14))
The analysis of the acceptability functions for plural predicates like are walking
and writing/singing in (10a–b) is similar. For sentence (10a), we get the following
acceptability function.
ACC
DIST WALK&WRITE
(x) =
⎧
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎩
0 x is any situation between partial to full-split
(=CT point)
x ⋅ ACC
WALK & WRITE
(x) x is any situation between full-split and joint
Here the CT point is the full-split situation, where two people are walking and two are
writing. The acceptability of any lower point, with three or less active agents, is zero
or very low (to the extent that distributivity tolerates such non-maximal situations).
Higher points than the CT, between full-split and joint, inherit their acceptability
from the acceptability of distributivity (x) and the acceptability for the head con-
cept WALK&WRITE, which may stay constant or decrease a little with the size of the
intersection, but (probably) not increase. The acceptability function for the complex
concept DIST WALK&WRITE (for are walking and writing) is described in Fig. 9a.
For sentence (10a) the CT point is the joint situation, hence we get the following
acceptability function.
ACC
DIST WALK&SING
(x) =
⎧
⎪
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎪
⎩
0 x is any situation between partial to full-split
(=CT point)
𝐥𝐢𝐧𝐞𝐚𝐫 x is any situation between full-split and joint
x ⋅ ACC
WALK&SING
(x) x is the joint situation
Here the partial-split situation and “smaller” situations are of low acceptability as
with walk and write. However, the CT point is the joint situation, where plausi-
bly, both distributivity and the WALK&SING concept attain maximal acceptability.
In between these two points, the function increases monotonically. This function for
the complex concept DIST WALK&SING is described in Fig. 9b.
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8 Conclusion
This paper aimed to point out some general principles, which, if correct, should
have desired implications for theories of concept composition in linguistics and psy-
chology. It is well-accepted that truth-value judgements are systematically related to
typicality, and that this relation is important for the compositional analysis of vague-
ness with nominal expressions. However, the general implications of this point for
the analysis of compositionality are still understudied. Recent experimental work has
shown that typicality eﬀects inﬂuence the interpretation of plurals in a rather similar
way to their relations with other vague concepts. Hopefully, the explorative work in
this paper may help in improving existing theories of context and concepts, and the
way they interact in the construction of meaning for complex expressions.
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Complement Coercion as the Processing
of Aspectual Verbs: Evidence
from Self-paced Reading and fMRI
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Abstract The so-called coercion verbs have been taken to select for an event as
their complement, and to coerce an entity-denoting complement into an event as a
resolution to the predictable type mismatch. This process is reported to manifest as
additional processing cost that unpredictably has been associated with more than
one cortical recruitment locus. Recent work has challenged the traditional view
showing that the processing effect is observed only for aspectual verbs (e.g., begin)
but not psychological verbs (e.g., enjoy) (Katsika et al. 2012), and that contra the
traditional assumption aspectual verbs not only select for events but also for
entity-denoting complements (Piñango and Deo 2015). Here, we test the hypothesis
that aspectual verbs require their complement to be conceptualized as a structured
individual. These verbs encode a set of functions that allow the construal of the
structured individual as an axis along a dimension (e.g. spatial, eventive) afforded
by the complement. The processing cost associated with the composition of the
“coercion conﬁguration” (animate subject + aspectual verb + entity-denoting
complement) emerges from (A) exhaustive retrieval of the verbs’ lexical func-
tions and (B) resolution of dimension ambiguity. Results from a self-paced reading
and an fMRI experiment conﬁrm that processing aspectual-verb sentences is more
costly than psychological-verb counterparts, and that consistently with previous
ﬁndings, comprehension is associated with both a Wernicke’s area and a left
inferior frontal cortex activation. Crucially, this activation pattern tracks the nec-
essary exhaustive lexical retrieval of the functions at the verb (Wernicke’s area) and
the subsequent ambiguity resolution of the dimension at the complement (LIFG)
required for the interpretation of the aspectual-verb utterance.
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1 Introduction
1.1 The Complement Coercion Phenomenon
It has been proposed that verbs like begin and enjoy carry a selectional restriction and
must combine with an event-denoting complement (Pustejovsky 1995; Jackendoff
1997). Evidence in support of this restriction comes from the observation that even in
sentences where the complement denotes an individual of the ordinary sort, an
eventive interpretation is obtained. For instance, the sentence in (1), despite con-
taining an entity-denoting complement, the book, can be interpreted as making ref-
erence to some event involving a book with John as its agent. In (2) and (3), the
selectional restrictions of begin are satisﬁed when it combines with the gerundival
complement reading the book or an event-denoting nominal the ﬁght.
(1) John began/enjoyed the book.
(2) John began/enjoyed reading the book.
(3) John began/enjoyed the ﬁght.
This eventive interpretation associated with (1) has been interpreted in the lit-
erature as an instance of the broader phenomenon of type coercion.1 The
hypothesis is that there is a class of verbs that exclusively selects for event-denoting
complements. This selectional restriction leads to a mismatch in the semantic
representation when such verbs combine with complements denoting ordinary
individuals. This mismatch is resolved by a semantic operation called type-shifting
(Partee 1987; Partee and Rooth 1983) that coerces the semantic type of the
entity-denoting complement into the appropriate event-denoting type (see
Pylkkänen 2008 for a summary of descriptions of the hypothesis).
Experimental investigation of this phenomenon has revealed behavioral and
neurological patterns that are taken to support this linguistic analysis. Psycholin-
guistic studies, using a variety of experimental paradigms, report that combining an
entity-denoting complement with a coercion verb (John began the book) engenders
more processing cost than combining it with a non-coercion verb (John read/wrote
the book) during real-time comprehension (Baggio et al. 2010; Frisson and McElree
2008; Katsika et al. 2012; Lapata et al. 2003; McElree et al. 2001, 2006; Pickering
et al. 2005, 2006; Scheepers et al. 2004, 2008; Traxler et al. 2002, 2005). On the
neurolinguistic side, it has been found that the complement coercion effect recruits
three distinct cortical regions: Wernicke’s area (Piñango et al. 2001), ventro-medial
1The term coercion is widely used to describe diverse phenomena in which it appears that
interpretations are derived despite apparent semantic incongruity or mismatch between the com-
bining expressions. The phenomena often considered under the coercion umbrella include nominal
coercion with mass-count nominals (e.g. Pustejovsky 1995; Michaelis 2005; Wiese and Maling
2005), aspectual coercion with grammatical aspect (De Swart 1998) and aktionsart (e.g. Piñango
et al. 1999; Todorova et al. 2000, Piñango and Zurif 2001; Piñango et al. 2006, Deo and Piñango
2011), and our present focus, complement coercion with complements of certain verbs.
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prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) (Pylkkänen and McElree 2007; Pylkkänen et al. 2009),
and BA45 (Husband et al. 2011). The additional cost has been interpreted as
manifesting the type-shifting operation or the mechanism of building an eventive
representation from an entity-denoting expression (Frisson and McElree 2008: 8;
McElree et al. 2001: 22; Pickering et al. 2005: 9). The observed patterns in par-
ticular brain regions have been interpreted as evidence that these areas implement
the operations of type-shifting and coercion.
1.2 Challenges to the Type-Shifting Hypothesis
The type-shifting hypothesis is, at its core, a hypothesis about the lexical semantics
of so-called “coercion verbs” and the conceptual entities that composition involving
such verbs is sensitive to. We propose that this hypothesis as formulated faces at
least three challenges which have direct implications for how the experimental
results are interpreted.
The ﬁrst challenge has to do with the underlying linguistic pattern. For at least
aspectual verbs, the most representative subset of coercion verbs, the eventive
interpretation is not obligatory in the presence of an entity-denoting complement. In
their simple transitive uses, the context in which these verbs have been tested,
aspectual verbs do not exclusively select for eventive complements and agentive
subject-referents. Sentences (4)–(6), found in the Corpus of Contemporary Amer-
ican English (COCA), exemplify such cases. For example, there is no construal of
(4) in which the book is coerced into an event of which the new autobiographical
memoir is an agentive participant. The same is observed in (5); the sentence does
not give rise to an eventive interpretation though the “coercion verb” is followed by
an entity-denoting complement (the genealogy of the kings of England).2
(4) Although this is mostly a collection of previously published essays, it is notable
because of the new autobiographical memoir that begins the book.
(5) This image begins the genealogy of the kings of England and flows into
materials speciﬁcally written for St. Albans.
(6) This column continues the review of the new PSA Club Services Website.
2A reviewer points out that the meaning of “begin” in these cases is similar to “open up” or “be the
beginning of X,” which would not be possible in (1) John began the book, thus leading to the
possibility of two distinct uses of “begin.” On this point we observe this “open up” interpretation
of “begin” can also apply to (1), giving rise to a metonymic reading such as “The story of John
began the book.” This is what we call the constitutive interpretation of sentences involving
aspectual verbs with an animate subject. Under our proposed Structured Individual analysis, it is
one of the plausible interpretations of the sentence (in addition to the more salient eventive
interpretation paraphraseable as “John began reading the book”). So, under this view both readings
are accounted for. Details are discussed in Sect. 1.3.
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This observation has been elaborated on in Piñango and Deo (2015) who
observe that “not only is there no eventive complement (syntactically explicit or
coerced) in these examples, but the sentences themselves are aspectually stative,
and it is more accurate to say that they report conﬁgurational relations between
individuals rather than causal relations between events (p. 10).” These distributional
and interpretational patterns for the subset of aspectual verbs cast doubt on the
validity of the empirical generalization that underpins the type-shifting analysis.
The second challenge comes from distributional differences in the complements
of coercion verbs. Reporting the results of a corpus-based study, Utt et al. (2013)
found that aspectual verbs co-occur signiﬁcantly more with event-denoting nomi-
nals (such as ﬁght in (3)) than psychological verbs. They call such expressions
event-nouns and deﬁne them as nouns denoting actions, cognitive processes, or
biological processes. These ﬁndings, while not incompatible with an
event-selecting lexical semantics for coercion verbs, are rather surprising. There
should be no reason why psychological verbs, if they lexically select for
event-denoting complements, occur far less frequently with such complements than
aspectual verbs. Further, this differential frequency distribution suggests that if the
type-shifting hypothesis is correct, then the nominal complements of psychological
verbs must undergo coercion far more frequently than the nominal complements of
aspectual verbs. This asymmetry between the two classes is not naturally recon-
cilable with the uniform event-selecting lexical semantics for aspectual and psy-
chological verbs that the type-shifting hypothesis relies on.
Finally, the third challenge comes from real-time implementation of coercion.
Speciﬁcally, Katsika et al. (2012) observe that the class of coercion verbs inves-
tigated in previous studies on complement coercion was not only semantically
heterogeneous, including at least two distinctly separable subclasses—aspectual
verbs (e.g. begin, ﬁnish, start) and psychological verbs (e.g. enjoy, prefer, endure),3
they also observed that when these two subclasses were separately studied, they
exhibited distinct processing proﬁles. The coercion effect (increased cost sometime
after the complement head) was observable with the aspectual verb set and not with
the psychological verb set.4
3The full class of coercion verbs investigated (in conflated fashion) also includes verbs like master
and attempt. See Katsika et al. (2012).
4Here we note that the psychological verb set examined in coercion studies only included a small
set of possible psychological verbs guided by the V + V-ing paraphrase diagnostic: John enjoys
the book = John enjoys reading the book. Crucially, even though all psychological verbs pass the
diagnostic, the diagnostic brings out the eventive interpretation more saliently with some psy-
chological verbs (e.g. enjoy, endure) than others (e.g. love, like, hate).
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These three challenges, taken collectively, suggest that the type-shifting
hypothesis, and the lexical semantics for coercion verbs that it presupposes, is at
best, problematic. In terms of grammatical possibilities, frequency distribution, as
well as processing behavior, coercion verbs do not appear to form a uniﬁed class.5
In what follows, we present a hypothesis which on the basis of a new analysis for
aspectual verbs (Piñango and Deo 2015) captures the pattern of real-time com-
prehension of aspectual verbs observed so far and makes further testable predic-
tions; predictions which we then proceed to test from processing and neurological
perspectives.
1.3 The Structured Individual (SI) Analysis
Piñango and Deo (2015) propose that aspectual verbs lexically select for comple-
ments that are structured individuals, rather than events. This proposal is moti-
vated by the goal of offering a uniﬁed analysis for both “coercion conﬁguration”
sentences like John began the book and sentences like The chapter on global
warming began the book (similar examples were given (4)–(6), not part of the
traditional coercion set). The intuition underpinning a structured individual is an
ordinary entity that maps onto a one-dimensional directed path structure
(one-dimensional DPS) along a range of dimensions. A one-dimensional directed
path structure is deﬁned, following Krifka (1998), as a totally ordered structure
whose adjacent (non-overlapping) parts bear the precedence relation along some
dimension (temporal, spatial, eventive, etc.). For instance, one may construe an
5Two anonymous reviewers argue that these challenges do not necessarily falsify the type-shifting
analysis, as the analysis can still be maintained by restricting the coercion phenomenon to the set
of aspectual verbs and excluding psychological verbs and the remaining heterogenous set of verbs.
One reviewer speciﬁcally suggests that the type-shifting account can restrict its claims to the
combination consisting of an animate subject, an aspectual verb, and an entity-denoting object. If
thus restricted, the processing cost can be accounted for through the following two steps: Step 1:
type-shifting of the entity-denoting object, creating multiple possible eventive interpretations; and
Step 2: event ambiguity resolution involving the selection of the proper event in context. We note
two problems with this general option: First, the fundamental assumption on which the
type-shifting analysis rests, which is that coercion verbs select for eventive arguments, is not valid,
as demonstrated by examples (4–6). Without this assumption there is no motivation for type
shifting (since the claim is that this mechanism is triggered by the presence of a mismatch). Hence,
the processing cost induced by aspectual verbs (see Exp.1) remains unaccounted for as it cannot be
attributed to the type-shifting operation (Step 1). As for Step 2, previous studies have already
shown that the processing cost cannot be attributed to the selection of the right kind of event
among plausible ones. Traxler et al. (2005) report that introducing a probable event prior to the
target coercion sentence did not attenuate the cost. Also, Frisson and McElree (2008) indicate that
coercion expressions with several alternative interpretations and no dominant one were not more
taxing than expressions with a strong dominant interpretation. In their words, “one cannot reduce
the cost of coercion to the more general effects of ambiguity or competition between different
interpretations” and that the effects are “not likely to reflect costs associated with deriving an
activity for the event sense.” (Frisson and McElree 2008: 8).
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entity like a bridge, which is a three-dimensional spatial entity, as mapping onto a
line (a one-dimensional DPS) along its most salient dimension, say spatial
(Jackendoff 1992; Verkuyl and Zwarts 1992). Similarly, the text of a book may be
construed as a one-dimensional path structure along the informational dimension,
taking its chapters as the adjacent parts. More examples from the COCA are given
below further illustrating the intuition.
(7) A moving train ﬁnishes the display. (Spatial part)
(8) This January 1 begins the dawn of a new age of attainable resolution.
(Temporal part)
(9) His death begins the Revel. (Eventive part)
(10) The only adequate or appropriate response to this reality seems to be the
expression that both begins and ends the novel. (Informational part)
Following Gawron (2009) and Deo et al. (2013), Piñango and Deo (2015) call
such one dimensional DPSs in any ontological domain an “axis.” In deﬁning the
notion of a structured individual, they make reference to axes onto which individuals
are mapped. This simply means that the individual is in a homomorphic relation to an
(ontologically, conventionally, or pragmatically) given one-dimensional DPS. The
predicate axis is taken to be the set of all entities (temporal, spatial, material, or
abstract) that are one-dimensional DPSs. An axis is an element from this set.
Structured individuals are deﬁned as entities that are relatable to such axes via
homomorphic functions. The formal deﬁnition is given in (11). According to (11),
an individual x of any type τ is taken to be a structured individual relative to a
function f of any type (τ, σ) iff f(x) is an axis and f is a homomorphism from the part
structure of x to the axis f(x).
(11) ∀xτ [struct-indf⟨τ,σ⟩ (x) ↔ [axis(f(x)) ∧ ∀x′, x′′ ≤ x [x′ ≤ x′′
↔ f(x′) ≤ f(x′′)]]]
(Piñango and Deo 2015)
Aspectual verbs are analyzed as having both a presuppositional and
truth-conditional component. They carry a lexical presupposition that requires their
complement denotation to be a structured individual. Truth-conditionally, they
require the subject to map onto some privileged small subpart of the axis deter-
mined by the complement denotation. A sentence with an aspectual verb is true iff
the subject denotation is construed as a speciﬁc (e.g. initial, medial, ﬁnal) subpart of
the axis that the complement denotation is mapped to.
The sample lexical entry for begin in (12) (P & D 2015), illustrates this general
schema assumed for aspectual verbs. The function (fc) that maps the complement
denotation to the axis comes from a (lexically encoded) set of functions each
associated with a dimension. The idea encapsulated in the deﬁnition is that
aspectual verbs are sensitive to whether their complement denotation can be con-
strued in context as a structured individual, i.e. whether it is possible given con-
textual information to map it to an axis along some dimension. The contextually
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accessed function fc reflects this contextual reliance. Once the presupposition that
the complement denotes a structured individual is met, aspectual verbs require that
there be some function f’ (∃f′) such that it maps the subject denotation to a small
initial part (< small-init) of the axis given by fc(x).
6
(12) a. [[begin]] = λxτ λyσ: struct-indfc(x). ∃f′ [f′(y) < small-init fc(x)]
b. Begin(x)(y) is deﬁned iff x is a structured individual with respect to the
contextually determined function fc. If deﬁned, begin(x)(y) is true iff there is
some function f′ (possibly identical to fc) such that f′(y) is a small initial
subpart of the axis fc(x).
(Piñango and Deo 2015)
With this generalized lexical meaning, aspectual verbs are able to combine with
arguments of different semantic types to yield a range of possible interpretations.
Consider the example in (7):
(7) A moving train ﬁnishes the display. (Spatial part)
In (7), the complement (the display) is construable as a structured individual
along the spatial dimension, mapping via the spatial trace function σ to its spatial
extent—yielding an axis along the spatial dimension—the spatial extent of the
display. The sentence is true iff the spatial extent of the entity denoted by a moving
train is a small ﬁnal subpart of the axis that the display maps onto along the spatial
dimension.
The selection of the functions that map the complement denotation and the
subject denotation to the axis is constrained by both the properties of the com-
plement and context. The lexical meaning of the complement must encode infor-
mation about the possible dimensions that are relevant to understanding the concept
denoted by the complement. For instance, an expression like magazine must con-
tain information about its spatial as well as informational structure; expressions like
bridge and river must contain the information that they have a salient spatial
dimension. This information will be mined during composition with aspectual verbs
6Notice that it is not necessary that the subject denotation and the complement denotation be
mapped to the axis by the same function. The complement denotation maps to the axis by the
contextually given function fc while the function that maps the subject denotation to the axis may
be distinct from it (hence the existential quantiﬁcation over the function that associates the subject
denotation to the axis). This separation between the two functions is motivated by examples like
“A veritable lineup of our planetary neighbors begins the month of March,” where the subject
denotation is best understood as an event while the complement denotes a temporal interval. In this
case, the temporal dimension from the complement (obtained by the identity function) is mapped
to the axis, while the function that maps the subject denotation to the axis is the runtime function τ,
that maps events to their runtime. The coercion conﬁguration also maps the complement deno-
tation and the subject denotation to the eventuality axis via non-identical functions, as we describe
later in this section. See Piñango and Deo (2015) for the detailed implementation.
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(and probably in other cases as well), for determining the dimension along which
the complement is to be construed as a structured individual in a given context.
The structured individual analysis treats the meanings of sentences containing
aspectual verbs to be underdetermined, with full determination being dependent on
which dimension is chosen for interpretation in a given context. Take “The tedious
preface begins the novel” for an example. Here the complement can be concep-
tualized as a body of informational content—an axis along the informational
dimension. The tedious preface maps to its informational content and is asserted to
be a small initial subpart of the informational content of the novel. In the infor-
mational dimension, the physical form (e.g. size, number of pages) of the novel is
irrelevant. It does not matter which page the content of preface appears on; the
preface could be printed on page 5, preceded by the title page, the copyright page,
or the table of contents. Since the truth of the sentence is determined by the
informational extent of the two arguments, it is possible that the sentence is false on
the spatial interpretation, in which the preface is printed on page 5. On the other
hand, the novel can be conceptualized as a spatial entity—an axis along the spatial
dimension, in which the novel denotes a structured individual consisting of physical
pages of a particular size, with a pagination order. In the spatial dimension, the
sentence is true iff the preface is printed on the ﬁrst page of the novel. A printer
might say something like “It is weird that, instead of the half-title and the copyright
page, it is the preface that begins the novel.” In this context, no reference is made to
the informational content of the preface.
Given that entity-denoting expressions may map onto axes in multiple dimen-
sions, comprehenders must rely on the context to determine the exact function that
determines the dimension along which the axis is construed. In the context of
formatting or printing the novel, the spatial dimension will be chosen; in the context
of reading the novel, the informational dimension is more relevant, and therefore
the more salient dimension.
The “coercion” uses of aspectual verbs are naturally accommodated within this
general analysis. This conﬁguration is characterizable as one in which an aspectual
verb combines with an animate agentive argument and an entity-denoting com-
plement with the resulting reading that the animate subject referent is the agent of
some implicit dynamic eventuality. These cases are analyzed as involving functions
that map entities to the events that they are participants of—inverse thematic
functions. While thematic roles (e.g. agent, patient, theme) map events to their
participants as the actor or undergoer, inverse thematic functions are deﬁned as
functions that “map pairs of individuals and times to the smallest event that the
individual bears a participant role to at that time in a given context” (Piñango and
Deo 2015). So in an intuitive way, inverse thematic functions are ways of accessing
events via the individuals that participate in them, rather than accessing individuals
via the participant role that they bear in an event. fagi maps an individual to the
smallest event that they are the agentive participant of at the reference interval i in a
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given context. fthi maps an individual to the smallest event that they are the
patient/theme of at i in a given context.
The salient reading for a sentence like “Jane Austen began the anthology” is one
that involves an eventive dimension (Jane Austen began reading/writing/etc… the
anthology). In this case, the axis is construed as some event of which Jane Austen
and the anthology are participants. The function fc is taken to be fthi , which maps the
complement, the anthology (as a structured individual), to the smallest event of
which it is the theme at the reference time. The subject, Jane Austen, is mapped to
the smallest event of which it is the agent by the inverse thematic function fagi . The
sentence comes out true if the smallest event of which Jane Austen is an agentive
participant at a reference interval i in a given context is a small initial part of the
event of which the book is a theme participant at i. This is the agentive reading of
the sentence.
However, the sentence also has another, constitutive, and reading where the
individuals, Jane Austen, and the anthology, get mapped to an informational axis,
such that the informational content corresponding to Jane Austen is understood to
be a small initial subpart of the informational content corresponding to the
anthology. In order to achieve this interpretation, metonymy has to be applied onto
the subject, yielding an interpretation that may be paraphrased as [the work of Jane
Austen] began the anthology.
Although one reading might appear to be more salient than the other, the
agentive and constitutive readings are both possible in principle and are determined
based on context and plausibility. Thus the indeterminacy of interpretation (agen-
tive and constitutive) also extends to aspectual verb sentences in the coercion
conﬁguration.
The underspeciﬁcation of meanings for aspectual verbs in the proposed analysis
may give rise to a concern that the Structured Individual analysis may
over-generalize. Indeed, a reviewer notes that sentences like “The jogger began the
bridge” sound awkward but are, in fact, predicted to be acceptable by our analysis,
given the spatial structure of the bridge. We agree that such sentences are predicted
to be acceptable and note that, given the right context, such readings do become
available. Consider, for example, the web-attested sentences (13–14).
(13) Fred Sebolt began to get rocks for the Wagon Bridge at Liberty Falls in the
last week in August, began the bridge in September 1881. (→ began
building the bridge)
(14) So with 25 miles left my teammate and I attached and began the bridge in a
headwind. (→ began cycling across the bridge)
Here, we note that the Structured Individual analysis, in fact, constrains the
properties of the eventuality that is construed as the relevant axis in the coercion
conﬁguration. This is because the structured individual presupposition requires that
the contextually determined fs be a homomorphism from the part structure of the
complement denotation to the part structure of the axis. The axial eventuality must
therefore be one in which the part structure of the complement denotation is
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incrementally related to the course of the event—that is, the complement of begin,
ﬁnish, etc. must be interpreted as an incremental theme argument of the implicitly
construed eventuality. This is indeed the case with coercion sentences like John
began the book—which cannot make reference to an event in which the book is not
construed incrementally (such as an event of John playing with or seeing the book).
This incrementality constraint on the interpretation of the eventuality associated
with aspectual verbs in the coercion conﬁguration falls out as a natural consequence
of the lexical meanings for aspectual verbs assumed in the Structured Individual
analysis—but must be stipulated in a type-shifting semantics for these verbs.
To summarize, the Structured Individual analysis not only grounds the lexical
meanings proposed (i.e., dimension functions) on independently motivated con-
ceptual properties, it makes no assumptions about selectional restrictions with
respect to events. Therefore, under this analysis, the comprehension of aspectual
verbs requires neither a type mismatch nor the implementation of a type-shifting
operation. Instead, under this analysis, aspectual verbs combine with their com-
plements and subjects just like other transitive verbs, but their full interpretation
requires the contextual resolution of the speciﬁc dimension along which the com-
plement can be construed as a structured individual. We call this process the res-
olution of dimensional ambiguity.
The analysis leads to a hypothesis about the processing of aspectual verbs which
we term the Structured Individual (SI) hypothesis. On this hypothesis, the
observed psycho- and neuro-linguistic reflexes of complement coercion are taken to
reflect not type-shifting operations but the retrieval of the potential
dimension-functions and the ultimate dimensional resolution. This allows us to not
only maintain a uniform semantics for aspectual verbs across its uses (viz. agentive
and constitutive readings), but also captures the observation from Katsika et al.
(2012) that aspectual verbs, but not psychological verbs, engender additional cost.
Under the Structured Individual hypothesis, the processing of aspectual verbs is
implemented in real-time comprehension as follows:
(A) When readers encounter an aspectual verb, they retrieve the verb containing a
number of (lexically encoded) dimension functions. We call this process the
exhaustive activation of lexically encoded functions. These functions map
between the domain of individuals (denoted by the subject) and subparts of the
axis construed from one of the dimensions associated with the complement
denotation.
(B) In order to get a determinate interpretation for the composition of the aspectual
verb and the complement, readers must determine the dimension along which
the complement denotation should be construed as a structured individual.
This means in turn, that the parser must choose a particular function from
among those encoded in the verb. Because each complement denotation
provides multiple dimensions, the parser is faced with dimensional ambiguity;
an ambiguity that must be resolved for the sentence to be interpreted at all.
Once the function is chosen (out of the possible ones offered by the interaction
of complement and subject’s denotations), the complement can be construed
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as a structured individual along the dimension associated with that function.
This is an instance of ambiguity resolution. These two processes are
described in Schema 1.78
According to this analysis then, resolving any sentence containing an aspectual
verb requires the above two processes; processes that have been previously and
independently invoked to capture semantic composition effects: (A) exhaustive
activation of the verb’s lexical functions (e.g. Shapiro et al. 19899), and (B) reso-
lution of ambiguity created by immediate composition demands, i.e. dimension
extraction from the complement (e.g. Frazier and Rayner 199010).
Schema 1 Processing of aspectual verbs
7As Schema 1 shows, the ambiguity resolution involves deciding between the dimensions along
which the structured individual associated with the complement denotation will be construed.
Crucially, one of these dimensions can be eventive, leading to the standard coercion reading. As
Frisson and McElree (2008) have shown, the kind of ambiguity between, say, reading the
anthology versus writing the anthology, is not expected to contribute to cost.
8The lexical functions and the ontological dimensions listed here are not exhaustive. Piñango and
Deo (2015) indicate that the dimensions can be “more abstract than that of space, time, or pieces of
text.” Consider their examples (web-attested):
(i) Black starts and ends the visible spectrum.
(ii) …. the 6 neighborhoods based on social status (on a scale of 1 to 6): 1 is the poorest and the
most dangerous of the neighborhood, 4 begins the middle class….
Sentence (i) makes reference to “an ordering of electromagnetic radiation corresponding to the
visible spectrum by wavelength” and (ii), to social status.
9This study shows that verbs with more possible argument structure arrangements (dative verbs)
increased response time to the secondary lexical decision task than those with fewer possible
arrangements (transitive verbs), regardless of the context. The authors therefore suggest that all the
argument structure information of a verb must be momentarily activated during real-time
processing.
10They found that delaying the disambiguation information for sentences that contain a word with
multiple meanings increased processing cost.
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We propose here that the “coercion” cost previously observed arises from the
processing of aspectual verbs, the best represented verb class tested among the
verbs tested in the past. In addition, we hypothesize that the seemingly incongruent
neurological patterns previously associated with complement coercion, are in fact
consistent with both step (A) and step (B).
In what follows, we present the results of two experimental studies that examine
the psychological and neurological viability of the Structured Individual hypothesis
(and ultimately the Structured Individual analysis). To this end, we carry out two
experiments using self-paced reading (Exp. 1) and fMRI (Exp. 2) respectively,
along with a pretest questionnaire. Three verb types are considered: aspectual verbs
(AspectualV), psychological verbs of the enjoy-“type” (EnjoyingV) (these include
only those psychological verbs that were tested as coercion verbs in previous work
(see Katsika et al. 2012 for details)) and psychological verbs of the love-“type”
(LovingV), which have been previously claimed to involve no coercion (Puste-
jovsky 1995) and thereby serve as controls. The three conditions all contain sen-
tences with an animate subject and an entity-denoting complement.
Based on the Structured Individual hypothesis, we predict that aspectual verbs
will induce longer reading times than either type of psychological verbs in the
self-paced reading because the former involve the resolution of dimension ambi-
guity. With respect to neural correlates, we expect aspectual verbs to recruit
additional cortical areas at two positions corresponding to the two processes
mentioned above: (a) when the subject combines with an aspectual verb, where the
parser exhausts the verb’s lexical functions, and (b) when the aspectual verb
combines with the complement, where the parser must mine the complement
denotation to determine the possible dimensions along which it is construable as a
structured individual (Schema 1).
2 Pretest: Norming Questionnaire
To ensure equal acceptability of the manipulated conditions, we employed a rating
questionnaire to test the stimuli.
2.1 Method
2.1.1 Participants
Forty native speakers of American English took the questionnaire, all between the
ages of 18–30 and without reading disabilities. The data of three participants were
discarded because their responses were either undifferentiated or inconsistent.
202 Y.-Y. Lai et al.
2.1.2 Materials
We created 50 triplets; each containing the three manipulated conditions as shown in
Table 1. Aspectual verbs (AspectualV) were contrasted with psychological verbs of
the enjoy type (EnjoyingV). Note that the two are collapsed as “coercion verbs” under
the type-shifting account. We further introduced psychological verbs of the love-type
as the control condition (LovingV). Under the type-shifting hypothesis, EnjoyingV
and LovingV are taken to differ in that only the former exclusively selects for eventive
complements whereas the latter does not. From our perspective, both EnjoyingV and
LovingV are psychological verbs. We have no independent reason to say that the two
differ in terms of lexical semantics. The reason we separate them here is because the
verbs in the EnjoyingV condition have been tested in the literature as “coercion verbs”
while those included in the LovingV set have not. Part of the contribution of
Experiment 1 (Sect. 3) is to determine if there could be processing differences between
these two sets at all that could warrant two different linguistic treatments.
Aside from the 50 triplets, we introduced 150 ﬁller sentences (50 of them were
nonsensical sentences); the whole set of the stimuli amounted to 300 sentences. The
50 triplets were split into two lists, each list containing 25 triplets of the three
conditions along with half of the ﬁllers. Each list was assigned to 20 participants, and
each participant received a unique pseudo-randomization of her corresponding list.
2.1.3 Procedures
The participants were asked to rate the acceptability of each sentence on a 1–5 scale
(1 = does not make sense; 5 = makes sense) and answer a multiple-choice,
multiple-answer question probing possible interpretations.
2.2 Results
Results from the means (Table 2) show that the three conditions were within the
acceptable range.
Repeated measures Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) revealed an effect of condition
(F(2, 72) = 32.59, p < 0.001). Planned pairwise comparisons indicated that LovingV
was rated signiﬁcantly higher than both AspectualV and EnjoyingV respectively (both
Table 1 Conditions and
sample sentences
Condition Example sentences
Lady Gaga
AspectualV started
EnjoyingV preferred
LovingV loved
this CD of American pop hits.
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ps < 0.001).11 Crucially, no difference was found between the AspectualV and
EnjoyingV conditions (p > 0.05). In addition, we performed a reliability test on the
itemswithin each condition to evaluate their internal consistency. The reliability results
showed that the items used in each condition were highly reliable (Cronbach’s alpha:
AspectualV = 0.92; EnjoyingV = 0.85; LovingV = 0.72). This means that, while
each condition contained 50 items (sentences), the items within each condition were
closely related as a group, yielding similar responses.
3 Experiment 1: Self-paced Reading
We conducted a self-paced reading experiment with a moving window paradigm to
investigate the time-course of the cost underlying the processing of aspectual verbs
and psychological verbs.
3.1 Method
3.1.1 Participants
Twenty-eight native speakers of American English were recruited, all between the
ages of 18–30 and with normal vision and auditory acuity. None of them had
history of reading disabilities.
3.1.2 Materials
The materials were adapted from the pretest questionnaire. The script contained 50
triplets, each consisting of the three conditions, and 150 ﬁller sentences (among
Table 2 Results of the
sensicality rating (N = 37)
Condition Mean Standard deviation
AspectualV 4.13 0.75
EnjoyingV 4.31 0.52
LovingV 4.80 0.22
11We attribute the difference in rating scores between LovingVs in one hand, and the other two
conditions on the other hand as a difference in familiarity induced by frequency. Verbs like love,
like, dislike have higher frequencies of use in the language, which means that the participants are
more likely to have come across these verbs in a greater variety of contexts and thus building a
greater familiarity with the usage. Indeed, a closer look at the frequency distribution via Corpus of
Contemporary American English suggests that LovingVs such as loved (42630), liked (32715),
disliked (1522), hated (10900) have higher frequencies (in parentheses) than EnjoyingVs such as
enjoyed (16000), preferred (12438), favored (7637), and tolerated (2187).
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which 100 were nonsensical). Each participant saw all the 300 sentences during the
experiment. Each sentence was segmented into several windows as shown in
Table 3. Our windows of interest were the Verb, Complement head, Head+1, and
Head+2 regions.
The verbs used (and their frequencies) in the stimuli are the following: Aspec-
tualVs included start (12), begin (13), ﬁnish (12), continue (9), complete (3), end
(1). EnjoyingVs included enjoy (14), prefer (10), favor (9), tolerate (8), endure (8),
resist (1). These verbs were adopted from previous studies and have been used in
Katsika et al. (2012). LovingVs included love (13), like (12), dislike (8), hate (5),
detest (5), approve of (3), be fond of (2), disapprove of (1), respect (1). All verbs in
the three conditions were matched by reaction times from an independent lexical
decision study carried out in our lab (DiNardo, unpublished thesis). It showed no
difference in accessing times among AspectualVs (465.77 ms), EnjoyingVs
(454.46 ms), and LovingVs12 (488 ms), all ps > 0.05.
3.1.3 Procedure
The stimuli were presented in black Courier New font in the center of a computer
screen with a white background. The participants read the sentences segment by
segment at their own pace, which allowed them to fully understand the sentences’
meanings. Every trial began with a series of dash lines, with a “+” sign at the left
edge of the screen, signaling the starting point of the sentence. The participants
began by pressing the space bar, causing the ﬁrst segment to show up. With the
subsequent press, the next word appeared, and the previous segment was replaced
by a set of dashes. At the end of the sentence, they were presented a statement
probing either the content or the acceptability of the sentence just read to ensure full
comprehension. The participants responded by pressing the “Agree” or “Disagree”
key on the keyboard. A practice session was given beforehand; the participants had
to reach 80% accuracy in the comprehension task before proceeding to the real
trials.
Table 3 Example of a set of experimental sentences and segmentations
Condition Verb Complement head Head+1 Head+2
AspectualV Lady Gaga started this CD of American pop hits.
EnjoyingV Lady Gaga preferred this CD of American pop hits.
LovingV Lady Gaga loved this CD of American pop hits.
12The only item (of the LovingV condition) not included in this lexical decision study is “be fond
of,” whose length affects RTs.
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3.1.4 Data Analysis
All 28 participants recruited were taken into account in the data analysis; none was
excluded. We performed a mixed model analysis, incorporating a ﬁxed effect of
condition (3 levels: AspectualV, EnjoyingV, LovingV) and random intercepts for
subject and item. Analyses were carried out in the R statistical environment, using
the lmer function in the lme4 packages (Baayen et al. 2008; R Development Core
Team 2014). The reading time measure was evaluated by contrasting a model
including condition as the predictor against a base model without it. This contrast
shows whether there is a signiﬁcant effect of condition. For the pairwise compar-
isons, the p-values were corrected by Tukey tests, and the b values represent the
unstandardized coefﬁcients. All signiﬁcant contrasts are reported.
3.2 Results
The accuracy of the comprehension task was 95.03%. Results of the reading task
are reported in Table 4 and Fig. 1. A marginally signiﬁcant effect of condition was
found at the verb (χ2(2) = 5.475, p = 0.0647: AspectualV/EnjoyingV > LovingV)
which went away at the complement head (χ2(2) = 1.445, p = 0.486). Sustained
signiﬁcant differences appeared instead at the Head+1 and Head+2 positions.
At the Head+1 position, there was a signiﬁcant effect of condition
(χ2(2) = 14.315, p < 0.001). The pairwise comparisons indicate that AspectualV
engendered signiﬁcantly longer reading times (RTs) than EnjoyingV (b = 18.301,
p = 0.036) and LovingV (b = 27.581, p < 0.001) respectively.
The Head+2 position revealed the same pattern. A signiﬁcant effect of condition
was found (χ2(2) = 11.197, p = 0.004). The pairwise comparisons suggest that
AspectualV engendered longer RTs than both EnjoyingV (b = 27.172 p = 0.011)
and LovingV (b = 27.504, p = 0.010).
Overall, the results indicate that aspectual verbs induced longer RTs than both
the enjoy-type and the love-type of psychological verbs at the two windows fol-
lowing the complement head, while the two types of psychological verbs did not
differ from each other. These results replicate Katsika et al.’s (2012) and Utt et al.
(2013) ﬁndings, and further show that psychological verbs behave as a class in
terms of processing proﬁle. We interpret these ﬁndings as suggesting that the
unique cost observed for aspectual verbs, but not psychological verbs (EnjoyingV
Table 4 Results of reading times in millisecond (standard errors in parenthesis)
Verb Complement head Head+1 Head+2
AspectualV 553.45 (7.30) 608.01 (8.70) 502.08 (7.13) 538.99 (9.07)
EnjoyingV 556.42 (7.26) 611.64 (9.61) 483.78 (5.55) 511.82 (7.38)
LovingV 537.93 (6.58) 598.98 (9.34) 474.50 (5.28) 511.49 (7.59)
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and LovingV), is due to the speciﬁc interpretive requirements of the aspectual verb
class: the determination among multiple possibilities of the dimension (e.g. even-
tive, informational, spatial) along which the structured individual associated with
the complement denotation must be construed. Crucially, this determination is
required; failure to resolve the ambiguity leads to failure to interpret the sentence.13
4 Experiment 2: fMRI
Previous neurological studies of the complement coercion effect report activity in
three distinct brain regions: Wernicke’s area in Piñango et al. (2001) lesion study,
ventral medial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) in Pylkkänen and McElree’s (2007) MEG
study, and BA45 in Husband et al.’s (2011) fMRI experiment. Despite the dis-
crepant results, all these studies attribute the effect to type-shifting the complement
to obtain an event interpretation. Notice that these experiments are subject to the
heterogeneous stimuli problem, mixing aspectual verbs, psychological verbs, and
Fig. 1 Results of reading times (ms); error bars: ± 1 standard error of the means
13Two anonymous reviewers suggest that these results in themselves are still consistent with the
type-shifting account provided that coercion is restricted to aspectual verbs. In footnote 5 above we
pointed out one key problem with this solution. Here we also note that the failure of the EnjoyingV
condition (composed strictly by those psychological verbs previously claimed to be coercion
verbs) to behave differently from the LovingV condition represents a further argument against the
type-shifting account, since the verbs in the EnjoyingV condition but not in the LovingV condition
passed what had been proposed as the main diagnostic for coercion: participation in the [V +
V-ing] paraphrase. What the uniﬁed behavior of the psychological verbs in the SPR shows is that
this diagnostic is not restrictable to aspectual verbs (since EnjoyingVs pass it) and therefore not
adequate for the characterization of the coercion effect understood in terms of mismatch and repair
via type-shifting.
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control verbs (e.g. master, try). Yet as mentioned, recent studies (Katsika et al.
2012; Utt et al. 2013) indicate that only aspectual verbs engender additional cost.
On the other hand, the Structured Individual hypothesis accounts for the comple-
ment coercion effect as the processing of aspectual verbs. In our fMRI experiment,
we aim to investigate its neural basis, expecting to ﬁnd brain activity corresponding
to the two hypothesized processes associated with it.
4.1 Method
4.1.1 Participants
Sixteen native speakers of American English participated this study, all between the
ages of 18–30, right-handed, without reading disabilities or history of neurological
disorders. The data from one participant were excluded from the analysis due to
severe head movement.
4.1.2 Materials
The stimuli were the same as the self-paced reading experiment, with a different set
of ﬁllers. The 50 triplets and 150 ﬁllers yielded 300 sentences in total. Each par-
ticipant saw all 300 sentences.
4.1.3 Experimental Design
We used an event-related paradigm. The stimuli were visually presented
segment-by-segment as in the self-paced reading experiment, each lasting for
500 ms. For 75% of the sentences, the participants were queried with a yes/no
comprehension question, which lasted for 4000 ms. There was a 500 ms interval
between the sentence-ﬁnal word and the comprehension question following the
sentence.
The total 300 sentences were divided into 10 runs. The stimuli were
pseudo-randomized such that no successive sentences were of the same condition.
Each run contained 30 sentences and lasted 5 min 33 s with the inclusion of the
machine connection delay.14
14This included the time to connect the stimulus presentation software (E-Prime) and the MRI
scanner.
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4.1.4 Imaging Acquisition
Anatomical Measurements: The fMRI experiment was performed on a Siemens
Sonata; 3T whole body MRI scanner (Erlangen, Germany). Each session began
with a 3-plane localizer followed by a sagittal localizer, and an inversion recovery
T1 weighted scan (TE/TR = 2.61/285 ms, matrix 192 × 192, FOV = 220 mm,
flip angle = 70°, bandwidth = 501 Hz/pix, 51 slices with 2.5 mm thickness). This
acquisition was used to deﬁne the AC-PC (anterior and posterior commissure) line
for prescription of the anatomic T1 images and functional images in the following
series.
Functional measurements: During the task, we conducted event-related func-
tional MRI using gradient echo echo-planar imaging (EPI) blood oxygenation level
dependent (BOLD) contrast, with TE = 30 ms, TR = 956 ms, matrix 84 × 84,
FOV = 210 mm, flip angle = 62°, bandwidth = 2289 Hz/pixel, slice thick-
ness = 2.5 mm, with 321 measurements (images per slice). The scanner was set to
trigger the stimulus presentation program, which enabled the image acquisition to
be synchronized with the stimulus presentation.
At the end of the functional imaging, a high-resolution 3D Magnetization Pre-
pared Rapid Gradient Echo (MPRAGE) was used to acquire sagittal images for
multi-subject registration, with TE = 2.77 ms, TR = 2530 ms, acquisition
matrix 256 × 256, FOV = 256 mm, bandwidth = 179 Hz/pix, flip angle = 7°,
176 slices with slice thickness = 1 mm (the fMRI data within subjects was reg-
istered to this brain volume, which was then registered across subjects into a
common 3D brain space using the Yale BioImage Suite software package (Papa-
demetris et al. 2006).
4.1.5 fMRI Data Analysis
All data were converted from Digital Imaging and Communication in Medicine
(DICOM) format to analyze format using XMedCon (Nolfe et al. 2003). During the
conversion process, the ﬁrst 6 images at the beginning of each of the 10 functional
runs were discarded to enable the signal to achieve steady-state equilibrium
between radio frequency pulsing and relaxation, leaving 315 images per slice per
run for analysis. Functional images were motion-corrected with the Statistical
Parametric Mapping (SPM) 5 algorithm (http://www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/software/
spm5) for three translational directions (x, y or z) and three possible rotations (pitch,
yaw or roll). Trials with linear motion that had a displacement in excess of 1.5 mm
Table 5 Event segmentation in the fMRI experiment
Condition Event 1 (subject + verb) Event 2 (complement ∼ sentence-ﬁnal)
AspectualV Lady Gaga started this CD of American pop hits.
EnjoyingV Lady Gaga preferred this CD of American pop hits.
LovingV Lady Gaga loved this CD of American pop hits.
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or rotation in excess of 2° were rejected. All further analyses were performed using
BioImage Suite (http://bioimagesuite.org, Papademetris et al. 2006).
Individual subject data was analyzed using a General Linear Model (GLM) on
each voxel in the entire brain volume with regressors speciﬁc for each task. For
each of the 3 sentence types (AspectualV, EnjoyingV, LovingV) there were two
regressors for two events, as shown in Table 5. These events correspond to the two
hypothesized processes induced by aspectual verbs under the SI hypothesis. Event
1 included the onset of the subject phrase and the offset of the verb; Event 2
included the onset of the complement until the offset of the sentence-ﬁnal word. We
hypothesize that the exhaustive activation of an aspectual verb’s functions takes
place at Event 1 when readers encounter the verb and that readers attempt to
determine the dimension along which the complement is construed as a structured
individual at Event 2 while facing the dimension ambiguity in sentences with
aspectual verbs.
The resulting beta images for each task were spatially smoothed with a 6 mm
Gaussian kernel to account for variations in the location of activation across sub-
jects. The output maps were normalized beta-maps, which were in the acquired
space (2.5 mm × 2.5 mm × 2.5 mm).
To take these data into a common reference space, three registrations were
calculated within the Yale BioImage Suite software package. The ﬁrst registration
performed a linear registration between the individual subject raw functional image
and that subject’s 2D anatomical image. The 2D anatomical image was then linearly
registered to the individual’s 3D anatomical image. The 3D differs from the 2D in
that it has a 1 × 1 × 1 mm resolution whereas the 2D z-dimension is set by
slice-thickness and its x-y dimensions are set by voxel size. Finally, a non-linear
registration was computed between the individual 3D anatomical image and a
reference 3D image. The reference brain used was the Colin27 Brain (Holmes et al.
1998) in Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space (Evans et al. 1992). All three
registrations were applied sequentially to the individual normalized beta-maps to
bring all data into the common reference space.
Data were corrected for multiple comparisons by spatial extent of contiguous
suprathresholded individual voxels at an experiment-wise p < 0.05. In a Monte
Carlo simulation within the AFNI software package and using a smoothing kernel
of 6 mm and a connection radius of 4.33 mm on 2.5 mm × 2.5 mm × 2.5 mm
voxels, it was determined that an activation volume of 183 original voxels (4953
microliters) satisﬁed the p < 0.05 threshold. Clusters were created for each of the
subtractions. Each cluster was identiﬁed with a region label, and then associated
with additional numeral labels corresponding to Brodmann areas.
Table 6 Mean response
times (ms) of the
comprehension questions
Condition Mean Standard error (se)
AspectualV 1684.18 25.06
EnjoyingV 1722.11 25.08
LovingV 1651.49 24.09
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4.2 Results
4.2.1 Behavioral Results
The overall accuracy of the comprehension task was 88.6%. The response times
(RTs) for the questions are shown in Table 6. Results of repeated measures
ANOVA (trials with no response were excluded) revealed no signiﬁcant effect of
conditions in RTs (F(2, 28) = 2.786, p = 0.08).
Fig. 2 AspectualV
> EnjoyingV at Event 1
(Subject + Verb): activations
in left BA 40 (Wernicke’s
area), bilateral BA7, bilateral
BA 6/24, and bilateral
primary sensory areas
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Fig. 3 AspectualV
> LovingV at Event 2
(Complement ∼ S-ﬁnal):
activations in LIFC (BA44,
45, 47), left insula, right BA8,
bilateral BA6, right IF cortex,
and left primary visual cortex
Table 7 Summary of the results of the fMRI experiment (signiﬁcant activations)
Event 1 (subject + Verb) Event 2 (complement ∼ S-ﬁnal)
AspectualV
—
EnjoyingV
(Fig. 2)
AspectualV recruited:
• Left BA 40 (Wernicke’s area)
• Bilateral BA 7, 6, 24
• Bilateral primary sensory cortex
EnjoyingV recruited more left
BA6, 24 and their right
counterparts in upper brain.
AspectualV
—LovingV
(Fig. 3)
LovingV recruited more left posterior
occipital regions (BA7, 18, 19, part of
BA39), and right BA 44/45.
AspectualV recruited:
• LIF cortex (BA 44, 45, 47), left
insula
• Bilateral BA6, right BA8
• Left primary visual cortex
• Right inferior frontal cortex
EnjoyingV
—LovingV
LovingV recruited more right BA7 and
right BA39
EnjoyingV recruited more bilateral
BA44, 45, 47, insula, and bilateral
BA6, 8
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4.2.2 Imaging Results
The imaging results showed that, at Event 1 (Subject + Verb), AspectualV pref-
erentially recruited Wernicke’s area (BA40), bilateral BA7, 6, 24, and primary
sensory areas over EnjoyingV (Fig. 2). At Event 2 (Complement ∼ Sentence-ﬁnal),
AspectualV preferentially recruited the left inferior frontal cortex (LIFC), including
BA44, 45, 47, and left insula, as well as bilateral BA6, right BA8, right inferior
frontal cortex, and primary visual cortex over the control LovingV (Fig. 3). These
results are summarized in Tables 7, 8 and 9.
Overall, the fMRI results reveal that at Event 1 (Subject + Verb) AspectualV
shows preferential recruitment in Wernicke’s area (BA 40) over EnjoyingV (Fig. 2)
whereas at Event 2 (complement phrase), preferential recruitment for AspectualV
(over LovingV) shifts to left inferior frontal cortex (Fig. 3).
Table 8 The differentially active regions of the AspectualV—EnjoyingV at Event 1(Subject+Verb).
L = left, R = right, AntCingulate = anterior cingulate, PrimSensory = primary sensory cortex,
Prim_Motor = primary motor cortex
Region Volume
(mmA3)
Mean
T-Value
Max
T-Value
MNICoord
Max
L BA40 2168 2.52033 3.55617 −48, −27, 39
L BA7 2761 2.6424 4.39206 −30, −54, 69
Medial_BA6_AntCingulate 7735 2.53566 4.9745 −18, −6, 45
R_BA7_PrimSensory 7377 2.61813 5.71615 27, −45, 51
L PrimSensorv PrimMotor 4081 2.44217 4.02101 −60, −15, 12
Table 9 The differentially active regions of the AspectualV—LovingV at Event 2(Complement
∼S-ﬁnal) L = left, R = right, IFG = inferior frontal gyrus, AntCingulate = anterior cingulate
Region Volume
(mmA3)
Mean
T-Value
Max
T-Value
MNICoord
Max
L Insula 1473 3.28132 6.8164 −36, 18, 0
L IFG BA47 BA45 BA44 11565 2.75671 6.73777 −37, 18, 0
L lateral BA6 3718 2.83759 5.80195 −39, 9, 51
R_AntCingulate 248 2.63028 3.68964 −6, 30, 30
R IFG BA44 BA45 3135 2.57169 4.19239 60, 18, 27
R medial BA6 BA8 5647 2.70576 5.40665 15, 0, 54
R lateral BA6 BA8 1080 2.53198 5.34182 39, 12, 54
Medial BA6 AntCingulate 4958 −2.59486 −4.74066 −18, −15, 78
PrimarvVisual BA18 BA19 6148 2.54813 4.2163 −12, −63, 6
Complement Coercion 213
5 Discussion
Experiment 1 (self-paced reading) showed that the AspectualV condition engen-
dered longer reading times than psychological verbs (EnjoyingV and LovingV)
during real-time comprehension after the complement head was encountered, thus
replicating and expanding on Katsika et al.’s (2012) and Utt et al.’s (2013) ﬁndings.
These observations call into question our traditional understanding of the “com-
plement coercion” phenomenon. The fact that aspectual and psychological verbs
show not only distinct linguistic behaviors but also computationally distinct pro-
cessing proﬁles suggests that the set of “coercion verbs” studied in previous work
collapses at least two semantically distinct classes of verbs. These observations are
in principle inconsistent with the type-shifting hypothesis, which predicts pro-
cessing cost at least for those psychological verbs that fall in the coercion set—a
prediction that is not supported by the results.
In order to account for this pattern of results, we propose the Structured Indi-
vidual hypothesis (based on the Structured Individual analysis for aspectual verbs)
whereby the processing cost associated with aspectual verbs results from (A) ex-
haustively retrieving the possible functions stored in the verb, and (B) the resolution
of dimension ambiguity (e.g. spatial, temporal, informational, eventive) that is
required to interpret the complement and consequently, the full sentence. According
to this hypothesis, the dimension is identiﬁed when the complement head denoting
a structured individual is encountered and the dimension along which this structure
must be mapped onto the axis is determined.15
We already ﬁnd initial support for this general approach in previously puzzling
ﬁndings. Traxler et al. (2005) show that a prior context sentence that either con-
tained the same coercion verb or explicitly mentioned the event structure attenuated
the cost in the following target sentence.
(15) Context: The student started/read a book…
Target: Before he started/read the book…
In their eye-tracking experiment, when either “started a book” or “read a book”
is given in the context sentence, there was no difference between “started the book”
and “read the book” in the target sentences. The Structured Individual
15Crucially, the dimension ambiguity resolution engendered by aspectual verbs is distinct from
inferencing the speciﬁc activity associated with the complement in the agentive interpretation in
the eventive dimension. Indeed, Frisson and McElree (2008) argue that the complement coercion
effect is not modulated by competition or selection/retrieval of a particular event. In their
eye-movement experiment, strongly preferred coercion sentences (The teenager began the nov-
el…) did not differ from weakly preferred ones (The waitress started the coffee…). This suggests
that the coercion cost is not modulated by the preference of interpretation or the number of
different interpretations. In fact, both the strongly and weakly preferred sentences in their
experiment involve aspectual verbs and animate subjects. Under the SI hypothesis, both sentences
give rise to an ambiguity along different dimensions (e.g. informational, temporal, or eventive),
and therefore cost emerges independent of the preference, as it is observed.
214 Y.-Y. Lai et al.
(SI) hypothesis captures this naturally: because the proper interpretation among
multiple ones is contextually determined, a context sentence that biases the inter-
pretation towards a certain dimension (likely the eventive dimension in this case)
resolves the dimension ambiguity associated with aspectual verbs and therefore
attenuates the cost.
A seemingly problematic ﬁnding for the SI hypothesis is Traxler et al.’s (2002)
results. They show that, following coercion verbs (including both aspectual and
psychological), entity-denoting complements (started the puzzle) induced more
processing cost than event-denoting complements (started the ﬁght). This may seem
to go against the SI hypothesis, which states that any sentence containing aspectual
verbs (including those with eventive complements) will require both exhaustive
dimension-function retrieval and dimension-ambiguity resolution (the two potential
sources of cost). The SI hypothesis accounts for this reported difference as an
attenuation of the effect brought about by a pre-determination of the intended
dimension along which the structured individual must be construed. Recall that the
objective of interpreting AspectualV sentences is to decide the exact dimension
along which the structured individual is construed. In cases like started the ﬁght, the
event-denoting complement (“ﬁght”) determines, or strongly biases towards, the
eventive dimension along which a structured individual is construed. Because the
dimension along which the structured individual must be construed is already
determined by the eventive complement, the effort of resolving the dimension
ambiguity (process B) is decreased, thus the observable cost of the composition is
attenuated.
We focus now on Experiment 2 (fMRI), which shows that aspectual verbs
induced preferential recruitment of the left posterior superior temporo-parietal
cortex (i.e. Wernicke’s area, BA40) when readers encountered the verb and the left
inferior frontal cortex (i.e. Broca’s area) when readers encountered the complement,
over each of the psychological conditions (enjoy-type and love-type respectively).
The Structured Individual hypothesis captures these patterns as follows: At Event
1, BA40 (green circles in Fig. 2) reflects the exhaustive activation of the aspectual
verb’s dimension functions. The reason that aspectual verbs would engage this
cortical region above and beyond the engagement induced by the EnjoyingV
condition is presumably that only the former must encode discrete, pre-speciﬁed,
functions. This encoding represents a measure of complexity and therefore of cost.
This interpretation of Wernicke’s area is consistent with previous work showing not
only that it is involved in the retrieval of lexico-semantic representations (Badre
et al. 2005; Binder et al. 2009; Damasio et al. 1996; Hickok and Poeppel 2004,
2007; Humphries et al. 2007; Lau et al. 2008) but also as Shapiro et al. (1993) show
through a Broca’s versus Wernicke’s comparison, that this cortical region is
speciﬁcally involved in exhaustive retrieval of lexical items during comprehension.
The activation of the precuneus (BA 7) (pink circles in Fig. 2), which was also
preferentially recruited for AspectualV at Event 1, although not initially expected
given previous neurolinguistic work on complement coercion, is completely con-
sistent with our view of the fundamental meaning of aspectual verbs. This cortical
region is reported to support spatio-temporal tasks such as processing visual-spatial
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information in perception and memory, especially spatial representation of
sequential movements (Cavanna and Trimble 2006; Fletcher et al. 1995; Wallentin
et al. 2008). We therefore interpret the recruitment of BA7 for aspectual verbs over
psychological verbs as reflecting axial conceptualization associated with the set of
dimension functions, one of which will ultimately map the structured individual
onto an axis. The activation of BA40 and BA7 combined is correlated with di-
mension function retrieval, which in the absence of a complement is still
underdetermined. These observations are clearly grounded in the basic principles of
the SI hypothesis, and in this way support it. By contrast, they are not naturally
connectable to the type-shifting approach, which by its very nature is expected to
target only one cortical region, and cannot be naturally connected to spatial
conceptualization.
The neurological patterns discussed in the paper are those that can be clearly
interpreted in the context of the comparison between the Structured Individual
hypothesis and the Type-Shifting hypothesis. To the extent that EnjoyingV shows
different patterns from AspectualV, we interpret the results as suggesting that the
two sets of verbs do not belong to a uniﬁed class.
At Event 2, the LIF cortex and insula activations (green in Fig. 3) are taken to
reflect the process of determining the dimension along which the complement
denotation is structured. This is not an unexpected activation pattern given that the
LIF cortex has in the past been reported to support certain kinds of ambiguity
resolution (e.g. Badre et al. 2005; Krain et al. 2006; Lau et al. 2008; Rodd et al.
2010). In particular, several studies have reported that the insula is involved in
processing of time. For instance, in an fMRI study using prismatic adaptation
(PA)16, Magnani et al. (2014) had participants perform a time reproduction task, in
which they indicated the time intervals as perceived. The PA-induced rightward
aftereffect resulted in an overestimation of time intervals whereas the leftward
aftereffect resulted in an underestimation of time intervals. Their imaging results
reveal that the left anterior insula and left superior frontal gyrus showed increased
activity after versus before PA. They hence suggest that these regions are involved
in spatial manipulation of the representation of time. Connecting those results with
the ones reported here, we propose that the insula recruitment for aspectual verbs is
likely to reflect a more general kind of structural conﬁguration, more speciﬁcally
the precedence relation on the axis along some dimension, including the temporal
dimension.
For Event 2 (as for Event 1) the premotor area or the supplementary motor area
(BA6) was recruited preferentially for AspectualV (light-blue circle in Fig. 3). This
area is reported to be involved in action planning or event sequencing (e.g. Crozier
1999), action simulation, the generation of ordinally structured sequences (Stadler
et al. 2011), and the updating of spatial information (Tanaka et al. 2005).
16During PA, participants are asked to wear prismatic lenses, which shift their visual ﬁeld toward
one side of space, and to point at visual targets. Due to the prismatic lenses, the visual targets are
shifted relative to their actual locations as perceived. The participants have to adjust to the visual
twist so as to point to the visual targets precisely.
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We propose that the BA6 activation associated with the AspectualV condition
reflects the sequential action planning along the eventive dimension.
Finally, we take the activity in the visual cortex (purple in Fig. 3) to reflect
components not speciﬁcally relevant to the linguistic mechanisms in question, but
mechanisms connected to attention, generalized task difﬁculty (Chen et al. 2008;
Tan et al. 2001), or written word recognition (see review in Price, 2012). We leave
it for future research to further clarify the connection between those presumed
general processes and the speciﬁc meaning composition mechanisms discussed
here.
Our fMRI results replicate Piñango et al. (2001) and Husband et al.’s (2011)
ﬁndings. Whereas Piñango et al. (2001) report that Wernicke’s aphasics (with
damage to the left posterior superior temporo-parietal cortex) have difﬁculty
comprehending sentences involving complement coercion, Husband et al. (2011)
show that BA45 in LIF cortex (Broca’s area) is preferentially involved in the
implementation of sentences demanding complement coercion (that is, to the extent
that a large portion of their stimuli sentences used aspectual verbs). Given their
corresponding experimental designs, it was not possible in those studies to elucidate
when during the course of comprehension, these respective cortical regions were
maximally recruited. Experiment 2 presented here resolves this question by
showing that Wernicke’s area is preferentially recruited during the unfolding of the
subject + aspectual verb composition whereas LIF cortex is preferentially recruited
later in the comprehension process, once the complement head (indicating the
presence of a structured individual) is retrieved. And again, this multiplicity of
regions ﬁnds coherence in the Structured Individual hypothesis while it is left
unexplained in the type-shifting approach, which by deﬁnition requires the acti-
vation to be localized to one cortical region.
Regarding the psychological verb conditions, as we have seen, the fMRI results
show a “split” behavior such that for Event 1, only EnjoyingV shows a difference in
preferential recruitment with respect to AspectualV; and for Event 2, only LovingV
shows a difference in preferential recruitment with respect to AspectualV. We
believe that this difference in behavior is rooted in independent but potentially
interacting factors which the present results can only begin to tease apart. So, what
we offer here is a conjecture whose examination we leave for future work.
As mentioned in the Introduction section, we do not predict a linguistic differ-
ence between the EnjoyingV and LovingV conditions. Consistent with previous
proposals, verbs in both conditions are all equally expected to select for a target of
emotion (Pesetsky 1995: 55, 96; Levin 1993; Katsika et al. 2012), thus predicting
uniﬁed psycholinguistic behavior, which the self-paced reading results reported
here support.
Moreover, we note that it is only with respect to composition with the com-
plement (Event 2) that our analysis predicts preferential recruitment for aspectual
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verbs above and beyond that for the two psychological verb conditions. With
respect to composition with the subject (Event 1), our analysis in principle makes
no such prediction. The reason for this is that like aspectual verbs, psychological
verbs also select for both entity-denoting and event-denoting complements. It is
possible that this complexity in lexical encoding gives rise to comparable degree of
neurological recruitment in Wernicke’s area during lexical retrieval of the verbs.
To the extent that we found a difference at Event 1 between the AspectualV and
LovingV sets on one hand and the EnjoyingV set on the other hand (Aspec-
tualV = LovingV > EnjoyingV), we look for the cause in the interpretive biases of
this latter subset of psychological verbs. Indeed, what unites the verbs in the
EnjoyingV set is that even though they may select for entity-denoting complements,
the complement is preferentially interpreted eventively i.e. the preferential inter-
pretation of enjoy the book is as enjoy reading/writing the book.17 This contrasts
with the LovingV set in that these verbs allow for such a paraphrase, but not
necessarily preferentially. So, love the book, can be understood as love reading the
book, but does not have to be; it can also be understood as love the story in the book
(state). If this eventive bias in interpretation for EnjoyingV were to impact lexical
retrieval (by allowing the event-denoting possibility to be considered ﬁrst by the
processor), it could make the EnjoyingV set less ambiguous and therefore less
taxing on Wernicke’s area than the LovingV set. This could, in turn, result in a
greater difference between AspectualV and EnjoyingV over AspectualV and
LovingV at Event 1.
Finally, regarding Event 2, our hypothesis predicts AspectualV > {Enjoy-
ingV = LovingV}, a prediction that holds only for LovingV. In line with our
conjecture, we observe that EnjoyingV condition, constructed with an
event-selecting bias, would be tapping a similar conceptual representation as the
AspectualV set, which disambiguates along the eventive dimension.18 Both con-
ditions, AspectualV and EnjoyingV, would then recruit possibly overlapping cor-
tical regions. Importantly, this would take place during Event 2, the segment when
the decision in favor of the eventive dimension would have been made—a reading
that, crucially, is not equally salient in the LovingV condition.
All this said, what is most important for our analysis is that the traditional
coercion verb set shows a split in neurological recruitment of Wernicke’s area
(AspectualV > EnjoyingV) at Event 1. And this split is consistent with the lin-
guistic distinction proposed here.
17A closer look at their distribution of the speciﬁc experimental V + Complement in COCA
(Corpus of Contemporary American English) shows that the LovingV set appears with greater
frequency for the entity-denoting complements used in the stimuli than the EnjoyingV set (Lov-
ingV: 41; EnjoyingV: 7).
18Recall that the eventive dimension in the agentive interpretation is a salient dimension that was
tapped in the AspectualV condition.
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6 Conclusion
This study represents an implementation of the Structured Individual analysis,
working out its psychological and neurological viability in the form of the Struc-
tured Individual hypothesis; a hypothesis that captures a psycho- and neurolin-
guistic distinction between aspectual verbs and psychological verbs in a
linguistically principled manner, and invokes independently motivated processing
mechanisms to capture their behavior. Our ﬁndings suggest that the complement
coercion effect is better understood as involving the real-time composition of
aspectual verbs rather than involving a special semantic operation such as
type-shifting. In this way, this kind of hypothesis represents a manifestation of an
approach to meaning composition which connects functional application to concept
composition through lexicalization, all along grounded in fundamental principles of
conceptual structure.
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Conceptual Combination, Property
Inclusion, and the Aristotelian-Thomistic
View of Concepts
Christina L. Gagné, Thomas L. Spalding and Matthew Kostelecky
Abstract Understanding how properties are extended to combined concepts is
critical to theories of concepts. In human judgments, properties true of a noun
(ducks have webbed feet) become less true when that noun is modiﬁed (baby ducks
have webbed feet), while properties false of a noun (candles have teeth) become
less false when that noun is modiﬁed (purple candles have teeth). These modiﬁ-
cation and inverse modiﬁcation effects have been shown to be extremely robust.
Gagné and Spalding (2011, 2014b; Spalding and Gagné 2015) have argued that
these effects are driven by expectation of contrast. The current experiment shows
that, as expected, the modiﬁcation and inverse modiﬁcation effects are unaffected
by the normative force with which a property is predicated of the head noun,
supporting the expected contrast explanation. The results are discussed with respect
to an Aristotelian-Thomistic approach to concepts (Spalding and Gagné 2013).
1 Overview
The human conceptual and language systems are compositional and highly pro-
ductive. One important mechanism underlying this compositional and productive
character is nominal compounding. Nominal compounding involves the combina-
tion of two or more free morphemes to form a noun. This process can lead to the
construction of new concepts in the conceptual system and new words in the mental
lexicon. Consequently, the process provides insight into both word formation and
conceptual combination. Combined concepts are typically expressed as either
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modiﬁer-noun phrases (e.g., mountain magazine) or compound words (e.g., snow-
ball) and these linguistic expressions are among the most basic examples of lin-
guistic productivity in that they consist of the combination of two morphological
constituents. In this chapter, we provide a brief overview of some psycholinguistic
and cognitive research that identiﬁes factors that influence the processing of com-
pound words and modiﬁer-noun phrases (which are generally either noun-noun or
adjective-noun constructions). We then turn to the question of how the meanings of
these linguistic expressions are elaborated, and present recent research on property
veriﬁcation. We discuss implications of these results for human concepts research,
and end by suggesting that a view of human cognition derived from Aristotle and
Thomas Aquinas could be helpful in understanding recent research on concepts.
2 Background
Concepts can often be paraphrased by expressing an underlying implicit relation
between the concepts (flu virus is a virus that causes flu). Previous research has
found that relational information plays a central role in the processing of combined
concepts (for an overview, see Gagné and Spalding 2014a). The interpretation of
combined concepts involves selecting the appropriate relational structure, and
factors associated with the use of the relations affect the processing of the combined
concept (e.g., combined concepts that share a recently used relational structure and
a constituent are processed more easily than those that use a different relational
structure, and these effects are true of both novel and known combinations; see
Gagné and Spalding 2014a). However, such relational interpretations provide only
the gist (i.e., a paraphrase) of the combined concept’s meaning (e.g., that a dog
house is a house for dogs) and do not exhaust our knowledge of the combined
concept. Where does the rest of the meaning come from? For example, imagine that
someone hears, for the ﬁrst time, the phrase dog house and that they know the
meaning of dog and house. Now, suppose we ask this learner, do doghouses have
doorknobs? There are several interesting points to note. First, the gist interpretation
house for a dog, does not, in and of itself, give the answer to the question. Second,
the gist is not unrelated or irrelevant to answering the question. The person might
reason that because dogs do not have hands, a doorknob would not be likely.
Clearly, though, this is an inference based on the gist, not something that is
inherently true of the combination of the concepts dog and house. Third, to be more
explicit, note that dog and house could also be combined to form a gist something
like house that has a dog, and this type of doghouse would be highly likely to have
doorknobs. The key point for the current chapter is that answering the question
requires an inference about the speciﬁc combination (and gist).
Our primary research question concerns how people make judgments about
whether or not particular properties are true for a given concept. In terms of empirical
evidence, we will focus on property veriﬁcation in combined concepts, which refers
to how people determine whether a particular characteristic (e.g., “is heavy”) is true
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of a modiﬁed concept (e.g., clay machine). In addressing this question, we apply an
approach in which a relation-based interpretation of the combined concept (Gagné
and Shoben 1997; Spalding et al. 2010), along with speciﬁc knowledge about the
constituent concepts and meta-knowledge, is used in subsequent reasoning processes
to infer the content of the combined concept (Gagné and Spalding 2011, 2014b;
Spalding and Gagné 2015 ; see also Connolly et al. 2007).
We should note that this “relations and reasoning” approach contrasts with many
theories of conceptual combination, which tend to assume that the interpretation of
a combined concept is the construction of a set of properties true of the combined
concept. These properties are assumed mostly to be drawn from the constituent
concepts, with some drawn from experience with the combined concept itself (see,
e.g., the selective modiﬁcation model of Osherson and Smith 1981; Smith and
Osherson 1984; Smith et al. 1988 or schema based models such as Murphy 1988,
1990; Wisniewski 1997 or prototype combination models such as Hampton 1987,
1991). In turn, these more feature-based notions of conceptual combination tend to
assume a kind of implicit “container” metaphor of concepts (see, e.g., Laurence
and Margolis 1999, for a discussion of the container metaphor). Such theories tend
to assume that properties are contained in the concepts (or, alternatively, that the
concept just is the set of properties, or that the concept is made of the properties),
and that property veriﬁcation is, therefore, a matter of somehow inspecting the
concept to see if the property is there. A schema theory of concepts, for example,
presents the concept as the structured set of properties (i.e., the schema itself is the
concept, and the schema is made of the properties in a certain structured set of
relationships to each other). Property veriﬁcation then, is a matter of somehow
seeing whether the property is a part of the schema. The relation and reasoning
approach and the more feature-based approaches to conceptual combination
therefore treat property veriﬁcation quite differently. We should note that in this
discussion of the various models, we have grouped schema-based and
property-based theories together because both approaches assume that properties
are parts of concepts (that is, they both use a container metaphor of concepts).
However, these two approaches differ in other aspects; for example, property-based
theories were derived from propositional logic and schema-based theories were
derived from predicate calculus (see Barsalou and Hale 1993). These differences,
although important, are not relevant for the purposes of our current investigation.
Recently, a series of research projects have aimed at understanding property
veriﬁcation in combined concepts in order to evaluate competing theories of con-
ceptual combination (Connolly et al. 2007; Gagné and Spalding 2011, 2014b;
Jönsson and Hampton 2008, 2012; Hampton et al. 2011; Spalding and Gagné 2015).
The most important result of these studies has been the modiﬁcation effect: modi-
ﬁcation leads properties that are true of the head noun of the modiﬁer-noun phrase to
be less true of the modiﬁed concept (e.g., baby ducks have webbed feet is judged less
true than ducks have webbed feet) while properties clearly false of the head are
judged less false of the modiﬁed concept (e.g., purple candles have teeth is less false
than candles have teeth), despite the fact that the properties were explicitly chosen to
be unrelated to the modiﬁer that was used. Indeed, the same effects arise even when
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the modiﬁer is a non-word (e.g., chonk ducks have webbed feet), and therefore
cannot provide any conceptual content to act as the basis for the property veriﬁcation
judgment (e.g., Gagné and Spalding 2014b). Furthermore, the modiﬁcation effect
seems to be very robust over levels of typicality of properties of the head. That is,
while features highly typical of the head are generally judged more true of the
modiﬁed concept than features that are not highly typical of the head, typicality of
the property for the head does not seem to provide much resistance to the modiﬁ-
cation effect. Even very highly typical properties of the head (e.g., the property
edible for the concept lamb) show the modiﬁcation effect (e.g., Hampton et al. 2011;
Spalding and Gagné 2015). Finally, we should note that the modiﬁcation effect
appears to be quite robust over speciﬁc veriﬁcation tasks, including ratings of
likelihood of the truth of a property for a category, true/false decisions about the
property’s relation to the concept and the response times to make those decisions,
and estimates of the percentages of category members for which the property is true.
(Gagné and Spalding 2011, 2014b; see also Spalding and Gagné 2015) argue
that the modiﬁcation effect is largely due to participants’ expectation that subcat-
egories will be both similar to and dissimilar from their categories, and that this
suggests that property veriﬁcation is more a result of reasoning than of inspecting
the contents of the combined concept. Furthermore, they argue that the modiﬁcation
effect strongly suggests that properties are not transferred from constituents to the
combined concept, but that instead the properties are predicated about the combined
concept as a result of the reasoning that results from the demand for property
veriﬁcation.
Thus, we suggest that the processing of a combined concept initially involves
constructing a structural description that denotes the way in which the two con-
stituents are connected and determines the linguistic (morphological) structure in
which the lexical representations of the constituents are mapped onto particular
morphosyntactic roles. This assumption follows from linguistic theories that also
propose a structure-based approach (e.g., Allen 1980; Levi 1978; Libben 1993).
Thus, the phrase cherry pie begins as a modiﬁer-head structure in which the cherry
is mapped onto the modiﬁer role and pie is mapped onto the head role. This
linguistic information is involved in constructing a relation-based structure for the
corresponding combined concept. The phrase cherry pie corresponds to pie made
with cherries. Properties can then be inferred for this structure. This aspect of our
proposal is consistent with previous data indicating that relational structures were
available prior to properties. For example, Eliaser (1994) found that relation-based
interpretations (e.g., whale boat = boat for hunting whales) were faster than
property-based interpretations (e.g., whale boat = a big boat). Similarly, Gagné
(2000) demonstrated that it took longer to judge that a property deﬁnition was
acceptable than to judge that a relational deﬁnition was acceptable.
When inferring properties, participants use the meta-knowledge that XY’s are a
type of Y (see Bauer 1983) to determine that properties that are true of Y (i.e., of the
category) are likely to be true of the subcategory, unless there is speciﬁc infor-
mation that would suggest otherwise. However, participants also draw on
meta-knowledge that subcategories are different in some way from the category.
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Indeed, the purpose of using a combined concept rather than just the category is
usually to refer to a subcategory that is distinct from other members of the category
(e.g., Clark and Berman 1987; Downing 1977). This accounts for why previous
research (e.g., Connolly et al.2007, 2011; Gagné and Spalding2014b; Hampton et
al. 2011) has found that a property (e.g., has webbed feet) that is true of an
unmodiﬁed concept (e.g., duck) also is seen as being true of a modiﬁed concept
(e.g., baby duck) but less so. This explanation readily accounts for why a property
(e.g., has teeth) that is false of an unmodiﬁed concept (e.g., candle) is judged as
being more true of a modiﬁed concept (e.g., purple candle), as reported in a series
of experiments reported by (Spalding and Gagné 2015). Both results (for the true
and the false properties) can be explained by participants reasoning that the sub-
category is distinct in some way from the category. Interestingly, the reasoning
process appears to be more heavily dependent on meta-cognition and on pragmatic
factors than on the speciﬁc content of the concepts involved. Consequently,
content-free modiﬁers (i.e., unknown words) also produced a modiﬁcation effect
even though they had no content that could be used to assess speciﬁc similarity or
dissimilarity with the category. Finally, Spalding and Gagné (2015) argue that if
property veriﬁcation for combined concepts involves such predication following
reasoning and judgment, it is possible that such processes are also involved in all
property judgments for single concepts, not just combined concepts. This, in turn,
suggests a very different, more Aristotelian-Thomistic, approach to the relation
between property and concept, rather than the kind of implicit “container” metaphor
that is so common in current theories of concepts. In particular, in the A-T
approach, concepts are not “made of” properties and they do not “contain” prop-
erties, and so one does not verify properties by “looking inside” the concept. We
return to this point in the Discussion.
3 Current Experiment
In the current experiment, we investigate whether the modiﬁcation effect is sensitive
to the way in which a test property is initially predicated of the head. Spalding and
Gagné (2015) used a procedure in which the likelihood of an unknown property
was manipulated for a particular head concept, and participants were then asked
what percentage of the head concept’s category members had the property or they
were asked what percentage of the members of the modiﬁed concept had the
property. For example, the participants might be told, “Almost all birds have
sesamoid bones. What percent of birds/baby birds have sesamoid bones?” Using
this procedure, Spalding and Gagné found robust modiﬁcation effects: The per-
centage estimates for properties presented as true of almost all category members
were higher for the unmodiﬁed than for the modiﬁed concepts. Spalding and Gagné
also found a robust inverse modiﬁcation effect: When the property was presented as
true of almost no member of the category, the percentage estimate was lower for the
unmodiﬁed than the modiﬁed concept. Spalding and Gagné’s manipulation was
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about the likelihood of the property for the unmodiﬁed head. However, it is unclear
whether properties predicated in ways that are more normative, rather than just
about the likelihood of the property, would show the same modiﬁcation effect
(Prasada and Dillingham 2009, for example, have shown that simple statistical
likelihood does not account for all aspects of the relation of properties to concepts).
In particular, we were interested in whether properties predicated with varying
degrees of normative force would show variation in the size of the modiﬁcation
effect. Investigating this point will allow us to determine the extent to which the
inclusion of properties is affected by general meta-knowledge about the parent
category (e.g., about the category bird when reasoning about a subcategory of
birds). We chose three ways of predicating the properties. In the Bare Generic
condition, the test property was predicated generically with no modiﬁcation: birds
have property X. In the Normative condition, the test property was predicated in a
normative way: normal birds have property X. In the Typical condition, the test
property was predicated in a less normative, but frequentist way: typical birds have
property X. Thus, the Bare Generic condition should have the most normative force,
and should thus result in the highest percentage estimates. The Normative condition
relaxes the implied “every” from the generic condition, but maintains some degree
of normative force, implying that a bird lacking property X might be abnormal.
Thus, one might expect that properties predicated in this condition would have
lower percentage estimates than those predicated in the Bare Generic condition. The
Typical condition further relaxes the force of the predication, such that a bird
lacking property X might be atypical, but not abnormal. Thus, one might expect that
the properties here would have the lowest percentage estimates of all the predication
conditions. The same kinds of predictions could be made for false features (birds do
not have property X, normal birds do not have property X, typical birds do not have
property X), but with the reversed order (i.e., properties presented as generically
false would have the lowest percentage estimation, then those presented as nor-
mative, then typical). In other words, the nature of the predication could be seen as
directly affecting the strength of the property for the head concept, but without
depending on the participants’ speciﬁc conceptual knowledge.
The critical interest for the current project, however, is whether this manipulation
might affect the modiﬁcation effect itself. One might make predictions for the size
of the modiﬁcation effect that parallel the predictions for the level of veriﬁcation.
That is, one might think that there should be little or no modiﬁcation effect for the
Bare Generic predication, a somewhat larger modiﬁcation effect for the Normative
condition, and the largest modiﬁcation effect in the Typical condition. Again,
similar, but reversed effects might be predicted for the false properties, across the
predication conditions. On the other hand, given the previous work showing, for
example, that even categorical properties (e.g., lambs are mammals; Hampton et al.
2011) show a robust modiﬁcation effect, and in which the major factor affecting the
modiﬁcation effect was the expectation of contrast between the category and the
subcategory rather than the speciﬁc content of the categories (e.g., Spalding and
Gagné 2015), one might expect robust and equivalent modiﬁcation effects across all
three predication conditions.
228 C.L. Gagné et al.
3.1 Method
Materials and design. 84 head nouns were drawn from Gagné and Spalding
(2011). Unmodiﬁed (bottles) and modiﬁed nouns (safety bottles) were constructed.
An unknown predicate (i.e., a potential property of the head which the participant
was not expected to know) was associated with each noun. Three levels of nor-
mative force were chosen to manipulate the type of predication for the unmodiﬁed
noun: Bare Generic (e.g., bottles are cooled in annealing ovens), Normative (e.g.,
normal bottles are cooled in annealing ovens), Typical (e.g., typical bottles are
cooled in annealing ovens). A second set of each type of predication was created to
present the same unknown property as false of the unmodiﬁed noun (e.g., bottles
are not cooled in annealing ovens; normal bottles are not cooled in annealing
ovens; typical bottles are not cooled in annealing ovens).
The test items were questions asking what percentage of the modiﬁed or
unmodiﬁed nouns had the property (e.g., What percentage of bottles/safety bottles
are cooled in annealing ovens?). Predication type was crossed with Property
(True/False) and Modiﬁcation (Unmodiﬁed/Modiﬁed) to create a 3 × 2 × 2
design.
Participants responded using a scale with a slider that moved from 0 to 100%.
These percentage estimates were the dependent variable in the experiment. The
materials were counterbalanced such that each level of predication was tested
equally often with each modiﬁed and unmodiﬁed noun. Each participant saw each
head noun on only one trial during the experiment. Thus, each person saw 84 trials.
Participants. One hundred forty-four ﬁrst-year psychology students participated
for partial course credit. All were native English-speakers.
Procedure. The instructions included information about the unknown predicates:
“The goal of this research is to understand the conceptual system. In everyday life,
we are frequently called upon to make judgments of the likelihood of something
being true on the basis of limited information. Consider the following situation: If
you were told that mammals require biotin for hemoglobin synthesis, how likely do
you think it would be that dogs require biotin for hemoglobin synthesis? Because
some concepts are described by one word (e.g., dogs), whereas other concepts are
described by phrases (e.g., hunting dogs), in this study you will be asked to make
judgments involving both types of concepts.”
On each trial, the participants were given a statement in which an unknown
predicate was presented with an unmodiﬁed noun and participants were told to
assume that the statement was deﬁnitely true. They were then asked what per-
centage of either the unmodiﬁed or modiﬁed noun would have the property (e.g.,
What percentage of bottles/safety bottles are cooled in an annealing oven?).
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3.2 Results
The descriptive statistics for the percentage estimates are presented in Table 1. The
data were analyzed using Linear Mixed Effects models, as these allow participants
and items to be simultaneously treated as random effects (thus avoiding the “lan-
guage as ﬁxed effect fallacy”, Clark 1973), among other advantages (for discussion,
see e.g., Pinheiro and Bates 2000; Quené and van den Bergh 2004, 2008). Predi-
cation condition (Bare Generic, Normative, Typical), Property (True, False), and
Modiﬁcation (Unmodiﬁed, Modiﬁed) were entered as ﬁxed factors. Interactions
involving Predication were tested using Chi-square tests of model ﬁts, while other
effects involving only factor comparisons with two values are reported as z-scores,
based on the slopes of the predictors in the models. The analyses were conducted
using the mixed function in Stata 13.
Most critically, there is no three-way interaction among Predication, Property,
and Modiﬁcation, Chi2(2) = 3.11, p = 0.21. Thus, there is no evidence that the
modiﬁcation effect differs across the levels of Predication and Property.
Because the modiﬁcation effect is (as predicted) in opposite directions for the
true and false properties, it is easiest to understand the data by separating the data
on this factor. When considering only the true properties, there is no interaction
between Predication and Modiﬁcation, Chi2(2) = 1.99, p = 0.37, but there are
strong effects of both Modiﬁcation (z = −5.27, p < 0.001) and Predication, with
the Bare Generic condition differing from both the Normative (z = −11.0,
p < 0.001) and the Typical (z = −11.1, p < 0.001) conditions. There is no evi-
dence that the modiﬁcation effect is sensitive to Predication type.
When considering only the false properties, there is again no interaction between
Predication and Modiﬁcation, Chi2(2) = 1.75, p = 0.42, but there are strong effects
of both Modiﬁcation (z = 3.08, p < 0.002) and Predication, with the Bare Generic
condition differing from both the Normative (z = 12.0, p < 0.001) and the Typical
(z = 13.0, p < 0.001) conditions. As was the case for the true properties, there is no
evidence that the modiﬁcation effect is sensitive to Predication type.
Finally, it is perhaps important to note speciﬁcally that there are robust modi-
ﬁcation effects in the Bare Generic condition, for both true (z = −6.49, p < 0.001)
and false (z = 4.44, p < 0.001) properties. Thus, although the Bare Generic con-
dition has numerically slightly smaller modiﬁcation effects, there is no statistical
Table 1 Mean
(SE) estimations of the
percent of category members
having the test property by
property type, predication
type, and modiﬁcation
Condition Bare generic Normative Typical
True: percent estimation
(SE)
Unmodiﬁed 96.7 (0.41) 88.2 (0.52) 88.3 (0.47)
Modiﬁed 92.6 (0.61) 83.3 (0.82) 82.7 (0.83)
False: percent estimation
(SE)
Unmodiﬁed 2.1 (0.34) 13.1 (0.66) 12.3 (0.61)
Modiﬁed 4.7 (0.52) 16.3 (0.81) 16.5 (0.79)
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evidence that those effects differ from the modiﬁcation effects in either the Nor-
mative or Typical condition, and there is evidence for a very robust modiﬁcation
effect, even in the Bare Generic condition.
4 Discussion
The results indicate that the type of predication does matter for property veriﬁca-
tion, with the Bare Generic form of predication having the highest percentage
estimates for the true properties and the lowest for the false properties. This sug-
gests that participants were treating these statements as being the most canonical in
that the statements were conveying information that most members of that category
share. Indeed, the Bare Generic condition percentage estimates in the current
experiment are very similar to those obtained by (Spalding and Gagné 2015,
Experiment 2) when they told participants that “almost all” members of the head
noun category had the property and then asked participants to estimate percentages.
The task used in Spalding and Gagné was identical to the one in the current
experiment, except that the likelihood of the property being true of the category was
manipulated by using Almost all, Some, and Almost No, suggesting that the Bare
Generic predication encourages a reading that is similar to “almost all”, at least in
the context of the other predication types. However, the Normative and Typical
types of predication did not differ from each other, for either true or false properties.
This suggests that participants were treating both the “normal” and “typical”
statements as linguistic hedges, rather than as applying differing normative force (as
was the case for the Bare Generic form). Indeed, it might be the case that these
conditions simply reminded the participants that there are many abnormal and
atypical members of most categories, thus lowering the overall likelihood of the
property. Thus, it appears that information provided by the type of predication
(Bare Generic, Normative, and Typical) is used to provide a starting point for what
percentage of category members are expected to have a given property.
Although the type of predication affected the percentage estimates strongly, it
had no impact on the modiﬁcation effect itself (as indicated by the lack of inter-
action). Thus, as with high levels of typicality or centrality (Hampton et al. 2011;
Spalding and Gagné 2015), presenting the property as generically true (or false) of
the unmodiﬁed head does not provide any resistance to the modiﬁcation effect,
relative to presenting it as normally or typically true (or false). For example, in
Hampton et al. (2011), the modiﬁcation effect was the same for statements with
mutable properties (e.g., lambs are white versus baby lambs are white) and
immutable (or central) properties (e.g., lambs are warm blooded versus baby lambs
are warm blooded). Interestingly, in the current data, despite the fact that the
normative and typical framings of the predications resulted in much lower (higher
for false properties) percentage estimates, this did not seem to make those condi-
tions any more susceptible to the modiﬁcation effect than the bare generic condi-
tion, as one might expect if those conditions simply made the participants think that
Property Inclusion, and the Aristotelian-Thomistic View 231
the categories were more variable with respect to those properties. This result (as
well as the lack of interaction in terms of mutable versus immutable properties
observed in previous studies) is consistent with the view that the modiﬁcation effect
is primarily due to participants’ expectations of partial contrast between categories
and subcategories (Gagné and Spalding 2011, 2014b; Spalding and Gagné 2015).
That is, because those true properties are still estimated at about 85% for the
unmodiﬁed head (and false properties at about 15%), they drive an expectation of
contrast when the noun is modiﬁed, but no more nor less of an expectation of
contrast than the bare generic condition. To further illustrate, it appears that
inferential processing is drawing more heavily on meta-knowledge about the
function of modiﬁcation rather than on content-speciﬁc knowledge about the par-
ticular properties and concepts, and consequently, for true properties, participants
reduce the estimate for modiﬁed concepts relative to unmodiﬁed concepts due to the
expectation that subcategories differ in some way from categories. An estimate
about any statement that has the form XY has property P is reduced (for true
properties) or increased (for false properties) relative to statements of the form Y
has property P. As discussed in the previous paragraph, the starting estimate (i.e.,
the estimate for the unmodiﬁed concept) can differ depending on the form of the
prediction, but the size of the increase or reduction is independent of this starting
estimate.
To give a concrete example, when participants are told that bottles are cooled in
annealing ovens, they assume that most members of the bottle category have that
property. They draw on this information and the meta-knowledge that an XY tends
to have the same properties as a Y when estimating what percentage of safety
bottles have that property to initially consider a relatively high percentage. This
estimate is then lowered because participants also use the meta-knowledge that
subcategory members are distinct, in some way, from the category. Interestingly,
even though there is nothing inherent in the content of the modiﬁer to conflict with
that property (just as there is nothing in the content of baby that would prevent a
baby lamb from being warm-blooded), the bias towards viewing categories and
subcategories as partially contrastive led to the lowering of the estimate of a
property that was previously said to be true of the category. The application of this
same bias explains why participants increase the estimate for a property that is said
to be false of the category; the property that is not true of most members of the
category is seen as the basis of the difference between the subcategory and category
and, thus, subcategory members are thought to be more likely to hold this property.
One might expect, on this view, that there should be an interaction of modiﬁ-
cation with predication type, such that the modiﬁcation effect would be larger as the
likelihood of the property for the head goes down (Hampton, personal communi-
cation). That is, in the limiting case, if 100% of the category has the property, then
100% of the subcategory should have it, and as one moves away from the 100%
mark for the category as a whole, then there is more “room” for the subcategory to
contrast with the category (while allowing the percentages to still work out from a
mathematical perspective). Two considerations argue against this, however. First, it
is highly unlikely that the participants are calibrating their estimates this ﬁnely;
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instead they seem to simply apply a more or less equivalent level of adjustment of
likelihood in all cases. Also, of course, it is known that people are not particularly
good about making sure that probabilities or percentages “add up” properly (see,
e.g., Jönsson and Hampton 2006). Second, even if they were calibrating their
estimates this ﬁnely, there is another effect that would seem to be a countervailing
force: (Spalding and Gagné 2015) found that when the property was not true
enough of the head category, then there was no modiﬁcation effect. In short, the
expectation of contrast depends on there being an initial expectation that the
property either is or is not true of the unmodiﬁed concept. When participants were
told that some X’s have property P, there was no modiﬁcation effect (nor was there
an inverse modiﬁcation effect). Generally, of course, the existence of both the
modiﬁcation effect and its inverse assumes that at some level of likelihood, there is
a reversal of contrast expectation, and hence there are probably some levels of
likelihood where there is no effect. In other words, as likelihood of a property
decreases towards 50% or so, the modiﬁcation effect goes away, and then
re-emerges as an inverse modiﬁcation effect as the likelihood of the property moves
further toward 0%. Thus, even if participants were trying diligently to make their
percentages add up properly, we should be unlikely to see the kind of interaction
suggested above, as this change to expected contrast works in opposition to the
interaction described in the earlier part of this paragraph.
4.1 The Aristotelian-Thomistic Approach
As suggested by Gagné and Spalding (2011,2014b) and Spalding and Gagné
(2015), the effect of expected contrast on the modiﬁcation effect suggests a very
different kind of property veriﬁcation process than that envisaged in other research
on this topic (Connolly et al. 2007; Jönsson and Hampton 2008, 2012; Hampton et
al. 2011). In particular, the results suggest that conceptual combination does not
consist of the merging and evaluation of properties of the constituent concepts as
the mechanism for creating new concepts. That is, the creation of the concept farm
dog does not appear to consist of accessing properties of farm and of dog and then
building the concept farm dog from these properties. If this were the case, then it is
difﬁcult to explain the pattern of results observed in the current experiment and in
previously published work on the same topic (such as Spalding and Gagné 2015,
which also reports an inverse modiﬁcation effect for false properties, such as
(purple) candles have teeth). In particular, it is more difﬁcult to understand why
properties that were explicitly said to be not true of the category would be added to
the subcategory. Furthermore, it strongly suggests that the process of conceptual
combination is not a process of mechanically transferring properties from con-
stituent concepts to the newly combined concept, but instead reflects reasoning at
the point of decision (for other arguments against such a property transference
mechanism, see Connolly et al. 2007; Fodor 1994, 1998, 2001; Fodor and Lepore
1993, 1996). Indeed, these results are difﬁcult to explain using feature-based
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theories of conceptual combination. This is particularly true for the false properties,
which would have no reason to arise in the combined concept’s representation
under any of the theories of conceptual combination. The modiﬁcation effect also
suggests that property veriﬁcation is not a matter of looking into the concept to see
if the property is there. Now, as Spalding and Gagné point out, if one does not do
property veriﬁcation by inspecting the contents of the combined concept, perhaps
one also does not make property decisions about any concept by inspecting the
contents of the concept. How, then, does one make such decisions?
We believe that the current results, and the previous results of research on the
modiﬁcation effect, point to the need for an alternative framework, based on the
incorporation of reasoning processes and meta-knowledge about the role of mod-
iﬁcation in human communication, that could be used in forming and testing
psychological theories of concepts and conceptual combination, and in particular
theories of the relationship between properties and concepts. Surprisingly, there is
relatively little modern research speciﬁcally into the relationship between properties
and concepts (see, e.g., Laurence and Margolis 1999). Historically, however, the
relation between properties and concepts has been investigated in great detail in
philosophy, particularly in the work of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. (Spalding
and Gagné 2013) have argued that the Aristotelian-Thomistic (A-T) view of con-
cepts might have much to tell us about concepts (see also Spalding and Gagné
2015). They showed that the A-T view is not the same as the modern “classical”
view, which was (correctly) ruled out by concepts research in the 1970s and 1980s,
and discussed several aspects of modern concepts research that ﬁt surprisingly well
with the A-T understanding of concepts. Therefore, we end this chapter with a
description of properties and concepts in the A-T view, and the suggestion that
taking this philosophical view of concepts seriously could have real beneﬁts for
research in the psychology of concepts, and particularly for our understanding of
the relationship between properties and concepts.
To begin, it is important to realize that thinkers in the A-T tradition have thought
deeply about properties and concepts and about how one reasons about things in the
world, and have made many distinctions at levels of granularity that are far ﬁner
than those in modern concepts research. Also, it should be noted that making
judgments about properties is not limited, in the A-T view, to philosophy of con-
cepts, but also explicitly involves the philosophical domains of logic and reasoning.
The discussion here is necessarily brief and introductory, but there is much serious
discussion of A-T thinking on properties (see, e.g., Reynolds 2001; Wippel 2000,
Part 2), concepts (for an overview, see, e.g., Mercier 1950a) and in the related
judgments people make (see, e.g., Mercier 1950b). Indeed, some of the terminology
in common modern use is taken from this tradition, though having lost much of its
technical meaning in the transition. Property is perhaps the most obvious case.
Property in modern usage is a part of the concept, and as such is a representation of
any characteristic believed to be associated with members of the category denoted
by the concept. Property in the A-T tradition is quite different. First, property is a
shorthand for proper accident, and a proper accident always inheres in things in the
world, not in concepts. Accidents contrast with substances. Substances, to a ﬁrst
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approximation, are things that exist in themselves, while accidents are things that
exist in or ‘inhere in’ substances. Thus, neither substances nor accidents (including
proper accidents) primarily exist in representations because accidents inhere in
substances and substances are found in the real world. Furthermore, proper acci-
dents contrast with other kinds of accidents, in that proper accidents “flow from” the
essence of the substance in which they inhere, while other kinds of accidents do not
flow from the essence of the substance. For example, having two eyes flows from
the essence of being human, but having brown hair does not. Note that being
necessary, in this sense, does not mean that every existing human must have two
eyes, or that a human who loses an eye becomes non-human, but rather that it is in
the nature of the human to have two eyes, and that a failure to have two eyes is a
deprivation of the normal property flowing from the essence. Such deprivations are
well-known and well-explained by the A-T view (see Spalding and Gagné 2013,
for more discussion and comparison to the so-called classical view of concepts).
Thus, properties, in the A-T view, are not parts of concepts. Instead, they are
characteristics of things in the world, though one may have a concept of a given
property, of course. Properties can be predicated of primary substances (e.g., wings
can be predicated of individual birds in the world), or of secondary substances (i.e.,
wings might also be predicated of a universal such as birds). Also, such predica-
tions can be remembered and become habitual, because we have understood how
wings and birds relate. Hence, one need not consciously think through the rela-
tionship of wings and birds anew every time. Importantly, though, it is the act of
predicating wings of birds that becomes habitual. Thus, it is not the case that wings
must become part of the concept bird, even when the predication happens habit-
ually (i.e., in the A-T view, it is not necessary to turn to a conceptual container
approach to account for the predication).
A second important characteristic of A-T thinking about concepts and properties
is that, unlike most thinking about concepts since at least Locke, the concept is not
the thing that the mind considers when it thinks about something. Rather, the thing
is what the mind considers, while the concept is simply what allows the mind to
think about the thing. One thinks about the external object via the concept, rather
than thinking terminating in or being directed toward the concept itself. Of course,
the mind can reflexively think about a concept—I can consider my own concept of
bird and reflect upon what it is to have a concept at all, but that is not what I do
when I think about birds; note that this distinction is rather hard to keep clear under
a Lockean approach, where to think about birds just is to activate the concept bird,
and thinking about the concept bird is also to activate the concept bird. Relatedly,
thinking, in the A-T tradition, is sometimes said to involve representations, but this
is not quite correct, in modern terms. Instead, thinking in the A-T tradition involves
re-presentations of the thing to the mind, of the mind re-presenting the thing
internally. Thus, re-presentation (in the verb sense) is primary in the A-T view,
whereas a representation (in the noun sense) is primary in modern theories. In the
A-T view, representation of a thing is an event, an action undertaken by a cognizer
through which a thing is known, not typically a thing known in itself. Although this
distinction may seem picayune, it is important to note that the early modern (and
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continuing) difﬁculties with radical skepticism and the “problem of the bridge”
derive from the claim that the ideas are what the mind grasps—If the mind grasps
ideas, how do we bridge from the ideas to the world? What becomes a fundamental
problem for many modern accounts of knowledge is simply not an issue on the A-T
view of knowledge, since in this account the mind grasps the thing through the
concept (or, stated differently, the thing is re-presented through the concept) rather
than grasping the concept itself. For Aristotle and, especially, Thomas Aquinas, the
mind mirrors or re-presents the external world in a basically reliable way (Feser
2009, pp. 145–149, provides a clear discussion of this point; for a more detailed
treatment, see Perler 2001).
A third important characteristic of the A-T view of concepts and properties is
that all thinking involves the use of sensory information. In the A-T view, any
judgment about a thing, for example, involves not only the concept of the thing, but
the phantasm, the sensory information associated with the actual things that the
concept is “of”. There is, following a famous dictum of Aristotle, no thinking
without a phantasm. This necessary involvement of the phantasm is important
because it means that there is a constant, fundamental, and completely thorough-
going recourse to the senses for any thought whatsoever. The A-T view has a long
history of carefully considering how exactly sensory and intellectual information
relate and interact in thinking. This history could be very helpful in understanding
some of the recent work on embodied concepts and perceptual symbol systems
(e.g., Barsalou 1999). Indeed, notions such as the re-enactment of conceptual
content via simulation (e.g., Barsalou 2009, p. 1282) accord extremely well with the
A-T notion of re-presentation (verb) as opposed to representation (noun). Similarly,
the way that (Wu and Barsalou 2009) describe the process of generating features
from simulations is very similar to how the A-T view would describe the process of
predicating properties via the phantasms (which are also multi-modal and
sensory-based). Furthermore, the A-T approach incorporates the imagination, a
power of manipulating phantasms, such that sensory information can be retrieved,
manipulated, and re-combined in novel ways, as well as common sense (here a
technical A-T term), which combines sensory information from multiple sensory
modalities. Finally, conceptual thinking in the A-T view involves the intellect,
which is the power called upon in formal reasoning, abstract concept formation,
mathematics, and other such tasks, as well as a power that can direct the imagi-
nation and access the phantasms. Thus, when a person thinks about concepts and
properties, all of these various powers come into play.
A fourth important characteristic of the A-T view is that properties (or features)
are not more fundamental than substances. Rather, substances are more funda-
mental than properties, because we say or ‘predicate’ properties of substances and
not the other way round. For example, we predicate ‘rational’ of ‘Socrates’ and not
‘Socrates’ of ‘rational’. We would never claim that ‘Rational is Socrates,’ though
the obverse clearly obtains, namely ‘Socrates is rational.’ The property (rationality)
is predicated of the substance (Socrates). Moreover, we never predicate one sub-
stance of another. For instance, we cannot predicate Socrates of Plato in the fol-
lowing judgment: Plato is Socrates. Instead, we predicate various accidents of
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substances and these accidents or features are seen to inhere in the substance. This
contrasts markedly from most modern views, in which concepts consist of prop-
erties. That is, the concept is made of or just is the set of properties. Thus, the
properties are more basic than the concept, which has several interesting conse-
quences. One is that if this general view were true, one would expect that cate-
gorization would be a matter of identifying the properties of a thing and then using
those properties to determine whether this thing is in the category. Indeed, as a
general description, this is basically how categorization is understood in most
modern theories. However, this implies that the properties should be identiﬁed prior
to the category. Thus, before one grasps that the thing they are looking at is a bird,
they should already have grasped that they are seeing a beak and feathers and
wings, etc. Note that it is not that they are seeing visual information that can be
interpreted in these ways, but literally that they are grasping those conceptual
features. A second implication of this approach is that there should be a clear and
simple linkage from the extraction of simple visual features to simple conceptual
features to the concept. In short, we should have no discontinuity between research
on object recognition and research on concepts and categorization. Yet, research on
object recognition rarely uses conceptual features, while research on concepts and
categorization assumes conceptual features and rarely even posits the exact con-
nection to the simple visual (or, for that matter, other sensory) features.
Finally, it is important to understand that the A-T view of concepts and prop-
erties is embedded within a very complicated and intricate understanding of not
only the mind, but of the physical world. Thus, for example, the A-T way of
thinking about essences, properties, and concepts derives not from what is con-
venient for philosophy of mind, but from prior metaphysical commitments about
the physical world and how the mind is seen to function (fairly reliably) as a part of
that world. That is to say, the A-T approach to accounting for physical change
through terms like actuality/potentiality and form/matter serves as the basis for A-T
cognitive theory, and this cognitive theory is, in turn, a further speciﬁcation of those
basic metaphysical commitments. An immediate and obvious beneﬁt of this
approach, say advocates of A-T cognitive theory, is that it is completely consistent
across differing levels of cognitive and metaphysical explanation, from how
intellectual concept formation occurs, to other sorts of cognition, to an explanation
of the constitution of physical things (including humans), and even to the processes
of change as such (e.g., Feser 2014) because it is all part of a general and consistent
view of the world.
What is surprising about this is how well the philosophy of mind inherent in the
A-T approach ﬁts modern evidence about the mind. (Spalding and Gagné 2013), for
example, discuss how the A-T approach ﬁts well with a wide variety of evidence
drawn from modern psychological research on concepts, including evidence for
prototypes and exemplars, as well as work on generics and essentialism, the relation
between human and non-human animals’ abilities to deal with categories, and other
recent research topics in concepts. We should also note here that (Prasada and
Dillingham’s 2009) notion of K-properties (i.e., properties that are indicative of a
kind of thing) is explicitly Aristotelian, though they do not explicitly make use of
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the rest of the A-T approach to cognition. Pustejovsky (1995) incorporates a version
of the four Aristotelian causes in his “qualia” structure for lexical items. Nor should
we think of the A-T view as being relevant only to the study of concepts or
language. Feser (2014) provides a broader discussion of the A-T approach as an
appropriate underpinning for science in general, both in the sense that its view of
human cognition provides a proper underpinning for the human activity of doing
science and in the sense that its metaphysical commitments provide a proper
underpinning for science considered as a set of propositions about the world.
Indeed, the A-T view may well provide at least as good a philosophy of mind as we
can ﬁnd in modern and contemporary approaches (see e.g., Madden 2013; see also
Spaldingetal. 2014). At the very least, the consistency between cognitive theory and
metaphysical commitments in the A-T view presents a picture that contrasts sharply
with modern psychology and philosophy of mind, where there seem to be
extraordinarily deep and intractable problems in consistently linking down to
metaphysics (Madden 2013, for example, discusses many problems with the rela-
tions between modern philosophy of mind and modern metaphysical approaches;
see also Feser 2006, 2008, 2009).
4.2 Applying the A-T View to the Modiﬁcation Effect
The applicability of the A-T view to cognitive science is seen acutely in what we
have been discussing throughout this article: property veriﬁcation judgments and
subsequent modiﬁcations made to those judgments. To show this applicability, it is
perhaps best to begin with a general explanation of how a property veriﬁcation
judgment is made (in its strictest sense) on the A-T view (i.e., through what
Aristotle and Aquinas call episteme or scientia, respectively), and then present how
the same approach might account for the sort of property veriﬁcation results
encountered in our experiment.
On the A-T view, property veriﬁcation in its strictest sense occurs in virtue of
understanding how a given property is explanatorily useful in knowing the nature of
the thing in which the property is found. In other words, in the A-T view, to do
property veriﬁcation is to verify that a characteristic is, in fact, a property of the
thing (i.e., that it is a characteristic that flows from the essence of the thing). To put
the matter concretely, we can ask, ‘How does one decide whether birds have
wings?’ but with the understanding that we are actually asking how one decides
whether wings is a proper accident (flowing from the essence) of bird. On the A-T
view, property veriﬁcation in this strict sense will occur when we understand why
the property regularly occurs in the kind of thing of which we are predicating the
property. Note that in the A-T view, much of what we “know” about the world,
even though a reliable guide for action, etc., is not actually known in the strict sense
of episteme or scientia. We return to this point below.
Now, as we have pointed out above, judgments are not made by looking in the
concept to see if there is a property there, but rather through a judgment about the
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thing to be known (thus, the distinction between a concept as what the mind grasps
vs. that by which the mind grasps the thing to be known, is quite critical to a proper
understanding of how property judgments are made). In the A-T view, our
knowledge begins in a confused and indeterminate manner and grows more speciﬁc
as we encounter a thing regularly (if we choose to try to understand). As we
regularly encounter birds, we may notice wings, beaks, feathers, etc., and notice
that other animals for which we have reﬁned concepts do not have these charac-
teristics. We do not yet know what these characteristics are, nor what they are for,
but they may make the object of inquiry stand out with respect to other animals.
Perhaps after further inquiry we come to see what these features are for and notice
that many or even all birds that we have encountered have these features. Once we
have this knowledge (i.e., what these features are for and a wide, perhaps, universal
distribution), wings, beaks, and feathers will become part of the causal story of
birds, and we can understand why birds have wings (even, with much inquiry,
flightless birds). At this point, we have recognized and predicated a proper accident,
a property that we think falls to all birds because we see that the nature of ‘bird’ is at
least partially, but essentially, explained by the property ‘wing’. We thus engage in
a process of developing more precise knowledge as we become more familiar with
a given object. Ultimately, in the A-T view, this process can (but does not always)
result in a deﬁnition, in which the thing can be deﬁned, in terms of its nature, via its
genus and speciﬁc difference (such that the human being can be deﬁned as a type of
animal, speciﬁcally a rational animal; note that genus and species are used here as
technical terms, but not in their modern biological technical senses).
How, then, would the A-T view explain the sort of property veriﬁcation that we
tested in our experiment, where we are clearly not asking for property veriﬁcation in
the strictest A-T sense? That is, how does one, on the A-T view, account for the
judgment that ‘birds have sesamoid bones,’ and, more pressingly, then account for a
modiﬁcation effect when test subjects were told to apply ‘sesamoid bones’ to a
newly combined concept, like ‘baby bird’? These examples clearly differ from the
property veriﬁcation in the strict sense described above, and for at least two reasons:
ﬁrst, our test subjects do not know the meaning of the predicate (in this case,
‘sesamoid bones’), whereas by the end of investigation the inquirer, by deﬁnition,
knows what the predicate means in what is described above. Second, A-T property
veriﬁcation in the strict sense is meant to result in a ‘categorical’ judgment, like ‘All
birds have wings,’ which applies universally to all things in the relevant category
(note, however, our comments above that terms such as “universal” or “necessary”
do not actually mean that every existing example will have the properties—there is
still the issue of deprivation of such properties—rather it means that such properties
are seen to flow from the essence). By contrast, in our experiment, our test subjects
are operating on distinctions of ‘generic’, ‘normal’, and ‘typical’, none of which
claims that the property universally applies. With those differences in mind, we
think that the A-T approach to cognitive theory is consistent with our empirical
results regarding reasoning about combined concepts.
An essential part of this story is to account for how and why reason functions as
it does when applied to combined concepts, which plays to the strengths of the A-T
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view. While the A-T view of cognition has a robust (proposed) philosophical
description of the mechanics of cognition (see, e.g., Brennan 1941; Kostelecky
2014), from how sensory data is initially perceived in a phantasm to an intellectual
judgment about the thing, it does not rest solely on those mechanics. Instead, there
are different sorts of knowledge and different kinds of inquiry that supervene on the
process that results in the conceptualization of the thing. The ‘highest’ form of
knowledge (‘highest’ because it is most certain) is simply ‘understanding’. In this
form of knowledge, one’s assent is forced, as it were, and there is no process of
reasoning required for assent. A classic example is ‘A whole cannot be smaller than
one of its parts.’ If I have understood the terms at play, I cannot force myself to
assent otherwise, since it is impossible to conceive of a whole being smaller than
one of its parts, and, importantly, the truth of the statement is immediately apparent;
reasoning and inquiry do not occur. Below this sort of knowledge is ‘science’,
which is the so-called strict sense of property veriﬁcation discussed above. ‘Sci-
ence’ deals in necessary knowledge, with conclusions that cannot be otherwise than
they are, but reasoning is clearly employed because ‘science’ follows the pattern of
a demonstrative syllogism. For example, if I know that all humans are rational and
that all Greeks are human, I know that all Greeks are rational.
Below this sort of inquiry is ‘dialectics’, which also makes claims that are meant
to be universal, but the premises are only taken as likely true, because the premises
are acquired or accepted from “the received opinion of the wise and the many”
(Aristotle, Topics I). This basic aspect of dialectics dovetails nicely with how our
research participants received their knowledge that ‘bottles are cooled in annealing
ovens’ or that ‘birds have sesamoid bones.’ We told them, and they took this
received opinion as true. Nevertheless, on the A-T view they neither ‘understand’
the proposition nor have an account of the ‘reason why’ the proposition is true. It is,
at best, ‘probable knowledge’ (i.e., what Aristotle claims is the product of dialec-
tics). Yet, nearly all our participants assented that these properties were true of the
head, as can be expected given that we (“the wise and the many”, at least in the
context of our experiment!) asserted the truth of these propositions.
As we modiﬁed the concept, a modiﬁcation effect comes into play, and fewer
subjects assent to the proposition involving the modiﬁed concept. This can be
accounted for by way of the relationship between reasoning and assenting to a
proposition, because assent, for Thomas Aquinas (he discusses issues of assent
directly, whereas Aristotle does not treat it as precisely), occurs more ﬁrmly and
immediately if the premises themselves are more certainly known. If the premises
are not ﬁrmly known, more reasoning is required to get to the point of assent (see
Thomas’ Disputed Questions on Truth, q. 14, art.1). Even then we are going to hold
less ﬁrmly the proposition to which we have assented.
On this account of how reasoning and assent function together, it is hardly
surprising that fewer people will assent to a proposition with a modiﬁed concept,
especially if they took the truth of the original proposition on trust. There are two
reasons for this. First, of course, we clearly have only probable reasoning in moving
from the truth of the property for the head to the truth of the property for the
combined concept, and this, according to Thomas, should result in lower conﬁdence
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in the outcome of that reasoning. This aspect of reasoning to assent would apply to
any proposition that involved probable reasoning (i.e., the strength of the conclu-
sion is going to be lower than the strength of the premise whenever the reasoning
involved is only probable, unless direct knowledge of the conclusion, or other
knowledge, can intervene).
Second, and more speciﬁc to the modiﬁcation effect per se, the structure of the
Thomistic understanding of category and subcategory should give rise to the kind
of expectation of similarity and contrast suggested by Gagné and Spalding (2011,
2014b) and Spalding and Gagne (2015). That is, as noted above, in the Thomistic
view a subcategory is distinguished from a category via a speciﬁc difference (i.e.,
something that differentiates this species from its genus, as in the human being
deﬁned as a rational animal). Hence, one should expect that there is some difference
(and, likely, an essential difference) when a subcategory is being posited. Of course,
a person can posit a purely accidental or even meaningless subcategory, but that
should be a relatively rare event and should not much affect one’s expectation that a
posited subcategory would differ from the category in meaningful way. Even in the
case of a purely accidental subcategory (in A-T terms, i.e., a subcategory that differs
primarily in non-proper accidents), there will often be reasons for the non-proper
accidental difference that will be related to the essence of the category. Consider,
for example, the subcategory of birds that live in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada.
Although there is no particular essence that relates to this rather artiﬁcial and
accidental subcategory, there are differences between the birds that can live in this
location and those that cannot, and these differences would be very likely related to
the essences of those various types of birds. Hence, one might expect that this group
may differ from birds in general in essential ways, even though this grouping is
accidental. But, in many, if not most, cases of known subcategories there would be
an explicitly essential difference—the essence of a subcategory just is not, gener-
ally, the same essence as the category. Furthermore, because multiple accidents
(both proper and otherwise) will either flow from, or co-occur with, a difference in
essence, there is good reason for the participant to expect contrast on various
characteristics, but also to expect that overall, there should still be many similarities
(because much that is essential, as well as proper and accidental, is in both the
category and subcategory). In a nutshell, this is how (Gagné and Spalding 2011,
2014b; Spalding and Gagné 2015) account for the modiﬁcation effect. It is not
inherently about modiﬁcation or conceptual combination, but instead is about the
expected relationship between the category and the subcategory. That expected
relationship of similarity and contrast enters into the reasoning process that the
person goes through in evaluating the likelihood of the truth of the predication of
the property to the subcategory.
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5 Conclusion
The current experimental results are consistent with a view of the modiﬁcation
effect in which the primary driver is the expectation of similarity and contrast
between category and subcategory, as suggested by (Gagné and Spalding 2011,
2014b; Spalding and Gagné 2015). In particular, and contrary to what would be
expected given feature-based theories of conceptual combination, the modiﬁcation
effect seems to be insensitive to the normative force with which a property is
predicated of the head noun concept, though the overall level of attribution of the
property is quite sensitive to the force of the predication. This view, in turn, is
consistent with an approach to concepts deriving from the Aristotelian-Thomistic
tradition (Spalding and Gagné 2013). We argue that taking the A-T view seriously
has much to offer current research on concepts and might provide a fruitful basis for
the development of a psychological theory of conceptual combination and of
concept processing, in general.
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Conceptual Versus Referential Aﬀordance
in Concept Composition
Louise McNally and Gemma Boleda
Abstract One of the deﬁning traits of language is its capacity to mediate between
concepts in our mind, which encapsulate generalizations, and the things they refer
to in a given communicative act, with all their idiosyncratic properties. This arti-
cle examines precisely this interplay between conceptual and referential aspects of
meaning, and proposes that concept composition (or concept combination, a term
more commonly used in Psychology) exploits both: Conceptually aﬀorded compo-
sition is at play when a modiﬁer and its head ﬁt as could be expected given the prop-
erties of the two concepts involved, whereas in referentially aﬀorded composition the
result of the composition depends on speciﬁc, independently available properties of
the referent. For instance, red box tends to be applied to boxes whose surface is red,
but, given the appropriate context, it can also be applied to e.g. a brown box that
contains red objects. We support our proposal with data from nominal modiﬁcation,
and explore a way to formally distinguish the two kinds of composition and inte-
grate them into a more general framework for semantic analysis. Along the way, we
recover the classically Fregean notion of sense as including conceptual information,
and show the potential of distributional semantics, a framework that has become very
inﬂuential in Cognitive Science and Computational Linguistics, to address research
questions from a theoretical linguistic perspective.
1 Introduction
The goal of this paper is to confront and explore the larger implications of a problem
that we have repeatedly observed in our ongoing work on the semantics of mod-
iﬁcation within noun phrases, which is one instantiation of concept combination.
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The problem is that, in the absence of context, sometimes the default interpretation
for the modiﬁer-noun combination is so strong as to make other possible interpreta-
tions seem impossible, whereas in context any interpretation—even the seemingly
impossible—is possible. Here is just one example, involving so-called ethnic adjec-
tives, which provide information about the ethnic origin, nationality or other loca-
tional origin of individuals.
1
Kayne (1984) and many others have claimed that when
ethnic adjectives like Canadian combine with eventuality-denoting nouns, the adjec-
tive must contribute information about the most external argument of that eventu-
ality, typically the agent. When it does not, a prepositional phrase expressing the
corresponding participant role must be used. Thus, in (1), where the context does
not previously mention Yeltsin visiting Canada, the PP to Canada rather than the
adjective Canadian is what the author chose, and indeed the adjective sounds very
odd.
(1) Yeltsin met the prospective Democratic presidential candidate Bill Clinton on
June 18. His itinerary also included an oﬃcial visit to Canada/??an oﬃcial
Canadian visit. (BNC)
However, one does not have to go far to ﬁnd counterexamples to Kayne’s claim.
When context or background knowledge make salient that some role other than agent
is assigned to the location/ethnicity, the adjective is perfectly felicitous and attested,
as in (2).
(2) Prince Edward and wife begin Canadian visit
(http://metronews.ca/news/canada/365325/prince-edward-and-wife-begin-canadian-visit/)
Confronted with the contrast between the strong default interpretation and the
possibility of any interpretation in context, linguists have tended to follow one of two
routes, both of which we will discuss and exemplify below. The ﬁrst involves taking
the default interpretation as the crucial fact to account for, leaving the non-default
interpretations in context unexplained. The second involves providing an analysis
that is weak enough to capture all interpretations, and saying little or nothing about
the strength of the default interpretation. In this paper, we argue that, in eﬀect, both
routes must be taken because two fundamentally diﬀerent interpretative processes
can be appealed to in the composition of modiﬁed noun phrases or, more generally, in
concept composition. Speciﬁcally, we take default interpretations to be the result of
what we will call conceptually aﬀorded concept composition, and non-default inter-
pretations to be the result of referentially aﬀorded concept composition. We borrow
the term aﬀordance loosely from the psychology literature, speciﬁcally the interpre-
tation of the term in Chemero (2003), as we discuss in further detail in Sect. 3.1.
1
The sources of examples taken from corpora or the internet via Google searches are indicated in
parentheses after the example. ‘BNC’ refers to a local installation of the British National Corpus
(Burnage and Dunlop 1992), though we have also consulted the English language corpora at http://
corpus.byu.edu for supplementary information.
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This distinction builds on the long-standing observation that language mediates
between concepts in our mind and the things they refer to in the world (Ogden and
Richards 1923, among many others). We take these connections to concepts and
to the world to be distinct aspects of language, each of which facilitates a diﬀerent
process of concept composition.
2
Take for instance the phrase red box in the exam-
ples in (3). In the absence of any context, red, when modifying box (or indeed any
noun denoting a physical object), refers to its color, and so we can usually paraphrase
(3-a) as “Identify a box that is red in color and put the relevant scarf inside it”. How-
ever, it may also refer to other properties of the box referent, such as the intended
color of its contents, if the discourse context makes the relevant property clear (3-b).
(3) a. Put the scarf in the red box.
b. (Context: For a fundraising sale, Adam and Barbara are sorting donated
scarves according to color in diﬀerent, identical, brown cardboard boxes.
Barbara distractedly puts a red scarf in the box containing blue scarves.)
Adam: Hey, this one belongs in the red box!
We call cases like (3-a) conceptually aﬀorded. In these cases, some component(s)
of the concepts contributed by two expressions in a phrase match in a way that indi-
cates how they should be composed, and interlocutors avail themselves of such a
suggestion. This matching invites the hearer to identify red as the color of the box in
(3-a).
3
In contrast, in referentially aﬀorded cases like (3-b), speciﬁc, independently
available information about the referent described by the phrase is used to guide the
way in which the concepts in question are composed.
This paper has three goals. First we develop this distinction, which has a prece-
dent in Asher (2011), in an explicit manner and support it with empirical evidence
we gathered in previous work. Second, we suggest modeling conceptually-aﬀorded
concept composition via (compositional) distributional semantics, which represents
meaning as a function of the contexts in which words and phrases appear in nat-
urally occurring language data, usually a large text corpus (Landauer and Dumais
1997; Turney and Pantel 2010). We consider this way of modeling concepts to be
similar in some of its basic properties to the view of concepts espoused, for example,
in Barsalou (2017). A fundamental hypothesis of some work in distributional seman-
tics (e.g. Lenci 2008) is that the resulting semantic representations can be used to
model the concepts associated with words. For this reason, we will present a brief
introduction to distributional methods in Sect. 4. Finally, we propose a way to for-
mally distinguish the two kinds of concept composition and integrate them into a
more general framework for semantic analysis.
2
See also Pelletier (2017) for discussion of these two dimensions of meaning in the context of a
broader examination of what he calls “Subjectivist” and “Objectivist” approaches, respectively.
3
See Hampton (2017) for discussion of experimental work that explores how subjects perform this
kind of composition.
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2 Two Approaches to Analyzing Modiﬁcation
We start by discussing previous approaches to the problem outlined in the introduc-
tion. As mentioned, the existence of strong, but overridable, defaults in the interpre-
tation of modiﬁers has led to two lines of analysis. The ﬁrst involves the proposal
of an inventory of primitive semantic relations to capture the defaults; the latter, the
use of an underspeciﬁed modiﬁcation relation which gets resolved in context or via
an appeal to indexicality. We consider these in turn.
The use of primitive semantic relations to mediate in modiﬁcation has a long his-
tory. We cite two representative and well-known examples here. The ﬁrst involves
Levi’s (1978) analysis of relational adjectives such as microscopic or tropical (ethnic
adjectives like Canadian are also considered a subclass of the relational adjectives).
Relational adjectives (as their name indicates) are morphologically adjectives, but
they are also noun-like in several respects: They are synchronically or diachronically
derived from nouns; they are generally deﬁned as introducing a relation between an
individual of the sort described by the adjective’s nominal stem and that described
by the modiﬁed noun (Bally 1944); and they have a more restricted syntactic dis-
tribution than other types of adjectives, occupying in English essentially the same
position in nominal syntax as do nounmodiﬁers of nouns, very close to the head noun
(e.g. computer in computer store). Some examples from Levi (1978, pp. 27–28) are
provided in (4), with typical paraphrases:
(4) a. microscopic analysis—analysis carried out using a microscope
b. tropical butterﬂies—butterﬂies found in the tropics
c. planetary mass—mass of a planet
d. editorial comment—comment by an editor
e. dramatic criticism—criticism of drama
Levi proposed that such examples are derived from an underlying structure that
makes the relation in question explicit. She further proposed that an inventory of
primitive relations could be speciﬁed: CAUSE, HAVE, MAKE, USE, BE, IN, FOR, FROM,
and ABOUT. For the derivation of examples involving deverbal nominalizations, as
in (4-d, e), she proposed somewhat more complex derivations that nonetheless also
availed themselves of primitives, including in some cases AGENT and PATIENT.
A second example of an appeal to primitive relations emerged in part from the
strong tendencies in the interpretation of (non-relational) adjectives described in
Pustejovsky (1995).
(5) a. red pen—pen that writes in red or that is red on the surface
b. red apple—apple whose skin is red
c. quick meal—meal that is quick to eat or to prepare
To account for these interpretations Pustejovsky argues that the lexical entry for con-
tent words (including nouns) should include what he called a Qualia Structure with
four features, each corresponding to a quale: FORMAL, CONSTITUTIVE, AGENTIVE,
and TELIC. The FORMAL quale characterizes the general ontological properties of an
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object; the CONSTITUTIVE, its parts; the AGENTIVE, how it comes into existence; and
the TELIC, its function. Pustejovsky proposes that adjectives can restrict the deno-
tation of a noun by placing conditions on the values of the diﬀerent qualia in the
noun’s semantic representation.
The logical representations in (6) illustrate how this approach can be used in the
sorts of modiﬁcation that interest us here. In (6-a), the primitive AGENT speciﬁes the
relation between Canada and the visit; in (6-b), the primitive CONSTITUTIVE acts as
an operator on the representation of apple to retrieve indirectly a part of the apple to
which the property denoted by red can be ascribed.
(6) a. Canadian visit: 𝜆e[𝐯𝐢𝐬𝐢𝐭(e) ∧AGENT(e,𝐂𝐚𝐧𝐚𝐝𝐚)]
b. red apple: 𝜆x∃y[𝐚𝐩𝐩𝐥𝐞(x)∧CONSTITUTIVE(𝐚𝐩𝐩𝐥𝐞) = PART-OF(y, x) ∧ 𝐫𝐞𝐝(y)]
The use of semantic primitives to capture modiﬁcation relations has two main
advantages. First, it speaks to the very strong intuitions that the literature reports
about default or productive interpretation processes (see e.g. Levi 1978, pp. 84–
86). Second, similar defaults are observed cross-linguistically—for example, Puste-
jovsky’s theory has been applied to various languages, and Levi observes that she
found evidence for a similar set of primitives in a study of Modern Hebrew (Levi
1978, p. 86). Clearly, there is something to be captured in these data.
However, the use of primitives of any sort, at least as the only compositional
strategy, has also long been argued to be problematic. On the one hand, it is clearly
too strong insofar as no set of necessary and suﬃcient primitives can be provided
to account for all cases.
4
Levi herself observes (p. 84; see also p. 238ﬀ.) that the
goal of her study is to account for patterns of modiﬁcation that are productive, as
opposed to possible: In other words, her aim was a theory of why, even if we can
interpret, for example, a phrase such as Korean passengers as ‘passengers on Korean
Airlines’,
5
our ﬁrst inclination is arguably not to do so but rather to interpret it as
‘passengers from Korea’. On the other hand, the use of primitives is too weak. As
e.g. Clark (1992) and Murphy (2002) observe, even when such primitives might
apply, they are insuﬃciently granular: There are cases in which they provide too little
information about the exact nature of the relation instantiated by any given primitive.
This is already apparent in the analysis of red apple in (6). The CONSTITUTIVE quale
introduces a part of the apple, but it does not specify which part, and so the inference
that it is the skin of the apple (or, more generally, its surface) is not directly accounted
for. A representative example involving a relational adjective is an electrical ﬁre,
which could be paraphrased as ‘a ﬁre caused by electricity’: This case is even more
problematic than the apple example insofar as the paraphrase does not capture the
fact that the term is used to refer to ﬁres caused by malfunctions in electrical systems
and not, for example, by lightning.
4
Observations to this eﬀect with respect to productive compounding, which shares important prop-
erties with modiﬁcation of the sort discussed by Levi, can be found as far back as Jespersen (1942).
See Gagné et al. (2017), Westerlund and Pylkkänen (2017), and references cited in these works for
further discussion of the complexities involved in modiﬁcation.
5
Example taken from http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2014/09/373_135962.html.
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Given these problems, a second line of approach to modiﬁcation has involved sac-
riﬁcing the coarse generalizations embodied in primitives in favor of broader empir-
ical coverage. On one version of the approach, modiﬁcation is mediated by a maxi-
mally underspeciﬁed relation whose value, much like that of a pronoun, is resolved in
context (examples include McNally and Boleda 2004; Kennedy and McNally 2010).
On another (see e.g. Bosch 1983; Rothschild and Segal 2009) adjectives have as
their lexical content functions from contexts to contents, that is, Kaplanian charac-
ters (Kaplan 1989). These analyses are respectively illustrated in (7).
(7) a. Canadian visit: 𝜆e[𝐯𝐢𝐬𝐢𝐭(e) ∧ Ri(e,𝐂𝐚𝐧𝐚𝐝𝐚)]
b. red apple: 𝜆x[(𝐫𝐞𝐝i(𝐚𝐩𝐩𝐥𝐞))(x)]
Again, this approach has both advantages and disadvantages. On the positive side,
it is appropriately ﬂexible: There is no interpretation that cannot be accommodated
under such an analysis. However, its ﬂexibility is arguably also a disadvantage: It has
nothing to say about the strength of default interpretations or the fact that we tend to
generalize them to new examples (a point made, as noted above, by Levi). Moreover,
these analyses have provided no substantive theory of how context intervenes to yield
the interpretations that arise.
We know of only one explicit proposal that contemplates the possibility of com-
bining these two general approaches to resolving modiﬁcation, namely that in Asher
(2011). Asher combines a classical, model-theoretically interpreted intensional logic
with a separate, proof-theoretic logic of types that is intended to mirror language
users’ systems of concepts. The latter is used to compute and resolve the basic rela-
tions between predicates in composition—for example, it will allow us to determine
that, in principle, it must be possible to infer that red picks out a type that, when com-
bined with the type picked out by pen, yields a type that corresponds to a pen that
writes in red.
6
Though he does not develop the possibility in detail, he suggests (p.
226) that Pustejovsky’s qualia could be introduced into his system as type-shifting
operators that mediate in this process: For example, WRITE could be the output of a
general type coercion operator TELIC applied to the type pen, and this information
could then be exploited in the semantic composition process. In addition, along-
side the possibility of such operators, Asher’s system contemplates the possibility of
contextually-valued type coercion operators for cases where the discourse structure
makes it clear that default value operators such as TELIC would not apply.
The proposal we develop in the rest of this paper shares with Asher’s the intuition
that there are (at least) two distinct sorts of composition processes involved in com-
puting the interpretation of a sentence. Our contributions will consist in laying out
the proposal in more explicit terms, providing new empirical support for this dual
system, the use of distributional semantics an alternative to Asher’s logic of types,
and a speciﬁc proposal for formalizing the distinction using Discourse Representa-
tion Theory (Kamp 1981).
6
Asher’s logic of types builds on an approach to type theory, now sometimes referred to as “Modern
Type Theory”, developed within intuitionistic logic by Martin-Löf (1984). Due to space limitations,
we refer the reader to Asher’s book and Chatzikyriakidis and Luo (2017) for details.
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3 A Dual System for Semantic Composition
3.1 Conceptually Versus Referentially Aﬀorded Composition
We begin with a very programmatic proposal concerning two ways in which the
construction of meaning can be mediated. Our proposal is based on the following
assumption.
Assumption The construction of meaning draws on connections we make between
linguistic expressions and our conceptual structure, on the one hand, and the world,
on the other.
This assumption is of course familiar from traditional semiotic models and also res-
onates with the “dual content” model recently proposed in Del Pinal (2015), which
provides (p. 44ﬀ.) a useful overview of the diﬀerent ways in which language, concep-
tual structure, and the world have been related to each other both in the philosophy
of language and cognitive psychology literature. The assumption also underlies the
classic Fregean model that distinguishes sense (Sinn), which Frege suggests forms
part of the ‘common treasure of thoughts that [humanity] transmits from one genera-
tion to another’, and reference (Bedeutung) (Frege 1892, p. 297). However, in modern
formal semantics in the Montagovian tradition, despite its Fregean roots, conceptual
structure has largely been set aside. In this latter tradition, Fregean sense has largely
been substituted for the notion of intension, modeled non-psychologistically as, for
example, a function from possible worlds to truth values.
We recover the classically Fregean notion of sense as including conceptual-like
information and propose that both conceptual and referential aspects of meaning
play a role in composition. Speciﬁcally, we can think of them as aﬀording concept
combination in diﬀerent ways. Our use of the term aﬀordance is based on Chemero’s
(2003) development of the notion, originally due to Gibson (1979); it is also inspired
in Rietveld’s (2008) extension of the notion to higher cognition. Chemero deﬁnes
aﬀordance as a relation between features of situations and abilities of organisms,
and argues that to perceive an aﬀordance is to recognize that the feature in question
facilitates an action by the organism. The classic example is a mug with a handle: If
a person who has never seen a mug gets to interact with it, it is very likely that she
will grab it by the handle. The mug, by its shape, aﬀords the grabbing-by-the-handle
action on the part of the person.
Our extension of this idea to the case of language is very simple. We take the
connection to concepts, on the one hand, and to the world, on the other, to be distinct
features of language, each of which facilitates—that is, aﬀords—a distinct composi-
tion process. If we posit that language users have access to both of these features and
the corresponding processes that they facilitate, the tension we observed between
default and highly context dependent interpretations in Sect. 2 disappears.
7
We cite the translation by Max Kölbel, published in Byrne and Kölbel (2009) which includes
references to the original pagination by Frege.
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The default interpretations, we argue, can be understood as the result of
conceptually-aﬀorded concept composition. These are the interpretations that are
immediately available in the absence of discourse context, and they are productive,
suggesting that they build on regularities in our lexical knowledge—that is, the con-
nections between words and concepts. For instance, the fact that physical objects
typically have colored surfaces will aﬀord the interpretation of a color term mod-
ifying a noun denoting a physical object as describing surface color, as in red box
(see example (3-a)) and red apple (5-b). The fact that a writing instrument produces
text or images with a particular color, and that this color may vary from one writing
instrument to the next—part of our concept of what a writing instrument is like—
aﬀords the interpretation of red pen as a pen that writes in red (example 5-a). Note
that the use of a color term with pen is easily extended to other writing instruments
with the same general properties, such as pencil, crayon, or marker. Similarly, the
fact that analyses are carried out using instruments, and that microscopes are instru-
ments, aﬀords the interpretation of microscopic analysis provided in (4-a) above.
Diﬀerent species of animals tend to require diﬀerent climates, so again, the inter-
pretation of (4-b), with tropical describing a climate, is on our view conceptually
aﬀorded.
Note that these interpretations arise from very detailed conceptual knowledge,
presumably accessible from the words involved. The primitive-based analyses dis-
cussed in the previous section are too coarse-grained to allow for these interactions;
the lack of conceptual information in typical formal semantic approaches doesn’t
allow for them either. Thus we need a richer and more nuanced lexical representa-
tion; in Sect. 4 we show how distributional semantics can serve this purpose.
The notion of conceptual aﬀordance also allows us to make predictions about
combinations of modiﬁers and nouns that will be infelicitous out of the blue. Inter-
estingly, Vecchi et al. (2011) developed a computational model (using, it is worth
noting, distributional semantics) that was able to partially distinguish between (out
of the blue) deviant versus possible adjective-noun phrases. Vecchi et al. randomly
selected a set of phrases that were unattested in a very large corpus and testedwhether
their model would group them in ways that correlated with whether or not the phrase
was acceptable to human judges. Examples of unattested but semantically acceptable
phrases included vulnerable gunman, huge joystick, and blind cook; deviant phrases
included, for instance, blind pronunciation, parliamentary potato, and sharp glue.
The acceptable phrases are similar to those we have hypothesized above to involve
conceptually aﬀorded composition. For instance, joysticks are physical objects and
have a size dimension that can be modiﬁed by huge. In contrast, it is not obvious in
the absence of a speciﬁc context along which conceptual dimension a pronunciation
could be blind, what kind of relation might exist between potatoes and parliaments,
or what it would mean for glue, which is not rigid, to be sharp.
Now, it is possible to ﬁnd a semantic interpretation for the allegedly deviant
phrases. For instance, imagine that potatoes were thrown at parliamentary mem-
bers in a protest concerning the recent economic crisis in Spain, and that one of the
potatoes knocked out the president of the parliament and was retrieved and put on
display. This object could well be dubbed the parliamentary potato. We submit that
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such interpretations are the result of referentially-aﬀorded concept composition: they
are retrievable only once we have a speciﬁc candidate (or small set of candidates) for
who or what is being referred to with the phrase, along with a salient set of candidate
properties that could be described by the modiﬁer.
To further illustrate referentially-aﬀorded composition, let us return to the use of
“red box” in (3-b) and the “Canadian visit” example in (2). In the ﬁrst case, the situ-
ation presents the hearer with two brown cardboard boxes. The speaker can assume
that the hearer knows that the boxes each have a context-speciﬁc property of being
destined to hold objects of a speciﬁc color. The use of red to modify the box color
in this case is incongruent with what we can arguably consider the basic concept
associated with box—the concept cannot aﬀord any meaningful interpretation of the
modiﬁer—but the box referents and their context-speciﬁc properties can. In the case
of (2), recall that the problem is that ethnic adjectives tend to express the agent when
combined with eventive nouns. Thus, by default we expect Canadian visit to describe
a visit made by Canadians. However, in (2) the interpretation on which Canada is the
location visited is aﬀorded by speciﬁc information about individuals in the context,
namely, that Prince Edward and his wife are members of the British royalty, that
Canada denotes a place, and that Prince Edward and his wife are the agents of the
action of beginning a (Canadian) visit.
In order for the distinction between conceptually and referentially aﬀorded con-
cept composition to have bite, we should have independent criteria for identifying the
components of the speciﬁc concepts being combined. For now, we limit ourselves
to the claim that once such criteria are established, it should be possible to predict
when a combination of modiﬁer and noun is easily interpreted in the absence of a
speciﬁc discourse context.
3.2 Empirical Evidence Supporting the Distinction
Despite the caveat made in the preceding paragraph, we have been encouraged by
the fact that the distinction between conceptually and referentially aﬀorded concept
composition gives us insight into puzzling data that we gathered in previous work
and for which we had no explanation at the time. We now summarize these data and
explain how our proposal predicts them.
First, the modiﬁcation data reviewed so far point to the fact that modiﬁer-noun
combinations can have very plastic interpretations. Our proposal suggests that a large
part of this plasticity corresponds to referentially aﬀorded composition. This predic-
tion is supported by empirical data we gathered about relational adjectives, which
we introduced in Sect. 2.
As noted above, relational adjectives are typically denominal and, crucially, the
adjective-forming morphology has been claimed to be essentially transparent (e.g.
Spencer 1999). The only contribution of the adjectival morphology, then, would be
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to make explicit that there is some relation between the referent of the noun from
which the adjective is derived and the referent of the noun that the relational adjective
modiﬁes.
8
By hypothesis, relational adjectives provide a way to pick up on, in a maximally
condensed fashion, themyriad possible relations between the referent of themodiﬁed
noun and the referent of the adjective’s nominal stem (e.g. ‘Canada’, in the case
of Canadian). These relations can be identiﬁed thanks to general knowledge (e.g.
national anthem) or be inferred from the meaning of the modiﬁed noun (particularly
when the noun is deverbal, as in chemical reaction); however, we posit that in many
cases the relations are in fact aﬀorded by speciﬁc information we have about the
referents in question in the discourse (e.g. Canadian visit in example (2) above).
Boleda (2007) reported that, in Catalan, relational adjectives appear much more
often in deﬁnite noun phrases than do other types of adjectives: Speciﬁcally, in
an analysis of a 16.5 million-word, balanced Catalan corpus, relational adjectives
appeared almost 60% of the time in deﬁnite noun phrases (59%, with a standard
deviation of 15%), while other types of adjectives did so a little over 30% of the
time. Deﬁnite noun phrases are used to refer to individuals that are familiar either
from the context or from prior discourse, and referentially aﬀorded concept compo-
sition is only possible when the referent is known. Thus, the high proportion of uses
of relational adjectives inside deﬁnite noun phrases suggests a tendency towards ref-
erential aﬀordance in the composition of relational adjectives and nouns.
9
Without a
distinction between the two kinds of composition, it is far from clear how to account
for the data in Boleda (2007).
Boleda and colleagues provided more data in the same direction in a statistical
study of the British National Corpus (Boleda et al. 2012). The study compared nom-
inal modiﬁcation using ethnic adjectives (Canadian) to modiﬁcation using preposi-
tional phrases (from Canada, to Canada, etc.).10 The two types of expressions often
seem synonymous: For instance, both Canadian visit and visit to Canada could be
used in example (2). However, the results showed that ethnic adjectives are used
especially when the discourse makes the semantic relationship between the head
noun and the adjective explicit, that is, in contexts where previous information about
the referent is available. Factors correlated with the use of these adjectives in the
corpus (as opposed to their prepositional phrase counterparts) included, again, the
deﬁniteness of the DP containing the ethnic adjective, and also others like the occur-
8
This claim does not exclude the possibility that, over time, a relational adjective might come to be
associated with a speciﬁc property or properties, such as the systematic use of ethnic adjectives to
pick out characteristic properties of the individuals of a particular origin, as in (i).
(i) Park’s parents immigrated to the United States in the 1950s. (. . . ) Park says, “My parents
thought the best way to help us succeed was to become very American. . . ”.
(W. D. Thomas, Korean Americans, Benchmark Books, 2009, p. 59.).
9
Of course, that does not imply that other types of adjectives cannot enter into referentially aﬀorded
composition (cf. the red box example in (3-b)), but relational adjectives, because of their properties,
are expected to do so more often.
10
Recall that ethnic adjectives are usually considered a subclass of relational adjectives.
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rence of visited Canada before Canadian visit in a given discourse. To summarize,
both studies constitute evidence for referentially aﬀorded concept composition and
show some eﬀects that the use of this composition strategy by language users has on
their linguistic output.
A second piece of evidence concerns another prediction of our proposal, namely,
that the more context dependent (or referentially aﬀorded) concept composition is,
the more diﬃcult it can be expected to be to reconstruct out of context. The results
of a study involving computational modeling of adjectival modiﬁcation, reported in
Boleda et al. (2013), are in line with this prediction.
Boleda et al. (2013) used computational semantic methods to produce meaning
representations for adjective-noun phrases. They built representations for phrases
like former commentator in two ways. On the one hand, they constructed a represen-
tation of the entire phrase directly from linguistic data, extracting statistics from a
large textual corpus. We will call this representation the observed representation. On
the other, they combined the representations for the individual words in the phrase
(also obtained from a corpus) using a computational algorithm. For example, this
algorithm took the representation for former and that for commentator to build a
semantic representation for former commentator. Boleda et al. then compared this
“artiﬁcial” or predicted representation with the observed one, to see how accurate
the prediction was.
11
Their results showed that the more typical the property denoted by the adjective
is for the entity described by the noun, the easier it is to model the semantics of
the phrase. Speciﬁcally, the resulting predicted representation of the phrase is more
similar to the observed one when the property is more typical. For instance, former
can be said to be a typical attribute for role-denoting nouns such as commentator,
father-in-law, teacher, or president, insofar as the concepts associated with these
nouns arguably include the speciﬁcation that the role has a potentially limited dura-
tion. Information about duration is supplied by adjectives like former, current, or
future. And indeed, the predicted representation for former commentator obtained
by combining the representations for its two component words was very similar to
the observed one. In contrast, the representation for phrases like former colour was
more diﬃcult to predict from the component words alone: Colour does not denote
a concept with a clear temporal speciﬁcation, and the relationship between former
and colour will depend on the object whose colour is being referred to.12
We conclude that modiﬁcation of nouns by adjectives describing typical attributes
corresponds to conceptually aﬀorded composition, and at least some uses of atyp-
ical modiﬁers correspond to referentially aﬀorded composition. In the latter cases,
without additional evidence from the speciﬁc discourse context it is hard to make
11
More details on the methods used in this study will be provided in Sect. 4.
12
Typicality correlates positively with frequency, but the contrasting eﬀects we mention are attested
with phrases of similar frequency, including the ones used in the text. Thus, the results of this study
cannot be explained simply as a byproduct of the frequency of the phrases in question.
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sense of the semantic relationship between the adjective and the noun.
13
Therefore,
the distinction between conceptual and referential aﬀordance in modiﬁcation helps
explain the results in Boleda et al. (2013).
Classical formal analyses of semantic composition involving adjectives are not
well-equipped to take into account the degree of ﬁt or typicality relation between
the property denoted by the adjective and general features of the concept associated
with the noun. Theories like Pustejovsky’s Generative Lexicon were designed to do
this to some extent; however, as noted in Sect. 2, such theories cannot help with
highly context-dependent meaning relations. Thus, the challenge is to ﬁnd a way to
incorporate the distinction between conceptually and referentially aﬀorded concept
composition into semantic theory, so as to broaden the theory’s empirical coverage.
As a ﬁrst step in addressing this challenge, we turn to distributional semantics.
4 Conceptually Aﬀorded Composition with Distributional
Semantics
We propose distributional semantics as a framework to account for conceptually
aﬀorded composition because we do not consider other approaches (e.g. standard
formal semantics or primitive-based approaches such as the Generative Lexicon) to
oﬀer a rich enough representation of a word’s meaning to account for the range of
eﬀects discussed. However, as it is beyond the scope of this paper to exhaustively
compare these diﬀerent approaches, we limit ourselves here to simply providing
enough background on distributional semantics for the reader to be able to follow
the formalization presented in the next section, leaving more thorough discussion
for future work.
Distributional semantic analyses (Landauer and Dumais 1997; Turney and Pantel
2010; Erk 2012) represent the semantics of a word as a function of the contexts it
occurs in. Context can be deﬁned in various ways, but the most typical approach is to
deﬁne context as the words surrounding the target word in a corpus. A distributional
representation for a word will then be a list of context counts, aggregated over the
whole corpus and suitably transformed, that is, a vector. Figures 1 and 2 oﬀer a toy
example. Figure 1 is intended to illustrate how even a small context window reveals
repeated examples of co-occurrences between a target word (here, moon) and other
words that are suggestive of our knowledge about the target. Figure 2 exempliﬁes
a partial vectorial representation for the words moon, sun, and dog.14 The vectors
show how the distributional representation mirrors some semantic similarities and
diﬀerences between these words: All three can appear with shadow, but, while moon
and sun appear with words such as planet or shine, dog does not. Moon and sun
13
Note that the semantic representations used are aggregates over all uses of a word in a corpus and
do not reﬂect discourse structure.
14
Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 are adapted from materials by Marco Baroni.
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Fig. 1 The basic data for
distributional semantic
representations: contexts
curtains open and the moon shining in on the barely
rough the night with the moon shining so brightly, it
surely under a crescent moon , thrilled by ice-white
is dazzling snow, the moon has risen full and cold
and the temple of the moon , driving out of the hug
in the dark and now the moon rises, full and amber
bird on the shape of the moon over the trees in front
Fig. 2 Semantic
representation: vectors of
context counts
planet night full shadow shine crescent
moon 10 22 43 16 29 12
sun 14 10 4 15 45 0
dog 0 4 2 10 0 0
are similar in representation, but not identical: for example, full and crescent occur
primarily with moon, while shine is a more typical context for sun than for moon.
A vector for a word as used in distributional semantics ranges from a few hundred
to a few thousand dimensions (that is, contexts or transformations thereof), thus pro-
viding a very rich, ﬂexible representation for word meaning. However, this makes it
diﬃcult to inspect it manually.
15
The power of distributional semantics lies in its use
of well deﬁned linear algebra techniques to manipulate these vectors, yielding use-
ful information about the semantics of the involved words. We visualize one kind of
technique used in Fig. 3, where simple, two-dimensional vectors for the words moon,
sun, and dog are visually represented. The two dimensions depicted in the graph
(corresponding to word contexts) are shadow and shine, with the values shown in
the left part of Fig. 3. The geometric distance (e.g., the Euclidean distance; see dis-
continuous lines) between the vectors for moon and sun is smaller than the distance
between the vectors for moon and dog. Crucially, the algebraic techniques that we
can visualize with two dimensions generalize to any number of dimensions. Thus,
in distributional semantics, geometric distance corresponds to semantic distance.
Distributional semantic methods are highly successful at modeling word meaning
because they are based on linguistic data naturally produced by humans, as mani-
fest in large text corpora drawn from the internet and other sources. The representa-
tions are rich, with hundreds or thousands of dimensions providing diﬀerent bits of
contextual information. Also, distributional representations are naturally graded; for
instance, the notion of semantic distance is a continuum, with words being more or
less distant. This makes them useful for semantic phenomena such as the typicality
eﬀect observed in the previous section.
Recently, researchers have begun to explore compositional distributional seman-
tics, giving a distributional representation not only to words but also to phrases and
15
The context counts in a real distributionalmodel are also typically further operated upon to remove
noise in the data and make them more compact; see the references in this section for more infor-
mation. Also, recently, neural network or deep learning models have been shown to outperform
traditional count-based methods such as the ones explained in this section (Baroni et al. 2014b).
Since nothing we say in this paper hinges on the particular type of model chosen, for clarity we
present count-based models only.
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shadow shine
moon 16 29
sun 15 45
dog 10 0
0 5 10 15 20
0
10
20
30
40
50
shadow
sh
in
e
dog (10,0)
sun (15,45)
moon (16,29)
Fig. 3 Semantic distance as geometric distance
Fig. 4 Vector composition
by addition
planet    night   blood
red 15 3 21
moon 24 15 1
red + moon 39 18 22
even sentences (Mitchell and Lapata 2010; Coecke et al. 2011; Socher et al. 2012;
Baroni et al. 2014a; Pham 2016 amongmany others); the previous workwe presented
at the end of Sect. 3.2 falls into this line of research. Here, the challenge is typically
framed as capturing how composition changes the values of the vectors. For instance,
blood is not a relevant context for moon, but when red modiﬁes moon it does become
relevant (see Fig. 4). This kind of eﬀect is achieved by applying composition opera-
tions to build the meaning representation of the phrase from the representations of its
constituents. A very simple but stubbornly eﬀective method is to simply add up the
word vectors, as in Fig. 4 (Mitchell and Lapata 2010), but more sophisticated meth-
ods have been designed that sometimes yield better results (Baroni and Zamparelli
2010). Nothing we say in this paper depends on the chosen method for composition,
hence we will simply use comp( ⃖⃖⃖⃖⃖⃗𝐫𝐞𝐝, ⃖⃖⃖⃖⃖⃖⃖⃖⃖⃗𝐦𝐨𝐨𝐧) for the distributional representation of
the phrase red moon obtained by applying a composition function to its constituent
word vectors, ⃖⃖⃖⃖⃖⃗𝐫𝐞𝐝 and ⃖⃖⃖⃖⃖⃖⃖⃖⃖⃗𝐦𝐨𝐨𝐧 (we represent word vectors with an overhead arrow).
Note, ﬁnally, that there is an alternative method for obtaining a distributional rep-
resentation for a phrase, namely, to directly extract it from the corpus, just as repre-
sentations for words are generated (Fig. 5). Because it is based on counts for actual
occurrences of phrases in corpora, this representation should be a faithful render-
ing of the meaning of the phrase, and this is why we used it as a benchmark in the
research in Boleda et al. (2013), to compare to the result of compositionally obtained
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a large red moon , Campana
a blood red moon hung over
glorious red moon turning
The round red moon , she ’s
a blood red moon emerged
rains , red moon blows,
monstrous red moon had climb
A very red moon rising is
under the red moon a vampire
planet night blood
red moon 34 20 31
Fig. 5 Corpus-extracted distributional representation for phrase red moon
(predicted) vectors. However, this technique can only be used for suﬃciently frequent
phrases. Since of course many possible phrases will not occur frequently or even at
all, composition is still needed to build a representation for many phrases.
Because of their data-driven nature and their rich representation of meaning,
compositional distributional representations for phrases are able to account for sub-
tle nuances of meaning arising from the combination of modiﬁers and nouns. For
instance, Baroni and Zamparelli (2010) report that the most similar element in a
large semantic space to the phrase historical introduction is historical background;
to small drop, droplet; to common understanding, common vision. Though crude and
incomplete as an approximation of what concepts are (as the discussion in Barsalou,
2017, will make apparent), these representations have the advantage of being easy
to construct and incorporable into a testable interpretive model. We therefore adopt
them for modeling conceptually aﬀorded composition in the formalization we oﬀer
in the next section.
5 A Mixed Model for Two Types of Semantic Composition
We next sketch how the mechanisms of conceptual and referential aﬀordance can
both be incorporated into a single, mixed interpretive model (see Boleda and Herbe-
lot 2016 for a review of previous work combining formal and distributional seman-
tics).
16
We will use Discourse Representation Theory (DRT) as the scaﬀolding for our
semantics. We use DRT because (1) the notion of discourse referent is crucial for
implementing referentially aﬀorded composition, and (2) the most recent research
on compositional distributional semantics has not yet been able to show how such
16
Some of the basic discussion in this section concerning the integration of distributional seman-
tics and formal semantics is drawn from McNally (2017); however, the application to DRT is new
here, as is the idea of referentially-aﬀorded composition. See Garrette et al. (2011) for a diﬀerent
approach to combining distributional semantics and Discourse Representation Theory, and see
Pelletier (2017), for extensive discussion of “two-tiered” semantic theories, of which he takes this
proposal to be an example.
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models can provide eﬀective analyses of referential grounding or discourse dynamics
(Bernardi et al. 2015; Sadrzadeh and Purver 2015). This latter state of aﬀairs leads us
to tentatively hypothesize that compositional distributional semantics is best used to
model only those parts of semantic composition that are, in our terms, conceptually
aﬀorded.
For reasons of space, we must assume basic familiarity with DRT; the reader is
referred to e.g. Kamp (1981) or Kamp and Reyle (1993) for background. Our imple-
mentation of DRT will be entirely standard, with just three exceptions. First, we need
a means of connecting distributional semantic representations to Discourse Repre-
sentation Structures (DRSs). Second, as a result of doing this wewill introduceminor
modiﬁcations in our treatment of nominal and adjectival predication with respect to
what is more generally assumed. Finally, we will need a way to distinguish concep-
tually aﬀorded from referentially aﬀorded composition.
We incorporate distributional semantics by building on the idea in Zamparelli
(1995) that nouns (and not just certain kinds of generic noun phrases) denote Carl-
sonian kinds (Carlson 1977).
17
The crucial step is to use distributional semantic rep-
resentations rather than atomic abstract entities as models for kinds. However, as
with the classic treatment of kinds as abstract entities, these distributional represen-
tations will be coded in the DRSs as constants. Since distributional representations
are, mathematically-speaking, vectors, the constants we use for them will be indi-
cated with an overhead arrow (e.g. ⃖⃖⃖⃖⃖⃖⃗𝐛𝐨𝐱), as noted in the previous section.
We further extend Zamparelli’s idea to adjectives, also interpreting them as vec-
tors (e.g. ⃖⃖⃖⃖⃖⃗𝐫𝐞𝐝). Since adjectives are not assumed to denote natural kinds but rather
to pick out properties, this proposal can be seen as generalizing Zamparelli’s, substi-
tuting concepts for both kinds and properties along the way. Distributional vectors
will thus serve as very crude representations for concepts.
18
The crucial step will be
to allow the distributional representations for nouns and adjectives to combine with
each other to yield new representations of the same type, whose role in the DRT part
of the semantics is exactly analogous to the role of the representations for unmodiﬁed
nouns.
In the previous section we brieﬂy sketched how the composition of two vectors
works. We assume that the grammar of a language indicates when semantic com-
position for certain phrases involves the composition of vectors, as opposed to other
17
Zamparelli posited that nouns come to denote sets of entities only in the semantic composition
process, and used type-shifting operations licensed by functional morphosyntax to do this. See
below.
18
We should insist that we are not making anything like the claim that concepts, whatever they
are, consist only of distributional information, even if such information may play a role in concept
formation. Rather, we are using distributional representations to model concepts primarily because
they have certain properties that we hypothesize concepts to share and because they have various
attractive methodological features, such as that of allowing us to make testable predictions of vari-
ous kinds.
Note also that, to our knowledge, the formal semantics literature has largely avoided the deeper
question of what kinds are and how they relate to concepts. Our reinterpretation of Zamparelli
should not be viewed as reﬂecting any particular position on how kinds have been understood in
this literature. See McNally (2017) for further discussion.
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sorts of semantic operations. The composition of vectors happens outside of the DRT
model, but as the result is also a vector, it can, like the component vectors, be asso-
ciated with a constant in a DRS, which we will represent as e.g. comp( ⃖⃖⃖⃖⃖⃗𝐫𝐞𝐝, ⃖⃖⃖⃖⃖⃖⃗𝐛𝐨𝐱).
In other words, constants of the form ⃖⃖⃖⃖⃖⃗𝐫𝐞𝐝, ⃖⃖⃖⃖⃖⃖⃗𝐛𝐨𝐱, and comp( ⃖⃖⃖⃖⃖⃗𝐫𝐞𝐝, ⃖⃖⃖⃖⃖⃖⃗𝐛𝐨𝐱) are all of the
same type. Thus, distributional semantics will give us a relatively concrete algebraic
model for simple and complex concepts on which both sorts of concepts are of fun-
damentally the same nature, much in the way lattice-theoretic structures serve as
models for treating atomic entities and pluralities as fundamentally similar types of
objects (Link 1983).
The next piece we need is a way to exploit nouns and adjectives with such inter-
pretations within DRT, so that referents can be associated with the concepts that
nouns and adjectives pick out. Zamparelli used Carlson’s (1977) realization relation,
which we represent here as Realize, aims to do this: This relation holds between an
object and a kind just in case the object constitutes an instance of the kind.
19
Again
following Zamparelli, we assume that the Realize relation is introduced by (possibly
abstract) functional morphosyntax that turns a noun into an expression that denotes
a set of entities. As a ﬁrst approximation, then, we can represent a referential expres-
sion such as a box as in (8), where u is the discourse referent introduced by the phrase,
which must satisfy the condition that it is a realization of the concept ⃖⃖⃖⃖⃖⃖⃗𝐛𝐨𝐱.
(8)
u
Realize(u, ⃖⃖⃖⃖⃖⃖⃗𝐛𝐨𝐱)
Now consider modiﬁcation. Prior to the point in the syntax at which the Realize rela-
tion is introduced, the composition operations at work will combine vector-denoting
expressions; this corresponds to concept composition. We model conceptually-
aﬀorded composition as the result of composing adjective and noun vectors directly
into a new vector, corresponding to a complex concept, which can then stand in the
Realize relation to a discourse referent, as in (9).
(9)
u
Realize(u, comp( ⃖⃖⃖⃖⃖⃗𝐫𝐞𝐝, ⃖⃖⃖⃖⃖⃖⃗𝐛𝐨𝐱))
The syntactic rules of the language will have to make it clear when this sort of com-
position can be appealed to and when not; interestingly, studies of the syntax of
modiﬁcation clearly indicate that syntax could, indeed, encode this kind of informa-
tion (see, e.g. McNally and Boleda 2004 and Bouchard 2005 on adjective ordering
constraints of the sort exempliﬁed by relational adjectives).
Now let us consider referentially-aﬀorded concept composition. As mentioned in
Sect. 3, this is attested only when the referent of the nominal is already familiar in the
19
Carlson’s ontology also included stages (spatiotemporal slices) of individuals, which could also
instantiate kinds, but these will not play a role in our discussion.
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discourse. This referent therefore plays a role in the interpretation of the combina-
tion of the modiﬁer and noun. We see two ways in which this could be implemented.
One would be to take the referent to modulate the composition operation that com-
bines the adjective and noun vectors. This could be represented as in (10), where the
subscript u indicates modulation by referent u.
(10)
u
Realize(u, compu( ⃖⃖⃖⃖⃖⃗𝐫𝐞𝐝, ⃖⃖⃖⃖⃖⃖⃗𝐛𝐨𝐱))
On this view, the concept associated with red in the context would be exactly the
same across all contexts, but its interaction with the concept contributed by the noun
would vary from one context to the next, for example by the use of varying weights
on the sums or products of the vectors.
Alternatively, the vector corresponding to the adjective could be modiﬁed as a
function of the referent, i.e. reinterpreted as an ad hoc, referent-mediated property,
as could be represented in (11).
(11)
u
Realize(u, comp(f (u, ⃖⃖⃖⃖⃖⃗𝐫𝐞𝐝), ⃖⃖⃖⃖⃖⃖⃗𝐛𝐨𝐱))
On this view, the composition operation as such is not altered in any way; rather
the input to that operation is. In other words, red in this example would simply be
associated with a diﬀerent concept in the context in question. Further research will
be needed to determine which of these options constitutes a better analysis of the
facts, or, indeed, if they are empirically distinguishable. However, it is worth noting
that this latter approach closely resembles the indexical interpretations of adjectives
proposed by Bosch (1983) and Rothschild and Segal (2009), brieﬂy introduced in
Sect. 2.
These analyses do not oﬀer an account of how context intervenes to determine the
referentially aﬀorded interpretation; in this, unfortunately, we are in good company,
as no theory we know of oﬀers such an account, and the area is one in which much
more research is needed.
We close this section with some very brief, speculative comments on how the
proposed analysis relates to classical analyses of adjective modiﬁcation of nouns
within formal semantics. Such modiﬁcation has been analyzed in two ways: Either
by treating the adjective as a second-order property that takes the noun as its argu-
ment, or by treating it as a ﬁrst-order property that is combined via conjunction or
set intersection with the (ﬁrst-order) property denoted by the noun (see e.g. Kamp
1975; Siegel 1976; Larson 1998, among many others, for proposals and discussion).
The latter analysis is appropriate speciﬁcally for cases of so-called intersective mod-
iﬁcation, when the adjectival and nominal properties are each entailed to hold of the
individual being described. The former is more general and can be used not only
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for intersective modiﬁcation but also for non-intersective modiﬁcation, namely, sub-
sective modiﬁcation, where the adjectival property does not obviously directly hold
of the referent but the noun property does (cf. molecular biologist), and intensional
modiﬁcation, where the nominal property is not entailed to hold (or is entailed not
to hold) at the time or world of ascription (former mayor or alleged thief ).
All of the above-sketched implementations of concept composition are counter-
parts of non-intersective modiﬁcation. In no case is the concept contributed by the
adjective directly related to the referent. Moreover, as we have set things up, our
analysis of concept composition directly captures the intuition developed in Land-
man (2001) and Partee (2010) that all adjective-noun combinations, even intensional
modiﬁcation, are, in some sense, subsective, that is, the nominal description is always
somehow used to identify the referent, insofar it contributes positively to the even-
tual complex description that the referent is related to via the Realize relation. Of
course, it remains to explore how to reproduce the entailment eﬀects of the world
and temporal parameters that have played a role in traditional analyses of intensional
adjectives, but we note that one surprising result of the study in Boleda et al. (2013)
was that intensional adjectives turned out to be no more diﬃcult to model in distri-
butional semantics than other kinds of adjectives, insofar as, all other things being
equal, compositional distributional semantic techniques could predict the semantic
representation for phrases containing intensional adjectives from the representations
of the component words just as well as they could for phrases containing noninten-
sional adjectives (see Sect. 4, above).
6 Conclusions
Semantic composition is a dynamic process that cannot be understoodwithout simul-
taneously considering what we are referring to and the concepts associated with the
words we are using. Concepts, and thus the words associated with them, encode sig-
niﬁcant regularities. At the same time, they are plastic, insofar as we must use a ﬁnite
vocabulary to describe a potentially inﬁnite variety of situations and generalizations
in the world. However, once a word is applied to a referent, that word is grounded
in a very speciﬁc manner, and the referent can inﬂuence the way we understand the
word and its associated concept(s) in the context of use. This interplay between our
conceptual structure and the world is what motivated the ﬁrst contribution of this
paper, namely to propose that modiﬁcation works in two ways: It can be concep-
tually aﬀorded, when the modiﬁer and the head introduce concepts that ﬁt to form
a complex concept, and the speaker and the hearer use this ﬁt in their interpreta-
tions; or referentially aﬀorded, when the result of combining the modiﬁer with the
noun depends on speciﬁc properties of the referent. This proposal has an antecedent
in Asher (2011), but we have made it more explicit and have proposed a speciﬁc
analysis combining distributional semantics and DRT.
Along the way we hope to have made a case for further exploring distributional
representations within semantic theory. They are automatically induced (and thus
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easy to construct and empirically well-founded), have some psychological plausibil-
ity (Landauer and Dumais 1997 and subsequent work), and oﬀer a wealth of empiri-
cal data. Distributional semantic representations also avoid some of the weaknesses
of semantic primitives: Since they generally encode a relatively large number of fea-
tures with continuous values,
20
they can express many more nuances of meaning
than a small set of discrete features, while at the same time accounting for default
interpretations. The key is to recognize their limitations. In this respect, we consider
promising the division of labor between distributional semantics and a referential
semantic framework like DRT.
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modulated by conceptual factors such as the speciﬁcity of the composing words.
These ﬁndings suggest that the LATL’s role in composition is at the conceptual as
opposed to the syntactic or logico-semantic level, making formal semantic theories
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an alternative theoretical foundation, this chapter seeks to connect LATL research
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1 Introduction
The ability to build complex concepts from simple parts is fundamental to human
language. Thus a central part of the cognitive neuroscience of language is to
develop a model of where, when and how this type of composition occurs. Neu-
roimaging experiments have shown that sentence processing engages a large net-
work of primarily left-lateralized, interconnected regions (Binder et al. 2009;
Jefferies 2013). One of these regions in particular, the left anterior temporal lobe
(LATL), appears to be directly implicated in the basic process of combining words
into phrases, such as the combination of nouns with adjectival modiﬁers (red boat)
or verbal predicates (eats meat) (Bemis and Pylkkänen 2011, 2013a; Pylkkänen
et al. 2014; Westerlund et al. 2015; Westerlund and Pylkkänen 2014). In order to
develop and test hypotheses about combinatory responses in the LATL, recent
research has tested representational distinctions arising both from linguistic theory
and neuropsychological studies of patients with temporal lobe damage. This work
has revealed that LATL responses generalize across various word classes
(Westerlund et al. 2015), but are sensitive to the conceptual nature of the combining
words. For example, the conceptual speciﬁcity of the composing items robustly
modulates the combinatory responses in the LATL (Westerlund and Pylkkänen
2014; Zhang and Pylkkänen 2015) and composition such as numeral quantiﬁcation
(e.g., two boats), which arguably does not add any conceptual features to a noun,
does not elicit LATL effects at all (Del Prato and Pylkkänen 2014; Blanco-Elorrieta
and Pylkkänen 2016). Thus the LATL appears mostly sensitive to the composition
of elements whose meanings are in some sense clearly conceptual, as opposed to
composition in a more general sense. In other words, the presence of semantic
composition alone is not predictive of combinatory effects in the LATL but rather
the semantic composition needs to ﬁt a certain a conceptual proﬁle. Given this, the
psychological literature on conceptual combination is a potentially a useful cog-
nitive basis for studying the LATL, a connection we explore in this article.
A large psychological literature has carefully investigated the way that meaning
is constructed at the conceptual level and developed models of possible combina-
tory mechanisms (see Murphy 2002 for discussion). Therefore, these models could
be useful for generating predictions about the LATL’s combinatory role. In this
chapter, we outline two major models of conceptual combination, ‘schema-based’
models and ‘relation-based’ models and discuss how these models may be able to
constrain the hypothesis space regarding the role of the LATL in composition.
2 The LATL as a Central Combinatory Region
The LATL’s anatomical location makes it an excellent candidate for a central
combinatory region. It is well connected to primary sensory and motor areas, along
with their related association cortices (Catani and De Schotten 2008; Gloor 1997),
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is close to the medial temporal lobe, which supports memory processes, and is
functionally connected to several critical language regions, including the left
inferior temporal gyrus and the middle temporal gyrus (Hurley et al. 2014).
Several neuroimaging experiments have implicated the LATL in sentence pro-
cessing above the word level. It is consistently engaged by contrasts between
structured, meaningful sentences and word lists or jabberwocky sentences (Bottini
et al. 1994; Brennan et al. 2010; Brennan and Pylkkänen 2012; Crinion et al. 2003;
Friederici et al. 2000, 2003; Humphries et al. 2001, 2005, 2006, 2007; Mazoyer
et al. 1993; Pallier et al. 2011; Rogalsky and Hickok 2009; Scott et al. 2000; Stowe
et al. 1998; Vandenberghe et al. 2002; Xu et al. 2005). Most critically for its
putative status as a combinatory region, a series of magnetoencephalography
(MEG) experiments has shown the LATL to be the region most reliably engaged
by the composition of basic adjective-noun phrases (Bemis and Pylkkänen 2011,
2013b; Del Prato and Pylkkänen 2014; Pylkkänen et al. 2014; Westerlund and
Pylkkänen 2014). The LATL shows consistent differences in neural activity,
peaking at around 250 ms, between adjective-noun phrases (e.g. red boat) and the
same nouns in isolation (preceded by an unpronounceable consonant string, e.g. xqk
boat) (Bemis and Pylkkänen 2011). Importantly, there is no equivalent increase in
activity when nouns are presented in a list (e.g. cup, boat) rather than in a phrase,
suggesting that the LATL is speciﬁcally engaged by the composition of words into
a coherent phrase, rather than by a simple increase in the amount of lexical
information present.
Of course, composition is not limited to the combination of adjectives and
nouns, but extends across all word classes: verbs and adverbs, verbs and their
objects, prepositions and their arguments, to name but a few. Within linguistics, at
least one prominent model of semantic composition outlines two broad types of
composition: the satisfaction of a predicate’s argument position (argument satu-
ration), and the optional modiﬁcation of a predicate (modiﬁcation) (Heim and
Kratzer 1998). Argument saturation represents a core process of semantic com-
position. Several word classes, such as verbs, prepositions, and determiners, require
arguments in order to exist in well-formed expressions. For example, in the phrase
‘eat meat’, the verb ‘eat’ takes the direct object ‘meat’ as its internal argument.
Composing the verb with its argument saturates its argument requirement, allowing
it to be interpreted. While argument saturation is crucial to the construction of
well-formed sentences, language also contains optional elements that serve to
enrich the meaning of a well-formed expression. For example, though ‘I ate meat’ is
a perfectly interpretable sentence, the meaning conveyed is greatly changed when
meat is modiﬁed with an adjective such as ‘spoiled’. This type of optional com-
position is typically described as modiﬁcation.
Westerlund et al. (2015) investigated whether LATL combinatory responses
generalize across these two composition types by presenting words in either
modiﬁcation or argument saturation contexts (black sweater and eats meat). Both
types of composition elicited larger responses in the LATL compared to the same
second words presented in isolation. In both cases, the effects peaked at ∼250 ms.
Furthermore, similar results were found in Arabic, a language with post-nominal
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adjectives (e.g. sweater black). These results provide evidence that the LATL plays
a general role in composition, independent of composition type, language, or word
order.
The LATL has also been implicated in the combination of simpler concepts to
create more complex concepts at the single-word level (e.g. boy can be represented
by the concepts young and male) (Baron and Osherson 2011; Baron et al. 2010),
which suggests that the LATL’s role in composition may be at the conceptual level,
rather than at the level of semantic composition as traditionally conceived of in
linguistics. Speciﬁcally, most linguistic theories of semantic composition would not
consider the construction of a complex single word concept out of its primary
features to be composition in the same sense as the composition of words into
phrases (i.e., the semantic complexity of boy would not in most formal semantic
theories correspond to structural complexity that required combinatory steps).
Relatedly, neuropsychological investigations of patients with damage to the
LATL have shown that their sentence comprehension and production remain mostly
intact, particularly if semantic demands are kept low (Cotelli et al. 2007;
Gorno-Tempini et al. 2004; Grossman et al. 2005; Hodges et al. 1992; Kapur et al.
1994; Kho et al. 2008; Noppeney et al. 2005; Wilson et al. 2012). Instead, damage to
the LATL leads to a disorder called semantic dementia (SD), in which patients suffer
a severe, amodal, memory loss for concepts that manifests across a variety of tasks,
including picture naming, word-picture matching, delayed-copy picture drawing,
and categorization (Gainotti 2006, 2007, 2011; Garrard and Carroll 2006; Garrard
and Hodges 2000; Hodges et al. 1992, 1995; Mummery et al. 1999, 2000; Patterson
et al. 2006; Rogers et al. 2004; Snowden et al. 1989). One well-documented aspect
of the pattern of conceptual memory loss in SD is that more speciﬁc concepts are
disproportionally affected by LATL degradation. Patients with SD use progressively
more general labels and lose the ability to distinguish similar concepts, mistaking,
for example, a zebra for a horse.
Westerlund and Pylkkänen (2014) investigated the relationship between con-
ceptual speciﬁcity and composition effects in the LATL, with the goal of charac-
terizing whether these two variables modulate the same LATL activity. The
conceptual speciﬁcity of the noun was varied in adjective-noun phrases (e.g. blue
canoe vs. blue boat) with results showing that combinatorial responses in the LATL
at ∼250 ms were sensitive to the speciﬁcity of the noun, with less speciﬁc nouns
(blue boat) eliciting greater combinatory responses in the LATL than more speciﬁc
nouns (blue canoe). For a fuller assessment of the position-by-position interplay
between single word speciﬁcity and composition, a follow-up experiment manip-
ulated the conceptual speciﬁcity of both the modiﬁer and head in noun-noun
compounds (e.g. tomato vs. vegetable, soup vs. dish) (Zhang and Pylkkänen 2015).
More speciﬁc modiﬁers (tomato) elicited the greatest responses in the LATL when
composed with a less speciﬁc head (dish). In both of these studies, the effects of
single word speciﬁcity were subtle or even completely absent when composition
was not at play, such as in the head word position when no modiﬁer was present
(boat vs. canoe) or in the modiﬁer position when the head word had not yet been
seen (vegetable _ vs. tomato _). In contrast, the effect of speciﬁcity on composition
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was robust. Thus these data suggest that at least this LATL-localized MEG activity,
occurring at ∼250 ms, is most strongly driven by the composition of concepts and
not by access to already stored representations.
In sum, these combined results show that although LATL composition effects
generalize across composition types and word order (Westerlund et al. 2015), they
can be signiﬁcantly diminished if the composition does not result in a substantial
boost in the conceptual speciﬁcity of the head word: modifying an already speciﬁc
noun (blue canoe; Westerlund and Pylkkänen 2014) does not elicit a strong com-
binatory response perhaps because the noun is already quite speciﬁc and modifying
a noun with a very general modiﬁer also fails to engage the LATL measurably
(vegetable dish; Zhang and Pylkkänen 2015). Westerlund and Pylkkänen (2014)
argued that these results suggest that the LATL’s role in composition might be
directly related to its role in semantic memory.
The pattern of semantic memory loss in the LATL has led researchers to
hypothesize that it acts as a ‘semantic hub’ (Lambon Ralph et al. 2010; Patterson
et al. 2007; Rogers et al. 2004; Rogers and McClelland 2004; Rogers and Patterson
2007), and Westerlund and Pylkkänen (2014) suggested that the semantic hub
model might be extended to account for the LATL’s involvement in semantic
composition. The semantic hub model assumes that concepts are represented as sets
of features (for example, a dog is brown, has eyes, and barks), and that these
features are represented in a distributed manner across the brain in modality-speciﬁc
areas (color and shape in visual areas, sound in auditory areas, etc.). However, these
distributed features alone are not sufﬁcient to account for the abstract amodal
representations that humans have of concepts. Though elephants and mice share
very little in common visually, we categorize them both as animals based on other
overlapping features. Rogers and colleagues argue that these categorization abilities
require the existence of a hub, located in the LATL, which stores amodal repre-
sentations of concepts by coordinating the distributed features. Because more
speciﬁc concepts share several overlapping features (e.g. all poodles have curly
hair, four legs, and floppy ears), it is more difﬁcult to distinguish their represen-
tations, which leaves them more vulnerable to damage as the LATL deteriorates. In
other words, when presented with two poodles, as opposed to a poodle and an
elephant, the hub must work harder to identify the few distinguishing features of
each poodle (say, a few inches difference in size) than to identify one of the many
differences between poodles and elephants (color, size, sound, location, etc.). Note
that the hub model is most plausibly a model of concrete concepts, unlikely to
sufﬁce as a general account of the semantic space which obviously includes con-
cepts and combinations such as original idea, lacking any obvious distributed
modal features (for discussion, see e.g., Shallice and Cooper 2013).
Proponents of the semantic hub model argue that the pattern of amodal semantic
memory loss in SD points to the LATL as the most likely candidate for a semantic
hub. However, this model has been criticized on the grounds that the pathology of
SD is not always neatly contained in the ATLs (Hodges and Patterson 2007;
Brambati et al. 2009), which can make it difﬁcult to assert that the ATLs are the
locus of the critical damage (Simmons et al. 2010). Furthermore, in the intact brain,
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the LATL is not consistently activated across all tasks that require conceptual
processing (Simmons et al. 2010). However, this latter fact may be due in part to
technical challenges in imaging the ATLs, related to their proximity to the nasal
cavities (see Visser et al. 2010 for discussion). The presence of LATL effects in the
MEG experiments listed above, which do not suffer from similar imaging chal-
lenges, lend some support to this interpretation.
Critics of the semantic hub model have also pointed to the ATL’s engagement in
social and emotional processing (Olson et al. 2007; Zahn et al. 2007) and theory of
mind tasks (Olson et al. 2007), as well as in the recognition of famous and familiar
people (Damasio et al. 2004; Gorno-Tempini et al. 1998; Sergent and Signoret
1992) to argue that the ATL’s role is speciﬁc to the social domain (Simmons et al.
2010). Yet other competing models of the LATL propose that LATL plays a role in
recognizing unique items, such as familiar people and places (Damasio et al. 1996;
Grabowski et al. 2001; Gainotti et al. 2003; Gainotti 2007; Ross and Olson 2012);
or that that semantic information is simply grouped by semantic categories, orga-
nized along an anterior-posterior gradient across the temporal lobes (Chao et al.
1999; Martin and Chao 2001).
It is of course possible that the LATL plays multiple roles in conceptual pro-
cessing. Though we discuss the LATL as a single uniﬁed region for the purposes of
simplicity, the LATL in fact has several anatomical and functional subdivisions
(Fan et al. 2014; Rogalsky and Hickok 2009; Sanjuán et al. 2014; Visser et al.
2012; Visser and Lambon Ralph 2011). Therefore, it is difﬁcult to determine
whether these models represent competing or complementary interpretations of
LATL activity. We believe the semantic hub model to be the simplest model that
can reconcile results from SD with results from the sentence processing literature.
In fact, when a noun is modiﬁed by an adjective, the outcome is a modiﬁed
conceptual representation, and Westerlund and Pylkkänen (2014) suggested that the
semantic hub might also be involved in the construction of that modiﬁed repre-
sentation. This might then account for the observed interaction within the LATL
between conceptual speciﬁcity and combinatory responses. However, this can only
be a rudimentary starting point for characterizing the precise contribution of the
LATL, as the semantic hub theories offer no mechanistic model of how complex
concepts are composed. Since the richest body of work on this topic can be found
under the term “conceptual combination” within cognitive psychology, we turn
next to these models in order to evaluate extant LATL data in light of predictions
arising from this work.
3 Theories of Conceptual Combination
Within psychology, theories of conceptual combination have focused almost
exclusively on the modiﬁcation of nouns, either by adjectives (e.g. red apple) or by
other nouns (e.g. city dog). In modiﬁcation, the concept being modiﬁed is the
‘head’, while the other is the ‘modiﬁer’. Psychological models for how concepts are
274 M. Westerlund and L. Pylkkänen
combined fall into two general camps: ‘schema-based’ models and ‘relation-based’
models. Schema-based models propose that interpretation arises from the features
of the individual constituents (Cohen and Murphy 1984; Hampton 1987, 1997;
Murphy 1988; Rumelhart 1980; Smith et al. 1988; Wisniewski 1997), whereas
relation-based models focus on how interpretation arises from the general rela-
tionship between constituents (Downing 1977; Gagné 2001; Gagné and Shoben
1997, 2002; Gleitman and Gleitman 1970; Levi 1978).
3.1 Schema-Based Models
Schema-based models start with the assumption that concepts contain sets of fea-
tures organized into a ‘schema’ (Cohen and Murphy 1984; Rumelhart 1980). Rather
than a disorganized list of features (is red, is sweet, is round, etc.), features within a
schema are organized into a set of dimensions that are important to that concept.
For example, the concept apple might have dimensions for color, shape, and taste,
amongst others, but not, say, for speed. Within each dimension, features are
weighted according to how typical they are for the concept. In the color dimension,
apple might have the possible features green, red and brown as features, and red
would be weighted higher than brown.
Within this framework, conceptual combination involves the modiﬁcation of the
head’s schema by a feature of the modiﬁer. Smith et al. (1988) laid out a prominent
version of this model, in which each dimension is weighted by how ‘diagnostic’ it
is for a concept; in other words, how useful the dimension is for distinguishing it
from similar concepts. For example, the taste dimension is useful for distinguishing
an apple from other small, round objects, as well as from other fruit. When two
concepts are composed, the modiﬁer’s feature is placed into a particular dimension
in the head’s schema. In red apple, for example, the feature red is placed into
apple’s color dimension. The process of modifying a dimension also makes that
dimension more diagnostic for the concept. This captures the intuitive fact that
knowing that a concept is red is even more important for identifying a red apple
than an apple.
While useful, this model struggles to account for instances of modiﬁcation in
which the modiﬁer is more complex than a simple adjective like red. Murphy
(1988) provides the adjective corporate as an example. The dimension that cor-
porate modiﬁes in a composed phrase is dependent on the head noun: a corporate
car is one owned by the company (modifying the ownership dimension), a cor-
porate lawyer is one who works for the company (modifying the employment
dimension), and corporate stationery has the company’s logo on it (modifying a
visual dimension). Furthermore, there can be complex interactions between the
various dimensions of a concept when it is modiﬁed (Medin and Shoben 1988;
Murphy 2002)—for example, the modiﬁer brown does not just modify the color
dimension of apple, but also affects our idea of its taste (unpleasant) and texture
(mushy).
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Murphy (1988, 1990) proposed that these complications can be accounted for by
adding world knowledge to the model. Comprehenders can then draw upon their
existing knowledge of cars, lawyers and stationery when deciding what dimension
is likely to be modiﬁed by corporate. Furthermore, after the appropriate dimension
has been identiﬁed and modiﬁed, world knowledge can be used to make further
inferences about the concept (Murphy 1990). For example, a comprehender might
realize that a brown apple is probably rotten, and use this knowledge to draw
conclusions about its likely taste and smell. One possible mechanism for this
process is ‘extensional feedback’ (Hampton 1987)—essentially, particular instances
of a composed concept can be retrieved from memory, and those memories can be
used to reﬁne the representation of the concept. For example, after reading brown
apple, you might remember the last brown apple you had the misfortune of biting
into, and you can incorporate aspects of that memory (the bad smell, the soft mush,
etc.) into your representation of the concept.
3.2 Relation-Based Models
The central insight behind relation-based models of conceptual combination is the
fact that concepts are often combined according to certain patterns. In the phrases
glass bottle, pea soup, and leather purse, the modiﬁers and heads are in a similar
relationship; in all three cases, the head is ‘made of’ the modiﬁer. Relation-based
models propose that comprehenders make use of these statistical regularities in their
language to constrain the process of composition. For example, when a compre-
hender reads the phrase glass bottle, she can recognize an instance of ‘made of’
relationship, and therefore immediately understand that a glass bottle is a bottle
‘made of’ glass without needing to access the speciﬁc features of the particular
concepts.
The most prominent relational model of conceptual combination is the RICE
(Relational Interpretation Competitive Evaluation) model (Spalding et al. 2010),
previously the CARIN (Competition Among Relations in Nominals) model (Gagné
and Shoben 1997). This model argues that there is a ﬁxed set of ‘primitive’ relations
into which all combinations can be classiﬁed (Downing 1977; Levi 1978), and that
comprehenders store distributional information about the types of relations in which
the words of their language tend to occur. The process of combining concepts
therefore consists of retrieving the appropriate relationship between the modiﬁer
and head and linking the concepts according to that relation. As an example, the
noun mountain, when used as a modiﬁer, occurs much more often in a location
relation (e.g. mountain cloud) than in an about relation (e.g. mountain magazine).
Gagné and Shoben (1997) showed that participants were quicker at judging the
sensicality of phrases in which modiﬁers were in a more frequent relation to the
head (i.e. mountain cloud was easier to interpret than mountain magazine).
Several researchers have argued that the assumption that there is a constrained
set of relational ‘primitives’ that are stored separately in the mental lexicon is not
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necessary for a relation-based model. Using Wordnet (Seco et al. 2004), Devereux
and Costello (2005) examined the semantic similarity of the constituent words for
all the phrases used in Gagné (2001), and concluded that semantically similar words
tend to be used in similar kinds of relations. For instance, gas and propane are
lexically very similar, and also tended to be used in combinations with similar kinds
of relations (gas crisis, propane shortage). Maguire et al. (2010) conﬁrmed that the
type of relations in which constituents tend to occur can be predicted by the
semantic nature of the constituents, in a study of all noun-noun combinations in
the British National Corpus. Using WordNet, they classiﬁed all the constituents in
the corpus into 25 different high-level semantic categories, such as ‘substance’,
‘artifact’, or ‘emotion’, and found a strong relationship between the semantic cat-
egories of the constituents in the combinations and their relations. They argued that
distributional information based on the semantics of the constituents can guide the
construction of a relation between them without necessitating the assumption of a
separately stored relation.
Importantly, there is evidence that people are sensitive to these category-level
statistical patterns. Maguire et al. (2010) showed that participants were able to
evaluate a combination like chocolate taste just as quickly as a combination like
chocolate rabbit, even though only chocolate rabbit conforms to the highest
relation frequency for chocolate (‘made of’). The RICE model would instead have
predicted that chocolate rabbit would be interpreted more rapidly, as it is the phrase
with the more frequent relation for chocolate. The authors suggested that this
contradictory result arose from the fact that substance-attribute combinations like
chocolate taste most frequently occur in the ‘has’ relation, which can make up for
the speciﬁc preference that chocolate has for a ‘made of’ relation like chocolate
rabbit.
3.3 Summary
In sum, schema-based models and relation-based models each address different
aspects of the composition process. Schema-based models focus on the internal
conceptual structure of constituents, and on how this internal structure is modiﬁed
when the concepts are combined. Relation-based models focus on statistical reg-
ularities in how concepts tend to compose, and argue that this information guides
the composition process. Importantly, these models are not necessarily mutually
exclusive. Maguire et al. (2010) suggest that statistical information could serve a
similar function to world knowledge within the schema modiﬁcation process, by
identifying candidate dimensions for modiﬁcation based on previously encountered
similar examples. They provide the example of stone squirrel. If a comprehender
matches the phrase to the common combination pattern ‘substance-object’, and
knows that this combination is most often used in a ‘made of’ relation, he can then
avoid retrieving irrelevant features such as is alive or eats nuts, and instead be
guided towards form features like has a tail and has four legs.
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4 Processing Predictions of Schema
and Relation-Based Models
4.1 Storage and Retrieval
The most important assumption of schema-based models of conceptual combina-
tion is that concepts are represented as a collection of features organized into
structured schemas. This assumption is also the basis of the semantic hub model of
the LATL, in which features are organized in modality speciﬁc areas, representing
dimensions, and the hub serves to organize all the relevant dimensions into a
schema.
Composing concepts requires the selection of the relevant feature of the modi-
ﬁer, as well as the corresponding dimension of the head; therefore, schema-based
models also assume that composition ﬁrst requires the retrieval of the feature
representations of both constituent concepts. According to the semantic hub model,
these feature representations are mediated in the LATL. Together, these models
predict that the LATL is involved in retrieving the feature schema for the modiﬁer
and head noun, and that this process is the necessary ﬁrst stage of conceptual
combination.
Relation-based models argue that language users store statistical information
about the distribution of concepts in their language across relation types. Maguire
et al. (2010) suggest that the relevant distributional information about composed
phrases is at the level of general semantic categories, such as plant-plant (e.g. flower
bud) and substance-substance (e.g. wax paste), rather than at the level of individual
words. Under this type of account, one might then expect certain neural responses
to encode combinations of category-level information. However, as regards the
LATL, Westerlund and Pylkkänen (2014) and Zhang and Pylkkänen (2015) have
shown that LATL combinatorial responses are sensitive to the speciﬁcity of the
nouns being composed, even when the nouns are in the same general semantic
category (for example, blue canoe and blue boat might each be categorized as
‘attribute-object’). Therefore, category-level information alone does not appear to
be driving LATL responses, though these results of course do not directly rule out
relation-based models. Determining whether the frequency of a given combination
affects combinatory responses in the LATL would be a more direct test of the
predictions of relation-based models. Furthermore, as proposed by Maguire et al.
(2010), it is possible that statistical information is accessed prior to the composition
response measured in the LATL, and used to guide feature selection.
More generally, if distributional information does guide the retrieval of features
in the LATL, we would expect different representations to be retrieved for the same
word, depending on the type of phrase it is presented in. Indeed, there is behavioral
evidence that the features that are retrieved for a concept are context-speciﬁc
(Barclay et al. 1974; Barsalou 1982; Tabossi and Johnson-Laird 1980). For
example, Tabossi and Johnson-Laird (1980) presented the same word within two
different contexts that each emphasized a different feature of the concept.
278 M. Westerlund and L. Pylkkänen
(1) The goldsmith cut the glass with the diamond
(2) The mirror dispersed the light from the diamond
Participants were faster at verifying the truth of the subsequent sentences dia-
monds are hard or diamonds are brilliant when these were compatible with the
feature emphasized by the context. However, there is as of yet no speciﬁc evidence
that distributional information of the kind posited by Maguire et al. (2010) con-
strains feature selection in the LATL.
In sum, schema models, which assume that a concept’s feature schema is
retrieved prior to composition, have direct theoretical overlap with semantic hub
models of the LATL. The idea that distributional information might direct feature
retrieval is open to further investigation.
4.2 Composition
4.2.1 What Is the Combinatory Process?
After the features and/or relations of the constituent concepts have been retrieved, a
composed concept is created. A composed concept is not simply the knowledge
that, for example, cooked pasta is pasta that has been cooked. Above and beyond
the features of the constituents, composed concepts have features that are true of the
combined representation but not of the individual constituents, or ‘emergent fea-
tures’. For example, comprehenders know that cooked pasta is soft even though
pasta itself could be hard. Thus composition can also result in the ‘deletion’ of
features. Understanding how, when, and even whether comprehenders arrive at a
complete composed representation is crucial to understanding the combinatory
process.
In schema-based models, the core process underlying combination involves the
selection of a relevant feature of the modiﬁer and the related dimension of the head.
Thus, these models predict that it will be more difﬁcult to select the appropriate
features for constituents with more complex internal representations, and that such
phrases will therefore be more difﬁcult to compose. There is behavioral evidence
that this is in fact the case. Participants were slower to understand novel phrases
with noun or non-predicating adjectives modiﬁers (such as prostitute committee)
than novel phrases with predicating adjectives (such as edible food) (Murphy 1990).
The speed of interpretation was also affected by the typicality and abstractness of
the modiﬁer (inedible food was interpreted more slowly than edible food) (Murphy
1990; van Jaarsveld and Drašković 2003; Xu and Ran 2011). If the LATL is
involved in the process of composing concepts, rather than in simply retrieving the
relevant representations, we might expect to see greater LATL activity for more
complex modiﬁers. This is consistent with the results of Zhang and Pylkkänen
(2015), in which composing more speciﬁc modiﬁers, with more features, elicited
greater LATL activity on the head noun.
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It is less clear how to reconcile this prediction with results from Westerlund and
Pylkkänen (2014) showing that less speciﬁc heads elicit greater LATL combinatory
responses. Less speciﬁc concepts have fewer features and therefore a less complex
internal representation; however, it may be more difﬁcult to select the appropriate
dimension to modify in a more general concept. For instance, what is a brown
animal? If it’s a mammal, this might be an animal with the feature brown in the
color-of-fur dimension. Alternatively, it might be color-of-scales if it’s a ﬁsh, or
color-of-feathers if it’s a bird. A noun denoting a general category of concepts,
comprising multiple disparate subcategories of concepts, may not have a single
readily accessible dimension that can be modiﬁed, in which case it might be more
difﬁcult to compose. Of course, this hypothesis makes the prediction that combi-
natory responses will vary depending on the modiﬁer; a modiﬁer that targets a
feature at the more general level might be easier to compose with a more general
head (e.g. dead animal).
Schema-based models also assume that a combined concept will inherit most of
the features of its constituents. Other than the dimension(s) being modiﬁed, the
features of the head noun should remain stable in the resulting representation. For
example, the representation of a red apple should still have the features of apple
(i.e. is sweet, is a fruit, grows on a tree, etc.). Connolly, Fodor, Gleitman, and
Gleitman (Gainotti 2007) argue, however, that the feature inheritance assumption is
incompatible with a phenomenon they term the ‘modiﬁcation effect’—the fact that
properties that are believed to be true of a concept are judged to be less true of a
modiﬁed concept. As a typical example, people rate baby ducks have webbed feet as
less true than ducks have webbed feet, despite the fact that webbed feet should be
inherited from duck into the composed phrase (Connolly et al. 2007). The modi-
ﬁcation effect also holds for non-word modiﬁers, which have no semantic content
(e.g. brinn bottles are cylindrical) (Gagné and Spalding, 2011).
Spalding and Gagné (2014) also provide intriguing evidence for a ‘reverse
modiﬁcation effect’, in which noun properties that are evaluated as false (e.g.
candles have teeth) are judged as less false when the noun is modiﬁed (e.g. purple
candles have teeth). Participants appear to be both less comfortable attributing a
true property (having webbed feet) and more comfortable attributing false prop-
erties (having teeth) to modiﬁed nouns.
Gagné and Spalding (2014) argue that the modiﬁcation and reverse modiﬁcation
effects are more compatible with relation-based models than schema-based models.
In the RICE model, they propose that the initial output of the composition process is
an underspeciﬁed representation, which they term a ‘relational gist’, limited to the
relation between the two constituent concepts. A comprehender’s ﬁrst-pass
understanding of a composed concept might thus correspond roughly to the idea
that ‘a mountain cloud is a cloud located in the mountains’, or that ‘a corporate car
is a car used by a corporation’ (Gagné and Spalding 2014; Spalding and Gagné
2014). In other words, they argue that no features are inherited during the ﬁrst stage
of the composition process. Any further information about the composed concept,
such as the fact that mountain clouds are white, fluffy, and block out the sun, is
accessed if and only if the context necessitates further interpretation.
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The intuition that combined concepts are initially underspeciﬁed, and are only
fully fleshed out if the context requires it is similar to a prominent model of
sentence processing in psycholinguistics, in which comprehenders construct rep-
resentations that are ‘good enough’ for the task of understanding the meaning of the
sentence but do not reflect a complete syntactic and semantic analysis of the sen-
tence (Ferreira et al. 2001, 2002; Ferreira and Patson 2007). However, this idea is
not as incompatible with schema-based models as Spalding and Gagné suggest. It
is somewhat implausible to assume that every feature of a concept is retrieved and
active during the process of composition: in composing the constituents baby and
duck, for example, a comprehender would have to activate every single feature that
he or she knows about ducks, including the fact that they have eyes, a heart and
lungs, lay eggs, breathe, etc. Instead, context and world knowledge can limit feature
retrieval. Therefore, if one assumes that in the absence of a supporting context the
speciﬁc feature having webbed feet is not part of the initial combined concept of
baby duck, schema modiﬁcation models do not strictly conflict with modiﬁcation
and reverse modiﬁcation effects. Instead, these effects might arise out of a post hoc
pragmatic reasoning process which assumes that a speaker is providing exactly the
necessary information and no more, leading participants to assume that the modiﬁer
plays an important contrastive role in the phrase (Gagné and Spalding 2014; Grice
1975; Hampton et al. 2011; Jönsson and Hampton 2012).
In sum, modiﬁcation and reverse modiﬁcation effects themselves are potentially
compatible with either model of composition. Instead, the major difference between
both models lies in whether the activation of conceptual features is necessary in
order for composition to occur. Schema-based models posit that conceptual features
are the elements being composed, whereas relation-based models assume that a
‘good-enough’ relational gist, lacking speciﬁc featural information, is the initial
output of the combinatory process.
The fact that the complexity of a modiﬁer’s schema affects composition in the
LATL is therefore most compatible with the predictions of schema models. In the
absence of a context requiring the retrieval of speciﬁc features, the relational gist
hypothesis does not straightforwardly predict that the conceptual speciﬁcity of the
constituents would affect LATL responses. Schema-based models further predict
that combinatory processes will be disrupted by damage to the LATL; for example,
it should be very difﬁcult to comprehend a phrase in which the modiﬁer addresses a
dimension of a more speciﬁc concept, since that concept’s representation will be
degraded. On the other hand, if distributional information can be used to construct a
relational gist without accessing a concept’s features, patients with SD should not
struggle to comprehend composed phrases. In this case, we might expect these
‘gist’ representations to reflect category-level generalizations, with patients con-
structing similar interpretations of, for example, red apple and red cherry. To the
best of our knowledge, patient studies have not yet provided evidence about
patients’ combinatory abilities that is ﬁne-grained enough to allow us to verify these
predictions.
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4.2.2 Timing of Composition
Both schema-based and relation-based models are compatible with the existence of
a ﬁrst-pass, shallow composition process, followed by a more elaborative stage.
According to schema-based models, the ﬁrst stage of the combinatory process
involves the retrieval of concept features followed by an elaboration stage aided by
world knowledge; therefore, combinatory activity in the LATL, peaking at 250 ms,
could provide an estimate of the timing of this ﬁrst stage of feature retrieval. On the
other hand, the ﬁrst stage of composition in the RICE model is the construction of a
relational gist, and concept features are only accessed, if necessary, in a second
stage. Therefore, the most straightforward way to reconcile this model with current
evidence about the LATL’s combinatory responses is to either assume that com-
binatory activity in the LATL represents a second processing stage after a relational
gist has been constructed, or that LATL activity is tangential to the composition
process.
Furthermore, because the ﬁrst stage of composition in the RICE model does not
involve the retrieval of conceptual features, this makes the prediction that features
that are irrelevant to the combined concept will never be activated at any stage of
processing. Several behavioral experiments have been conducted to address this
prediction by investigating the accessibility of emergent and deleted features at
various points during composition. Early evidence suggested that phrasal features
were actually accessible faster or at the same time as the features of the individual
constituents (Gagné and Murphy 1996; Glucksberg and Estes 2000; Hampton and
Springer 1989; Potter and Faulconer 1979). For example, Springer and Murphy
(1992) found that subjects were faster at evaluating the truth of a sentence like
boiled celery is crispy than boiled celery is green. At ﬁrst glance, these results are
compatible with the predictions of the RICE model.
However, these early experiments measured relatively slow response times
(around one second), and therefore may have primarily reflected late-stage rea-
soning processes. When McElree et al. (2006) used a speed-accuracy tradeoff task
to examine the online accessibility of noun and phrasal features, they showed that
noun features (water pistols have triggers) were veriﬁed more accurately than
emergent features (water pistols are harmless) at early stages of processing.
Importantly, subjects were also slower to reject deleted features (water pistols are
dangerous), suggesting that irrelevant noun features are retrieved during the
combinatory process. Furthermore, Swinney et al. (2007) used a cross-modal
priming task to conﬁrm that deleted features (peeled banana-yellow) are primed
during composition, and more quickly than emergent features (peeled banana-
white).
These results suggest that irrelevant noun features (e.g. bananas are yellow) are
in fact activated during composition, contradicting the predictions of relation-based
models. Furthermore, phrasal features (e.g. peeled bananas are white) emerged
relatively rapidly, in the absence of explicit pragmatic demands. This suggests that
at least some phrasal features are an automatic outcome of the composition process,
though they emerge after noun features have been retrieved.
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In sum, behavioral and neurophysiological evidence suggest that constituent
features are retrieved very rapidly, at or before 250 ms after the onset of composing
word. This is followed by the retrieval of features of the composed phrase, a process
that may still be ongoing at around 600 ms (Molinaro et al. 2012). Therefore,
current evidence supports a two-stage model of conceptual combination. First, at
least some of the features of both constituents are activated. This feature activation
may be guided by an existing context, and might also be guided by statistical
information about the semantic category of the constituents. Then, the modiﬁer’s
feature modiﬁes the representation of the head concept, leading to the emergence of
new phrasal features and the suppression of irrelevant noun features. This can be
followed by a further stage of explicit reasoning processes, possibly only to the
extent that this is necessary in the comprehension context (Hampton 1987; Murphy
1988, 1990). Of course, composed phrases are often encountered in the context of a
phrase or paragraph, in which case contextual information may be available prior to
the start of the composition process.
Though further investigation is necessary to determine precisely how phrasal
features are retrieved, and how contextual and world knowledge information guide
retrieval, the fact that irrelevant features are retrieved during the composition
process is more compatible with schema-based models than with relation-based
models, though it remains unclear whether these irrelevant features are retrieved in
the LATL.
5 Conclusions and Future Directions
In this chapter, we have laid out the general predictions and assumptions of schema
and relation-based models of conceptual combination. Schema-based models argue
that composition involves the activation of a both constituents’ feature schemata
and the modiﬁcation of the head’s schema by a feature of the modiﬁer, whereas
relation-based models focus on the importance of distributional information in
guiding the interpretation of a composed concept.
The fact that LATL combinatory responses take place mostly on the head, after
both feature representations can be accessed, and are sensitive to the conceptual
speciﬁcity of the composing constituents provides preliminary evidence more
compatible with the predictions of schema-based models than with the predictions
of relation-based models. Schema-based models can be combined with the semantic
hub model to predict that the LATL is the locus of feature retrieval and of schema
modiﬁcation, though it is likely that this latter process involves an interplay
between the LATL and other higher-order regions, such as the LIFG
(Thompson-Schill et al. 1997, 1999) and possibly the angular gyrus (Molinaro et al.
2015; Price et al. 2015), particularly if world knowledge and contextual information
can be used to guide the composition process.
Furthermore, schema-based models make the following testable predictions
about the LATL as the neural center of composition: (i) that the speciﬁc features
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activated for the composed constituents should vary to some degree depending on
the surrounding context and possibly on distributional information about the con-
stituents, (ii) that the difﬁculty of integrating the modiﬁer’s feature into the head’s
schema will affect the amplitude or timing of combinatory responses, (iii) that
supporting contextual information should mitigate these effects, and (iv) that
phrasal features will be retrieved later in composition. Equipped with these pre-
dictions, we can now guide our investigation of the LATL in order to construct a
detailed model of its combinatory role and its relationships to other language
regions. Of course, we do not have enough evidence to rule out relation-based
models entirely, and therefore should further investigate the role of distributional
information on LATL responses.
In this review, we have focused exclusively on theories of modiﬁcation,
restricted to the composition of adjective-noun and noun-noun phrases. In light of
evidence that the LATL shows similar combinatory responses across composition
types (Westerlund et al. 2015), it is important to determine whether we can extend
current psychological models of composition to include other composition types.
While this challenge is beyond the scope of this chapter, we do note that
Bornkessel-Schlesewsky and Schlesewsky (2013) have advanced a general com-
positional model in which all words have an ‘actor-event schema’, which focuses
on actors and actions. For example, an actor-event schema for paint might include
the typical actor (humans) as well as the typical actions performed around it. This
idea is similar in intent to an idea put forth by Wisniewski (1997) that concept
schemas should include ‘scenarios’ corresponding to verbs describing actions or
events relevant to the concept. These schemata are then composed in much that
same manner as modiﬁed phrases, with the head’s schema being altered by the
information it is composed with. For example, in a phrase like the doctor paints, the
actor dimension would be ﬁlled with the subject doctor. Bornkessel-Schlesewsky
and Schlesewsky (2013) propose that these general schemas are combined in the
LATL, and therefore provide a possible ﬁrst step towards investigating the com-
position of other types of concepts than simply adjectives and nouns.
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Dimension Accessibility as a Predictor
of Morphological Gradability
Galit W. Sassoon
Abstract Existing formal theories represent the interpretations of gradable predi-
cates in terms of single scalar dimensions. This paper presents a new approach,
which aims to cover morphological gradability in multidimensional adjectives and
nouns. Following psychological theories, nouns are assumed to be associated with
dimension sets, like adjectives. Degree constructions are proposed to involve
quantiﬁcation on dimensions. This approach correlates the acceptability of a given
noun or adjective in comparison constructions with its type of characteristic cate-
gorization criterion (i.e., whether, as a default, its dimensions combine into a single
criterion via quantiﬁers or other operations). A preliminary study conﬁrms the
predicted correlation. Directions for future research are proposed.
1 Adjectives Versus Nouns in Comparison Constructions
1.1 The Challenges
In model-theoretic referential semantics, the interpretation of a predicate (a word
like dog, big, or card game) is modeled through its intension, namely, a function
from contexts (such as worlds, times, or information states) into classes of entities,
contextually given extensions. By contrast, in cognitive psychology, concepts such
as ‘dog’, ‘big’, or ‘card game’ are modeled through their dimensions, prototypes,
and similarity structures. Gradually, it has been understood that both formal and
conceptual representations play a role in natural language semantics. This is evident
in the study of morphological gradability, which is the topic of the present study.
Natural language predicates can be divided into various syntactic categories, two of
which are adjectives and nouns. Most adjectives, including, tall, expensive and
healthy among others, aremorphologically gradable. In other words, they felicitously
G.W. Sassoon (✉)
Department of English Literature and Linguistics, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel
e-mail: galitadar@gmail.com
© The Author(s) 2017
J.A. Hampton and Y. Winter (eds.), Compositionality and Concepts
in Linguistics and Psychology, Language, Cognition, and Mind 3,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-45977-6_12
291
combinewith degreemorphemes, as in taller, tallest, too tall, tall enough and very tall.
However, some adjectives exist that are not morphologically gradable, including, for
instance, geological, prime, and even. Thus, a map can be said to be more expensive
than another map, but not more geological.
Degree morphemes that classically combine with gradable adjectives are, by and
large, incompatible with nouns, as the infelicitous forms in (1) illustrate. The sit-
uation persists across languages (Baker 2003) In particular, within-noun compar-
isons such as (2) are not naturally used to compare, e.g., real ducks. Their status
improves only when, e.g., toys or drawings of ducks are discussed, namely in
non-literal interpretations of duck (‘duck-like’). In English, when the noun occurs as
the complement of a mediating particle, such as the preposition of in (3a), this also
raises the acceptability of the within-noun comparison. Moreover, given nouns like
duck as inputs, morpho-syntactic processes may yield adjective phrases as outputs,
such as duckish or duck-like, which are compatible with degree morphemes, as
illustrated in (3b).
(1) #Ducker, #Duckest, #duck enough, #too duck, #very duck
(2) #The rightmost bird is more a duck than the leftmost bird.
(3) a. The rightmost bird is more of a duck than the leftmost bird.
b. This toy bird is more {duckish, duck-like} than that toy bird.
Hence nouns are generally thought to be incompatible with degree morphemes.
While the data can be explained by stipulating a syntactic constraint along these
lines, researchers of gradability explain the data by postulating a semantic type
difference. Nouns are conventionally thought to denote, in each context of evalu-
ation, sets of entities, whereas adjectives are often thought to denote a scalar
dimension. For example, in every world, long denotes a function, flong, from entities
to their degrees on the length dimension. Non gradable adjectives are represented in
terms of binary dimensions (Kennedy 1999; see von Stechow 1984 and Heim 2000
for slightly more complex degree-based types). Dimensions form the basis for
categorization, therefore entities whose length exceeds a contextual membership
norm are classiﬁed as long.
The problem with the syntactic-category and/or semantic-type approach comes
from gradable constructions that ARE acceptable with nouns. The unacceptable
construction in (2) above is a within-predicate comparison, namely, a comparison
of two entities along the dimensions of a single predicate (duck). However, the
between-predicate comparisons in (4a) and (5a, b), which involve comparisons of
single entities along the dimensions of two different predicates, seem to have dif-
ferent distributional constraints. Many dimensional adjective pairs cannot naturally
co-occur in such comparisons, as illustrated in (4b) (Kennedy 1999), while
between-noun comparisons, such as (5a, b), appear generally natural—clearly more
than their within-noun counterparts in (5c, d). A mediating particle of is mandatory
for the latter to sound natural.
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(4) a. This dish is more sour than sweet
b. #The table is {longer, more long} than heavy
(5) a. Rubinstein is more a pianist than a conductor.
b. This creature is more a crab than a lobster.
c. #Rubinstein is more a pianist than my son
d. #This creature is more a crab than that one is.
Between-noun comparisons are often analyzed in metalinguistic terms. For
example, Morzycki (2011) describes them as comparisons along degrees of
imprecision of propositions in the sense of Lasershon (1999). Following this
analysis, (5a) conveys that the proposition Rubinstein is a pianist is closer to the
truth than the proposition Rubinstein is a conductor. A problem that arises from this
analysis is that both of these propositions are plainly true. Thus, in order to explain
examples like (5a), Morzycki’s imprecision scale has to include various degrees of
plain truth. The basis for the distinction between these degrees seems to lie in the
prototypicality structures underlying categorization under pianist and conductor,
but the details of this intuition have yet to be explicated (relevantly, see Hampton
2007 for the view that similarity to a prototype is a common basis for both typi-
cality and graded membership).
In addition, Morzycki (2011) convincingly criticizes previous analyses on the
grounds that they are not restrictive enough. However, his account is also not
restrictive enough. (5d) is judged less natural than (5b) despite the fact that the
propositions This is a crab and That is a crab may differ in terms of their distance
from the truth just as much as the propositions This is a crab and This is a lobster
may. Nor is the data in (1)–(2) explained, e.g., why can’t degree morphemes such as
very and too combine with nouns and relate to imprecision-based scales? In sum,
metalinguistic scales of imprecision (or of speakers’ preference, cf. Giannakidou
and Yoon 2011) do not form an exhaustive account of gradability in nouns. This
paper proposes that these scales emerge as a consequence of the workings of
categorization mechanisms. Only the latter have the potential to explain the com-
plexity of the data.
The goals of this paper are programmatic. It aims to give a direction for an
explanation of morphological gradability and to begin developing methods to test
its predictions, rather than to report some complete results. The goal is to assess
more systematically the relative acceptability of nouns in different comparison
types, and to begin testing additional, more speciﬁc, predictions of the hypothesized
account, while indicating the issues which are left open for future research.
Multiple factors may affect judgments of acceptability, including, for example,
syntactic well-formedness, adherence to a language norm or register, frequency of
use, and semantic-pragmatic appropriateness (Bard et al. 1996). Focusing on
semantic-pragmatic aspects, this paper explores the proposal that the role of their
dimensions in categorization is an important factor in explaining the status of
predicates in degree constructions. Classiﬁcation under long is merely a matter of
length, but classiﬁcation under healthy, for example, is a matter of degree in a
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variety of dimensions such as blood-pressure, cholesterol and blood-sugar level.
One can be healthy in some respects but not others (Kamp 1975; Klein 1980).
Hence, in addition to the fact that, in each context, predicates denote degree
functions and are associated with entity sets through classiﬁcation norms (Kennedy
1999), I propose that the relation dimension of associates each predicate (e.g., bird,
healthy, similar), in each context, with a set of one or more predicates—its con-
textual dimensions (e.g., has a beak, healthy with respect to the flu, ).1
While degree functions and entity sets can be learnt independently of a speci-
ﬁcation of dimensions, speakers do seem to make pervasive use of dimensions in
decisions about degrees and categorization. For example, as explained in Sect. 1.2,
the degree functions of nouns are often determined using the degree functions of
their dimensions (functions from entities into the degree to which their values in the
dimensions match certain ideal values).
Previous formal accounts have considered comparison constructions from the
perspective of one-dimensional adjectives such as long. However, the naturalness
of comparison constructions with multidimensional adjectives, and even with
nouns, suggests that the comparison morpheme denotes an operation that can access
their dimension set and use it for comparison. An important question arises con-
cerning semantic composition. How do the different dimensions of a predicate and
the operation denoted by a degree morpheme combine?
The following paraphrases of hypothesized readings of comparison construc-
tions illustrate the potential relevance of dimensions and the way they combine
together. Examples (6a) and (6b) include paraphrases for within-adjective com-
parisons with a dimensional and a multidimensional adjective, respectively.
Examples (6c) and (6d) include possible paraphrases for between-predicate com-
parisons with multidimensional adjectives and nouns, respectively. A more sys-
tematic study is needed to determine whether such readings do indeed exist.
(6) a. The sofa is 2 cm longer than the table (is): The difference between the
degree of the sofa and the table in the dimension underlying entity classi-
ﬁcation as long or not, flength, equals twice the degree of a centimeter.
b. (Generally) John is healthier than Bill: (Generally), the difference between
the degrees of John and Bill in the dimensions contextually underlying
entity classiﬁcation as healthy or not, fblood pressure, fcholesterol, fchickenpox, …,
exceeds zero.
c. John is more optimistic than pessimistic: The number of dimensions along
which John is optimistic exceeds the number of dimensions along which he
is pessimistic.
1Describing in detail a formal model and the ways it addresses philosophical arguments against
dimensions would demand more space than allocated for this paper. See Sassoon (2013a) for
extensive discussions.
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d. John is more (of) a linguist than a psychologist: The number (or proportion)
of dimensions of a linguist whose membership norm John exceeds is higher
than the number (or proportion) of dimensions of a psychologist whose
norm he exceeds.
These paraphrases suggest that comparison morphemes involve quantiﬁcation
over or counting of dimensions. In other words, it follows from (6a, b) that a degree
difference in at least SOME dimensions of an adjective should be present for within
noun comparisons to hold true. In positive multidimensional adjectives, such as
healthy, the requirement might be stronger to the extent that a degree difference
should generally be present in ALL or MOST of the dimensions. Furthermore, it
follows from (6c, d) that a larger NUMBER or PERCENTAGE of dimensions of a
predicate in comparison to another predicate should be observed in an entity for the
comparison to hold true. Without of, the comparison in (6d) appears ambiguous
between such an interpretation, which seems especially accessible for American
English speakers, and an alternative one, whereby the relative similarity of John to
the prototypes of linguist and psychologist compare. Intuitively, John may have
neither properties of linguists nor of psychologists, but could still resemble their
prototypes to different extents. This would hold true if he is, for instance, a typical
philosopher, or maybe a child (Sassoon 2015).
A large body of data suggests that in categorization, the degree functions of the
nominal dimensions by default combine to form a single similarity function through
averaging operations such as weighted sums or products, as assumed in psycho-
logical similarity theories (cf., Sect. 1.2). By contrast, the degree functions of
adjectival dimensions appear by default to combine through counting operations,
such as those that formal, logical theories assume for quantifying expressions like
ALL,MOST or SOME (cf., Sect. 1.3). Thus, the hypothesis presented in (7) emerges:
(7) a. The Quantiﬁcational Hypothesis: In within-predicate comparisons (cf.,
(6a, b), (3)), other degree constructions such as those in (1), and possibly
also between-noun comparisons like (5a, b), the degree morpheme combi-
nes with the dimensions of the predicates via a counting operation (quan-
tiﬁer) in its semantics.
b. The reduced acceptability of nouns: If the dimensions of a predicate are
already bound by similarity operations, it is impossible or hard for a
quantiﬁer to access and bind them. As a result of this impossibility (or extra
processing cost involved in overriding the similarity operations), accept-
ability reduces.
The following tests suggest that the dimensions of multidimensional adjectives
are more accessible for grammatical operations, and in particular for quantiﬁers, to
operate on, than those of nouns (Bartsch 1986; Landman 1989; Sassoon 2013a).
Linguistic labels of operations on dimensions include prepositions, as in (8a),
quantiﬁers, as in (8b), exception phrases, as in (8c), and quantifying adverbs, as in
(8d), which on the relevant reading convey that their adjectival argument holds in
all (or most) respects. The dimensions of nouns, by contrast, are not easily
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accessible in this way, as the reduced acceptability of the nominal examples in
(9) illustrates.
(8) a. healthy with respect to blood pressure; good in math.
b. healthy in {some, most, every} respect(s); different in three respects.
c. healthy except for high cholesterol; identical except in two respects, size
and color.
d. perfectly healthy; {mostly, completely, totally} different.
(9) a. #bird with respect to size; #dog in movement.
b. #tiger in {some, most, every} respect(s); #table in three respects
c. #is a bird except for size; #is a snake except in two respects, length and color.
d. #perfectly (a) pine; #{mostly, completely, totally} a duck.
Accordingly, the within-predicate comparison morpheme (-er or more) and
similar degree morphemes, may denote operations on dimensions which are
incompatible with nouns. This is presumably because their dimensions are already
bound by similarity operations and thus inaccessible, as stated in (7b). Moreover,
according to the quantiﬁcational hypothesis presented in (7), the acceptability of
within-predicate comparisons (e.g., (6a, b) and (5c, d)) should correlate with the
acceptability of constructions involving quantiﬁcation over dimensions, such as
those in (8)–(9). This is because it is hypothesized that the same problem underlies
the reduced acceptability of nouns in all cases. The acceptability of these con-
structions is assumed to depend on the accessibility of the dimensions, namely, the
possibility for a quantifying operation to bind them. These predictions extend to
similar degree constructions, such as those in (1), and possibly to between-predicate
constructions, if those indeed have interpretations such as those in (6c, d). Finally,
presumably, mediation by morphemes such as of raises acceptability, because these
morphemes combine with the noun to prepare a set of dimensions for more to
operate on. Thus, labor is divided between the two morphemes. However, di-
mension accessibility may still affect processing and thus acceptability.
Much theoretical work is needed to develop this idea and much experimentation
to test it as well. However, this paper focuses on the more basic, general motivation
for the quantiﬁcational hypothesis. To better understand the determinants of
dimension accessibility, the following two sections review studies of the role of
dimensions and dimension-binding operations in categorization. We start by dis-
cussing the role of similarity operations in categorization under nouns.
1.2 Psychological Theories of Similarity-Based
Categorization
Consider, for example, ordinary concepts such as games. The intuition that all
members of such concept categories have something in common has been prevalent
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since antiquity. It led to the domination of the classical view of categorization and
predicate interpretation as based on deﬁnitions, namely necessary and sufﬁcient
conditions for membership in the extension. Wittgenstein (1953) encouraged his
readers to check whether games such as board games, Olympic games, and word
games, have anything in common. This move has led many to reject the classical
view on the grounds that deﬁnitional properties are rarely, if ever, found. For
example, one might think of a game as a physical activity, but this is not valid for
chess. One might consider competition against opponents, but solitaire does not
involve any opponents. Winning and losing characterize solitaire, but when a child
throws a ball at the wall they too disappear. Thus, a member of a natural category
may share a slightly different set of properties with each other member. Generally,
resemblances between members are much like resemblances between family
members.
This conception of categorization in terms of family resemblance triggered the
development of fruitful experimental paradigms, including extensive work within
cognitive psychology (for a review see Murphy 2002) This work has shown that
speakers associate concepts with sets of dimensions, and they systematically con-
sider entities that score highly in these dimensions better examples than others of
the concepts in question. For example, some of the bird dimensions include having
feathers, wings, beak, small size, egg-laying, flying, singing and perching. Thus, a
robin is considered more typical or representative of a bird than an ostrich (Rosch
1973). When subjects are asked to rate an item by typicality their ratings are
relatively similar, and typicality differences between members can be measured
with great reliability if one combines the responses of a group of raters (McCloskey
and Glucksberg 1978). Furthermore, typicality is a strong predictor of categoriza-
tion probability (Hampton 1998). and speed (Rosch 1973); e.g., the veriﬁcation of
sentences like a robin is a bird is faster than of sentences like an ostrich is a bird.
But in a context such as the bird walked across the barnyard, for which a chicken is
regarded as a typical bird, categorization is faster for chicken than for robin (Roth
and Shoben 1983).
These results motivated the prototype theory, which models conceptual
structure via a set of weighed dimensions and selected dimensional values that
characterize what the best example p of that concept is like, whether such an object
exists or not. Each dimension F has a weight WF (e.g., Wflying tells us how
important flying is in classiﬁcation) and a selected value, fF(p) (e.g., fsize(pbird)
represents the ideal size for birds), or range of values (e.g., characteristic colors for
apples). The typicality of an item d in a category like bird is modeled by d’s
similarity to the prototype of bird, pbird; e.g., the similarity of a robin to a bird is
indicated by its averaged degree in the bird dimensions: How well its values match
the prototypical values in the dimensions. Since instances of a concept may
resemble the prototype in some properties or others, but not necessarily in all its
properties, similarity among them is described as family resemblance.
Categorization, following this view, is a process of deciding whether an entity is
similar enough to a concept’s prototype. Thus, the tight coupling between similarity
and membership is captured (Hampton 1998, 2007). Moreover, newly encountered
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entities which average better than known members are correctly predicted to be
automatically regarded as category members. Thus, this account captures the fact that
we are able to categorize inﬁnitely many new instances under the concepts we are
familiar with, based on aﬁnite set of encoded dimensions andmembers. Classiﬁcation
of atypical instances is slower because they have low degrees in the dimensions. Thus,
more dimensions have to be considered to determine membership.
Two main types of similarity functions, additive and multiplicative, are relevant
to us, because, as we will shortly explain, nouns associated with them are predicted
to exhibit different levels of dimension accessibility. Additive Similarity can be
modeled as the weighted sum of x’s dimensional degrees, as in (10) (Rosch and
Mervis 1975),2 while multiplicative similarity can be modeled by the weighted
product of x’s dimensional degrees, as in (11) (Medin and Schaffer 1978).
(10) Additive similarity: S(x, p) = wF1fF1(x) + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + wFnfFn(x)
(11) Multiplicative similarity: S x, pð Þ= fF1 xð ÞWF1 ×⋯× fFn xð ÞWFn
Multiplication models cases in which the most radical decrease in similarity is
between entities which perfectly match the ideal in all the dimensions and entities
which mismatch in just one or very few dimensions. For instance, assuming, for
simplicity, equal dimensional weights and dimensional degrees between 0 and 1,
then even instances which match in all of the dimensions except for a 0.5 score in
one dimension, have a low mean similarity, 0.5, because multiplication yields 0.5
× 1 × ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ × 1 = 0.5 (Murphy 2002). Two 0.5 scores yield a mean similarity of
0.25, and so on. The decrease predicted by additive similarity is by far less drastic.
For example, each bird sub-species is associated with a bundle of dependent or
interrelated dimensions, such as shape, color, behavior, genetic layout, inner bio-
logical function and offspring characterization. Multiplication models the fact that a
shift in one dimension is usually sufﬁcient to justify classiﬁcation in a different
sub-species; e.g., all robins resemble prototypical robins in being small, eating
seeds and fruit, and communicating by singing, whereas all eagles resemble pro-
totypical eagles in being big, eating animals, and communicating with calls. An
entity which is somewhat a robin and somewhat an eagle would not classify as
either and would, instead, classify as a new species. Thus, multiplicative similarity
is recognized by a tendency for interrelated dimensions and gaps between cate-
gories, whereas additive similarity is recognized by independent dimensions and
category overlaps; e.g., a scholar with some properties of a linguist and some
properties of a philosopher may well count as both.
To study dimension integration in different noun domains, Hampton, Storms,
Simmons and Heussen (2009) invented scenarios with borderline cases. In one
scenario, a historical nuclear accident nearby a remote island resulted in the
2With binary dimensions (dimensions denoting functions from entities to 0 or 1), and weights
indicated by the number of category members satisfying them (WF = | [[bird]] ∩ [[F]] |), simi-
larity reduces to x’s family-resemblance score—the number of dimensions all-members share with
x (cf., Tversky 1977).
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evolution of hybrid creatures, e.g., a sub-kind with some features of lobsters and
some features of crabs. In a second scenario, a secluded community in a remote area
had the habit of using artifacts in ambiguous ways. For instance, some pieces of
clothing had features of both a scarf and a tie. Participants were asked to help
scientists classify the entities. In line with multiplicative-similarity, hybrids of two
natural kinds were often classiﬁed as neither one of the kinds. By contrast, in line
with additive similarity, hybrids of social categories were often classiﬁed as
belonging to both categories.
In an additional study, categorization under labels of artifacts and human traits,
unlike animals and plants, appeared often to be based on a simple counting strategy,
i.e., on whether entities were within the norm in some (or most) of the concept’s
dimensions (Wattenmaker 1995). This was modeled with additive similarity,
assuming binary dimensions (dimensions which denote functions from entities to 1
or 0) of equal weights. This case is unique in that the effect of averaging can be
represented via quantiﬁers. A social noun N is interpreted as denoting the property
that an entity x has if and only if x is within the membership norm (fF(x) = 1) in
SOME (or MOST) of N’s dimensions. This property discerns social nouns from
natural-kind nouns, in which categorization is based on multiplicative similarity (a
weighted product, rather than sum, as in (11)), so that even a representation of their
dimensions as binary and of equal weights does not yield classiﬁcation based on
dimension counting. Thus, given the quantiﬁcational hypothesis in (7), social nouns
are predicted to be more compatible than natural-kind nouns, not only with
quantiﬁcational dimension-binding operations, such as those in (8)–(9), but also
with degree morphemes such as those in (1)–(6).
Notice, however, that the adjective-noun distinction confounded the results of
Wattenmaker’s 1995 study. Most of the social concepts in his experiments were
adjectives applicable to humans, and most of the natural kind concepts were nouns.
Thus, the reported ﬁndings indirectly support the view that adjectives and social
nouns, but not natural-kind nouns, may be interpreted by means of quantiﬁcation
(dimension counts). The next section reviews linguistic data suggesting that
quantiﬁcation over dimensions is indeed prevalent in categorization under adjec-
tives. But this methodological issue highlights a broader point. To achieve better
understanding of the complexity of language cognition, a need arises for tighter
collaboration between linguists and psychologists. This need is precisely what this
book is meant to address.
1.3 Logical Operations of Quantiﬁcation Over Dimensions
in Adjective Categorization
Consider, for example, the adjective identical. Native speakers intuitively judge
entities as identical if and only if they are identical in all (or most) of the respects
that count as relevant in the context. By contrast, they intuitively judge entities to be
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different if and only if they are different in some (at least one) respect. Objects are
considered clean if and only if dirt of no sort (dust, stains, etc.) is attested on them,
while they are considered dirty if and only if dirt of some sort is attested. Indi-
viduals with a slight cold are not strictly speaking healthy, since they are not all
healthy, while one type of sickness sufﬁces to count as sick.
Considering these, among many other examples, the following hypotheses
emerge. First, the dimensions of adjectives seem to be integrated using quantiﬁ-
cation or counting operations. Second, the dimensions of positive adjectives (like,
e.g., identical, healthy and clean) appear, as a default, to be integrated by means of
universal quantiﬁers (ALL, NO). By contrast, those of their negative antonyms
appear to be integrated by existential quantiﬁers (SOME). In other words, intu-
itively, to count as healthy, one cannot have any serious disease, whereas to count
as sick, one must have some disease or other. Hence, healthy seems to mean healthy
in ALL respects while sick means sick in SOME respects. We may consider
someone to be healthy (or not to be sick) despite, say, high cholesterol only when
this dimension is considered irrelevant. When using expressions like all or every-
body, the standard practice is to ignore irrelevant entities (von Fintel 1994), but not
to allow any other exceptions. Moreover, the discourse in a given context may
revolve around cholesterol problems, for example, such that healthy and sick would
associate uniquely with this dimension. Thus, positive adjectives also have weak
interpretations.
Several corpus and judgment studies (Sassoon 2012, 2013b; Shamir 2013) ex-
plored these hypotheses. They suggest that, indeed, universal and existential
quantiﬁcation on dimensions is general among positive and negative adjectives, but
rare in concrete nouns. The methodology exploited the fact that exception phrases
indicate universal generalizations (generalizations, unlike existence statements, can
have exceptions). This fact is illustrated by the higher acceptability of (12a, b) than
of (12c, d) (von Fintel 1994; Hoeksema 1995; Moltmann 1995; Fox and Hackl
2006). Notice that, as logical theories predict, negated existential quantiﬁers are
universal (cf., (12b)), and negated universal quantiﬁers are existential (cf., (12d)).
(12) a. Everyone is happy except for Dan
b. No one is happy except for Dan
c. #Someone is happy except for Dan
d. #Not everyone is happy except for Dan
Accordingly, speakers tend to accept exception phrases with adjectives whose
dimensions combine via an implicit universal quantiﬁer ALL, but not with their
negative antonyms, whose dimensions combine via an existential quantiﬁer SOME,
cf. the acceptability contrast in (13a, c) (Hoeksema 1995). And since negated
existential quantiﬁers are universal and vice versa, the effect is reversed in the
presence of negation. Hence, exception phrases tend to be accepted with negated
existential adjectives, but not universal ones, as illustrated in (13b, d).
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(13) a. I am healthy except for high blood pressure (bp) (∀F≠ bp, I’m healthy in
F).
b. He is not sick except for the flu (¬∃F≠ flu, He’s sick in F/∀F≠ flu, He’s
healthy in F).
c. #I am sick except for normative blood pressure (#∃F≠ bp, ¬(I’m healthy
in F)).
d. #I am not healthy except for (normal) cholesterol (#∃F≠ ch, ¬(I’m healthy
in F)).
These judgments are supported by distributional patterns, as revealed in a study
of 1300 naturally occurring examples of the form ‘Adj. except’ with 8 antonym
pairs in positive versus negated contexts (Sassoon 2013b). Frequency of
co-occurrence of an adjective with dimensional exception phrases depended both
on adjective polarity (positive vs. negative) and context polarity (existence or
absence of negation), which interacted signiﬁcantly (p < 0.001). Universality, i.e.,
frequency of implicit universal quantiﬁcation on dimensions, as measured by the
frequency of exception phrase modiﬁcation of an adjective in contexts without
negation, was higher in positive adjectives (cf., (13a)) than in their negative
antonyms (cf., (13c)), whereas existentiality, i.e. frequency of implicit existential
quantiﬁcation on dimensions, as measured by frequency of exception phrase
modiﬁcation of an adjective when negated, was higher in negative adjectives (cf.
(13b)) than in positive ones (cf. (13d)). Moreover, in positive adjectives, univer-
sality was higher than existentiality, but in negative adjectives, it was lower.
These patterns were also reflected in survey results (Sassoon 2012). They sup-
port the view that negative antonymy systematically affects the force of quantiﬁer
on dimensions. The dimensions of positive adjectives tend to be bound by a uni-
versal quantiﬁer, ALL or NO, while those of negative antonyms tend to be bound
by an existential quantiﬁer, SOME. In other words, by default, multidimensional
adjectives are used to convey generalizations on dimensions, while multidimen-
sional antonyms relate to counterexamples to such generalizations. Moreover,
Shamir (2013) directly compared adjectival antonyms to concrete nouns, showing
that these nouns are less acceptable with dimensional exception phrases than either
positive or negative adjectives, in both negated and non-negated contexts
(p < 0.000; cf. #bird/not a bird, except for flying/size/wings), in line with dimen-
sion binding via similarity operations, instead of quantiﬁcation.
At the same time, context can override the tendency for similarity-based
dimension binding; e.g., in a scientiﬁc context in which birdhood is deﬁned by
means of n genes, it is acceptable to state that a certain exemplar is a bird except
with respect to 3 genes. Similarly, Sassoon’s (2013b) corpus results illustrate that
context can override the tendency for universal and existential quantiﬁcation in
positive and negative adjectives, respectively. This is also evident from certain
intuitive judgments; e.g., both the combination of smart and of stupid with except in
math are natural, and so is The ipad is a bigger iphone except you can’t make calls.
In addition, the likelihood of multiplicative versus additive dimension-binding in
Wattenmaker’s (1995) study was affected by the order of presentation (the number
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of preceding additive vs. multiplicative predicates). Other contextual factors await
future research (see one pilot in Sassoon 2012).
Returning to default contexts, we have seen that dimension-binding in nouns is
mostly based on averaging functions (weighted-sums or -products), rather than
quantiﬁers. This is in accord with the fact that the noun dimensions are normally
neither necessary nor sufﬁcient conditions for categorization (Hampton 1995 ). Noun
dimensions are often binary (e.g., ‘wings’ and ‘beak’ for birds) and many. In contrast
to adjectives, conceptual gradability in nouns emerges due to averaging on many of
them, not due to counting or to a choice of a single scalar dimension. Adjectives, by
contrast, can be represented as having a free dimension argument F. This argument
can be saturated as in clever in doing math, which denotes the property of having
higher than normal ability to do math, assuming math to be a dimension of clever.
Alternatively, the dimension argument can be bound by an explicit or implicit
quantifying expression as in vital in every respect or atypical in two respects.
Moreover, the dimension argument can be bound by comparison morphemes;
e.g., more in X is more expensive than Y selects the unique member of the
dimension-set of expensive (a function from entities to their cost), and returns the
relation of being more costly (that relation between x and y such that for SOME
dimension F of expensive, x is F-er than y; cf., (6a)). With the multidimensional
adjective healthy, comparison can be along more dimensions; e.g., healthier can
denote a relation between entities x and y such that for ALL health dimensions F, x
is F-er than y (cf., (6b); for detailed compositional derivations see Sassoon 2014).
The hypothesis in (7) proposes that the acceptability of predicates in such con-
structions depends on the accessibility of their dimensions, namely the extent to
which their interpretation can be modeled by means of a dimension argument
bound by a quantiﬁer. Here are a number of its testable predictions.
Most importantly, a continuum of (un)acceptability is predicted. All nouns are
predicted to be less acceptable than adjectives in within-predicate comparisons,
because, by default, their dimensions are bound by averaged similarity operations
and thus are not accessible for quantiﬁers to bind. However, additive nouns are
expected to be more acceptable than multiplicative nouns, because under certain
assumptions their interpretation can turn to one based on dimension counting. Thus,
nouns denoting social categories are expected to be more acceptable than nouns
denoting animals and plants (cf., (14c–d) vs. (14a–b), respectively). In addition, if
between-noun comparisons exhibit the same continuum (cf., (15c) vs. (15a)), this
will support the availability of a reading involving comparison of the number of
dimensions of each compared predicate, whose norm an entity exceeds (cf., (6c, d)).
But if their only reading directly exploits degrees of similarity of entities to nominal
prototypes, no acceptability difference between social and natural-kind nouns is
expected.
Similar contrasts are expected to occur also with quantiﬁers on dimensions and
exception phrases that weaken generalizations on dimensions, as in (16) and (8)–
(9). Moreover, if comparisons indeed involve quantiﬁcation on dimensions, then
the acceptability of a predicate in comparison constructions and in quantiﬁcational
constructions, as in (16), is expected to correlate.
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(14) Within-noun comparisons: “X is more NP than that Y”
a. #This piece of fruit is more an orange than that piece of fruit.
b. #This farm animal is more a cow than that farm animal.
c. ?This booklet is more a diary than that booklet.
d. ?This artist is more a composer than that artist.
(15) Between-noun comparisons: “X is more NP1 than (Y is) NP2”
a. ?This piece of fruit is more an orange than an apple
b. ?This farm animal is more a cow than that farm animal is a horse
c. This booklet is more a diary than a sketchbook
d. This artist is more a composer than that artist is a poet
(16) Dimensional exception phrases: “X is (not) NP, except for/with respect to
DIM”
a. #This vegetable is (not) a potato except for color.
b. #This predator is (not) a tiger except for its teeth number.
c. ?This place is (not) a church except in appearance.
d. ?This girl is (not) a genius except with respect to literature.
Finally, within-noun comparisons (cf., (14)) are expected to be less acceptable
than single-subject between-noun comparisons (cf., (15a, c)). The latter seem to have
a reading that directly exploits the similarity functions underlying categorization in
nouns, while the former do not, presumably because they only select for dimensions
compatible with difference modiﬁers (interval-scale dimensions), as in two inches
longer and slightly shorter (Sassoon 2013a). Even relatively abstract adjectives seem
to allow for an interval-scale construal (e.g., slightly happier, a lot more beautiful),
whereas nouns appear to refuse it and are mostly based on nominal dimensions (e.g.,
wings: yes/no) or ordinal dimensions (movement type: flying > swimming > run-
ning; Gardenfors 2004). Two-subject between-predicate comparisons (cf., (15b, d))
are also expected to dislike nouns as they seem to license difference modiﬁers (e.g.,
The sofa is 2 inches longer than the table is wide), as opposed to single-subject
comparisons (e.g.,, (15a, c)) which seem to be incompatible with difference modi-
ﬁers (cf., #slightly/#a lot more a car than a truck; Morzycki 2011). The judgment
study we now turn to aims to test some of these predictions.
2 A Pilot Study of Acceptability Judgments
2.1 Method
The participants were recruited using Amazon mechanical Turk (AMT), an online
labor market place where workers are paid small amounts of money to complete
small tasks named HITs (Human Intelligence Tasks). It has been shown that AMT
provides a quick and relatively cheap method to acquire high-quality experimental
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results that do not differ signiﬁcantly in performance from standard experimental
settings (Buhrmester et al. 2011). The hits were only visible to American workers
with approval rates exceeding 95%. They were awarded 2 cents per hit consisting of
a single item rating, with an average hourly rate of 6.5$. A group of 25 different
participants completed each hit. Once 25 participants ﬁlled out a hit, it was no
longer visible. Moreover, each participant chose how many hits to ﬁll out. In total,
140 participants answered an average of 44.5 different questions each (SD = 58).
All hits were completed on 18/07/2013.
The stimuli were sentences formed of 24 deﬁnite noun phrases that served as
subjects and 24 indeﬁnite noun phrases that served as predicates, such as, for
example, This farm animal and a cow, respectively, in This farm animal is more a
cow than that farm animal. The factors manipulated were entity type—half of the
subjects (and their predicates) denoted natural entity types (plants and animals) and
half denoted social entity type (human traits and artifacts), and structure—each
subject-predicate combination occurred in 7 different constructions. These con-
structions were: (i) two baseline conditions (Pos, Not) including basic and negated
categorization forms (‘x is P’ and ‘x is not P’); (ii) three comparison conditions
(Within, Be1s, Be2s) including within-noun comparisons (‘x is more P than y’; cf.,
(14)), single-subject between-noun comparisons (‘x is more P than Q’, as in (15a,
c)), and two-subject between noun comparisons (‘x is more P than y is Q’, as in
(15b, d)); and (iii) two modiﬁed forms (Ex, ExNot) including basic and negated
forms with dimensional exception phrases (‘x is P except for Dim’ and ‘x is not P
except for Dim’, as in (16)).
An eighth condition consisted of within-adjective comparisons, constructed by
applying each one of 6 positive one-dimensional adjectival predicates (tall, heavy,
big, old, expensive and colorful) to 4 of the 24 subjects, an animal, plant, artifact
and human trait. Thus, focusing on the within-predicate comparisons, the factors
manipulated were Predicate type (adjective vs. noun) and Entity type (social vs.
natural).3,4
In comparisons with two entities, the two were always described as This NP and
That NP (as in This artist is more a composer than that artist.) In comparisons with
two predicates, each nominal predicate was matched with a contrasting predicate
(e.g., duck and goose; dress and night shirt; see Table 1 for the full set of subjects
and contrasting predicate pairs). The matched pairs were mostly withdrawn from
the stimuli reported in Hampton, Storms, Simmons and Heussen (2009). The pairs
of human traits and professions were chosen from a list created by searching the
3An additional factor was Than-phrase type—half of the sentences with each entity and predicate
type included a clausal than-phrase and half included a phrasal one, as in This animal is taller than
that animal is versus This person is taller than that person, respectively.
4Here is a set of examples for each of the 8 conditions: (1) This place is a church; (2) This place is
not a church; (3) This place is more a church than that place is; (4) This place is more a church than
an art gallery; (5) This place is more a church than that place is an art gallery; (6) This place is a
church except in appearance; (7) This place is not a church except in appearance; (8) This place is
older than that place is.
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corpus of contemporary American English (Coca, Davies 2010) for the string “(s)he
is a” followed by a noun. Unfortunately, two errors occurred in the survey: ‘crew’
and ‘fly’ were used instead of ‘crow’ and ‘insect’, respectively. Thus, the results are
reported with these two items removed.
The 192 target sentences (24 × 8 conditions) with 57 additional good and bad
ﬁllers of various forms can be found in Appendix 1. The 249 sentences (hits) were
presented as a single randomly ordered list, out of which different participants ﬁlled
out different subsets. The variables are therefore within-subject, but with many
missing observations.
The following instructions occurred in every hit: “[This hit is for English Native
Speakers Only] RATE THE FOLLOWING SENTENCES BY HOW
NATURAL THEY SOUND TO YOU AS AN ENGLISH NATIVE SPEAKER.
FOR EXAMPLE: (i) To me, the sentence “This child is rarely sick” is a perfectly
natural sentence, so I give it ‘7’; (ii) However, the sentence “This child is rarely tall”
is perfectly unnatural and makes no sense (me or my friends would never use such a
combination of words), so I give it ‘1’”. Following the instructions the participants
saw a sentence and a 7-point scale with the labels PERFECTLY NATURAL and
Table 1 The 24 between noun comparisons with a single subject
Natural entity types
Animals Plants
1 This farm animal is more a cow than a
horse
1 This tree is more a pine than an oak
2 This insect is more a mosquito than a
wasp
2 This vegetable is more a potato than a
carrot
3 This bird is more a crow than a pigeon 3 This flower is more a dandelion than a
rose
4 This reptile is more a snake than a lizard 4 This spice is more onion than mint
5 This predator is more a wolf than a tiger 5 This plant is more moss than grass
6 This aquatic mammal is more a dolphin
than a shark
6 This piece of fruit is more an orange
than an apple
Social entity types
Human concepts Artifacts
1 This journalist is more a consultant than
a reporter
1 This place is more a church than an art
gallery
2 This artist is more a composer than a
poet
2 This piece of clothing is more a dress
than a nightshirt
3 This football player is more a champion
than a celebrity
3 This car is more a taxi than an
ambulance
4 This girl is more a genius than a child 4 This hall is more a theatre than a
cinema
5 This colleague is more a businesswoman
than a friend
5 This container is more a carafe than a
vase
6 This person is more a victim than a
witness
6 This booklet is more a diary than a
sketchbook
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PERFECTLY UNNATURAL adjacent to 7 and 1, respectively. They selected an
answer by clicking on the radio button adjacent to the relevant number.
2.2 Results
The mean naturalness and standard deviation for each condition are presented in
Table 2 (for more detailed tables by items see Appendices A-B). The two left
columns of Table 2 reveal a potential interaction between structure and entity type.
As predicted, nominal structures involving comparison (conditions 1–3) and
exception-phrases (conditions 4–5) were rated as more natural with social items
(subjects and predicates) than with natural items (e.g., more a composer was rated
higher than more a pine, and a diary except for the sketches was rated higher than a
potato except for color). However, no such differences were found in adjectival
comparisons (condition 6) (e.g., taller) and basic categorization structures (7–8)
(e.g., is a pine/composer).
The right column further suggests that within-adjective comparisons (condi-
tion 6), are more natural than single-subject between-noun comparisons (condi-
tion 1), which in turn are more natural than within-noun comparisons (condition 2).
The least natural seem to be the two-subject between noun comparisons
(condition 3).
To test whether these potential effects and interactions are signiﬁcant, the results
of the 7 nominal conditions were analyzed using a variety of mixed models with
naturalness as the dependent variable and participant and item (22 subject +
predicate combinations) as random effects. This type of analysis tests whether the
Table 2 Averages and standard deviations by condition for 10 natural items (subjects +
predicates), 12 social items, and all 22 items
Conditions Mnatural
(SD)
Msocial
(SD)
Mtotal
(SD)
1. Single subject between-noun comparisons (Be1s):
More NP1 than NP2
3.94
(2.10)
5.23
(1.90)
4.64
(2.09)
2. Within-noun comparisons (Within):
More NP than Y (is)
3.38
(1.98)
4.46
(2.00)
3.97
(2.06)
3. Two-subject between-noun comparisons (Be2s): More NP1
than y is NP2
2.76
(1.74)
3.15
(1.90)
2.97
(1.84)
4. Exception phrases (Ex):
X is NP except
2.86
(1.92)
3.51
(2.09)
3.21
(2.04)
5. Negated exception phrases (ExNot):
X is not NP except
2.66
(1.80)
3.54
(2.12)
3.14
(2.03)
6. Within-adjective comparisons (Adj):
More AP than Y (is)
6.08
(1.58)
6.02
(1.58)
6.05
(1.58)
7. Basic categorization (Pos):
X is NP
6.44
(1.28)
6.58
(1.00)
6.52
(1.14)
8. Negated categorization (Not):
X is not NP
6.49
(1.24)
6.54
(1.15)
6.52
(1.19)
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manipulated factors explain anything more than what could be predicted on the
basis of the participants and the stimuli. It is reasonably robust against influence of
a single outlier item or participant, and against missing observations (Baayen et al.
2006).
The baseline and comparison conditions were compared using a mixed model
with Entity type (natural vs. social) and Structure (Basic vs. Comparison) as ﬁxed
effects. A structure effect and an interaction were predicted, and indeed a signiﬁcant
main effect was found for both Entity type (F(1, 20) = 12.2, p = 0.002)with higher
ratings for social (M = 5.2, SD = 2.1) than natural items (M = 4.6, SD = 2.3), and
Structure (F(1, 2660) = 1979.9, p < 0.001), with higher ratings for basic (M = 6.5,
SD = 1.2) than comparative structures (M = 3.9, SD = 2.1). Further, the two
factors signiﬁcantly interact (F(1, 2652) = 45.7, p < 0.001). Comparative struc-
tures were rated higher with social (M = 4.3, SD = 2.1) than natural items
(M = 3.4, SD = 2.0), while basic structures with social (M = 6.6, SD = 1.1) and
natural items (M = 6.5, SD = 1.3) were rated similarly.
Considering the three comparison conditions more speciﬁcally, a mixed model
analysis with structure (Within, Be1s, Be2s) and entity type (social vs. natural) as
ﬁxed effects conﬁrmed the predicted entity type effect (F(1, 20) = 29.3, p < 0.001),
with higher ratings for social (M = 4.3, SD = 2.1) than natural items (M = 3.4,
SD = 2.0), and revealed an additional structure effect (F(2, 1544) = 140.7,
p < 0.001). Pairwise comparisons conﬁrmed that, as expected, the naturalness of
the single-subject between-noun comparisons (M = 4.6, SD = 2.1) was signiﬁ-
cantly higher than the naturalness of the within-noun comparisons (M = 4, SD =
2.1; Mean difference 0.65, SE = 0.096, df = 1544, p < 0.001), which was sig-
niﬁcantly higher than the naturalness of the two-subject between-noun comparisons
(M = 3, SD = 1.8; Mean difference 0.99, SE = 0.096, df = 1553, p < 0.001).
Univariate tests based on the pairwise comparisons of marginal means yielded F(2,
1548) = 146.9 (p < 0.001).
The analysis further revealed a signiﬁcant entity by structure interaction
(F(2, 1548) = 13.2, p < 0.001), with bigger differences between natural and social
items in single-subject between-noun comparisons (Msocial = 5.2, SD = 1.9;
Mnatural = 3.9, SD = 2.1) and within-noun comparisons (Msocial = 4.5, SD = 2;
Mnatural = 3.4, SD = 2) than in two-subjects between-noun comparisons
(Msocial = 3.2, SD = 1.9; Mnatural = 2.8, SD = 1.7). To test these simple entity
type effects (illustrated in Fig. 1), separate mixed models were conducted for each
structure, with entity type as the ﬁxed effect. The signiﬁcantly higher naturalness
predicted for social versus natural entity types was conﬁrmed in within noun
comparisons (‘more N than y’; F(1, 24) = 13.4, p = 0.001) and single-subject
between-noun comparisons (‘more N1 than N2’; F(1, 28) = 15.4, p < 0.001), and
it approximated signiﬁcance in two-subject between-noun comparisons (‘more N1
than y is N2’; F(1, 19) = 4.3, p = 0.051). Importantly, there were no entity type
effects in the baselines (for Pos—‘x is P’: F(1, 19) = 0.377, p = 0.546; for Not—‘x
is not P’: F(1, 19) = 0.046, p = 0.83) and adjectival condition (‘more Adj than y’;
F(1, 20) = 0.122, p = 0.73). Thus, entity type only affected naturalness of nominal
comparisons, as predicted.
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Turning to exception phrases, the baselines (Pos, Not) and modiﬁed condi-
tions (Ex: ‘x is N except in dim’, ExNot: ‘x is not N except in dim’) were also
compared using a mixed model with Entity type (natural vs. social) and Structure
(Basic vs. modiﬁed) as ﬁxed effects. Again, a structure effect and an interaction
were predicted. While the Entity type effect was only approximating signiﬁcance
(F(1, 19) = 4.3, p = 0.051), with higher ratings for social items (M = 5, SD = 2.3)
than for natural items (M = 4.6, SD = 2.4), the analysis revealed as predicted a
signiﬁcant Structure effect (F(1, 2109) = 3009.4, p < 0.001), with higher ratings
for basic structures (M = 6.5, SD = 1.2) than for exceptive structures (M = 3.2,
SD = 2), and a signiﬁcant interaction (F(1, 2106) = 27.1, p < 0.001). Exceptive
structures were rated higher with social items (M = 3.5, SD = 2.1) than with
natural items (M = 2.8, SD = 1.9), while basic structures with social items
(M = 6.6, SD = 1.1) and natural items (M = 6.5, SD = 1.3) were rated similarly.5
Considering the two exceptive structures more speciﬁcally, a mixed model
analysis with structure (Ex, ExNot) and entity type (social vs. natural) as ﬁxed
effects conﬁrmed the predicted entity type effect (F(1, 20) = 5.2, p = 0.033), with
higher ratings for social items (M = 3.5, SD = 2.1) than for natural items
(M = 2.8, SD = 1.9), and with neither a signiﬁcant structure effect (MEx = 3.21,
SD = 2; MExNot = 3.14, SD = 2; F(1, 1008) = 0.818, p = 0.366) nor an interac-
tion (F(1, 999) = 2.3, p = 0.131). Separate mixed models for each condition
revealed that, as Fig. 1 illustrates, the structures with exception-phrases exhibited
the entity type effect both with negation (Msocial = 3.5, SD = 2.1; Mnatural = 2.7,
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Fig. 1 Entity × Structure
interactions: entity type
effects (social > natural)
occurred in the structures
involving nominal
comparisons and
exception-phrases, while they
occurred neither in the basic
categorization structures, nor
in the adjectival comparison
structures
5These conditions were also analyzed using Structure (Basic vs. modiﬁed) and Negation (yes/no)
as ﬁxed effects. Beside the structure effect (F(1, 2109) = 2945.7, p < 0.001), there was neither a
signiﬁcant negation effect (F(1, 2114) = 0.585, p = 0.444), nor an interaction (F(1,
2102) = 0.324, p = 0.569).
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SD = 1.8; F(1, 22) = 5.4, p = 0.029) and without negation (Msocial = 3.5, SD =
2.1; Mnatural = 2.9, SD = 1.9; F(1, 20) = 4.49, p = 0.047).
6,7
Focusing on within-predicate comparisons with adjectives versus nouns, a
mixed model with Entity type (Social vs. Natural) and Predicate type (Adjective vs.
Noun) as ﬁxed effects, and participant and item (44 subject + predicate combina-
tions) as random effects, was carried out to test a predicted predicate-type effect and
interaction. The test yielded signiﬁcance for both Predicate type (F(1, 39) = 164.2,
p < 0.001), with higher ratings for comparisons within adjectives (M = 6.1,
SD = 1.6) than nouns (M = 4, SD = 2.1), and Entity type (F(1, 40) = 8.8,
p = 0.005), with higher ratings for comparisons within social items (M = 5.2,
SD = 2) than within natural items (M = 4.7, SD = 2.2). Further, a signiﬁcant
interaction was manifested as predicted (F(1, 40) = 12.8, p = 0.001). While
comparisons with social nouns (M = 4.5, SD = 2) were rated higher than with
natural nouns (M = 3.4, SD = 2), comparisons with social adjectives (M = 6,
SD = 1.6) and natural adjectives (M = 6.1, SD = 1.6) were rated similarly.8
Finally, recall that comparative structures were hypothesized to resemble
structures with dimensional exception-phrases in involving quantiﬁcation over
dimensions. Thus, the naturalness of a predicate in both types of structure was
expected to correlate, as its naturalness in both structures was expected to be
affected by the accessibility of its dimensions to binding by quantiﬁers. Thus,
analyses by item were conducted to test correlations. Table 3 presents the corre-
lation coefﬁcients and p values for the comparison by exception-phrase condi-
tions (n = 22). Notice the moderate correlation between the dimensional exception
6All simple structure effects in comparison constructions were also signiﬁcant when mixed
models were conducted separately for the dataset of natural entity types and for the dataset of
social entity types, with structure as the ﬁxed effect.
First, within the natural dataset, structure was signiﬁcant (F(2, 775) = 38.5, p < 0.001). The
naturalness of the single-subject between-noun comparisons was signiﬁcantly higher than the
naturalness of the within-noun comparisons (Mean difference 0.681, SE = 0.134, df = 773,
p < 0.001), which was signiﬁcantly higher than the naturalness of the two-subject between-noun
comparisons (Mean difference 0.499, SE = 0.127, df = 776, p < 0.001). Univariate tests based on
the pairwise comparisons of marginal means yielded F(2, 773) = 38.5, p < 0.001.
Second, within the social dataset, structure was signiﬁcant (F(2, 826) = 132.9, p < 0.001). The
naturalness of the single-subject between-noun comparisons was signiﬁcantly higher than of the
within-noun comparisons (Mean difference 0.665, SE = 0.130, df = 826, p < 0.001), which was
signiﬁcantly higher than the naturalness of the two-subject between-noun comparisons (Mean
difference 1.403, SE = 0.129, df = 826, p < 0.001). Univariate tests based on the pairwise
comparisons of marginal means yielded F(2, 826) = 132.9, p < 0.001.
By contrast, in the exception phrase modiﬁed constructions, structure was signiﬁcant neither in
the natural dataset (F(1, 434) = 3.28, p = 0.071), nor in the social dataset (F(1, 528) = 0.22,
p = 0.64).
7With structure as the ﬁxed effect, the exception phrases (Ex, ExNot) didn't differ from the worst
comparison, Be2 s (F(2, 1554) = 3.4, p = 0.034), but scored lower than the within-noun com-
parison (F(2, 1551) = 44.8, p < 0.001).
8A mixed model with Than-clause type (phrasal vs. clausal) and predicate type (adjective vs. noun)
as ﬁxed effects yielded neither a signiﬁcant Than-clause type effect (F(1, 39) = 2.2, p = 0.149),
nor an interaction (F(1, 39) = 3.3, p = 0.076).
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phrases with negation and both the within-noun comparisons (ExNot × Within:
rs = 0.58, p = 0.005) and single-subject between-noun comparison (ExNot ×
Be1s: rs = 0.45, p = 0.037).
3 Discussion
By the quantiﬁcational hypothesis presented in (7), the acceptability of predicates in
comparative and exceptive constructions depends on the accessibility of their
dimensions. In other words, it depends on the extent to which categorization under
the concepts they label can be modeled by means of quantiﬁcation over their
dimensions. Given this hypothesis, a continuum of (un)acceptability was predicted.
All nouns were predicted to be less natural than adjectives in within-predicate
comparisons, because, by default, their dimensions are bound by averaged simi-
larity operations and thus are not accessible for quantiﬁers to bind. However,
additive nouns were expected to be more acceptable than multiplicative nouns,
because under certain circumstances their interpretation turns to one based on
dimension counting and quantiﬁcation. Thus, in particular, additive nouns denoting
social categories were expected to be more acceptable than multiplicative nouns
denoting animals and plants (Hampton et al. 2009).
The results of this study conﬁrmed the predicted continuum. First,
within-predicate comparisons (‘{P-er, more P} than y’) were rated as more natural
with adjectives like tall or big than with nouns like a composer or pine.
Second, as Fig. 1 illustrates, additive social nouns were rated as more natural
than non-additive natural kind nouns in all the comparison constructions tested. The
acceptability of nominal comparisons appears to match the degree to which the
noun’s default interpretation can be approximated by one based on dimensional
quantiﬁers, as hypothesized. This suggests that these constructions involve opera-
tions on accessible dimensions. An accommodation of binary dimensions with
equal weights renders the interpretation of additive, but not multiplicative nouns,
equivalent to one based on quantiﬁcation. Thus, the former were predicted to be
more acceptable in degree constructions. These predictions were borne out.
Table 3 Correlation
coefﬁcients for exception
phrase by comparison
conditions
Spearman’s
rho
Be1s ExNot Within Be2s
Ex rs 0.116 0.701** 0.376 0.241
p2 0.6 <0.001 0.084 0.280
Be1s rs 1 0.413 0.694** 0.693**
p2 . 0.056 <0.001 <0.001
ExNot rs 1 0.578** 0.447*
p2 . 0.005 0.037
Within rs 1 0.452*
p2 . 0.035
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Third, similarly, social additive nouns were better than natural-kind multi-
plicative ones with dimensional exception phrases. The negated condition (as in
“not an N except for dim”) indicates the acceptability of dimension binding by an
existential quantiﬁer (SOME). By contrast, the non-negated condition (“N except
for dim”) indicates the acceptability of dimension binding by a universal quantiﬁer
(ALL). The two conditions did not differ signiﬁcantly, suggesting that neither
existential nor universal quantiﬁcation dominates classiﬁcation in nouns (as in
Shamir 2013). But the more a noun resembles an adjective in its default
dimension-binding, the more acceptable it seems to be in either exception phrase
construction.
Finally, the correlation matrix in Table 3 suggests that a correlation exists
between the naturalness of exception phrase modiﬁcation and comparison, at least
in negated nouns. Comparative structures were hypothesized to resemble structures
with dimensional exception-phrases in involving quantiﬁcation over dimensions.
Thus, the naturalness of a predicate in both types of structure was expected to
correlate, as its naturalness in both structures was expected to be affected by the
accessibility of its dimensions to binding by quantiﬁers.
The fact that this prediction was only conﬁrmed by the negated condition sug-
gests that compatibility with existential quantiﬁcation is more important in pre-
dicting acceptability of nouns in comparisons. Possibly, comparisons are interpreted
by existentially binding the dimensions of their predicative argument. Thus, their
naturalness correlates with that of a construction that forces a noun to be interpreted
as existential on its dimensions. To assess the validity of this interpretation, future
research should assess the naturalness of comparative predicates with dimensional
exception phrases (“x is (not) more P than y except in dim”). If comparative
predicates are predominantly existential, higher acceptability is expected in the
negated case.
All in all, the results seem to support the quantifying hypothesis. The study has
shown that higher likelihood of categorization based on counting and quantiﬁcation
corresponds with higher naturalness in grammatical constructions involving
implicit counting or quantiﬁcation, and those include not only dimensional ex-
ception phrases (e.g., tiger (in every respect) except for its teeth number), but also
comparisons (e.g., more a pine than {an oak, that tree, that tree is an oak}).
However, this study included only positive, one-dimensional, context relative
adjectives (e.g., big). Future studies should also consider negative (e.g., small),
absolute (e.g., empty, and closed), and multidimensional adjectives. The latter are
particularly interesting, because they resemble nouns in having multiple dimen-
sions. As such they form a stricter test for the presented theory. They too are
expected to be better than nouns in comparative and exceptive structures, since they
are expected to have a higher tendency than nouns toward quantiﬁcational binding
of their dimensions. One multidimensional adjective (Italian) appeared in the three
comparison types, as part of the 57 ﬁllers. Its averaged scores in the
within-predicate comparison This ﬁlm is more Italian than that ﬁlm, 6.12 (1.21),
and two-subject between-predicate comparison This ﬁlm is more Italian than that
ﬁlm is American, 3.92 (1.79), were by far higher than the average scores of the
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nouns in these comparisons (4.70 and 2.97), as expected. But its score in the
single-subject between-predicate comparison This ﬁlm is more Italian than Amer-
ican, 5.24 (1.68), was similar to the noun scores (4.00). These comparisons appear,
indeed, to be especially suited to nouns.
Moreover, this comparison type manifested the least signiﬁcant correlation. This
may stem from the existence of a second reading, as suggested in the discussion of
(6d), whereby similarity of an entity to two nominal prototypes is directly compared.
This reading does not involve dimension counting, and thus, its contribution to the
naturalness judgments is expected to be independent of the naturalness of exception
phrases. Its existence is compatible also with the relatively high naturalness of nouns
in this construction. At any rate, the clear preference of additive nouns over multi-
plicative nouns in this comparison does support the existence of a reading based on
counting of accessible dimensions, as the paraphrases in (6c–d) suggest.
An anonymous reviewer observed that the between-natural-noun comparisons
involved taxonomical hierarchies, e.g., snake and lizard were predicated over
reptile and wolf and tiger over predator, whereas some between-social-noun
comparisons didn’t, e.g., champion and celebrity were predicated over football
player. A second reviewer suggested that failure of an implicature may have
confounded the results. The suggested implicature is that one of the two compared
predicates (e.g., rose and dandelion) applies to the entity in question, but the
speaker does not know which. Naturalness may have been reduced by the difﬁculty
of imagining a speaker being unsure of whether a flower is a rose or a dandelion.
These potential confounds deserve investigation (e.g., by presenting sentences in
contexts where the implicature is either satisﬁed or not), but they cannot explain
why differences between natural and social nouns occurred also in several other
constructions, speciﬁcally within-noun comparisons and exception phrases, of
which the between-noun comparisons were actually more acceptable.
A number of additional issues merit attention. Recall that the embedded clause in
the within-predicate comparisons was as in This football player is more a champion
than that football player (is), rather than than that one (is). The idea was to block
interpretations of that one as relating to a property, which would turn the com-
parison into a between-noun one, but this feature may have reduced the naturalness
of these comparisons, and thus should be eliminated in future studies. Moreover, in
the exception phrase conditions, each noun was matched with but one dimension.
This fact may have added noise that reduced the signiﬁcance of the results. Future
research should assess judgments for exception phrases with at least 3–4 dimen-
sions per noun or adjective (cf., Sassoon 2012. and Shamir 2013), as well as with
other quantiﬁcational constructions, such as P in every respect, some respect, and
most respects. Nouns and adjectives of additional domains can be tested (for
instance, abstract nouns: problem, love), as well as additive natural kind nouns and
multiplicative social nouns, assuming such exist. The role of mediating particles
(cf., of in (3a)) should also be addressed.
The present study has broader implications for our understanding of the
adjective-noun word class distinction, including in particular ‘nouny’ adjectives and
adjective-like nouns. Consider in particular, nationality concepts such as American
312 G.W. Sassoon
or trait concepts such as extrovert. They can ﬁll in attributive-adjective positions as
in extrovert personality and American nationality, but unlike most adjectives, they
can also ‘stand alone’ in argument positions without any explicit noun around, as in
Americans and extroverts, and unlike the ill-formed #talls and #healthies. An
explanation in terms of categorization based on accessible dimensions deserves
consideration. Possibly, in argument position, the dimensions are bound by additive
similarity functions, with equal dimensional weights. But since this type of inter-
pretation can be represented by means of a dimension set bound by a quantiﬁer,
these nouns easily occupy adjectival positions.
Additional implications pertain to size adjectives such as big and huge. When
modifying certain nouns, as in this midget is a big fan, they do not attribute big
physical size. Morzycki (2009) argues that this interpretation of big occurs when it
modiﬁes a noun that is itself morphologically gradable (e.g., fan, stamp-collector,
genius or idiot). For example, smoker denotes a measurement of frequency or afﬁnity
for smoking. On this view, size adjectives function as degree modiﬁers, similar to
very (type < d,t >); e.g., big denotes a mapping fbig of nominal degrees d to their
relative size, fbig(d). Morzycki further observes that nominal gradability readings of
size adjectives are absent in predicate position (as in the fan is big), or in negative
size adjectives (as in a small fan just came in, which relates to physical size, not
fan-hood). These features are unique to nominal-gradability readings, as opposed to
abstract size readings (as in this mistake is big/small) and signiﬁcance readings (he is
huge!). The position generalization is captured by postulating a morpheme meas in
the nominal degree projection, which is not available in other positions. Meas takes
as arguments a gradable noun, a size adjective, and an entity and returns truth if and
only if the entity falls under the noun and its degree in the noun is big.
However, this account of gradable nouns in terms of degree functions fails to
explain why these nouns are not generally compatible with gradability morphemes
(e.g., *faner, *fanest, *too fan), and why their combinations with more must be
mediated, as in more of an idiot than Bill. The results reported in this paper give rise
to an alternative approach, which rests on the observation that the gradable
dimensions of adjectives are often context dependent, and their choice is affected,
among other things, by the noun they modify. For example, the dimension of long is
different for tables than for stories. Assuming that nouns are themselves associated
with dimension sets, size adjectives may, under certain circumstances, be able to
access and operate on these sets. The position generalization can be captured by
postulating that, unless an adjective has a dimension set argument (as typical does in,
e.g., typical of birds), only in attributive position can it access the dimension set of
the noun it modiﬁes (perhaps by virtue of a syntactic head whose semantics does the
job). This account uses Morzycki’s logic, but spares the need to stipulate that some
nouns denote a degree function, while most other nouns do not, or that size adjec-
tives are adverbial (adnominal) modiﬁers, while most other adjectives are not.
This approach extends beyond size adjectives and explains the different inter-
pretations of old in He is an old friend and This friend is old. Thus, the availability
of nominal dimensions for adjectives to operate on is a more general phenomenon
in attributive position. Moreover, the set of examples of gradable nouns reported in
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the literature typically includes nouns such as idiot, nerd, soccer fan, airhead, goat
cheese enthusiast, simpleton, Barbie doll lover, loser, and weirdo (de Vries 2010).
It is easy to observe that all of them belong to the social domain. Thus, their
dimensions are expected to be relatively accessible for grammatical operations to
quantify over as in idiot with respect to his political views and complete/total idiot
(de Vries 2010). Moreover, these nouns seem to have morphologically gradable
dimensions (e.g., stupid, intelligent, admiring) accessible for size adjectives to
select and use for their interpretation.
Dimension accessibility for quantiﬁer binding seems to affect additional gradable
constructions. For example, in various languages human categories such as boy and
girl directly combine with the modiﬁer very, as in the Hebrew meod yalada (‘very
girl’, ‘very girlish/immature’) and Spanish Es muy hombre (‘is very man’, ‘He is
very much a man’; Espinal 2013). Additive dimension binding for the noun girl
makes its dimensions more accessible than those of most other nouns. The
importance of gradable traits in the stereotype of girls (e.g., loving pink) can be
stretched to the point that girl is interpreted as equivalent to girlish, thereby
licensing very. In sum, nouns carrying expressive or evaluative components such as
idiot, coward, hero or child in its metaphoric sense, get as close to gradable
adjectives as nouns can (Constantinescu 2011: 49–96), perhaps because they have
adjectival dimensions (another point to consider in the future).
To conclude, the main result of the reported study is a connection between the
acceptability of a given noun or adjective in comparison constructions and its type
of characteristic categorization criterion (i.e., whether, as a default, its dimensions
combine into a single criterion via quantiﬁers or other operations). This result
highlights connections between cognitive psychological ﬁndings and linguistic
phenomena, thus potentially contributing to the study of morphological gradability
within linguistics and to an improved understanding of certain experimental results
in cognitive psychology, where the potential role of the noun-adjective distinction
was overlooked (Wattenmaker 1995). By raising awareness both to grammatical
and conceptual distinctions, and by pointing out directions for future research, this
paper has aimed to deepen our understanding of the relations between the formal
and conceptual components of natural languages.
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Appendix A: Averages on 25 Participants for the Compar-
ison Conditions with Nouns (Left) and Adjectives (Right)
Nominal
predicates by
entity type
Single subject
between-noun
comparisons
Within-noun
comparisons
Two-subject
between-noun
comparisons
Adjectival
predicates by
entity type
Within-
adjective
comparisons
More NP1
than NP2
More NP
than Y (is)
More NP1
than y is NP2
More AP
than Y (is)
Animals M SD M SD M SD Animals M SD
Cow 3.64 2.06 2.92 2.00 2.32 1.62 Taller 5.88 1.56
Mosquito 2.64 1.94 2.68 1.76 2.52 1.70 Bigger 6.84 0.61
Crow 2.68 2.03 2.16 1.54 1.96 1.37 More expensive 6.32 1.12
Snake 4.84 1.93 3.6 1.70 3.16 2.13 More colorful 6.72 0.60
Tiger 4.28 2.03 3.28 1.80 2.84 1.69 Heavier 5.6 1.74
Dolphin 3.6 2.15 2.8 1.74 2.56 1.24 Older 5.48 2.14
Plants Plants
Pine 4.52 1.96 4.32 1.93 3.28 1.93 Older 5.84 1.83
Potato 3.16 2.19 2.12 1.45 2.2 1.50 Bigger 6.4 0.94
Dandelion 3.72 1.97 4.08 2.00 2.8 1.60 More expensive 6.08 1.65
Mint 3.32 1.89 3.76 1.94 2.52 1.65 More colorful 6.72 0.72
Moss 4.76 1.97 3.52 1.90 3.4 1.79 Taller 5.68 1.76
Orange 3.6 2.00 3.4 2.23 2.48 1.58 Heavier 6.4 1.39
Artifacts Artifacts
Church 5.48 1.60 4.48 1.90 4.24 2.06 Older 6.16 1.59
Dress 5.44 1.63 3.8 2.15 2.8 1.83 More colorful 6 1.52
Taxi 3.72 2.20 4 1.94 2.92 1.65 Heavier 5.88 1.70
Theatre 5.04 2.05 4.08 2.26 3.44 1.83 Bigger 6.6 0.69
Vase 5.76 1.75 4.32 1.69 3.16 1.87 Taller 6.24 1.14
Diary 6.2 1.26 4.44 1.92 3.32 1.93 More expensive 6.64 1.02
Humans Humans
Reporter 5.48 1.50 4.12 1.99 2.96 1.71 Older 5.4 1.85
Composer 5.76 1.36 4.76 2.03 3.12 1.68 More colorful 5.68 1.64
Champion 5.44 1.36 4.76 1.77 3.56 1.83 More expensive 4.68 2.26
Genius 4.32 2.22 5.24 1.75 2.12 1.53 Bigger 6.6 0.94
Businesswoman 4.88 1.92 4.32 1.87 3.16 1.97 Heavier 5.56 1.55
Person 5.2 2.14 5.2 2.04 3 2.02 Taller 6.8 0.63
M 4.48 1.03 3.84 0.86 2.91 0.52 M 6.09 0.54
SD 1.03 0.28 0.86 0.20 0.52 0.22 SD 0.54 0.50
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Appendix B: Averages on 25 Participants for the 24 Nouns
in Baseline and Modiﬁed Conditions
Basic
categorization
conditions
(Pos)
Negated
categorization
conditions
(Not)
Exception
phrase
condition (Ex)
Negated
exception
phrase
condition
(ExNot)
X is NP X is not NP X is NP
except
X is not NP
except
Entity type Item Noun M SD M SD M SD M SD
Animals Cow 6.68 1.12 6.68 0.68 1.92 1.29 2.04 1.40
Mosquito 3.48 2.44 5 2.43 2.24 1.70 2.88 1.90
Crow 3.04 2.51 3.44 2.56 1.8 1.30 1.68 1.41
Snake 6.72 0.87 6.64 1.23 3.64 2.31 4 1.94
Tiger 6.52 1.06 6.76 0.65 2.32 1.49 1.96 1.31
Dolphin 6.68 0.68 6.36 1.23 3.08 1.79 3.52 1.96
Plants Pine 6.64 1.09 6.76 0.59 2.84 1.38 2.64 1.57
Potato 6.64 0.93 6.32 1.64 2.88 1.99 2 1.50
Dandelion 6.84 0.46 6.92 0.39 3.28 2.16 2.68 1.67
Mint 5.12 1.88 5.12 2.16 3.12 2.10 2.52 1.53
Moss 5.92 1.92 6.72 0.72 2.48 1.86 2.76 2.12
Orange 6.68 0.88 6.64 0.79 3.04 1.93 2.48 1.68
Artifacts Church 6.92 0.27 6.72 0.66 4.32 2.48 5.24 2.34
Dress 6.72 0.60 6.84 0.54 2.88 1.88 2.84 2.07
Taxi 6.52 1.02 6.84 0.54 3.24 1.94 3.48 1.94
Theatre 6.12 1.77 6.12 1.68 4.32 2.11 3.64 2.02
Vase 6.72 0.66 6.52 1.30 3.04 1.78 2.16 1.57
Diary 6.16 1.01 6.92 0.27 4.08 1.74 3.56 2.14
Humans Reporter 6.6 1.10 6 1.62 2.56 1.88 2.4 1.50
Composer 6.8 0.63 6.84 0.61 2.72 1.89 3.84 2.22
Champion 7 0.00 6.76 0.59 4.28 1.76 4.28 1.84
Genius 6.84 0.61 6.88 0.43 5.04 1.99 5.16 1.57
Businesswoman 5.72 1.25 5.16 1.87 3.08 1.57 2.76 1.53
Person 6.8 0.80 6.84 0.46 2.56 1.90 3.08 1.81
M 6.25 1.07 6.32 1.07 3.11 0.81 3.07 0.95
SD 1.02 0.63 0.84 0.69 0.81 0.29 0.95 0.29
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Appendix C: The Full Set of Sentences Together with Their
Naturalness Mean and Sd
Item Structure: basic form Mean Std
1. [BaA1] This farm animal is a cow 6.68 1.12
2. [BaA2] This fly is a mosquito 3.48 2.44
3. [BaA3] This bird is a crew 3.04 2.51
4. [BaA4] This reptile is a snake 6.72 0.87
5. [BaA5] This predator is a tiger 6.52 1.06
6. [BaA6] This aquatic mammal is a dolphin 6.68 0.68
7. [BaH1] This journalist is a reporter 6.6 1.10
8. [BaH2] This artist is a composer 6.8 0.63
9. [BaH3] This football player is a champion 7 0.00
10. [BaH4] This girl is a genius 6.84 0.61
11. [BaH5] This colleague is a businesswoman 5.72 1.25
12. [BaH6] This person is a victim 6.8 0.80
13. [BaP1] This tree is a pine 6.64 1.09
14. [BaP2] This vegetable is a potato 6.64 0.93
15. [BaP3] This flower is a dandelion 6.84 0.46
16. [BaP4] This spice is a mint 5.12 1.88
17. [BaP5] This plant is moss 5.92 1.92
18. [BaP6] This piece of fruit is an orange 6.68 0.88
19. [BaT1] This place is a church 6.92 0.27
20. [BaT2] This piece of clothing is a dress 6.72 0.60
21. [BaT3] This car is a taxi 6.52 1.02
22. [BaT4] This hall is a theatre 6.12 1.77
23. [BaT5] This container is a vase 6.72 0.66
24. [BaT6] This booklet is a diary 6.16 1.01
Structure: Negated Basic form 6.25 (1.02) 1.07 (0.63)
1. [BaNA1] This farm animal is not a cow 6.68 0.68
2. [BaNA2] This fly is not a mosquito 5 2.43
3. [BaNA3] This bird is not a crew 3.44 2.56
4. [BaNA4] This reptile is not a snake 6.64 1.23
5. [BaNA5] This predator is not a tiger 6.76 0.65
6. [BaNA6] This aquatic mammal is not a dolphin 6.36 1.23
7. [BaNH1] This journalist is not a reporter 6 1.62
8. [BaNH2] This artist is not a composer 6.84 0.61
9. [BaNH3] This football player is not a champion 6.76 0.59
10. [BaNH4] This girl is not a genius 6.88 0.43
11. [BaNH5] This colleague is not a businesswoman 5.16 1.87
12. [BaNH6] This person is not a victim 6.84 0.46
13. [BaNP1] This tree is not a pine 6.76 0.59
14. [BaNP2] This vegetable is not a potato 6.32 1.64
(continued)
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(continued)
Item Structure: basic form Mean Std
15. [BaNP3] This flower is not a dandelion 6.92 0.39
16. [BaNP4] This spice is not a mint 5.12 2.16
17. [BaNP5] This plant is not moss 6.72 0.72
18. [BaNP6] This piece of fruit is not an orange 6.64 0.79
19. [BaNT1] This place is not a church 6.72 0.66
20. [BaNT2] This piece of clothing is not a dress 6.84 0.54
21. [BaNT3] This car is not a taxi 6.84 0.54
22. [BaNT4] This hall is not a theatre 6.12 1.68
23. [BaNT5] This container is not a vase 6.52 1.30
24. [BaNT6] This booklet is not a diary 6.92 0.27
Structure: Single entity Between noun comparisons 6.32 (0.84) 1.07 (0.07)
1. [Be1s1A1] This farm animal is more a cow than a horse 3.64 2.06
2. [Be1s1A2] This fly is more a mosquito than a wasp 2.64 1.94
3. [Be1s1A3] This bird is more a crew than a pigeon 2.68 2.03
4. [Be1s1A4] This reptile is more a snake than a lizard 4.84 1.93
5. [Be1s1A5] This predator is more a wolf than a tiger 4.28 2.03
6. [Be1s1A6] This aquatic mammal is more a dolphin than a shark 3.6 2.15
7. [Be1sP1] This tree is more a pine than an oak 4.52 1.96
8. [Be1sP2] This vegetable is more a potato than a carrot 3.16 2.19
9. [Be1sP3] This flower is more a dandelion than a rose 3.72 1.97
10. [Be1sP4] This spice is more onion than mint 3.32 1.89
11. [Be1sP5] This plant is more moss than grass 4.76 1.97
12. [Be1sP6] This piece of fruit is more an orange than an apple 3.6 2.00
13. [Be1sT1] This place is more a church than an art gallery 5.48 1.60
14. [Be1sT2] This piece of clothing is more a dress than a nightshirt 5.44 1.63
15. [Be1sT3] This car is more a taxi than an ambulance 3.72 2.20
16. [Be1sT4] This hall is more a theatre than a cinema 5.04 2.05
17. [Be1sT5] This container is more a carafe than a vase 5.76 1.75
18. [Be1sT6] This booklet is more a diary than a sketchbook 6.2 1.26
19. [Be1sH1] This journalist is more a consultant than a reporter 5.48 1.50
20. [Be1sH2] This artist is more a composer than a poet 5.76 1.36
21. [Be1sH3] This football player is more a champion than a celebrity 5.44 1.36
22. [Be1sH4] This girl is more a genius than a child 4.32 2.22
23. [Be1sH5] This colleague is more a businesswoman than a friend 4.88 1.92
24. [Be1sH6] This person is more a victim than a witness 5.2 2.14
Structure: Two entity Between noun comparisons 4.48 (1.03) 1.03 (0.28)
1. [Be2sA1] This farm animal is more a cow than that farm animal is a
horse
2.32 1.62
2. [Be2sA2] This fly is more a mosquito than that fly is a wasp 2.52 1.70
3. [Be2sA3] This bird is more a crew than that bird is a pigeon 1.96 1.37
4. [Be2sA4] This reptile is more a snake than that reptile is a lizard 3.16 2.13
5. [Be2sA5] This predator is more a wolf than that predator is a tiger 2.84 1.69
(continued)
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(continued)
Item Structure: basic form Mean Std
6. [Be2sA6] This aquatic mammal is more a dolphin than that aquatic
mammal is a shark
2.56 1.24
7. [Be2sP1] This tree is more a pine than that tree is an oak 3.28 1.93
8. [Be2sP2] This vegetable is more a potato than that vegetable a carrot 2.2 1.50
9. [Be2sP3] This flower is more a dandelion than that flower is a rose 2.8 1.60
10. [Be2sP4] This spice is more onion than that spice is a mint 2.52 1.65
11. [Be2sP5] This plant is more moss than that plant is grass 3.4 1.79
12. [Be2sP6] This piece of fruit is more an orange than that piece of fruit is
an apple
2.48 1.58
13. [Be2sT1] This place is more a church than that place is an art gallery 4.24 2.06
14. [Be2sT2] This piece of clothing is more a dress than that piece of
clothing is a nightshirt
2.8 1.83
15. [Be2sT3] This car is more a taxi than that car is an ambulance 2.92 1.65
16. [Be2sT4] This hall is more a theatre than that hall is a cinema 3.44 1.83
17. [Be2sT5] This container is more a carafe than that container is a vase 3.16 1.87
18. [Be2sT6] This booklet is more a diary than that booklet is a sketchbook 3.32 1.93
19. [Be2sH1] This journalist is more a consultant than that journalist is a
reporter
2.96 1.71
20. [Be2sH2] This artist is more a composer than that artists is a poet 3.12 1.68
21. [Be2sH3] This football player is more a champion than that football
player is a celebrity
3.56 1.83
22. [Be2sH4] This girl is more a genius than that girl is a child 2.12 1.53
23. [Be2sH5] This colleague is more a businesswoman than that colleague is
a friend
3.16 1.97
24. [Be2sH6] This person is more a victim than that person is a witness 3 2.02
Structure: Within adjective comparison 2.91 (0.52) 0.52 (0.22)
25. [WaA1] This farm animal is taller than that farm animal is 5.88 1.56
26. [WaA2] This fly is bigger than that fly 6.84 0.61
27. [WaA3] This bird is more expensive than that bird is 6.32 1.12
28. [WaA4] This reptile is more colorful than that reptile 6.72 0.60
29. [WaA5] This predator is heavier than that predator is 5.6 1.74
30. [WaA6] This aquatic mammal is older than that aquatic mammal 5.48 2.14
31. [WaP1] This tree is older than that tree is 5.84 1.83
32. [WaP2] This vegetable is bigger than that vegetable 6.4 0.94
33. [WaP3] This flower is more expensive than that flower is 6.08 1.65
34. [WaP4] This spice is more colorful than that spice 6.72 0.72
35. [WaP5] This plant is taller than that plant is 5.68 1.76
36. [WaP6] This piece of fruit is heavier than that piece of fruit 6.4 1.39
37. [WaT1] This place is older than that place is 6.16 1.59
(continued)
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(continued)
Item Structure: basic form Mean Std
38. [WaT2] This piece of clothing is more colorful than that piece of
clothing
6 1.52
39. [WaT3] This car is heavier than that car is 5.88 1.70
40. [WaT4] This hall is bigger than that hall 6.6 0.69
41. [WaT5] This container is taller than that container is 6.24 1.14
42. [WaT6] This booklet is more expensive than that booklet 6.64 1.02
43. [WaH1] This journalist is older than that journalist is 5.4 1.85
44. [WaH2] This artist is more colorful than that artist 5.68 1.64
45. [WaH3] This football player is more expensive than that football player
is
4.68 2.26
46. [WaH4] This girl is bigger than that girl 6.6 0.94
47. [WaH5] This colleague is heavier than that colleague is 5.56 1.55
48. [WaH6] This person is taller than that person 6.8 0.63
Structure: Within noun comparisons 6.09 (0.54) 0.54 (0.50)
1. [WhA1] This farm animal is more a cow than that farm animal is 2.92 2.00
2. [WhA2] This fly is more a mosquito than that fly 2.68 1.76
3. [WhA3] This bird is more a crew than that bird is 2.16 1.54
4. [WhA4] This reptile is more a snake than that reptile 3.6 1.70
5. [WhA5] This predator is more a tiger than that predator is 3.28 1.80
6. [WhA6] This aquatic mammal is more a dolphin than that aquatic
mammal
2.8 1.74
7. [WhP1] This tree is more a pine than that tree is 4.32 1.93
8. [WhP2] This vegetable is more a potato than that vegetable 2.12 1.45
9. [WhP3] This flower is more a dandelion than that flower is 4.08 2.00
10. [WhP4] This spice is more a mint than that spice 3.76 1.94
11. [WhP5] This plant is more moss than that plant is 3.52 1.90
12. [WhP6] This piece of fruit is more an orange than that piece of fruit 3.4 2.23
13. [WhT1] This place is more a church than that place is 4.48 1.90
14. [WhT2] This piece of clothing is more a dress than that piece of clothing 3.8 2.15
15. [WhT3] This car is more a taxi than that car is 4 1.94
16. [WhT4] This hall is more a theatre than that hall 4.08 2.26
17. [WhT5] This container is more a vase than that container is 4.32 1.69
18. [WhT6] This booklet is more a diary than that booklet 4.44 1.92
19. [WhH1] This journalist is more a reporter than that journalist is 4.12 1.99
20. [WhH2] This artist is more a composer than that artist 4.76 2.03
21. [WhH3] This football player is more a champion than that football
player is
4.76 1.77
22. [WhH4] This girl is more a genius than that girl 5.24 1.75
23. [WhH5] This colleague is more a businesswoman than that colleague is 4.32 1.87
24. [WhH6] This person is more a victim than that person 5.2 2.04
(continued)
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Item Structure: basic form Mean Std
Structure: Modiﬁed forms 3.84 (0.86) 0.86 (0.20)
1. [ExA1] This farm animal is a cow except for its milk taste 1.92 1.29
2. [ExA2] This fly is a mosquito except with respect to the chemistry of its
blood
2.24 1.70
3. [ExA3] This bird is a crew except for its eating habits 1.8 1.30
4. [ExA4] This reptile is a snake except with respect to eye structure 3.64 2.31
5. [ExA5] This predator is a tiger except for its teeth number 2.32 1.49
6. [ExA6] This aquatic mammal is a dolphin except in behavior 3.08 1.79
7. [ExP1] This tree is a pine except with respect to the wood ﬁbers 2.84 1.38
8. [ExP2] This vegetable is a potato except for color 2.88 1.99
9. [ExP3] This flower is a dandelion except in size 3.28 2.16
10. [ExP4] This spice is a mint except for the bitterness 3.12 2.10
11. [ExP5] This plant is moss except with respect to metabolism 2.48 1.86
12. [ExP6] This piece of fruit is an orange except for shape 3.04 1.93
13. [ExT1] This place is a church except in appearance 4.32 2.48
14. [ExT2] This piece of clothing is a dress except for its use 2.88 1.88
15. [ExT3] This car is a taxi except for its current function 3.24 1.94
16. [ExT4] This hall is a theatre except with respect to seat type 4.32 2.11
17. [ExT5] This container is a vase except with respect to texture 3.04 1.78
18. [ExT6] This booklet is a diary except for the sketches 4.08 1.74
19. [ExH1] This journalist is a reporter except for salary 2.56 1.88
20. [ExH2] This artist is a composer except with respect to education 2.72 1.89
21. [ExH3] This football player is a champion except for running abilities 4.28 1.76
22. [ExH4] This girl is a genius except with respect to literature. 5.04 1.99
23. [ExH5] This colleague is a businesswoman except in generosity. 3.08 1.57
24. [ExH6] This person is a victim except for subjective experience 2.56 1.90
Structure: Negated modiﬁed forms 3.11 (0.81) 0.81 (0.29)
1. [ExNA1] This farm animal is not a cow except for its milk taste 2.04 1.40
2. [ExNA2] This fly is not a mosquito except with respect to the chemistry
of its blood
2.88 1.90
3. [ExNA3] This bird is not a crew except for its eating habits 1.68 1.41
4. [ExNA4] This reptile is not a snake except with respect to eye structure 4 1.94
5. [ExNA5] This predator is not a tiger except for its teeth number 1.96 1.31
6. [ExNA6] This aquatic mammal is not a dolphin except in behavior 3.52 1.96
7. [ExNP1] This tree is not a pine except with respect to the wood ﬁbers 2.64 1.57
8. [ExNP2] This vegetable is not a potato except for color 2 1.50
9. [ExNP3] This flower is not a dandelion except in size 2.68 1.67
10. [ExNP4] This spice is not a mint except for the bitterness 2.52 1.53
(continued)
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11. [ExNP5] This plant is not moss except with respect to metabolism 2.76 2.12
12. [ExNP6] This piece of fruit is not an orange except for shape 2.48 1.68
13. [ExNT1] This place is not a church except in appearance 5.24 2.34
14. [ExNT2] This piece of clothing is not a dress except for its use 2.84 2.07
15. [ExNT3] This car is not a taxi except for its current function 3.48 1.94
16. [ExNT4] This hall is not a theatre except with respect to seat type 3.64 2.02
17. [ExNT5] This container is not a vase except with respect to texture 2.16 1.57
18. [ExNT6] This booklet is not a diary except for the sketches 3.56 2.14
19. [ExNH1] This journalist is not a reporter except for salary 2.4 1.50
20. [ExNH2] This artist is not a composer except with respect to education 3.84 2.22
21. [ExNH3] This football player is not a champion except for running
abilities
4.28 1.84
22. [ExNH4] This girl is not a genius except with respect to literature. 5.16 1.57
23. [ExNH5] This colleague is not a businesswoman except in generosity. 2.76 1.53
24. [ExNH6] This person is not a victim except for subjective experience 3.08 1.81
Fillers 3.07 (0.95) 0.95 (0.29)
1. [Filba] This chair is often wide 2.28 2.01
2. [Filba] This inspector saw anything 1.96 1.46
3. [Filgo] This inspector did not see anything 6.8 0.63
4. [Filgo] This chair is often covered 6.16 1.29
5. [HeBa] This boy is healthy 6.88 0.43
6. [HeEx] This boy is healthy except for a cold 4.88 1.90
7. [HeExN] This boy is not healthy except for a cold 1.52 1.17
8. [HeNBa] This boy is sick 6.92 0.27
9. [HeNEx] This boy is sick except for a cold 1.48 0.98
10. [HeNExN] This boy is not sick except for a cold 4.16 2.07
11. [NaBa] This ﬁlm is Italian 6.96 0.20
12. [NaBa] This immigrant is Italian 6.92 0.27
13. [NaBe1s] This ﬁlm is more Italian than American 6.12 1.21
14. [NaBe2s] This ﬁlm is more Italian than that ﬁlm is American 3.92 1.79
15. [NaCo1] This ﬁlm is Italian compared to that ﬁlm 3.2 1.96
16. [NaCo2] This man is Italian compared to that ﬁlm 1.92 1.35
17. [NaEx1] This ﬁlm is Italian except with respect to the music 4.84 1.99
18. [NaEx2] This immigrant is an Italian except with respect to the accent 3.08 2.00
19. [NaExN1] This ﬁlm is not Italian except with respect to the music 4.52 2.04
20. [NaExN2] This immigrant is not an Italian except with respect to the
accent
3.48 2.23
21. [NaWh1] This ﬁlm is more Italian than that ﬁlm 5.24 1.68
22. [Filba] This musician is a big fan 5.24 1.86
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23. [Filba] This musician is a small fan 2.84 1.78
24. [Filba] This musician is a bigger fan than that musician 4.2 2.14
25. [Filba] This musician is a smaller fan than that musician 2.44 1.70
26. [Cob1] This banana is bent compared to that banana 5.12 2.20
27. [Cob2] This rod is bent compared to that rod 6.16 1.49
28. [Cob3] This bed is bent compared to that bed 5.08 2.02
29. [Coba1] This creature is bald compared to that creature 5.76 1.03
30. [Cobi1] This building is big compared to that building 6.56 0.90
31. [Cobi2] This pencil is big compared to that pencil 6.68 0.61
32. [Coch1] This dress is cheap compared to that dress 6.84 0.46
33. [Coch2] This apartment is cheap compared to that apartment 6.92 0.27
34. [Coe1] This tea glass is empty compared to that tea glass 5.88 1.37
35. [Coe2] This wine glass is empty compared to that wine glass 5.64 1.62
36. [Coe3] This espresso cup is empty compared to that espresso cup 4.56 1.94
37. [Coe4] This jam jar is empty compared to that jam jar 5.36 1.81
38. [Coe5] This whiskey glass is empty compared to that whiskey glass 5.36 1.85
39. [Coex1] This dress is expensive compared to that dress 6.88 0.32
40. [Coex2] This apartment is expensive compared to that apartment 6.8 0.40
41. [Cof1] This tea glass is full compared to that tea glass 5.6 1.67
42. [Cof2] This wine glass is full compared to that wine glass 5.92 1.38
43. [Cof3] This espresso cup is full compared to that espresso cup 5.64 1.65
44. [Cof4] This jam jar is full compared to that jam jar 5.72 1.37
45. [Cof5] This whiskey glass is full compared to that whiskey glass 6 1.26
46. [Coh1] This creature is hairy compared to that creature 6.48 0.81
47. [Cos1] This banana is straight compared to that banana 5.92 1.57
48. [Cos2] This rod is straight compared to that rod 6.04 1.56
49. [Cos3] This bed is straight compared to that bed 5.92 1.32
50. [Cosh1] This girl is short compared to that girl 6.56 0.80
51. [Cosh2] This basketball player is short compared to that basketball
player
6.56 0.94
52. [Cosm1] This building is small compared to that building 6.8 0.49
53. [Cosm2] This pencil is small compared to that pencil 6.52 0.90
54. [Cot1] This girl is tall compared to that girl 6.28 1.28
55. [Cot2] This basketball player is tall compared to that basketball player 6.28 0.87
56. [Cota1] This ice-cream is tasty compared to that ice-cream 6.56 0.64
57. [Cotle1] This ice-cream is tasteless compared to that ice-cream 6.6 0.89
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